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Abstract. With the Arab uprisings of 2011, the so-called ‘Turkish model’ 
emerged as central to a number of debates within academia about the 
significance of the modernisation experience of Turkey and its alleged 
applicability for developing countries of the Middle East and North Africa 
region. This thesis explores the concept of the Turkish model through the lens of 
modernisation studies.  
 
There are two mainstream conceptualisations of the Turkish model within the 
scholarly literature, namely what this thesis terms the ‘structural model’ and the 
‘societal model’. While the structural model emphasises the value of the 
Kemalist secularisation program and the pre-1980 period of state-led 
development for the alleged success of Turkey in modernisation, the societal 
model highlights the role of social forces, particularly focusing on the post-1980 
period of economic liberalisation and the rise of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi) after 2002.  
 
The methodology of the structural model is based on hypotheses of ‘classical 
modernisation theory’, whereas the societal model is inspired by ‘neo-
modernisation theory’. Nevertheless, there is a gap in the existing literature on 
the Turkish model in terms of holistically examining  this country case with a 
rising approach within modernisation studies in recent years – the ‘multiple 
modernities paradigm’.  
 
This thesis offers an alternative approach to the study of the Turkish model by 
applying the multiple modernities paradigm. This theorem challenges 
Eurocentric and deterministic conceptualisations of modernity by arguing that 
the processes of secularisation and economic development do not necessarily 
result in the consolidation of liberal democratic regimes. The thesis argues that 
the conceptual frameworks used by the structural and societal models within 
Turkish studies are based on the historical Western European experience of 
development, which prevents the two schools from fully accounting for the 
nuances of the unique process of transformation in Turkey. While expecting 
Turkey to replicate the Western experience, both approaches neglect the 
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significance of historical contingency, path dependency and international context 
for the socio-economic and political history of this country. By contrast, the 
multiple modernities paradigm acknowledges the profound impact these factors 
had on Turkey’s modernisation experience. Based on this framework, the thesis 
analyses the economic, social and political development trajectories of Turkey, 
showing that modernisation in this non-Western society has been a complex 
phenomenon that produced a divergent ‘modernity’ rather than converging 
towards Western values such as liberal democracy.       
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: ASSESSING THE TURKISH MODEL OF 
MODERNITY   
 
This first chapter provides the context of the research undertaken in the thesis. 
The chapter extensively focuses on the scholarly literature on the ‘Turkish 
model’1, shedding light on different understandings of the concept. The 
shortcomings of existing approaches are discussed and an alternative 
conceptual framework for the study of the subject matter is presented, which 
constitutes the main research objective of the thesis. This chapter also explains 
the main arguments of the work as well as clarifying the research methods and 
methodology that are used throughout the thesis.          
 
The chapter consists of six sections. Part one presents a review of the existing 
literature on the Turkish model. That section comparatively analyses the shared 
and divergent features of the two most commonly used approaches to the study 
of the subject matter. It shows that there is a consensus regarding the 
conceptualisation of Turkish model of modernity as comprised of the processes 
of economic development, democratisation and ideological transformation of 
Islamism. Building upon this, part two critically examines the competing 
understandings of the three fundamental elements of the Turkish modernity 
and highlights major gaps in the existing literature. Part three further discusses 
the neglected elements within the literature and explains how the ‘multiple 
modernities paradigm’ (MMP) will be used to offer an alternative and more 
effective understanding of Turkish modernity and historical modernisation 
experience. Part four contains essential information about the research 
methodology and methods used throughout the thesis. Part five contains the 
                                                        
1
 It could be helpful for the reader to note the verbal context in which this thesis utilises two essential 
terms throughout this work – modernity and modernisation. These words are often used 
interchangeably, yet there is a noteworthy distinction between their meanings. Modernity ‘is the 
condition of being modern’ (Cambridge 2014). The term refers to a state of existence that is different 
from past forms of human experience in fields such as economic conditions, political organisation and 
social life. By contrast modernisation ‘is the transitional transformation period by which the state of 
modernity manifests’ (Cambridge 2014). Hence, modernity is a state of existence that is an outcome 
of a process of modernisation.         
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summary and concluding remarks of the chapter. Finally, part six provides the 
plan of the thesis, briefly summarising the content and purpose of each chapter.  
 
1.1 COMPETING PERCEPTIONS OF THE TURKISH MODEL  
 
With the Arab uprisings of 2011, the so-called ‘Turkish model’ emerged as 
central to a number of debates about the significance of the modernisation 
experience of Turkey and its alleged applicability for developing countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (See, for instance, Nafaa 2011; 
Atasoy 2011; Dede 2011; Kirişçi 2011; Taşpınar 2011; Al-Azm 2011; Akyol 
2012; Torelli 2012; Andrikopoulos 2012; Rane 2012; Bengio 2012; Kubicek 
2013b; Tziarras 2013). The popularity of the concept has extended beyond 
academic circles as numerous newspapers and non-academic journals have 
published views on the Turkish model and the politics of the post-2011 MENA 
region, resulting in an array of highly subjective articles (Kalın 2009; Aktaş 
2011; Akyol 2012). The Turkish model has been utilised in various ways by 
scholars, leading to the emergence of numerous understandings in fields of 
foreign policy analysis, political economy, political Islam, democratisation and, 
more broadly, modernisation. This thesis explores the concept of the Turkish 
model through the lens of modernisation studies.  
 
The current discourse on the Turkish model is not entirely a new subject as it 
had its precedents in the 20th century and the early 2000s. In the 1930s, the 
Kemalist modernisation project of Turkey attracted the interest of Western 
observers and reform-minded monarchs of predominantly Muslim non-Western 
countries such as Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq (Atabaki and Zürcher 2004; Omrani 
2007:155; Altunışık 2008:42). In recent decades, the country was offered as a 
model twice more (Kirişçi 2011:34-35): first, in the early 1990s, as a potential 
inspiration for the nation-state formation processes of newly independent 
Turkic countries in Caucasia and Central Asia – which were founded after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 – and second, in the early 2000s, 
when the US President George W. Bush and the Turkish Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan publically announced their joint vision for the future of the 
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MENA societies – the so-called ‘Broader MENA Initiative’ that presented Turkey 
as an appropriate democratisation model for the region.     
 
In its earlier manifestations, the notion of a Turkish model inspired some social 
and political reforms in several countries, most notably in Pahlavi Iran and the 
Kingdom of Afghanistan in the 1930s and the Republic of Azerbaijan after 1991 
(Atabaki and Zürcher 2004; Altunışık 2008; Kirişçi 2011). Nevertheless, the 
difference between the earlier manifestations of the Turkish model and the 
ongoing post-2011 discourse is that this time the debate has not remained 
limited to scholarly and policy-making circles but caught the attention of the 
general public, particularly the so-called ‘Arab street’ (Kirişçi 2011:43). In this 
regard, a survey made shortly after the 2011 Arab uprisings in several countries 
of the MENA region found that 61 percent of the respondents perceived Turkey 
as a model for the modernisation of their own societies (Akgün and Gündoğar 
2012:5). Moreover, the leader of the Ennahda Party that won the first free and 
fair elections in post-2011 Tunisia, Rachid Ghannouchi explicitly told the press 
that his party would follow the footsteps of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) 
and adopt Turkey as their model (Jung 2011:2, Hurriyet Daily News 2011). A 
crucial research question that emerged out of these discussions is could the 
historical experiences of one society be possibly applicable to other countries?  
 
Over the years, a large body of literature has suggested that the Turkish model 
could supposedly be helpful for the modernisation of MENA societies in terms of 
economic development, democratisation and building a pluralistic socio-
political context in which Islamic values could co-exist with ‘modernity’ (Fuller 
2004; Çavdar 2006; Altunışık 2008; Nasr 2009; Kaddorah 2010; Dede 2011; 
Kayadibi and Birekul 2011; Kirişçi 2011; Atasoy 2011; Kalın 2009; Aktaş 2011; 
Ülgen 2011; Taşpınar 2011; Akyol 2012; Bozkurt 2012; Ramadan 2012). 
Modernity, in this regard, has been portrayed in the literature on Turkish model 
as a universally desirable objective and the notion was understood by these 
scholars as referring to the values that characterise the contemporary Western 
civilisation – a liberal democratic political system, an industrialised, literate and 
largely urban society and a secular view of state and religion affairs. In this 
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context, two mainstream conceptualisations of the Turkish model of modernity 
emerged within the scholarly literature, namely the ‘structural model’ and the 
‘societal model’2 (Duran and Yılmaz 2011; Laçiner 2014:22-23). 
 
It has been argued by both schools that Turkey has been very successful in 
establishing a ‘consolidated liberal democratic regime’, achieving a ‘high 
economic development level’ and ensuring ‘the ideological moderation of the 
Islamic political movement’, yet the approaches differ in terms of analysing how 
the supposed success in these three fields has been achieved (Fuller 2004; Dede 
2011; Al-Azm 2011; İşeri and Dilek 2012; Kaddorah 2010; Jung 2011; Kirişçi 
2011; Andrikopoulos 2012). 
 
Scholars adhering to the understanding of the structural model interpret the 
Turkish model as ‘a state-led modernisation process directed by a secularised 
bureaucratic elite’ (See Altunışık 2008:45; Kubicek 2013b; Ülgen 2011; Ünver 
2013; Karakaş 2007). The proponents of the societal model, however, perceive 
the Turkish model to be an example of the ‘compatibility of Islam with 
modernity’, arguing that the Turkish case proves that an Islamic political party 
such as the AKP can co-exist with non-Islamic parties within a secular and 
democratic state structure (See Ghanim 2009; Torelli 2012; Jung 2011; Akyol 
2012; Khattab 2013; Verhagen 2012; Younis 2012; Nafaa 2011; Taşpınar 2011; 
Kayadibi and Birekul 2011; Nasr 2009).  
 
The structural model highlights the secularisation experience of Turkey as the 
key characteristic that differentiates its modernity from that of other developing 
and predominantly Muslim societies, attributing the alleged success of Turkey 
in development, democratisation and secularisation to the legacy of the 
Kemalist Westernisation program in the pre-1980 period (Duran and Yılmaz 
2011; Öniş 1999; Tütengil 1970; Ünver 2013; Berkes 1964; Lewis 1961; Kongar 
                                                        
2
 Please note that this method of categorising the literature on the Turkish model of modernity into 
two main approaches was used by the author in two journal articles that focused on different 
dimensions of the concept: See Göksel (2012, 2014). Nevertheless, the text of this thesis itself is 
original.       
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1985). An example of this narrative can be found in Erdener Kaynak and Metin 
Gürol (1987:61):  
 
The Turkish War for Independence, establishment of the Turkish 
Republic and the reforms that created modern Turkey have been 
admired and taken as a model by many Middle Eastern countries. Many 
Arab nationalists look to Ataturk, the creator of the Turkish Republic, as 
an idol.   
  
By contrast, the societal model heavily focuses on the post-1980 socio-economic 
and political history of Turkey, arguing that the origins of Turkey’s 
contemporary achievements in economic development, democratisation and the 
emergence of a so-called ‘moderate Islamic paradigm’ with the AKP from 2002 
onwards, lay in the dramatic transformation process that begun in the 1980s 
during Turgut Özal’s tenure as prime minister (1983-1989) and later, as 
president (1989-1993) (Taşpınar 2011; Akyol 2012). While the alleged success 
of Özal’s economic liberalisation program – that shifted the development policy 
of Turkey from the state-led import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) to the 
free market-driven export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) – is highly praised by 
the societal model, the late 1990s is portrayed conversely as an era of political 
instability and economic failure caused by the inefficiency of various coalition 
governments (Taşpınar 2011). Akin to the positive portrayal of the Özal era, the 
post-2002 rule of the incumbent AKP administration is also presented by the 
societal model as a period that has greatly contributed to the modernisation of 
Turkey. The AKP is given credit for the emergence of Turkey as a ‘success story’ 
in the MENA region with its pro-active foreign policy, rapid economic 
development and achievements in democratic consolidation (See Çavdar 2006; 
Nafaa 2011; Dede 2011; Atasoy 2011). 
 
The societal model highlights the significance of the role of the AKP within 
Turkish modernisation to such an extent that the concept of the ‘Turkish 
modernity model’ becomes synonymous with the ‘AKP model’, namely the 
particular trajectory of ideological transformation the Turkish Islamic political 
movement had experienced over the years (Jung 2011:3). Alper Y. Dede’s article 
(2011:25) provides an archetype of such a narrative, suggesting that the 
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Turkish model is deeply connected to Turkey’s democratisation process, which 
is said to have started with the victory of the AKP in the 2002 parliamentary 
elections despite the fact that Turkey actually made the transition to free and 
fair multi-party elections in 1950. In this context, the AKP is claimed to be a ‘role 
model’ of ideological moderation and democratisation for Islamic or social 
conservative political movements of the MENA region such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood of Egypt and the Ennahda Party of Tunisia (Dede 2011:25; Torelli 
2012; Taşpınar 2011; Shafiq 2009).   
 
Following the post-2011 interest to the Turkish model, the aforementioned 
division of opinion between the two schools manifested as a result of the search 
by scholars to accurately analyse the historical modernisation process of Turkey 
and draw supposedly helpful insights for the MENA societies. However, the 
origins of the current understandings of Turkish modernity lay in an already 
established and extensive literature within modernisation studies. Conventional 
theories of modernity strongly shaped the literature on Turkey as the 
methodology of the structural model is based on hypotheses developed earlier 
by ‘classical modernisation theory’ (CMT), whereas the societal model is 
inspired by ‘neo-modernisation theory’ (NMT). 
 
The depiction of Islam as a hindrance to modernity and the alleged necessity of 
the adoption of secularism to achieve modernisation in the Muslim world 
supported by scholars of CMT, such as David Apter (1965), Daniel Lerner 
(1958) and Sylvie Kedourie (1992), moulded the framework of the structural 
model (Çağlar 2013; Laçiner 2014). Influential scholars of Turkish 
modernisation such as Tarık Zafer Tunaya (1960), Bernard Lewis (1961), Niyazi 
Berkes (1964), Binnaz Toprak (1981) and Emre Kongar (1985) adhered to the 
understanding of CMT, perceiving secularisation as an integral element of 
modernity, praising the Kemalist Westernisation program of the 1930s and 
attributing the alleged success of Turkish modernisation process to its assertive 
secularist character.  
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According to Lewis (1961), the most positive character of Turkish 
modernisation has been the willingness of Turkish policy-makers to join 
Western civilisation through social reforms. The structural model contends that 
in order for any modernisation program to achieve success in predominantly 
Muslim societies, the socio-political influence of Islam has to be minimised as 
this belief system is represented as one that controls all aspects of life in a 
country due to the absence of divine and worldly spheres in its framework: 
 
Islam is both a historical and an organic religion. On the level of ideas, it 
views history in sacred terms. This means that religion assumes an 
important role in establishing a socio-political order which conforms to 
divine design. On the structural level, its ecclesiastical organization is 
comparatively weak. In the absence of an autonomous church, the 
distinction between the religious system and the rest of society becomes 
obscure (Toprak 1981:21). 
     
In this context, Berkes (1964) applies one of the most assertive variants of CMT 
to the Turkish case by arguing that secularisation and modernisation are 
synonymous and that it is unimaginable to envisage a modern society without a 
complete transformation of its lifestyles and worldview. The popularity of CMT 
among Turkish social scientists should not be surprising in light of the 
ideological compatibility between Kemalist ideology and the hypotheses of US-
based scholars who developed CMT. After all, both Kemalism and CMT depict 
contemporary Turkey as the product of a ‘successful Westernisation program’ 
launched by a highly educated altruistic bureaucratic elite and a visionary 
leader of extra-ordinary capabilities, Kemal Ataturk (Kansu 1995:12).     
 
NMT also influenced the study of modernisation in Turkey as scholars of the 
societal model built their narrative around the hypothesis that the reformist 
interpretation of Islam – not unlike Protestantism – would positively impact on 
the modernisation of a predominantly Muslim society by combining Islamic 
ethics with capitalism and commercialism (See Zürcher 2004; Yavuz 2013; 
Güngör 1991; Nasr 2009; Atasoy 2005; White 2002). Thus, NMT resulted in the 
emergence of a new concept within the literature, the so-called Islamic 
Calvinism, which has been utilised by the societal model to the case of 
modernisation in Turkey.  In this regard, the societal model has re-casted Islam 
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as a modernising force and criticised the secularisation thesis of the structural 
model by portraying the state-imposed Kemalist modernisation project of the 
early Republican years as a failure that could neither thoroughly secularise the 
society nor prevent the rise of Islamism in the country (See, for instance, Yavuz 
2005, 2013; Nasr 2009; Atasoy 2005, 2009).  
 
The conceptualisations of the Turkish model offered by both schools are based 
on a different set of hypotheses derived from two distinct theoretical 
frameworks of modernity – CMT and NMT. Nevertheless, there is also common 
ground that can be found in the narratives they offer. Both the structural model 
and the societal model share the premise that contemporary Turkey constitutes 
a successful modernisation experience in the Muslim world. Furthermore, the 
concept of modernity is understood by both approaches in terms of success in 
three fields: economic development, democratisation and socio-political change in 
the form of the ideological change of Islamism.  
 
In this context, the thesis will argue that there is a major gap in the literature on 
the Turkish model in terms of holistically studying this country case with an 
unconventional approach to modernity, namely the ‘multiple modernities 
paradigm’ (MMP). In contrast to large numbers of works that have used CMT 
and NMT frameworks, there are few noteworthy studies which analyse the 
Turkish modernity through the lens of MMP. In this regard, Nilüfer Göle (2000; 
2002), Alev Çınar (2005), Esra Özyürek (2006), İbrahim Kaya (2004) and 
Masoud Kamali (2005) offer highly successful applications of MMP framework 
to the Turkish case. However, all of these scholars examine the scholarly 
discourse regarding the link between Islam and modernity on the Turkish 
example, heavily focusing their research on social change within Islamic groups. 
In contrast to these earlier works that mainly focus on the social development 
process of Turkey in terms of religious interpretation and the so-called concept 
of Islamic modernity, this thesis studies the origins of the Turkish modernity as 
a whole by tracing the trajectory of economic, socio-political and institutional 
development processes in light of MMP.           
 
29 
 
This theorem challenges Eurocentric and deterministic conceptualisations of 
modernity put forward by CMT and NMT as it argues that the processes of 
secularisation and economic development do not necessarily result in the 
consolidation of liberal democratic regimes (For the framework of multiple 
modernities paradigm, see Eisenstadt 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003; Wagner 2000, 
2008, 2012; Arnason 1997, 2000, 2002, 2003; Wittrock 2002). The thesis 
argues that the conceptual frameworks used by the structural and societal 
models within Turkish studies are based on the historical Western European 
experience of development, which prevents the two schools from fully 
accounting for the nuances of the unique process of transformation in Turkey.  
 
While expecting Turkey to replicate the Western experience, both approaches 
neglect the significance of historical contingency, path dependency and 
international context for the socio-economic and political history of this country. 
By contrast, the multiple modernities paradigm acknowledges the profound 
impact these factors had on Turkey’s modernisation experience, which is highly 
useful in terms of comprehending the particular historical background that 
produced the contemporary Turkish version of modernity (Wagner 2012:VII-
XIII; Eisenstadt 2000:2; Arnason 2003:XI). Based on this framework, the thesis 
analyses the economic, social and political development trajectories of Turkey, 
showing that modernisation in this non-Western society has been a complex 
phenomenon that produced a ‘divergent modernity’ rather than converging 
towards Western values such as liberal democracy.       
 
In the following section, the chapter will focus on how the mainstream 
conceptualisations developed by the structural and societal models affect the 
way these schools study the economic, political and social development 
processes in Turkey – which collectively constitute the Turkish modernity. In all 
three dimensions of modernisation, the chapter will highlight the weaknesses of 
understandings offered by the existing approaches, which will pave the way for 
a re-conceptualisation of the Turkish modernisation experience through the 
lens of MMP in this thesis.   
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1.2 THE ‘TRINITY OF MODERNITY’ AND THE TURKISH MODEL 
The previous section showed that the utilisation of opposing theories of 
modernity by scholars results in the emergence of two contrasting formulations 
that provide entirely different answers to the question of how Turkey has 
achieved modernity. This section will offer a critique of the mainstream studies 
of the Turkish model and argue that a more nuanced understanding would be 
possible through the application of MMP on all three aspects of the 
modernisation experience, namely economic, social and political development.        
 
1.2.1 Studying the Economic Development of Turkey 
1.2.1.1 The structural model vs. the societal model   
 
The political economy of development in Turkey possesses a vast scholarly 
literature, yet several issues remain unresolved and continue to be a source for 
divided opinion: when did economic modernisation3 begin and which period 
and policies are most responsible for Turkey’s achievements in economic 
development? What has propelled the country into being the 16th largest 
economy in the world and a widely referred supposedly ‘successful economic 
development model’? (World Bank 2013; Dede 2011; Kirişçi 2009, 2011; 
Andrikopoulos 2012; Duran and Yılmaz 2011).  
 
Scholars who subscribe to the structural model perceive the economic policies 
of the pre-1980 period as having been the source of Turkey's modern economic 
success and argue that this the era that should be taken as an example by other 
developing societies (See Pamuk 2006:824; Togan 1996; Altuğ and Filiztekin 
2006; Keyder 1987; Ülgen 2011). The economic strategy referred to positively 
in this context is the statist4 development period (1930-1950) under the one-
                                                        
3
 Economic modernisation refers to a number of inter-related processes such as industrialisation, 
urbanisation, mechanisation, infrastructure development, increases in literacy rate of the population 
and the imrovement of average living standards that result in profound changes in the socio-economic 
life of a society.    
4
 Also known as the etatist strategy based on the French word, yet as this thesis is written for an 
English-speaking readership, I found it more appropriate to use its equivalent in English language 
throughout this study.    
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party authoritarian rule of the Kemalist CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi). Sumru 
Altuğ and Alpay Filiztekin (2006:17), for instance, highlight this early 
Republican era as the most significant years for the achievement of 
development, because the most dramatic progress in labour productivity, 
mechanisation of agriculture and accumulation of capital is claimed to have 
occurred in this period of planned development. The ISI period of 1960-1980 is 
also emphasised by the structural model as it is argued that the rapid 
industrialisation and urbanisation witnessed in this era constituted the 
preconditions for Turkey’s later economic success (Öniş 2006:241). The 
structural model claims that the success of pre-1980 state-led development far 
outweighs the achievements of the post-1980 period that followed and the re-
organisation of Turkish economy along the lines of laissez-faire5 in the early 
1980s (Öniş 2003; Ünver 2013; Andrikopoulos 2012). Rather than market 
forces such as entrepreneurs, the main agent that is identified is the ‘state’ and 
the policies developed by its bureaucratic institutions such as the State Planning 
Organisation (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, DPT). 
 
In contrast, the societal model focuses on the post-1980 phase of Turkish 
economic development experience and emphasises the significance of transition 
from ISI to an EOI strategy through the economic liberalisation program of Özal 
in the 1980s (See Morrissey 1996; Öniş 1999; Cecen, Dogruel and Dogruel 
1994:46; Özcan and Turunç 2011; Waterbury 1992b). Scholars such as John 
Waterbury (1992b:127) and Ziya Öniş (1992:74), for instance, argue that akin 
to other economic ‘success stories’ such as the newly-industrialised East Asian 
countries South Korea and Taiwan, Turkey is a model of neoliberal economic 
success.  
 
The pre-1980 economic policies are depicted by the societal model as 
responsible for the supposed failure of the economic modernisation program of 
Turkey. The Turkish economy of that era is argued to have had problems that 
are common in less-developed economies such as a large budget deficit, an 
                                                        
5
 The term laissez-faire refers to an economic environment in which transactions between 
governments and private individuals are free from state intervention mechanisms such as restrictions, 
tariffs and subsidies. The phrase is of French origin, literarily meaning ‘let them do’ or ‘let it be’.    
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unstable exchange rate, high inflation, over-reliance on public enterprises and 
excessive state intervention into economic affairs (Morrissey 1996:89). Within 
this narrative, the pre-1980 period is defined as resting ‘on a top-down state 
tradition governed by a state recruited elite in the civil service, the army, and in 
politics’ which is contrasted with the positively portrayed post-1980 period 
when ‘a new generation of indigenous entrepreneurs and conservative 
Anatolian urbanites began to undermine the state elite and their middle class 
allies’ (Özcan and Turunç 2011:64-68). The main agents in the framework of the 
societal model are social forces such as the entrepreneurs and their activities – 
e.g. exports to the markets of countries in the surrounding regions of Turkey 
such as Europe, the Central Asia and the Middle East.  
 
1.2.1.2 The critique of the literature and the multiple modernities paradigm   
 
Within the existing literature on the economic dimension of Turkish modernity, 
the significance of path-dependency – continuity between subsequent periods of 
history – is severely neglected. Both the structural and societal models 
artificially divide the economic development trajectory of Turkey through 
portraying the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods as contrasting experiences 
rather than perceiving the EOI strategy as a continuation of the national 
development objective of the ISI policy within a different international economic 
setting.  
 
In this context, the role of two key factors on the economic development of 
Turkey are overlooked by both mainstream approaches: external factors (i.e. 
the impact of changes within the global political economic system and the 
interaction between Turkey and foreign actors such as the US and the EU on 
Turkish political economy) and the ‘sequencing of economic development’ (i.e. a 
number of non-Western countries such as Japan, South Korea and Brazil 
achieved rapid economic growth rates throughout the latter half of the 20th 
century, because they successfully sequenced their development strategies as a 
response to the changes in the international system and the changes in the 
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conditions of their economies) (See, for instance, McPherson 1995; Staehr 2005; 
Zalduendo 2005:18; Nsouli, Rached and Funke 2002:10; Edwards 1990).  
 
The idea of sequencing economic development6 suggests that the EOI strategy is 
most effective when it is based on the groundwork of a successful ISI policy as 
seen in the experiences of rising East Asian economies such as Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan and China. Once a society experiences industrialisation within a 
protectionist national economic system based on the ISI and establishes strong 
indigenous industries that could compete with the enterprises of other 
countries within the global economy, then that economy could increase the 
likelihood of a successful transition to the EOI strategy through economic 
liberalisation. In such a setting, the protectionism of the ISI would no longer 
protect the national industries from foreign competition but only restrict their 
production capacity to the size of the national market due to the absence of 
external markets to export goods. Therefore, the EOI can in fact be seen as a 
continuation of the state-led national modernisation strategy of developing 
economies in a different form, rather than being portrayed as a fully contrasting 
paradigm of development under free-market rules. As such, the pre-1980 and 
post-1980 development policies in Turkey could be seen as complementary in 
terms of ensuring the economic modernisation of Turkey in the long term.  
 
In addition to overlooking the role of path-dependency and international 
context, the methodologies of the structural and societal models limit 
themselves to analysing either the role of the state or the market forces rather 
than comparatively studying both essential elements of capitalist development. 
Thus, there is a strong need to scrutinise the economic development process in 
                                                        
6
 It is important to note that the concept of ‘sequencing economic development’, in this context, does 
not mean that societies which adopted a variety of different development strategies over the years 
such as the ISI and the EOI, decided on shifting from one policy to another in advance. Instead, it 
denotes the idea that even though policy-makers cannot effectively predict and design a ‘reform path’ 
in advance, there is still an element of continuity between successive economic policies and that 
shifting from one development strategy to another does not necessarily mean that one paradigm of 
development has collapsed. Sequencing economic development refers to an ‘eclectic and adaptive 
process which succeeds through continual monitoring, review, and revision of policies’ in light of the 
changing circumstances of the time (McPherson 1995:I).  
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Turkey through a new approach that does not rely on the limiting lenses of CMT 
and NMT.  
 
Contesting the arguments of the structural and societal models, MMP offers a 
more suitable approach to the study of economic modernity as it emphasises 
the significance of path-dependency within the modernisation experiences of 
developing non-Western cases, which is compatible with the idea of sequencing 
economic development (Wagner 2012:VII-XIII; Eisenstadt 2000:2; Arnason 
2003:XI). Economic modernity is a direct product of the particular development 
policies a non-Western society follows in its historical trajectory of change: 
 
The new powers in the world - such as China, India, Brazil and South 
Africa - emerge from different historical trajectories, such as experiences 
of a regional version of communism, colonial domination, extreme 
inequality in an entrenched oligarchic setting or apartheid, and their 
‘modernities’ are bound to be shaped by those experiences, and 
sometimes now their choices are seen as models to be emulated 
elsewhere (Wagner 2012:VIII-IX). 
 
Thus, the nature of economic modernity cannot be analysed in isolation from 
the historical development trajectory of a society. Moreover, that trajectory can 
only be understood if the links – especially the continuities – between different 
historical periods are understood.      
       
MMP also acknowledges the significance of a ‘globalised international setting’ 
for the modernisation of non-Western economies as these societies have 
devised their economic development programs within an international 
economic system that radically differs from the circumstances of the historical 
trajectory in the West (Wagner 2012:168-169; Arnason 2003:287-295; 
Eisenstadt 2000:14). The Industrial Revolution and the subsequent waves of 
rapid material changes occurred spontaneously in Britain as a result of the 
specific historical economic trajectory of the country. This can be called the 
‘original’ economic modernity as it was one of a kind (Eisenstadt 1999:284). 
The economic modernisation process of the non-Western societies, however, 
emerged only after they encountered Western modernity via the economic and 
military imperialism of Western nations (Eisenstadt 2000:14). From that critical 
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moment onwards, the historical trajectory of non-Western societies was altered 
forever.    
 
The original modernity of the West could not possibly be replicated elsewhere, 
because unlike its spontaneous manifestation in Britain, non-Western nations 
such as Turkey have had to design economic development programs in order to 
free themselves from Western hegemony. This premeditated economic 
development process not only occurred as a reaction to Western modernity, but 
it was also shaped by it through increased interaction between societies. As 
technological advances in communications and transportation technology that 
began in the West gradually spread all around the world throughout the 19th 
and 20th centuries, an inter-connected international economic system emerged. 
This meant that the economic modernisation of non-Western societies would 
occur while interacting with elements of Western modernity as well as other 
non-Western nations. The result of this interaction can be most effectively 
comprehended by a non-deterministic theory such as the MMP, because this 
approach takes into account the historical contingency of economic 
modernisation in non-Western country cases such as Turkey whose route 
would be shaped by unexpected factors that did not exist in the case of the 
‘original economic modernity’ in Britain. Hence, as it will be studied in more 
detail in Chapter 2, the MMP offers a more inclusive conceptual framework 
than the deterministic approaches of CMT and NMT, which expect human 
societies across the world to eventually converge towards Western modernity 
defined in terms of free-market capitalism and liberal democracy.          
 
In sum, the alternative conceptualisation of the economic modernisation of 
Turkey through MMP in this thesis will provide an effective understanding of 
the particular development trajectory experienced in the country by 
acknowledging historically contingent factors, the impact of interaction with 
Western modernity (international context) and the path-dependency between the 
pre-1980 and post-1980 periods. In the following section, the chapter will 
compare and critically review the understandings of the political development 
experience of Turkey developed by scholars of structural and societal models.                                   
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1.2.2 Studying the Political Development of Turkey 
1.2.2.1 The structural model vs. the societal model  
 
CMT and NMT both define political modernisation as ‘a general process of 
change in the political sphere through differentiation and specialisation of 
political functions and structures’ alongside ‘an increased popular participation 
in politics’ and ‘an increased popular identification with the political system’ 
(Dodd 1988:12; Rostow 1960; Huntington 1968:33-34; Inglehart and Welzel 
2005). This definition reveals that popular participation into policy-making and 
legitimacy of the system are two essential elements of political development as 
understood by CMT and NMT. CMT and NMT perceive the concept of political 
development as synonymous with democratisation, which has also reflected in 
the arguments of the structural and societal models on the case of Turkish 
modernisation.   
  
In recent years, particularly since the Arab uprisings of 2011, Turkey has been 
presented in the narratives of both the structural and societal models as a 
‘successful model of democracy’ for developing countries such as Tunisia and 
Egypt (see, for instance, Yavuz 2013; Aktaş 2011; Akyol 2012; Al-Azm 2011; 
Dede 2011; Atasoy 2011; Kubicek 2013b). In this regard, the approaches 
converge on presenting Turkey as a ‘consolidated liberal democracy’ and 
interpreting democratisation as the most significant element of the political 
development process experienced in modernising societies.  
 
Nonetheless, the structural and societal models differ in terms of their analysis 
of how Turkey supposedly democratised. The structural model suggests that 
Turkish democratisation has been a successful experiment due to the assertive 
secularism of the Kemalist rule in the formative years of the Republic (1923-
1950) which is said to have triggered a complete ‘cultural revolution’ in Turkey 
by instilling the society with Western values (see Ünver 2013; Fuller 2004; 
Altunışık 2008; El-Labbad 2009; Everts 2004; Kubicek 2013b; Heper 1997). 
Challenging this assumption, the societal model argues that Turkish 
democratisation has been successful not because of Kemalist Westernisation 
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program which had failed to spread democratic values, but rather due to the 
democratic transformation of the Islamic political movement (see Yavuz 2009, 
2013; Atasoy 2009; Akyol 2012; Kaddorah 2010; Kalın 2009; Jung 2011; Nafaa 
2011; Taşpınar 2011). Thus, it has been argued that democratisation has 
manifested ‘not from top’ via the imposition of Kemalism but ‘from below’ due 
to the rise of a social force, the Islamic movement, which has allegedly 
transformed over the years by adopting democratic principles and ceasing or 
downplaying its criticism towards the principle of secularism (Dede 2011; 
Atasoy 2011).   
 
The main hypothesis of the structural model, derived from CMT, is that 
democracy can only develop in a thoroughly secularised society, and therefore 
the assertive secularism of the Kemalist regime was beneficial for the 
consolidation of democracy in Turkey. An example for this school of thought can 
be found in Metin Heper (1991:1): 
  
Atatürk attempted to plant the seeds in Turkey for both the horizontal 
and vertical dimensions of liberal democracy… It is true that during his 
lifetime, except for a brief experiment in 1930, a multi-party system was 
not installed. Atatürk, however, had an emphatic belief in the innate 
capacity of the people to develop and, in due course, impinge upon 
government. This particular approach has borne fruit in later years. A 
multi-party system was finally established in 1945.    
 
By contrast, the societal model – which is inspired by the Islamic Calvinism 
hypothesis developed by NMT – conceptualises modern Turkey as an exemplar 
of the compatibility between Islam and modernity. For instance, a notable 
scholar who adheres to the approach of the societal model, Vali Nasr (2009:232-
251), defines the Turkish modernity as the ‘harbinger’ of an emerging 
modernisation paradigm in the wider Muslim world, namely a ‘Muslim capitalist 
democracy’.  
 
The societal model particularly depicts the AKP rule since 2002 as an era of 
democratic consolidation in the country:           
    
38 
 
Turkey has changed in remarkable ways [under the AKP]. A torrent of 
sweeping democratic, legal and economic reforms has been rushed 
through the political system. The power of the military has been 
curtailed; individual freedoms have been extended; Kurds have begun to 
receive rights long denied; and a start has been made to repair the 
damage caused by years of economic mismanagement and corruption… 
Turkey has made a great leap forward (Morris 2005:2).  
 
1.2.2.2 The critique of the literature and the multiple modernities paradigm 
 
While both the structural and societal models present contemporary Turkey as 
a liberal democracy, neither attempts to show to what extent Turkey fulfils the 
criteria required to be considered as a liberal democracy through referring to 
the characteristics of such regimes as defined by influential scholars of 
democratisation such as Robert A. Dahl (1971), Larry Diamond (2008), Alfred C. 
Stepan (2000), Arend Lijphart (1999) and David Held (2006). Also, in support of 
their argument for the evaluation of Turkey as a liberal democracy, neither the 
structural model nor the societal model refer to any notable international 
indexes that measure levels of democratisation across the world such as the 
annual reports published by the Freedom House (2008, 2013) or the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (2008).  
 
In the absence of an assessment of Turkish democratisation based on any 
reliable conceptualisation of liberal democratic regimes, the description of 
Turkey as a consolidated liberal democracy reflects the subjective views of 
observers. In reality, since Turkey made the initial transition from authoritarian 
one-party rule to multi-party parliamentary system through free and fair 
elections in 1950, a number of shortcomings within the political and legal 
framework of the state have prevented the consolidation of liberal democracy in 
the country (Freedom House 2008:11; Vardan 2009; Kubicek 2013a:46; Dodd 
1988:21; Hürsoy 2012:116; Öniş 2006). The Freedom House Index, for example, 
classifies Turkey as ‘partly free’ as of  2013, based on a set of indicators which 
together constitute one of the most commonly used criteria for identifying 
liberal democratic regimes, namely ‘electoral process’, ‘political pluralism and 
participation’, ‘functioning of government’, ‘freedom of expression and belief’, 
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‘associational and organisational rights’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘personal autonomy 
and individual rights’ (Freedom House 2013).  
 
Today, the democratic shortcomings of Turkey include the absence of strong 
checks and balances to contain the executive power of governments, ongoing 
problems in granting minority rights to communities such as Kurds and Alevis, 
the excessive politicisation of judicial processes, the authoritarian nature of the 
1982 Constitution and regular human rights abuses (Aknur 2012a; Yıldız 
2011:130; Karabelias 2009:57). Until recent years, the extraordinary influence 
of the Turkish armed forces on policy-making – commonly referred to as the 
military tutelage – was another defect of the democratisation process in the 
country, one that had characterised it since 1960 (Polat 2011; Cizre 1999; 
Jenkins 2010). These limitations to the practice of liberal democracy in Turkey 
highlight the shortcomings of the narratives offered by the structural and 
societal models. In this context, there is a strong need for a new approach to 
study the political development of Turkey.  
 
MMP is helpful in terms of re-conceptualising the political aspect of Turkish 
modernisation as it radically differs from CMT and NMT in terms of its 
formulation of political development. While the two established theories assert 
that liberal democracies are the only modern regimes that can ensure the ‘fair 
distribution of justice and services to the citizenry’, the definition of political 
development adopted by MMP does not necessitate the existence of a liberal 
democratic regime as the ones formed in Western European and Northern 
American countries (Wittrock 2002; Eisenstadt 2000, 2002; Wagner 2012).  
 
MMP simply defines political development as the formation of complex state 
structures that can effectively direct policy-making (Eisenstadt 2002:1-2; 
Wittrock 2002:47-50). According to MMP, authoritarian regimes such as the 
former Soviet Union, its successor the Russian Federation and the People’s 
Republic of China are complex state structures that effectively monopolise 
power within a highly centralised framework and that they are just as ‘modern’ 
as the democracies of the Western world in terms of their function (Arnason 
40 
 
2002, 2003). If MMP is applied to the case of political development in Turkey, it 
can be argued that the state structure in the country is modern, yet it is a 
different type of modernity than the liberal democratic variant based on the 
Western experience of transformation. Therefore, rather than the Eurocentric 
formulations of modernity developed by CMT and NMT and applied on the 
Turkish case of political development by the structural and societal models, a 
more realistic account of the Turkish modernity can be acquired through the 
lens of MMP. 
 
The key difficulty the CMT and NMT encounter when applied to the context of 
Turkish modernity is that their deterministic frameworks do not acknowledge 
the particularities of this country case that caused it to diverge from the 
historical Western experience of political development seen in cases such as 
Britain and France. The application of MMP – with its emphasis on historical 
contingency, path-dependency and international context – to Turkey in this thesis 
will shed light on the case-specific factors that subverted the expectations of 
mainstream theories of modernity, which envisaged the consolidation of liberal 
democracy in secularising or economically developing societies.  
 
In the following part of the chapter, the contrasting approaches of the structural 
and societal models to the social development experience of Turkey will be 
critically examined and compared with the framework of MMP.  
 
1.2.3 Studying the Social Development of Turkey 
1.2.3.1 The structural model vs. the societal model  
 
Within the scholarly literature on the Turkish case, the social development 
aspect of modernity has been defined in terms of the ‘ideological 
transformation’ that has been experienced by the Islamic political movement in 
the country (See, for instance, Yavuz 2009, 2013; Akyol 2012; Kaddorah 2010; 
Taşpınar 2011; Dede 2011; Atasoy 2011; Nasr 2009). In this context, ideological 
transformation or moderation refers to the shift from anti-systemic movements 
aiming to build a totalitarian Islamic state via revolution towards political parties 
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and civil society organisations aiming to increase religiosity in public space 
through participation into free and fair elections. The so-called ‘radical change of 
the discourse and methods’ of the Islamic political movement in Turkey over the 
years has been a much cited aspect of Turkish modernisation, one that also 
remains one of its most controversial and least understood aspects due to the 
ongoing division of opinion over how this process has occurred (Yavuz 2004; 
Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1996). 
 
As with their opposing views on the economic and political development 
processes of Turkey, which were analysed in the two preceding sections of this 
chapter, the structural and societal models also differ in terms of examining the 
social development experience in the country. The structural model focuses on 
how the secularist elite of the Republican regime shaped the transformation of 
Turkish political Islamism through a calculated strategy of ‘carrot and stick’, 
namely by suppressing manifestations of radical Islamism through measures 
such as party closures and/or imprisonment while, simultaneously providing 
enough space for the socio-economic and political activities of its more 
moderate variants, thus ensuring the integration of the mainstream Islamic 
movement into the political economic system in Turkey (See Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 
1996; Ünver 2013; Özbudun and Hale 2010; Heper 1997). Conversely, the 
societal model emphasises the role played by social and external forces on the 
moderation of political Islam such as Turkey's EU membership process, 
integration into global economy through economic liberalisation and the 
changing discourses of Islamic thinkers such as Ali Bulaç and religious orders 
such as the Gülen movement (See Tuğal 2009; Aydın 2005; Çevik and Thomas 
2012; Atasoy 2005; Turam 2006).  
 
Fully reflecting the methodology of CMT, the structural model praises the 
success of the so-called ‘Kemalist cultural revolution’ that took place within an 
authoritarian state formation in the early Republican years (1923-1950) with a 
heavy emphasis on secularisation (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1996). An archetype of the 
narrative can be seen in Ergun Özbudun and William Hale (2010:22):  
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If not for the considerable success of Ataturk's modernisation program; it 
can be said with confidence that Turkey could not even come close to 
achieving the political, economic and cultural development levels it has 
reached today.    
 
It has been argued that the pressure imposed on the Islamic movement by the 
Kemalist elite of the military has forced the movement to tone down its religion-
inspired discourse, cease its critic of secularism and adopt democratic 
principles (Aydın 2005:196; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1996; Heper 1997:34). The 
framework of the structural model indicates that the main agency that has 
shaped the parameters of Islam's role in Turkish politics has been the state 
actors, not Islamic groups themselves:  
 
The consolidation of democracy in Turkey and the gradual 
reincorporation of Islam into politics were facilitated by the increasing 
secularization of Turks, after the establishment of the Republic in 1923, 
which made general support for a radical religious revival less likely. 
Even more critically, the increasing moderation of the worldviews of 
significant religious groups rendered those groups less of a threat to the 
secular democratic state (Heper 1997:34). 
 
The structural model recently came under criticism by scholars of the societal 
model such as Cihan Tuğal (2006, 2009) and Zülküf Aydın (2005) who assert 
that the emergence of a supposedly moderate Islamic paradigm in Turkey 
occurred due to rising pressure of social forces on the regime and this should be 
seen as a 'conservative or silent revolution' (See also Tuğal 2009; Atasoy 2005; 
Yavuz 2004, 2013). This narrative developed within the societal model has been 
influential in shaping the political discourse in Turkey to such extent that even 
the AKP administration used the label of ‘silent revolution’ to name one of its 
major official publications, which praises the party’s efforts for the supposed 
creation of a socially modern, moderate and liberal democratic ‘new Turkey’ 
since 2002 (see The Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry 2013).        
 
In this narrative, rather than the pressure of state institutions on Islamic 
political movement, change is argued to have manifested ‘from below’ as a 
result of social factors such as moderate Islamic networks. A common element 
found in studies belonging to the societal model school is the emphasis put on 
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the liberalisation process initiated by the then-prime minister Turgut Özal in 
the 1980s (Yavuz 2009; Aydın 2005). In this regard, Kamil Yılmaz (2009:120-
121) provides a typical narrative: 
 
Özal's tenure as prime minister (1983-89) and president (1989-93) is… a 
breakthrough in Turkish history… his neoliberal economic policies along 
with his efforts in expanding individual rights and freedoms benefited… 
people with religious backgrounds. The small companies of these 
religious businessmen in Anatolia started to export their goods abroad, 
especially textiles, through which some of them became multi-billion 
dollar business enterprises... It is possible to say that the Özal era marked 
the transformation of these religious people from the lower class to the 
'middle class' stratum in Turkish society.           
 
1.2.3.2 The critique of the literature and the multiple modernities paradigm 
 
Studies of Turkey’s experience in state-religion relations conducted by the 
aforementioned structural and societal models are helpful to understand the 
process of ideological transformation experienced by the Islamic political 
movement as each school of thought shed light on different elements of this 
complex phenomenon. Nevertheless, neither of the structural and societal 
models can fully account for the ideological moderation of the movement as 
each overlooks critical factors that shaped this trajectory.   
 
The structural model is state-centric as it overlooks critical effects of economic 
development and social networks on transformation of the Islamic movement. 
The argument of the structural model is solely based on the hypothesis that 
Islamic groups moderated due to gradual liberalisation of political sphere in the 
country as the Republican regime gradually softened its ideology, eventually 
allowing conservative citizens more freedom to express themselves. This 
argument is derived from a long established understanding in the theoretical 
literature on democratisation known as the ‘democratic moderation thesis’ (See 
Somer 2007).  
 
The democratic moderation thesis claims that if an anti-systemic political 
movement is persecuted by the state, it will be radicalised whereas opening up 
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the system to participation will inevitably result in its moderation (Somer 
2007). A case that challenges this hypothesis, however, is that of the split within 
the Turkish Islamic political movement itself. After the closure of the Islamic FP 
(Fazilet Partisi) in 2001 by the Constitutional Court, the competing factions 
within the FP formed two different parties, namely the reformist AKP and the 
traditionalist SP (Saadet Partisi). While the former adopted a moderate platform 
and refused the concept of shari'a, the latter continues to overtly challenge the 
secular state structure today. Both movements had been the subject of the same 
policy of ‘carrot and stick’ by the secularist regime of Turkey, but the strategy 
clearly resulted in two different political discourses (Gümüşçü and Sert 
2009:961). 
 
So, why the reformist faction of the FP founded the AKP and changed their 
political discourse, whereas the revolutionary Islamic ideology of the SP 
remained intact? The difference between the AKP and the SP lay in the social 
and economic ties both movements formed over the years, a nuance that can 
only be highlighted if social forces are taken into account (Çavdar 2006:480). 
Thus, the methodology of the societal model centred on the analysis of social 
factors have to be acknowledged as the ties between the AKP and the 
conservative capitalist class in Turkey resulted in the moderation of the 
movement, a factor that differentiates the AKP from the SP (Gümüşçü and Sert 
2009).  
 
As highlighted by the critique above, the structural model neglects a key 
component, namely the impact of social forces on ideological moderation such 
as the nature of economy. A similar problem exists within the narrative 
provided by the societal school as this approach also overlooks a key aspect, the 
gradual opening of a limited political space to Islamism by the Kemalist regime 
through a supervised democratisation process.  
 
The societal model takes the rise of a conservative capitalist class aligned with 
the Islamic political movement in the 1980s and 1990s as the main determinant 
of ideological moderation. However, through overlooking the importance of the 
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pre-1980 limited democratisation process that allowed Islamic groups to form 
political parties such as the MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi) which had even entered 
coalition governments throughout the 1970s, the societal model fails to provide 
an answer to this question: why the Islamic political movement in Turkey had 
not been transformed into a revolutionary force due to its supposed repression 
by the assertive secularist regime in the pre-1980 period? The answer is 
provided by the structural model, which suggests that the gradual opening of 
the political system with the transition to multi-party political life in 1950 
provided an opportunity space for social and political activities of Islamists, 
preventing the radicalisation of the movement. In fact, in the pre-1980 period, 
the Islamic political movement known as the National View (Milli Görüş 
Hareketi)7 had already adopted democratic competition as a method. Without 
the crucial historical background of the pre-1980 period and the gradual 
integration of Islamism into Turkish political life, the moderation of Islamic 
discourse witnessed with the rise of the AKP in the 2000s could not have 
possibly occurred.  
 
The aforementioned shortcomings of both of the established approaches to the 
social development experience of Turkey are caused by the dedication of these 
schools to present Turkey as an exemplar of hypotheses developed by the 
mainstream theories of modernisation. While applying the framework of CMT 
on the Turkish case, the structural model over-emphasises the role of 
secularisation in modernity and develops a Eurocentric argument that portrays 
all understandings of Islam as potentially de-stabilising forces that should 
always be contained by the state. This framework overlooks the complexity of 
the Islamic movement and the ties it has built with different social forces such 
as business unions (e.g. MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD), Islamic orders (e.g. Naqshbandi 
orders and the Gülen movement) and intellectuals which have also shaped the 
direction of the movement while producing different variants of political 
                                                        
7
 Since 1969, the National View movement formed all the mainstream Islamic political parties in 
Turkey: the MNP (1970-71); the MSP (1972-81); the RP (1983-1998); the FP (1997-2001) and the SP 
(2001-Present). The reformist wing of the National View seceded from the FP and formed the AKP 
(2001-Present).  
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Islamism adopted by competing parties such as the AKP and the SP in modern 
Turkey.  
 
Akin to the structural model, the societal model also puts forward a uni-
dimensional understanding in its application of the framework developed by 
NMT to the case of Turkish socio-political development. Through focusing solely 
on the post-1980 economic development process of the country, which is said to 
have produced a so-called Muslim capitalist modernity, the impact of the pre-
1980 democratisation process and the interaction between the secularist state 
and the Islamic movement on the ideological transformation of Turkish 
Islamism is neglected. 
 
As will be analysed in detail in Chapter 2, MMP suggests that there are many 
different variants of Islamism within predominantly Muslim societies stemming 
from the various readings of Islamic scripture as well as the particular cultural, 
economic and political contexts of countries that condition the ideologies and 
methods of Islamic movements. As there are multiple ways to achieve 
modernity in non-Western societies that diverge from the Western experience, 
it is only natural that there would also be many different ‘Islamisms’ (Kaya 
2004). Unlike CMT that presents secularisation as the only way for the 
modernisation of the Muslim world and NMT that portrays Islam as fully 
compatible with capitalism and democracy, MMP does not presuppose any 
knowledge about the nature of Islamism and its connection with modernity. 
This allows MMP to avoid ideological bias in its approach to the subject matter. 
Its framework is highly inclusive which allows scholars to effectively 
understand the unique historical characteristics of social development in non-
Western countries. 
    
Based on the setting of a society, Islamic political movements may manifest in 
various forms and the nature of Islamism may change due to the alteration of 
the initial socio-political and economic conditions. The change of the discourse 
of Islamism occurred in parallel to the transformation experienced by the 
Turkish state and its official ideology over the years, a key aspect of socio-
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political development that has been overlooked within the literature developed 
by the structural and societal models (Turam 2012a:5). In the context of the 
evolution of Islamism in Turkey, the utilisation of MMP by this thesis will also 
demonstrate how the state has changed through its engagement with the 
Islamic movement.      
   
MMP offers a multi-dimensional framework to study the evolution of the Islamic 
political movement of Turkey as it highlights the significance of path-
dependency within the modernisation trajectory of a given society. The 
application of MMP to the case of development in Turkey in Chapter 5 of the 
thesis will reveal that a broader set of institutional and social factors than those 
envisaged by the structural and societal models affected the Turkish Islamic 
movement, producing the AKP in the 2000s.                       
 
1.3 RE-CONCEPTUALISING THE TURKISH MODEL THROUGH THE LENS OF 
THE MULTIPLE MODERNITIES PARADIGM 
 
The aforementioned critique of the structural and societal models and the 
frameworks of CMT and NMT that inform their methodology on each of the 
three key aspects of modernisation – economic, political and social development 
processes – highlighted some of the shortcomings of the existing literature on 
the modernisation of Turkey. In every step of that analysis, the alternative 
framework offered by MMP was discussed in comparison to show that it could 
remedy these shortcomings and account for the unique nuances of Turkish 
modernity more effectively than the established theories.  
 
The literature review in the preceding part showed that the most noteworthy 
gap in the literature of Turkish model is the absence of a study that highlights 
the significance of path-dependency, historical contingency and international 
context within the whole process of transformation. In the following empirical 
chapters on Turkish modernisation, the thesis will adopt MMP that highlights 
the influence of historical conditions and show in detail how the post-1980 
period of economic development, democratisation and ideological 
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transformation processes in the country were built upon the consequences of 
the pre-1980 era setting, being entirely shaped by earlier events. MMP will also 
enable this thesis to study the effects of a wide range of factors on the 
modernisation of Turkey, rather than restricting the work to the analysis of only 
the role of the state or the social forces such as capitalists and Islamic orders.  
 
Another key advantage in applying MMP to the study of modernisation in non-
Western countries such as Turkey is that it saves the researcher from making 
Eurocentric presuppositions about linkages between economic development, 
democratisation and secularisation processes. As it will be shown in Chapter 2 
and as discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter, both CMT and NMT 
claim that economic development and democratisation are positively correlated 
which means that an improvement in one process would always positively 
impact on the other. This assumption of a positive feedback loop is derived from 
the historical Western experience of modernisation that resulted in the 
formation of liberal democratic regimes and capitalist economies in Western 
European and Northern American societies in addition to some non-Western 
cases such as Japan and South Korea.  
   
As a result of the adoption of the positive feedback loop concept, CMT and NMT 
as well as their reflections within the literature on Turkish study all three 
processes of modernisation collectively, which leave them highly susceptible to 
ideological bias. The feedback loop hypothesis is the main cause of reductionist 
arguments such as the view developed by CMT that incompatibility between 
modernity and religious and/or cultural values of the non-Western world 
should be attributed for the absence of democracy in non-Western societies 
(Kedourie 1992). The logic of this argument implies that the West modernised 
and democratised because its cultural and/or religious belief system is superior 
to other societies.         
 
The teleology inherent in this retrospective account of modernisation prevents 
researchers of modernisation from studying ‘what is out there’ as they rather 
study ‘what is not out there’ by expecting democratisation to manifest whenever 
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secularisation process is initiated and/or the economic development levels 
reach the average standards of Western economies. Consequently, the realities 
and experiences of our time are neglected, while the future of the non-Western 
world is conceptualised as a mere replica of the contemporary Western 
countries. The epistemology of MMP successfully remedies this problem as it 
does not claim a priori knowledge about the subject matter, instead studying 
economic development, democratisation and ideological change processes in 
non-Western cases separately from one another to realistically uncover the 
connections or lack thereof between these phenomena. As a result, MMP 
provides a more objective method to analyse diverse trajectories of 
modernisation across the non-Western world, rather than expecting all societies 
to eventually converge towards Western values.   
 
In recent years, a growing number of critical works have challenged established 
accounts of Turkish modernisation put forward mainstream theories of 
modernity. The most significant of these critical studies on various aspects of 
Turkish modernity are the works of Aykut Kansu (1995), Reşat Kasaba (1997), 
Nilüfer Göle (2000; 2002; 2009), Bedri Gencer (2000; 2008), Alev Çınar (2005), 
Chris Hann (1995), Selçuk Esenbel (2000) and Esra Özyürek (2006) – all of 
which have greatly benefited this thesis.  
 
Göle (2000; 2009), Özyürek (2006) and Çınar (2005), in particular, contributed 
to the conceptual framework of the thesis as all three scholars use approaches 
inspired by or analogous to MMP. Göle’s theory, referred to as ‘local 
modernities’, is fully compatible with MMP, which is hardly surprising 
considering that she has previously used MMP itself in her works. Local 
modernities are defined as the ‘peculiar form modernity takes in non-Western 
societies’ (Göle 2009:95). A very similar concept is referred to as ‘alternative 
modernities’ by Özyürek (2006:18-19). Accordingly, modernity does not lie 
beyond the ‘imagination’ and ‘social practice’ of non-Western societies and their 
own characteristics give a particular shape to it, which emerges out of the 
interaction between Western modernity and non-Western contexts.  
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Akin to Göle, Çınar (2005) and Özyürek (2006) aim to illustrate the synthetic 
ways in which Turkey’s historically and contextually specific features have 
combined with Western influence to create contemporary Turkish modernity. 
The heavy emphasis placed on the role of international context – in terms of 
Turkey’s interaction with external actors such as NATO, the EU and the IMF – 
for the manifestation of Turkish model in this thesis is partly inspired by Göle’s 
arguments. The insights offered by Çınar were also helpful as her framework 
implicitly makes use of path dependency in addition to international context.    
 
Another valuable insight for this thesis was derived from Kansu (1995) who 
strongly believes that political change in Turkey should not be studied with the 
taken-for-granted assumption that the year the republic was founded – 1923 – 
constituted a break in the historical narrative; and historians should instead 
focus on highlighting the linkages between the late Ottoman years and the 
Republican period. In my study of the genegis of the Turkish model, I follow a 
very similar line of argument, emphasising path dependency and continuity 
within Turkey’s modernisation experience over accounts centred on 
presuppositions of break. Another noteworthy work that stresses the driving 
role of path dependency is Gencer (2000) and akin to his framework, the 
premise of this thesis is that historical experience of a country should be 
examined as a whole rather than focusing on subjectively selected segments. 
 
The CMT-oriented understanding of modernity and modernisation has been the 
main target of deconstruction by critical Turkish studies. In light of this, the 
critique this thesis launches against CMT through the lens of MMP may seem as 
‘beating the air’ – in other words, a futile attempt to highlight the shortcomings 
of a perspective that has already been widely denounced. Since the 1970s, many 
critics of CMT such as dependency and world-system theorists have proclaimed 
the ‘donwfall’ of this mainstream school of thought, a belief shared by Kansu 
(1995:13-14): 
  
There is no need to have a discussion here about the limits, ideological 
choices and shortcomings of [Classical] Modernization Theory. This 
discussion has already been successfully made by academics based in the 
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United States of America and Modernization Theory has been left to the 
dusty shelves of libraries, where it belongs (Kansu 1995:13-14). 
 
This argument, which presents CMT as an obsolete paradigm that has long lost 
its appeal for public imagination and for academics working on related fields, 
was premature. In fact, much of the discursive hegemony of CMT and that of its 
more recent variant – NMT – is intact even today. In this regard, the sense of 
euphoria that initially characterised the writings of political scientists and 
columnists after the 2011 Arab uprisings can be evaluated as evidence, because 
many observers perceived the street protests as a vindication of the hypothesis 
that all societies would build liberal democratic societies and converge towards 
Western modernity (Cook 2011; Landler 2011; Sullivan 2011; Massad 2012). As 
shown in the preceding sections of this chapter, the mainstream portrayals of 
Turkish model have been archetypes of such a discourse, clearly illustrating the 
way in which those adhering to the tenets of structural and societal models 
continuously apply the ideas of CMT and NMT. Hence, the need to deconstruct 
the Eurocentric frameworks of CMT and NMT in the context of the Turkish 
model debate has so far remained as a major gap, constituting the primary 
purpose of this thesis.   
 
To fully reflect unique characteristics of the Turkish experience, this thesis 
adopts the conceptual framework of MMP as it will study each pillar of Turkish 
modernisation separately: Chapter 3 will focus on the economic development 
process, Chapter 4 will examine the democratisation experience and Chapter 5 
will trace the ideological transformation of the Islamic political movement. In 
Chapter 6, the linkages or lack thereof between these three processes will be 
highlighted to present the characteristics of Turkish modernity and to re-
examine the arguments put forward by theories of modernisation in light of 
findings drawn from the Turkish case. Before proceeding towards a new 
analysis of the modernisation experience of Turkey through the lens of MMP, 
the following parts of the chapter will explain the research methodology and 
methods used throughout this thesis. 
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1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS  
 
In this part of the chapter, the type of research and the nature of sources used in 
the thesis will be discussed. In this regard, the three essential questions below 
will be answered:   
 
i) Why the Turkish case has been selected in particular for this study of 
modernisation? 
  
ii) What type of research methodology and methods are used in this thesis to 
verify hypotheses based on the framework of MMP?   
 
iii) How the research was conducted (i.e. the examination of the data collection 
and selection process)?  
 
1.4.1 Why the Turkish Case?  
 
Turkey is often portrayed in the scholarly literature on modernisation as the 
‘first modern Muslim country’ and/or ‘a bridge between the West and the East’, 
constituting an allegedly successful model of Westernisation for other 
predominantly Muslim societies to follow (See Ahmad 1993; Kaya 2004:11, Göl 
2008:18; Laçiner 2014:20; Nasr 2009:232-237; Çavdar 2006; Dede 2011; 
Atasoy 2011; Akyol 2012; Tziarras 2013; Kaddorah 2010). Turkey has long held 
a ‘special place’ within the literature as the experience of the modern Republic 
and that of its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, together constitute one of the 
longest processes of Westernisation ever witnessed in a non-Western society 
(Lewis 1961; Göl 2008, 2009; Laçiner 2014).  
 
When the Industrial Revolution began in the latter half of the 18th century in 
Britain and spread to Western Europe and the US within a few decades, the 
Ottoman Empire was in control of a considerable portion of Eastern Europe as 
well as most of the territories that today constitute the region known as the 
MENA. As the contemporary successor to one of the largest non-Western 
empires and an early example of independent nation-states in the non-Western 
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world, the Republic of Turkey and its modernisation experience caught the 
attention of scholars as well as policy-makers from other countries since the 
1930s (Rustow and Ward 1964; Rostow 1960; Apter 1965; Lerner 1958).  
 
As mentioned before at the beginning of this chapter, the history of the concept 
of Turkish model can be traced to the 1930s when the Westernisation program 
of the Kemalists based on secularism and state-led economic development 
inspired the implementation of similar, albeit smaller-scale, reforms in Iran 
under Reza Shah Pahlavi and Afghanistan under King Amanullah Khan (Atabaki 
and Zürcher 2004; Omrani 2007:155). In fact, whenever new states or political 
regime changes manifested8 in predominantly Muslim non-Western societies, 
Turkey has been shown as a potential guide that can be used as a model in the 
formulation of economic, political and social development programs (See, for 
instance, Bal 1998; Altunışık 2005).  
 
The special role long attributed to Turkey by scholars of modernisation as well 
as policy-makers of other countries such as Reza Shah Pahlavi resulted in the 
country to exert a noteworthy influence over historical and contemporary 
studies of modernisation. Due to its close interaction with the Western world, 
Turkey also possesses a long and complex history of Westernisation, which 
enables researchers to study the reactions of the society to this external 
stimulus and its subsequent consequences on the political, economic and social 
development trajectory in the country. To sum up, the high attention given to 
the country in the scholarly literature and its particularly long historical 
experience mean that Turkey is an appropriate non-Western country case to 
test the validity of hypotheses offered by MMP as well as to critically re-examine 
the earlier understandings of modernity developed by CMT and NMT in light of 
the data provided by the Turkish modernisation experience.   
 
                                                        
8
 For example, the full independence of various MENA countries such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria after 
the decolonisation process in the late 1940s; the foundation of new nation-states such as Azerbaijan 
and Turkmenistan in Caucasia and Central Asia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991; 
the 2011 uprisings in a number of MENA countries such as Tunisia and Egypt.  
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1.4.2 Research Methodology   
 
The use of theories in social research has always been necessary and inevitable 
as empirical data analysis and generalisable theoretical frameworks are 
intrinsically linked (Neuman 2014:88; Ritchie and Lewis 2003:25). Empirical 
data collection and case analysis is a meaningful method for enhancing our 
knowledge as long as it can yield generalisable hypotheses. The opposite is also 
true, however, as hypothetical principles that supposedly govern social reality 
should be tested on cases to verify their validity: 
  
Most qualitative researchers when writing about their craft emphasize a 
preference for treating theory as something that emerges out of the 
collection and analysis of data… [P]ractitioners of grounded theory… 
especially stress the importance of allowing theoretical ideas to emerge 
out of one’s data. But some qualitative researchers argue that qualitative 
data can and should have an important relation to the testing of theories 
as well (Bryman 2012:387).    
 
This thesis adheres to the latter approach as it consistently refers to a number 
of theories of modernity and aims to compare and contrast them on the Turkish 
case in order to assess their explanatory capabilities.            
 
As will be examined in more detail in Chapter 2, the theories of modernity 
within the literature – including the framework of MMP adopted in this thesis – 
define the concept of modernisation as ‘a broad process of transformation that 
consists of systemic changes in the fields of economic, political and social 
development’ (Wagner 2012:X). The highly discursive and interpretative9 
nature of a thesis that studies this multi-dimensional process of change 
pertaining to economic and socio-political structures necessitates the use of 
qualitative methodology (Ritchie and Lewis 2003:3). After all, qualitative 
methodology is most suited to understand the ‘complexities of social and 
                                                        
9
 In social research, interpretivism is an epistemological stance which argues that social scientific 
knowledge cannot be isolated from the way the social world impacts on the worldview of researchers 
(Ritchie and Lewis 2003:17). Even though it may not be possible to produce entirely objective 
knowledge, the researcher can minimise the risk of personal bias as much as possible through 
clarifying the rationale behind the choice of certain methodological and theoretical frameworks used 
in producing knowledge. Interpretivism is one of the key characteristics of qualitative research that 
clearly distinguishes it from quantitative methodology, which is based on natural scientific model 
(Bryman 2012:380). For a more detailed examination of research subjects of interpretative nature, see 
Berg (2001:239).   
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political life’, which, in the context of this thesis, refers to the re-examination of 
the literature on democratisation and ideological transformation processes in 
Turkey through MMP (Pierce 2008:45).  
 
The nature of qualitative methodology has been the source of contentious 
debates among scholars and one particularly controversial issue is about the 
reliability of this type of research (Trenta 2014:110). Quantitative researchers, 
in particular, have raised doubts about whether truly objective knowledge can 
be obtained through what is often described as qualitative researchers’ 
‘unsystematic views about what is significant’ and supposedly ‘unstructured’ 
ways of collecting data (Bryman 2012:405). In this context, various methods 
have been suggested for correctly assessing the reliability and validity of 
qualitative research, ranging from external reliability to internal validity and the 
criteria for trustworthiness10. One of the most commonly used methods in recent 
years is the so-called subtle realist account – developed by Martyn Hammersley 
(1990) – which acknowledges the difficulty of being certain about the reliability 
of qualitative research as the world of social reality consists of mostly subjective 
interpretations. Hence, subtle realism suggests that the most effective way to 
assess the merit of qualitative research is to see if the hypotheses can be 
internally verified in light of the data presented within a given work (Bryman 
2012:396).           
 
In the conduct of social research, understanding the characteristics of 
qualitative methodology is only the first step towards thinking about the nature 
of a research project. Eventually, every researcher who engages in qualitative 
study is faced with an ontological decision about how to understand social 
reality and our knowledge of it:  
 
In broad terms, there are three distinct positions, realism, materialism 
and idealism. Realism claims that there is an external reality which exists 
independently of people’s beliefs or understanding about it… Materialism 
also claims that there is a real world but that only material features, such 
as economic relations, or physical features of that world hold reality… 
                                                        
10
 For a detailed explanation of these different approaches of research assessment, see Bryman 
(2012:390-414).   
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Idealism, on the other hand, asserts that reality is only knowable through 
the human mind and socially constructed meanings (Ritchie and Lewis 
2003:11). 
 
Though realism, materialism and idealism constitute three broad and opposing 
categories, it has been noted that there are ‘less extreme’ stances such as subtle 
realism that can be positioned in a middle ground in the imaginary spectrum of 
varying ontological positions (Ritchie and Lewis 2003:13). This thesis adheres 
to subtle realist account, forthrightly acknowledging that the analysis it 
provides on the Turkish model of modernity through the lens of MMP is only 
one possible understanding of social reality. Yet, it is my sincerest belief and 
hope that the data and analysis presented in this work can shed light on a 
broader portion of reality than the existing approaches on the subject matter 
put forward by structural and societal models.    
 
The main argument – and the target contribution to scholarly literature – of the 
thesis is based on the premise that the data available for the study of the 
Turkish model of modernity and its historical background can be interpreted 
more successfully with a framework provided by MMP. In an attempt to prove 
the validity of this argument, the thesis uses critical research approach – which 
is a type of qualitative methodology – to highlight the shortcomings of existing 
narratives on Turkish modernity offered by structural and societal models. 
Historically, critical research has its roots in Marxist theory and post-
structuralism, but it is no longer exclusively used by such researchers. Broadly 
understood, critical research is used to re-evaluate/deconstruct11 existing 
approaches to the study of a subject matter in addition to offer alternative ways 
for studying the same subject more effectively. For instance, a crucial part of 
such research could be to draw attention to under-studied dimensions of a 
subject to show that a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon 
is possible. As this thesis argues that the readings of Turkish modernity by 
structural and societal models suffer from Eurocentrism and that a more 
                                                        
11
 Note that ‘deconstruction’, in the context of this thesis, refers to the research method based on 
criticising existing approaches to a subject. It is not used in the context of a broad theoretical 
perspective as in post-structuralist research (for more details on this issue, see Comstock 1982; 
Bryman 2012:380-384).     
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effective comprehension of it can be obtained through the lens of MMP, a 
methodology based on critical research is appropriate. The use of qualitative 
methodology based on the critical research approach has shaped the data 
collection and analysis methods of this thesis, which will be clarified in the next 
section.          
                    
1.4.3 Research Methods: Analysing and ‘Re-reading’ the Data 
1.4.3.1 Data Analysis  
 
Qualitative researchers have often been criticised for not providing clear 
explanations of their data collection process and/or being much less explicit 
about their methods of data analysis compared to quantitative researchers 
(Neuman 2014:477). In recent years, however, this trend has been changing as 
many qualitative researchers are now expected to clearly justify their choices of 
research methods.  
 
As explained in the previous section, this thesis uses a critical approach based 
qualitative methodology. Various research methods are used for examination of 
qualitative data and the most appropriate one for this study is narrative analysis 
method, which is ‘a type of qualitative data analysis that presents a 
chronologically linked chain of events in which individual or collective social 
actors have an important role’ (Neuman 2014:496). The critical methodology of 
this thesis aims to deconstruct established narratives about the historical 
origins of Turkish modernity and replace them with an alternative explanation. 
Narrative analysis method is best suited for this type of work because it is 
specifically designed for examining connections between crucial historical 
events (e.g. a social uprising or a sudden regime change) and macro-level 
historical processes (e.g. economic development, democratisation or social 
change), aiming to understand the ‘sequence of events’ and explain ‘why events 
and phenomena occur as they do?’ (Neuman 2014:496).                     
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Narrative analysis method has three main tools that will be consistently used 
throughout this thesis: 1. path dependency, 2. periodization and 3. historical 
contingency.  
 
Path dependency is ‘the way that a unique beginning can trigger a sequence of 
events’, the historical starting point continuously shaping the outcome of the 
following trajectory (Neuman 2014:497). The impact of initial conditions on the 
subsequent development of events may take different forms – positive and/or 
negative – such as constraining, limiting or even accelerating a given 
phenomenon. If the strength of the initial event far outweighs the influence of 
subsequent events and fully determines the characteristics of the entire path, 
then this case is called as a self-reinforcing path dependency: 
 
A classic example… is the QWERTY pattern of letters on a keyboard. The 
pattern is inefficient. It takes longer for the fingers to hit keys than 
alternative patterns do, and it is difficult to learn. Engineers created 
QWERTY more than a century ago to work with early crude, slow, 
mechanical typewriters. They designed a keyboard pattern that would 
slow human typists to prevent the primitive machines from jamming. 
Later, mechanical typewriters improved and were replaced by electric 
typewriters and then by electronic keyboards. The old keyboard pattern 
was unnecessary and obsolete, but it continues to this day. The inertia to 
use an obsolete, inefficient system is strong. It overwhelms efforts to 
change existing machinery and people to a more rational, faster 
keyboard. Social institutions are similar. Once social relations and 
institutions are created in specific form… it is difficult to change them 
even if they are no longer efficient under current conditions (Neuman 
2014:497).  
 
Another probable variant of path dependency is the so-called reactive sequence, 
which radically differs from self-reinforcing path dependency. In the case of 
reactive sequence, each new historical juncture or turning point builds upon the 
previous one, but initial starting conditions do not necessarily exert an over-
whelming force that could determine the entire trajectory of a given 
phenomenon (Neuman 2014.497). Hence, each new factor that enters the chain 
of events has the potential to subvert the entire trajectory, ultimately changing 
the outcome.  
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In the empirical analysis of Turkey’s modernisation experience in this thesis – 
studied respectively in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 on the economic, political and social 
aspects of the phenomenon – I will heavily utilise both types of path 
dependency based analytical methods. Particularly in Chapter 6, in which the 
theoretical implications of the Turkish case will be discussed, a number of 
flowcharts based on path-dependency explanations will be presented to 
highlight the sequence of key factors and turning points that shaped Turkey’s 
sui generis modernisation trajectory.   
 
Periodization is another commonly used tool of narrative analysis method as 
qualitative researchers working on long historical processes often break the 
‘flow of time’ into artificial segments to help us understand the underlying 
characteristics of certain eras that distinguishes them from preceding or 
following eras (Neuman 2014:498). This thesis too follows a certain 
periodization method in its analysis of the Turkish case, but the characteristics 
of this particular periodization were not my own design. In fact, I argue that the 
contrasting periodization methods used in mainstream studied of Turkish 
model by the structural and societal models – namely the pre-1980/post-1980 
divide – disrupt the narrative of Turkey’s modernisation experience as a 
continuous trajectory. Through studying path dependent elements in pre-1980 
and post-1980 periods, my aim is to show the linkages in between, expose the 
explanatory weaknesses of existing approaches, and ultimately re-conceptualise 
the Turkish modernity. 
 
The last tool of narrative analysis research method, historical contingency, is ‘a 
unique combination of particular factors or specific circumstances that may not 
be repeated’ and this ‘combination is idiosyncratic and unexpected from the 
flow of prior conditions’ (Neuman 2014:498). Historical contingency can be 
seen as the main threat to deterministic social theories as such case-specific 
factors may potential defy supposedly generalisable hypotheses. I combine 
historical contingency and path dependency methods to explain why – despite 
repeated attempts to conform to values of Western modernity such as 
secularism, liberal democracy and free-market capitalism – the Turkish 
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experience produced divergent features that defy deterministic expectations of 
CMT and NMT derived from their study of historical European and Northern 
American experiences. The next section will discuss the data collection methods 
followed in this thesis.     
 
1.4.3.2 Data Collection  
 
The staggering and ever-increasing amount of data available for the study of a 
subject matter such as modernisation means that one of the key difficulties 
faced by the researcher is how to specify the issues to be studied and how to 
select the sources on that basis. The way I have managed this issue is that as 
broad a concept as modernisation is commonly understood, the conceptual 
framework provided by theories of modernity allows it to be constructed as 
consisting of three specific development processes in economic, political and 
social life. As the preceding parts of this chapter defined these processes 
themselves through the frameworks of the structural and societal models as 
‘economic development’, ‘democratisation’ and ‘ideological transformation of 
Islamism’ in the case of the Turkish modernity, the thesis develops its historical 
analytical narrative based on this narrowly defined conceptualisation. These 
three processes can be seen as essential ‘case studies’ to understand the 
modernisation experience in Turkey as they constitute the mostly commonly 
referred aspects of Turkish modernity today.    
 
It is important to note that to further specify the research inquiry, the thesis 
solely focuses on the modernisation experience of the Republic of Turkey from 
its foundation in 1923 until 2013 and the historical legacy of the Ottoman 
Empire is not studied in detail – though it is acknowledged when necessary at 
certain instances as the modernisation of the country certainly began in the late 
Ottoman era (Göl 2009:799). As the three cases of modernisation refers to the 
study of macro processes such as industrialisation, mechanisation, 
secularisation and democratisation, the focus of the thesis is on showing which 
policies and factors have impacted on them and how these phenomena have 
evolved over the years. As such, even though micro elements of modernisation 
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such as the evolution of party politics, voting preferences of the citizenry and 
changes in the practice of social customs and traditions are referred to in 
relevant instances of the thesis, they do not constitute the focal points of the 
work.    
         
Most of the data used throughout the thesis come from critical examination and 
interpretation of a variety of sources, namely the secondary literature such as 
peer-reviewed journal articles, academic books and monographs and the 
primary literature such as political party programs, official party manifestos, 
constitutions, a number of legal articles and reports of international 
organisations such as the EU, the IMF and the World Bank as well as those of 
non-governmental organisations such as the Freedom House and Reporters 
Without Borders. As the originality of the work is based on conceptual 
interpretation, it makes no pretence to offering new and original data on the 
subject of Turkey’s modernisation such as unused archives or interviews. The 
difficulty of preserving scholarly objectivity is a known problem of research 
projects that are mainly reliant on secondary literature (Trenta 2014:110). To 
minimise this risk whenever possible, I have crosschecked the validity of the 
data provided by secondary sources with data obtained from primary sources 
and with statistical data.  
 
The use of statistical data to assess the economic development process in 
Turkey posed two other potential problems for the project: various sources 
have used different mathematically-based methods to analyse the same data set 
which have produced different results and different sources have offered 
contradicting data on the same periods of time (e.g. the differences between the 
official data released by governments and the data presented by international 
financial institutions). In order to ensure the reliability of the data as much as 
possible and at the expense of appearing one-sided, the thesis prioritised the 
data used by international financial institutions such as the World Bank over 
that of the Turkish governments. The rationale behind this is that compared to 
international organisations, governments are generally relatively less 
transparent structures consisting of a strict hierarchy of bureaucratic 
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institutions that are potentially more capable to manipulate data such as 
economic growth rates. Also, they are more likely to resort to such an action due 
to their vested interest in appearing successful in the eyes of the citizenry. In the 
event of a clash between two methods of research over the same data, the thesis 
also prioritised the data offered by international organisations over that of 
scholars on the basis of preserving consistency.    
                 
1.4.3.3 Notes on Transliteration  
 
The method used in the transliteration of Turkish names is to keep their original 
forms in Turkish language as much as possible. For that purpose, letters that do 
not exist in English such as ‘ö’, ‘ğ’, ‘ü’ have been introduced, e.g. Turgut Özal, 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül. However, usages of Turkish names 
such as ‘Kemal Ataturk’ that have been strongly established in English sources 
with the absence of Turkish letters are kept in their familiar form in order to 
avoid confusing the reader.  
 
To preserve consistency, the thesis uses the abbreviation of institutions, parties 
and organisations as established in Turkish language rather than the 
abbreviation of their English translation. E.g. the AKP is the abbreviation of the 
original name of the party in Turkish, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, rather than 
that of its translation, ‘Justice and Development Party’. The same principle can 
be seen in the cases of the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – Republican People’s 
Party), the MGK (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu – National Security Council) and the DPT 
(Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı – State Planning Organisation). (See Pages 17-18 for 
the full list of abbreviations).         
 
1.4.4 Elaboration of Some Concepts  
   
In addition to the questions answered above, a number of caveats associated 
with the study of modernisation, its constituent elements and the case of Turkey 
need to be elaborated upon in this section.     
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1.4.4.1 Measuring economic development   
 
Measuring economic development levels in societies has long been a 
controversial issue within the fields of modernisation and political economy. In 
particular, the reliance of researchers on quantifiable indicators of development 
such as literacy rates, average per capita income, urbanisation ratio and 
industrialisation ratio have been accused of Eurocentrism as many of those who 
study these issues attribute a particular positive value to development and use 
the Western model of capitalist socio-economic organisation as a basis (Escobar 
1995). This is a valid critique as scholars of CMT have used indicators based on 
the ideological values of the West to measure how ‘developed’ other societies 
are. Nevertheless, in the absence of quantifiable indicators, there is no 
alternative method to study economic development. Some scholars have 
developed indexes to measure human happiness levels instead of economic 
development, but it is important to note that these studies are much more 
fallible than the positivist economic indicators, as only a very small sample of 
the total population can be included in these surveys which cannot provide any 
data for the analysis of economic change processes experienced by a society as 
whole (See, for instance, Selim 2008).  
 
1.4.4.2 Defining political Islamism and the Turkish Islamic movement  
 
A contentious issue that will be studied in the context of the Turkish 
modernisation experience is the definition of ‘political Islamism’. There exists a 
confusion about this concept as particularly after the September 11 attacks in 
the US in 2001 and the 7 July 2005 London bombings, Islam as a belief system 
has often been equated with its most radical interpretation adopted by terrorist 
groups such as the al-Qaeda (Göl 2011:432; Yıldırım 2012:36). It is important to 
note that there is a clear difference between Islam and Islamism as the former 
refers to the religion while the latter is used to denote the political ideology that 
is derived from a particular interpretation of religious values and worldview. 
Thus, it can be said that there is one Islam, yet there are many Islamisms. As 
such, political Islam should be analysed by ‘looking at the societal patterns, 
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political relations and modes of production in which it operates, as opposed to 
norms, ideals and values’ (Yıldırım 2012:39). 
  
An Islamic political movement can be defined as one whose ideology is derived 
from or inspired by religious values and that the mobilisation of its constituency 
is achieved through references to a shared religious identity (Yavuz 2009; 
Rashwan 2007:15). According to Banu Eligür (2010:4), political Islamism has 
many variants that use different methods to reach their objectives, yet a key 
denominator for all Islamic movements is that they take Islamic values of the 
era of the Prophet as a reference for morality and utilise it to produce solutions 
for the problems of the modern world. However, not all Islamisms are the same.  
 
The interpretation of Islamism adopted by many revolutionary Islamic 
movements is that of a closed society, one that envisages the imposition of 
shari’a from above and a very restricted democratic life compared to the 
Western liberal democratic model, if at all. Nevertheless, there are many 
political Islamic movements across the Muslim world that do not defend a 
totalitarian state structure and reject the forceful imposition of shari’a. The 
modern Turkish Islamic movement is multi-faceted as it consists of political 
parties such as the AKP and the SP, orders such as the Gülen movement and 
Naqshbandis, intellectuals such as Ali Bulaç, Sezai Karakoç and İsmet Özel, non-
governmental organisations such as MÜSİAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları 
Derneği) and various foundations and journals. The key characteristic of the 
mainstream Islamic movement in Turkey is its self-proclaimed moderateness, 
as it no longer appears to voice objectives such as building an Islamic theocracy, 
but seems rather concerned about expanding the expression and influence of 
religiosity within a public sphere and state designed by secularists:  
 
Islamism in Turkey is basically an urban movement empowered by a 
strong middle class and its identity politics (Çınar and Duran 2008:25).      
 
Apart from the mainstream Islamic movement, there remains a number of 
armed fringe groups such as the IBDA-C, the Hizbu’t Tahrir and the Hizbullah of 
Turkey that continue to overtly aim to build an Islamic state in Turkey through a 
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revolution, yet they are divided into small groups and lack any visible support 
from the population at large (Heper 1997:43; Aydın 2005:191). Despite their 
negligible influence over the social and political life of the country, however, it is 
important to note that these organisations have been involved in the murders of 
a number of secular and left-wing intellectuals in Turkey over the years (Eligür 
2010:4).  
 
There is a consensus within the scholarly literature that most Islamic groups in 
Turkey adopted a moderate and reformist stance that is flexible in its approach 
towards secularism and cultural Westernisation, yet it is important to note that 
not all groups have experienced the same level of transformation (Aydın 2005; 
Yavuz 2013; Atasoy 2005; Eligür 2010). The SP, for instance, remains an anti-
systemic party that is far more critical of secularism and issues such as alcohol 
consumption than the AKP. The underlying causes of the varying degrees of 
ideological transformation experienced by the Islamic political movement in 
Turkey will be discussed extensively in Chapter 5.  
 
1.4.4.3 Defining the ‘elite’  
 
The concept of ‘elite’ is commonly defined as those who hold a particular 
influence over policy-making through their control of commodities such as 
power (through positions in bureaucracy and government), wealth and 
knowledge production (Yılmaz 2009:114). In the context of Turkey, the term 
has long been utilised to refer to the Kemalists who had possessed influential 
positions within the administrative and judicial bureaucracy in addition to 
forming the officer class of the military (Burak 2012:66). The Republican or the 
Kemalist elite was characterised primarily by its traditional monopoly over 
cultural and political capital in the country rather than economic, therefore, it 
denotes a cultural group sharing a common lifestyle and worldview. It can be 
said that the group consisted of not only bureaucrats and politicians but also of 
intellectuals such as academicians (Göle 1997:50).  
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Throughout the thesis, I will utilise the terms ‘Republican elite’, ‘Kemalist elite’ 
and the ‘state establishment’ interchangeably to refer to the secularist elite that 
used to be influential over the policy-making in the country. Yet, it is important 
to note that the conventional balance of powers within Turkey rapidly changed 
over the course of the AKP rule since 2002 as a conservative ‘counter-elite’ 
manifested in the political, economic and social spheres of the country, an issue 
that will be analysed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  
  
1.5 CONCLUSION  
 
Part one of this chapter showed that CMT and NMT strongly impacted on the 
existing literature on the modernisation of Turkey, shaping respectively the 
approaches of the structural and societal models. Deriving their 
conceptualisation from the theories of modernity, the two models have defined 
the Turkish model as composed of three processes: economic development, 
democratisation and the ideological transformation of Islamism which, in the 
context of this thesis, form the three main case studies to understand the 
modernisation trajectory of Turkey. In this regard, a gap in the literature is that 
these elements of modernity in Turkey have not been studied holistically 
through the lens of MMP that offers an alternative perception of modernisation 
by contesting the views of CMT and NMT.   
 
Part two built on the findings of the literature review of the preceding section 
and examined the way aforementioned three processes of modernisation have 
been studied by the structural and societal models on the case of Turkey. It 
became clear that the significance of historical contingency, international 
context and path-dependency within the socio-economic and political 
development trajectory of the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods of the Republic 
has been the main neglected element in the narratives developed by the 
structural and societal models.  
 
In an attempt to prove the hypothesis developed by CMT that secularisation was 
a necessity of modernity, the structural model selected the pre-1980 period of 
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Republican modernisation experience and overlooked the changes experienced 
by the country since then. On the other hand, the societal model solely focused 
on the post-1980 period and presented the economic and political changes 
witnessed in the country from 1980 to 2013 as an illustration of the 
compatibility between religion and modernity, the so-called Islamic Calvinism. 
The assumption was that if Protestant ethics could positively impact on 
capitalist development in the Western world and that Christianity, democracy 
and capitalism could co-exist, the rise of moderate political Islamism would 
surely result in the formation of a capitalist and democratic modernity in 
predominantly Muslim societies such as Turkey.    
              
As explained in part three, throughout the analysis of the literature review and 
the comparison of existing approaches with the hypotheses of MMP, this 
chapter argued that there is a strong need to re-conceptualise the Turkish 
modernity. The variant of modernity in Turkey today is the path-dependent 
outcome of the modernisation trajectory in the country. Without understanding 
the developments of the pre-1980 period, the post-1980 era cannot be 
understood. As noted by a distinguished scholar of MMP, ‘a new understanding 
of modernity needs to build on the insight in the contingency of historical 
developments’ (Wagner 2012:XII).  
 
In accordance with the research methodology and methods presented in part 
four, the thesis will now proceed to study the three essential cases of the 
Turkish model of modernity in light of MMP. The following section will explain 
in detail the plan of the thesis, summarising the purpose of each chapter within 
the work.      
 
1.6 PLAN OF THE THESIS 
 
The following Chapter 2 contains the theoretical background of the thesis. It 
traces the emergence and evolution of modernisation studies from the post-
World War II period onwards, focusing particularly on how the terms modernity 
and modernisation have been conceptualised by different schools of thought 
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over the years. After comparatively examining the distinct understandings 
provided by schools of modernity, the chapter notes that all theories – including 
the multiple modernities paradigm – converge on understanding modernisation 
as the economic, political and social development experience of a society while 
modernity is the outcome of this process of change.          
 
The main objective of Chapter 3 is to re-conceptualise the economic 
modernisation trajectory of Turkey in light of a conceptual framework drawn 
from the multiple modernities paradigm. In this regard, the chapter focuses on 
how Turkey achieved economic modernity as defined by this theorem. 
Particular focus is given to the divergence of the Turkish case of economic 
development from the historical path of capitalist development in the Western 
world – as seen by classical and neo-modernisation theories. Throughout the 
chapter, the narratives of the structural and societal models are deconstructed 
through the lens of the multiple modernities paradigm, which emphasises the 
significance of path-dependency within different periods of economic 
modernisation in Turkey.  
 
Chapter 4 studies the political modernisation trajectory of Turkey in light of the 
framework of the multiple modernities paradigm. The democratisation process 
forms the most important element within the broader political modernisation 
trajectory. This is to critically review the narratives developed by classical and 
neo-modernisation theories, which long claimed that an economically modern 
society would also manage to build a consolidated liberal democratic regime. In 
contrast to this view, this chapter shows that the economic modernisation 
process in Turkey did not lead to the consolidation of liberal democracy. In the 
concluding part, the chapter highlights the way the Turkish case of political 
modernisation diverged from the Western model, focusing on the reasons 
behind this phenomenon.  
 
Chapter 5 provides the third and final component of the study of the Turkish 
modernity by examining the widely publicised ideological transformation of the 
Islamic political discourse in the country. As with Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, this 
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chapter provides a helpful case to test the validity of competing hypotheses put 
forward by theories of modernity as the so-called ‘social dimension of 
modernisation’ in the form of secularisation and/or ideological transformation 
has formed a crucial element of the frameworks of classical and neo-
modernisation scholars. The chapter argues that the two main factors that led to 
a change in the mainstream Islamic political discourse in Turkey were the 
political and economic opportunities that Islamic groups gained over the years. 
In this regard, political opportunity space refers to the provision of a degree of 
freedom of association for the Islamic political movement, which founded a 
number of political parties that competed in free and fair elections since the 
1970s. Economic opportunity space denotes the rise of a conservative capitalist 
class in the post-1980 period, which formed links with the Islamic political 
movement. The chapter explains how these two factors affected the ideological 
transformation of Islamic groups in Turkey. In this regard, the chapter will 
contest the hypothesis of classical modernisation theory, while the frameworks 
of neo-modernisation theory and multiple modernities paradigm will be 
validated. Nevertheless, potential problems within the understanding of social 
modernity by neo-modernisation theory will also be noted.          
     
 Chapter 6 collectively reflects on the performance of the research hypotheses 
used throughout this study of the Turkish case. It particularly discusses linkages 
or the lack thereof between the three main components of modernity – 
economic development, democratisation and ideological transformation. In this 
context, the theories of modernity are critically reviewed in light of the findings 
of the Turkish case. The chapter highlights the inability of the mainstream 
theories – classical and neo-modernisation – to account for all the particularities 
of the modernisation of Turkey. By contrast, it is argued that the conceptual 
framework of the multiple modernities paradigm can more successfully explain 
the divergent trajectory of modernisation in non-Western country cases such as 
Turkey due to its approach that challenges the exclusionary Eurocentrism of its 
rival theories.  
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Chapter 7 contains the summary and concluding remarks of the thesis. It 
reflects on the contributions of the work to the scholarly literature. In addition, 
the chapter discusses the potential objections and critique that may be raised as 
well as the potential avenues for future research.                    
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CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING MODERNITY AND MODERNISATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
Before proceeding to study the Turkish case in detail, it is necessary to discuss 
how the concept of modernity and its interaction with religion, economic 
development and democratisation have been perceived within modernisation 
studies. The question of ‘modernisation’ initially emerged in international 
politics in the 18th century when the economic and military supremacy of 
industrialising Western European nations vis-à-vis the rest of the world was 
becoming apparent (Gencer 2008:45). From the late 18th century onwards, non-
Western countries based near Europe such as the Ottoman Empire, Egypt and 
Iran initiated reformation programs to close the development gap with the 
West. Throughout the 19th century, other non-Western countries such as Japan 
and China also implemented modernisation programs in an attempt to defend 
their sovereignty from the threat of expanding Western colonial empires such 
as Britain, France and the Netherlands.  
 
Following the decolonisation process of the post-World War II years in the 
1950s and 1960s, numerous new independent states were founded across the 
non-Western world, attracting the interest of social scientists from various 
academic disciplines such as sociology, economics, political science and 
international relations (IR). A multi-disciplinary school of thought known as 
‘classical modernisation theory’ (CMT) emerged in the 1950s and the issue of 
modernisation began to be studied extensively. Over time, other schools of 
thought challenged the understanding of modernity developed by classical 
modernisation theorists. These included ‘dependency theory’, ‘world-systems 
theory’, ‘neo-modernisation theory’ (NMT) and ‘the multiple modernities 
paradigm’ (MMP).    
 
In order to show how the concept of modernity has been defined within the 
scholarly literature, this chapter will comparatively assess the arguments 
offered by competing theories within modernisation studies. The chapter 
consists of five sections. Following this introduction, part two provides an in-
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depth analysis of how the concept of modernity has been defined by three main 
theories. Part three builds upon that comparative analysis and discusses the 
way modernisation studies have perceived the interaction between modernity 
and three crucial issues – religion, economic development and democratisation. 
Part four offers a critique of mainstream depictions of modernity and 
modernisation, arguing that MMP can more effectively grasp the essence of 
these complex phenomena. Part five briefly summarises the analysis conducted 
throughout the chapter.  
 
2.2 WHAT CONSTITUTES ‘MODERNITY’? 
2.2.1 The Mainstream Approaches and Their Rivals: Classical 
Modernisation, Neo-Modernisation, Dependency and World-Systems  
 
CMT dominated academic discourses from the 1950s until the late 1970s. CMT 
is multi-disciplinary in nature and produced a number of variants within 
different disciplines such as economy, sociology, politics and international 
relations (IR). The theory inherited its strong belief in the idea of ‘human 
progress’ from 19th century European social thought (Turner 1984:1). Notable 
sociologists, such as Herbert Spencer and Emile Durkheim, utilised the concept 
of progress by portraying human history in terms of transformation from pre-
modern to modern society. For Spencer, this was a shift from ‘militancy’ to 
‘industrialism’, whereas Durkheim interpreted it in terms of a transition from 
‘mechanical solidarity’ based on shared values towards ‘organic solidarity’ 
based on division of labour (Durkheim 1964; Peel 1971; Leftwich 1996:7). CMT 
portrays the process of change and the idea of human progress as inevitable and 
irreversible, standing in contrast to the view of NMT and MMP that human 
civilisations may possibly experience cycles of progress and decay rather than 
constant development (Rustow and Ward 1964:3) (See Table 2.1.). 
 
Common to all variants of CMT regardless of their ideological roots and 
disciplines is the emphasis put on the dichotomy of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, 
namely the assumption that all traditional characteristics of a society would 
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gradually be replaced by modern ones (Erkilet 2007:108-138; Berberoglu 
1992:8; So 1990:33-34; Apter 1965:7). The concepts of tradition and modernity 
are placed at extremes of an imaginary spectrum indicating different levels of 
progress of a society. In this model, the two concepts are binary opposites and 
cannot co-exist with each other once a society completes its modernisation 
process. Walt Whitman Rostow (1960), for instance, offers one of the most 
classical dichotomies of CMT by analysing the transition to modernity in several 
phases, the starting point being the ‘traditional society’ and the final stage being 
the ‘mass consumption society’. The three stages in between collectively 
constitute the transition phases, the so-called ‘take-off’ to modernity. 
 
Apart from making a definite distinction between tradition and modernity, a 
common feature that characterises the works of classical modernisation 
theorists is their description of modernity as comprised of three inter-related 
processes of transformation: ‘economic development’, ‘social development’ and 
‘political development’ (see Levy 1968; Lerner 1958; Apter 1965; Rustow 
1970:337-338; Escobar 1995:4; Chuanqi 2004:300; Huntington 1968:33-34; 
Banuri 1987:12; Sigelman 1974:525; Zapf 2004:2; So 1990:33-34). Economic 
development refers to material changes in a society triggered by 
industrialisation, urbanisation and mechanisation. Social development denotes 
the gradual elimination of the influence of traditional and religious belief 
systems and their replacement – via secularisation process – by the rule of logic 
and science. Political development means the formation of centralised state 
structures with efficient decision-making mechanisms. In addition, it refers to 
the replacement of authoritarian states by governing bodies that would ensure 
the political representation of citizens via democratisation process. In other 
words, the conceptualisation of a ‘modern society’ by CMT is one that is 
industrialised, mostly urban, consumption-oriented, liberal democratic and 
secularised (Turner 1984:3).  
 
Industrialisation, secularisation and democratisation constitute the ‘holy trinity’ 
of CMT. These processes are valued as the only means to ensure the 
achievement of modernity (So 1990:33-34; Chuanqi 2004:300; Wagner 2008). It 
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has been argued that there is a positive feedback loop between these three 
processes as each one supposedly reinforces and enables the other to reach 
success (Lerner 1958; Apter 1965; Sigelman 1974:525; Zapf 2004:2). Dale F. 
Eickelman and James Piscatori (1996:23) have encapsulated the nature of the 
theory and the feedback loop:   
 
Economic specialization, it was argued, leads to political 
institutionalization; and the displacement of traditional, usually landed, 
elites by urban middle classes leads to the emergence of centralized 
commercial, bureaucratic, and educational structures.  
 
Understanding modernity in this manner shows that classical modernisation 
theorists have taken the historical transformation experience of Western 
European and Northern American societies as the basis for their 
conceptualisation. The model of a secularised, liberal democratic and capitalist 
country fully reflects the contemporary features of the Western world. Thus, the 
definition of modernity adopted by CMT clearly equates it with ‘Westernisation’. 
The more non-Western societies begin to resemble their Western counterparts, 
the more they would be evaluated as ‘modern’. Non-Western societies that have 
adopted Westernisation and undertaken reforms to emulate the Western 
development experience in political, economic and cultural spheres have been 
labelled as ‘transitional’ or ‘developing’ by CMT (Toprak 1981:6; Berberoglu 
1992). It is assumed that the rise of Western modernity in Europe and North 
America was merely the first image of the future of human civilisation and that 
Western experience was not geography-specific but merely the beginning of a 
‘universal’ transformation of humanity. The hypothesis of convergence into 
Western modernity is rooted at the heart of CMT:                           
 
Modernization is the internal achievement of a society; the particular 
processes of modernization support each other in combination; the 
leading nations do not impede the followers; the process of 
modernization are converging in a common goal (Berger 1996:46 cited 
in Zapf 2004:2). 
  
The understanding of modernisation as Westernisation was not only limited to 
academia but also shaped the mind-set of statesmen in the non-Western world, 
inspiring large-scale Westernising social engineering projects modelled after 
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European models such as the ones developed by Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and 
Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran (Ayubi 1991:49; Escobar 1995:VII). CMT dominated 
many disciplines of social sciences in the post-World War II years and its 
conceptualisation of modernity – as a Westernisation process that consists of 
economic, political and social development – rapidly became an unquestionable 
approach in the 1950s and 1960s:  
 
Development had achieved the status of a certainty in the social 
imaginary. Indeed, it seemed impossible to conceptualize social reality in 
other words. Wherever one looked, one found the repetitive and 
omnipresent reality of development: governments designing and 
implementing ambitious development plans, institutions carrying out 
development programs in city and countryside alike, experts of all kinds 
studying underdevelopment and producing theories ad nauseam 
(Escobar 1995:5).   
 
Despite its early intellectual hegemony, however, a number of emerging schools 
of thought such as dependency theory, world-systems theory, NMT and most 
recently, MMP, questioned the established framework of CMT from the late 
1960s onwards. When developing non-Western societies began to diverge from 
the Western modernity model in the decades following the decolonisation of the 
late 1950s and 1960s, classical modernisation theorists began to perceive 
culture and religion as the main factors that allegedly hindered modernisation 
efforts in the non-Western world (Volpi 2010:76). Neo-modernisation theorists, 
such as Samuel P. Huntington (1984), later resurrected this approach. In 
retrospect, the problem within the theoretical framework lay not in cultural 
differences between Western and non-Western societies but in the highly 
exclusionary conceptualisation of modernity by CMT as a ‘secular, liberal 
democratic and capitalist society’. 
 
CMT came under criticism by social theorists such as Ernest Gellner (1981) for 
not being able to explain why secularising non-Western societies such as Turkey 
and Iran could not catch up with the West in terms of attaining high levels of 
economic development and consolidating liberal democracy. The hypotheses of 
CMT were also challenged by dependency theory, which argues that rather than 
culture, it is actually the imperialistic economic hegemony of the West that has 
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resulted in many of the so-called Third World countries remaining economically 
undeveloped (Turner 1984:3). Dependency theory emerged in the 1960s and 
became particularly popular among South American scholars (See Frank 1967, 
Cardoso and Faletto 1979).  
 
Dependency theory focuses on external sources of un-development in the non-
Western world through analysing the balance of powers and hegemonic 
relations in the international political economic system. CMT perceives un-
development as the original (pre-modern) state of a society, whereas 
dependency theory claims that it is a modern phenomenon – the product of an 
unequal distribution of capital due to Western imperialism within the 
international economic system (Berberoglu 1992). Accordingly, the success of 
the material development process of the West was based on colonialism and the 
global slave trade, which led to the accumulation of capital used to trigger the 
Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries (Berberoglu 1992:10).  
Dependency theorists and world-systems scholars alike have claimed that their 
works ended the hegemony of CMT by exposing its weaknesses (Wallerstein 
1974; 2004; Apter 1987:27).  
 
The framework of dependency theory is based on the idea that once Western 
European and Northern American societies gained the upper hand in material 
development vis-à-vis non-Western countries, the former used their 
technological and economic superiority to exploit the resources of the latter in 
order to bolster their economies even further, which resulted in a ‘dependency 
relationship’ between the two – one that is constantly re-produced by the initial 
gap (Berberoglu 1992:26-27). Dependency theory replaces the ‘modern versus 
tradition dichotomy’ of CMT with a new dichotomy between the so-called 
‘metropolitan centre’ based in the West and its ‘dependent periphery’ based in 
the non-Western world. For instance, the economic interaction between the US 
and South American countries during the 20th century has been given as a 
typical example for this type of dependency relationship (Bodenheimer 1971, 
Frank 1967).     
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Table 2.1. Comparative Analysis of Three Theories of Modernity 
Theories 
Concepts                               Classical Modernisation                                             Neo-Modernisation                                                           Multiple Modernities 
 
  Modernity ‘Holy Trinity’: economic, social and political 
development  
‘Holy Trinity’: economic, social and political 
development 
‘Flexible Trinity’: economic, social and 
political development without a strong 
correlation in between  
  Features of a  
  Modern Society 
Capitalist, secular, liberal democracy 
(Modernity is equated with ‘Westernisation’: 
the convergence thesis) 
Capitalist, liberal democracy 
(Modernity is equated with 
‘Westernisation’: the convergence thesis) 
Many possible modernities (e.g. socialist, 
authoritarian etc.)  
(Modernity is not Westernisation)  
  Idea of Progress Unidirectional progress (e.g. ‘the irreversible 
secularisation thesis’)  
 
Development is not unidirectional, it could 
regress and collapse 
Development is not unidirectional, it could 
regress and collapse  
  Development 
  Processes 
‘Positive feedback loop’ between 
democratisation and economic development 
‘Positive feedback loop’ between 
democratisation and economic 
development 
 
‘Negative feedback loop’ or no feedback 
between development processes are possible  
 
  Religion Complete secularisation of a society is 
necessary for modernity 
A religious interpretation that positively 
portrays capitalism and democracy is 
sufficient (i.e. Protestant ethics, Islamic 
Calvinism) 
Social development in terms of secularisation 
and/or ideological moderation of  religious 
groups is not an absolute requisite for 
modernity  
  Islam  Incompatible with modernity   Is compatible with capitalism and 
democracy   
As there are many ‘modernities’, there are 
also many ‘Islamisms’, some of them 
compatible with modernity 
 Source: Author. 
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The value of dependency theory lies in its focus on the international system and 
uncovering the historical roots of Western success in economic development as 
it shows that it is rooted in colonialism and economic hegemony over non-
Western countries rather than cultural or religious superiority as had been 
claimed by classical modernisation theorists (Apter 1987:28). Nevertheless, 
dependency theory takes the existing system of Western hegemony as a 
constant and rules out any possibility for non-Western nations to catch-up with 
the West in terms of economic development, overlooking successful examples 
such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. For instance, by the late 
1970s, the size of the Japanese economy had surpassed all Western societies 
except the US in terms Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (World Bank 2014a). The 
People’s Republic of China also managed to rapidly develop within the last three 
decades, becoming the second largest economy in the world in terms of its GDP 
in the late 2000s (The Economist 2011:132). Another weakness of dependency 
theory is that it assumes the concept of hegemonic interaction with the West is 
applicable to all non-Western societies (So 1990:104). If so, how could some 
non-Western nations manage to develop whereas others have failed in this 
endeavour?   
 
With the rise of East Asian economies towards the end of the 20th century, 
dependency theory began to lose some of its explanatory capabilities of 
modernisation in the non-Western world. Hence, world-systems theory 
emerged within dependency theory itself in the 1970s. This approach more 
successfully accounted for the rise of some non-Western economies by arguing 
that the transition of some ‘peripheral countries’ to ‘semi-peripheral status’ was 
facilitated by Western countries as it was supposedly necessary for the 
international capitalist system to function effectively (See Wallerstein 1974; 
Amin 1974; Frank 1978). World-systems theory suggests that within the logic of 
the international political economic system and the ‘willingness’ of developed 
Western countries, some peripheral societies may have a relatively more equal 
economic relationship with the West (Berberoglu 1992:35-36). Though more 
successful than dependency theory, world-systems theory is also unable to 
provide a satisfactory answer as to how some non-Western countries such as 
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Japan reached even higher levels of technological development than many 
countries of the West. Both dependency theory and world-systems theory focus 
entirely on exogenous factors and do not attribute autonomy to any indigenous 
factors that may affect the modernisation of a society. Yet, the example of the 
rapidly developing East Asian countries showed that domestic policies such as 
state capitalism could influence the outcome of the transformation process in 
non-Western societies, causing them to achieve noteworthy successes in 
modernisation despite following different trajectories than the historical 
Western experience (Kaya 2004:8). This suggests that approaches that reduce 
the role of non-Western societies to passive agents controlled by Western 
economies and/or the capitalist world-system centred in the West cannot 
sufficiently account for the modernisation of the non-Western world.     
 
Though the strength of the rival approaches put forward by dependency and 
world-systems theorists has also waned over time, a key element of their 
criticism towards CMT has remained influential. CMT has been accused of 
Eurocentrism and Orientalism (See Pieterse 1996:542; Bernstein 1971:147; So 
1990:54). CMT has even been accused for justifying the global hegemony of the 
US via serving the interests of the US State Department in the so-called Third 
World countries, as it has been claimed that the Western modernity model 
based on promotion of democracy and free-market capitalism has been used by 
Washington to counter the socialist modernity project of its main competitor, 
the Soviet Union, during the Cold War years (Berberoglu 1992:7). The fact that 
the US State Department funded scholarly works of influential classical 
modernisation theorists such as Daniel Lerner (1958) in the late 1940s has 
supposedly justified these accusations in the eyes of some observers, resulting 
in a prestige loss for the school of thought (Shah 2011:1; Berberoglu 1992; So 
1990).  
 
Along with dependency theory and world-system theory, neo-modernisation 
theorists launched a new set of influential theoretical criticisms of CMT. Samuel 
P. Huntington's work (1968) has dramatically impacted on modernisation 
studies as it challenged some of the key arguments of CMT and offered a revised 
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understanding, which laid the ground for the emergence of NMT in the 1980s. 
The key point contested by Huntington (1968) is that the modernisation 
process in the non-Western world was not as linear as suggested by classical 
modernisation theorists such as Rostow (1960), often collapsing before 
reaching maturity in fields such as economic development as the process is 
highly de-stabilising. 
 
Proponents of NMT argue that the ‘clear-cut transition’ from tradition to 
modernity envisaged by CMT does not reflect reality, as elements of tradition 
and modernity co-exist in many modernised and modernising countries (See 
Higgott 1983; Binder 1986; Berstein 1971:146; Inglehart and Welzel 2009:33-
35; Giddens 1990:36). It has been pointed out, for instance, that a Western 
society as economically and politically developed as the US also experiences a 
resurgence of religiosity witnessed since 1980s with the rise of numerous 
popular Evangelical churches and preachers across the country (Smith 1998).  
 
Scholars of NMT argue that traditional values can not only co-exist with 
modernity but also enhance the transformatory pace of political and economic 
development (Huntington 1968; So 1990; Zapf 2004:4). In this regard, a 
commonly used example by NMT is the modernisation experience of East Asian 
societies such as Japan, South Korea and the People’s Republic of China. It has 
been argued that the traditional values of East Asian societies based on strict 
discipline and dedication in the workplace rapidly accelerated the pace of their 
economic development, enabling these countries to catch up with the West in 
that field (See Black et al. 1975; Gbosoe 2006; Toprak 1981:7).  
 
Until the late 1980s, the idea of global convergence towards the Western model 
of modernity developed by CMT seemed to be defunct, unable to legitimise its 
arguments in the face of sustained criticism by dependency theorists and neo-
Marxist scholars (Roxborough 1988:753; Inglehart and Welzel 2009:34). 
However, starting with the collapse of the Soviet Union, a re-awakening of the 
convergence thesis – arguing that Western modernity is a universal destination 
for humanity – began after its adoption by NMT. In the 1990s, NMT interpreted 
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the fall of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe as vindication of the convergence 
thesis (Dallmayr 1993:4).  
 
Francis Fukuyama (1992), who had resurrected a culturalist form of CMT, 
believed that the collapse of the communist Soviet Union signalled the final 
victory of liberal democratic and capitalist modernity based in the Western 
world (Sadowski 1993:14). Furthermore, Fukuyama (1992) offered a 
particularly Eurocentric understanding of modernity unseen since the heyday of 
CMT in the 1950s by arguing that the liberal democratic capitalist route is not a 
model among many, but ‘the final stage’ of human progress. Hence, the idea that 
liberal democracy and capitalism is the ‘pinnacle of human civilisation’ has 
dominated CMT and its contemporary offshoot, NMT (See Leftwich 1996:4; 
Huntington 1984; Fukuyama 1992).  
  
Despite its differences with CMT, therefore, NMT also defines modernisation as 
consisting of three inter-related elements that feed each other: social 
development (change in value system), economic development (improvements 
in education levels, technology and productivity) and political development 
(emergence of a stable, centralised state structure with democratic institutions) 
(see Huntington 1968:33-34; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) (See Table 2.1.). In a 
highly influential work that has shaped the academic discourse of the last 
decade, Inglehart and Welzel (2005:1) incorporate the ‘holy trinity’ of CMT into 
the framework of NMT by defining modernity as consisting of three pillars 
termed ‘human development’: socioeconomic development, cultural change and 
democratisation.  
 
Accordingly, economic development, cultural change and political change 
processes occur simultaneously within an ever accelerating and interactive 
process of transformation (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). In this 
regard, it is argued that political and economic development requires a 
‘supportive cultural system’ that would enable the society to embrace the idea 
of change (Inglehart 1997:10-11). This approach implies that some of the 
cultural systems in the non-Western world are not compatible with modernity. 
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Akin to CMT, therefore, NMT also appears to be susceptible to the influence of 
Eurocentrism as the idea of global convergence towards Western political and 
economic systems is ingrained in its framework of modernity.  
 
2.2.2 An Alternative Paradigm: Multiple Modernities (MMP) 
   
In the 1990s, MMP emerged within modernisation studies as a school of thought 
that overtly challenges the long established Eurocentric and deterministic 
conceptualisation of modernity in the form of the Western model based on the 
convergence thesis (Preyer 2007:10; Arnason 2003:324; Eisenstadt 2003:130; 
Matin 2013:2). MMP strongly asserts that Westernisation cannot be the only 
form of modernity for developing non-Western societies (See Eisenstadt 2000, 
2002, 2003; Arnason 1997, 2003; Wagner 2000, 2008). In the last two decades, 
the rise of former socialist countries and authoritarian state capitalist 
economies of the non-Western world such as the People’s Republic of China and 
the Russian Federation have posed a major challenge to the idea of convergence 
towards a liberal democratic-capitalist modernity. Therefore, the main premise 
of MMP is ‘that forms of modernity are so varied and contingent on culture and 
historical circumstance that the term itself must be spoken of in the plural’ 
(Fourie 2012:52).  
 
MMP acknowledges the possibility of different paths to modernity beyond the 
singular perception of human evolution modelled on the Western trajectory by 
CMT and NMT (See Eisenstadt 1996; Wagner 2000; Arnason 1997; Kaya 2004). 
Modernity is re-conceptualised as a broader process than Westernisation, with 
Western modernity reduced to ‘one model among many possible routes’: 
 
The concept of later modernities [MMP] suggests that there have been 
multiple ways to modernity and that those multiple ways give rise to 
multiple consequences. These consequences do not converge anywhere, 
neither under the label of liberal democracy nor under that of communist 
society. The multiple consequences of multiple ways indicate that history 
is far from coming to an end (Kaya 2004:X).  
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The concept of modernisation is simply defined by MMP as ‘a process of 
systemic changes’ whose direction and results cannot be predicted (Eisenstadt 
2000:3; Preyer 2007:6). In this regard, modernity is acknowledged to have first 
emerged in Europe from the 17th century onwards as ‘a mode of socio-political 
life and economic organisation’ (Wagner 2012; Giddens 1990:1; Giddens and 
Pierson 1998:94). The definition of modernity provided by MMP focuses on its 
distinct character from preceding periods, largely fitting to the 
conceptualisation of Anthony Giddens (1990:6):  
 
How should we identify the discontinuities which separate modern social 
institutions from the traditional social orders? Several features are 
involved. One is the sheer pace of change which the era of modernity sets 
into motion. Traditional civilisations may have been considerably more 
dynamic than other pre-modern systems, but the rapidity of change in 
conditions of modernity is extreme. If this is perhaps most obvious in 
respect of technology, it also pervades all other spheres. A second 
discontinuity is the scope of change. As different areas of the globe are 
drawn into interconnection with one another, waves of social 
transformation crash across virtually the whole of the earth's surface. A 
third feature concerns the intrinsic nature of modern institutions. Some 
modern social forms are simply not found in prior historical periods-
such as the political system of the nation-state, the wholesale 
dependence of production upon inanimate power sources, or the 
thoroughgoing commodification of products and wage labour. 
 
Features of modernity that first emerged in the West (e.g. centralised nation-
state based political organisation, industrialisation, urbanisation, mechanisation 
and more effective decision-making mechanisms) spread to other societies, 
transforming them over time. Hence, some initially West-specific conditions can 
no longer be used to distinguish human societies today.  
 
In this context, MMP argues that modernised societies may share some 
characteristics in the structural complexity of their state organisation and 
development levels in economy, however they do not need to have the same 
ideological worldview or governance type (Eisenstadt 2002:2). Accordingly, all 
non-Western country cases constitute ‘different modernities’ as the contingent 
circumstances of the historical trajectory of each society results in the 
emergence of a different configuration of economic, political and social 
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development. Thus, the characteristics of non-Western cases of modernisation 
such as those of Russia, Japan, South Korea, China, Turkey, Iran and Egypt may 
not only differ from the features of Western modernity based on liberal 
democracy, free-market capitalism and secularisation but may also radically 
differ from each other.          
 
In addition, modernisation may trigger economic, political and social 
development in a country, yet these three processes are not necessarily 
positively correlated with each other (Wagner 2012:XIII). More often, material 
development, democratisation and secularisation do not occur simultaneously 
in non-Western countries and the modernisation process produces unique 
types of modernities that are shaped by the particularities of the historical 
conditions in a given society (Göle 2002). For instance, a society may have made 
great strides towards industrialisation, urbanisation and mechanisation while 
traditional and religious values may remain deeply entrenched and/or that 
society may be governed by various types of authoritarian regimes rather than 
possessing the liberal democratic institutions seen in the Western world. In this 
regard, for instance, it is noted that many of the secular regimes that have 
emerged in the non-Western world such as the former Soviet Union, the 
People’s Republic of China and the Kemalist Turkey of the 1930s have been 
authoritarian structures, not liberal democracies (Burak 2012:67).     
 
It is important to note that MMP puts forward an entirely different methodology 
than its rival theories – CMT and NMT – towards studying modernisation in 
non-Western contexts. While the two mainstream analyse modernisation with 
the assumption that economic, social and political development processes 
positively impact on each other and that they should be analysed in conjunction, 
MMP suggests that the more effective way is to scrutinise each process 
separately without presupposing their positive correlation. 
 
Though the conceptualisation of modernity offered by MMP is much more 
complex, multi-dimensional and one that can be more easily applied to various 
country cases than the earlier theories, it is important to note that it has also 
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received criticism. The understanding of ‘modernity’ offered by influential 
thinkers of MMP such as Shmuel N. Eisenstadt is found by some scholars to be 
excessively subjective and socially constructivist to the point of losing the ability 
to define the term altogether (Matin 2013:3; Chakrabarty 2011; Schmidt 
2006:78).  
 
As such, it has been argued that MMP does not possess a clearly defined 
approach to explain what modernity is in the first place and to distinguish a 
modern society from a pre-modern one (Fourie 2012:62; Schmidt 2006). 
However, this critique overlook that MMP actually puts forward a distinct 
framework to define modernity: a modern society is one that has experienced a 
process transformation in the fields of political, economic and social development 
(See Wagner 2012:X; Eisenstadt 2000). Its difference from the ‘holy trinity’ 
developed by CMT and NMT is that MMP does not perceive secularism, free-
market capitalism and representative liberal democratic institutions as the 
inevitable products of the process of change a society experiences. Therefore, its 
conceptualisation of the characteristics of modernity can be called the ‘flexible 
trinity’ (See Table 2.1.). In this regard, modernisation and its product – 
modernity – are evaluated as open-ended and continuous journeys that assume 
different forms in various societies depending on the particular historical 
trajectory and conditions of each country (Wagner 2012).  
 
 The distinct understandings of modernity and modernisation have been 
explained so far. The following section of the chapter will focus on the 
perceptions of the interaction between modernity, religion, economic 
development and democratisation.       
 
2.3 COMPONENTS OF MODERNITY 
 
2.3.1 Modernity and Social Development: Religion and Secularisation 
 
The ideas of notable sociologist Max Weber (1930) expressed in his The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism have shaped, albeit in different 
ways, the understanding of religion by both CMT and NMT (Berger 2001:447). 
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Weber (1930) indicated that a key element of the dramatic change Western 
European societies had experienced during their transition to modernity was 
the rise of ‘rationality’ (Volpi 2010:76). The concept of rationality was 
particularly used to refer to secularisation, a process that entails the 
replacement of religious beliefs and mysticism with scientific explanations and 
the ‘rule of logic’ as a way of thinking for modern societies. The Western 
experience of secularisation was seen as the first example of a universal process 
of social change that would transform the whole humanity. Thus, the followers 
of Weber who formed CMT fully expected religious beliefs and traditional norms 
to be replaced by what they referred to as rationality in modernising non-
Western societies such as Turkey (Volpi 2010:76).  
 
Adherents of CMT define the concept of modernity in terms of the 
Enlightenment ideal of human progress that is achieved through scientific 
thinking. Modern society is conceptualised as one that has ensured the 
superiority of reason over religion, which is commonly portrayed as a residue of 
the dogmatic and irrational belief system of the pre-modern era (Yavuz 2013:5). 
Based on this understanding of modernisation, it has been argued that religion 
and modernity are incompatible (See, for instance, Cassirer 1951, Gay 1966; 
Israel 2009; Kedourie 1992). Hence, CMT suggests that a society where religious 
values and the clergy continue to play influential roles cannot possibly be 
identified as modern. However, it is important to note that Weber and classical 
modernisation theorists paradoxically perceived a particular form of 
Christianity, the Protestantism that emerged after the Reformation movement 
of the 16th century, as beneficial for the modernisation process.  
 
While some forms of other religions such as Protestantism and Confucianism 
have been described by classical modernisation theorists as potentially 
beneficial for achieving modernity, Islam constantly appears in their narratives 
as a ‘barrier’ to development, incompatible with the idea of progress (Çınar and 
Duran 2008:17; Göl 2009:796; Kedourie 1992; Huntington 1984; Berkes 1964). 
Elie Kedourie (1992), for instance, claims that Islam and industrialisation are 
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not compatible as the Islamic belief-system is supposedly against the use of 
modern production techniques.  
 
The alleged incompatibility between Islam and modernity is not only limited to 
the field of economic development. Islam has been perceived as a ‘religious 
doctrine’ as well as a ‘political philosophy’ (Toprak 1981:20). It has been argued 
that the absence of a definite boundary between the approach of Islam to 
worldly and divine spheres results in the monopolisation of all socio-political 
life by Islamic clergy, leading to stagnation of political and social development 
processes in predominantly Muslim societies (Saeed 1994:X). Huntington 
(1984), for instance, argues that authoritarianism is inherent in Islam and that a 
predominantly Muslim society could never become democratic without 
undertaking a complete secularisation program (See Stepan and Linz 2013:17). 
According to CMT, Islam is a ‘dying belief system’ that would eventually fail to 
resist the sweeping tide of modernisation (Volpi 2010:76). Material 
development understood in terms of industrialisation, urbanisation, 
administrative reform and educational transformation would necessarily result 
in a decrease in religiosity, producing a secular/non-religious society (Wallis 
and Bruce 1992). CMT adheres to the ‘irreversible secularisation thesis’ which 
assumes that once a secularising cultural reform project is launched, it will 
initiate a self-sustainable chain reaction that would eliminate religiosity in 
predominantly Muslim countries (See Table 2.1.).  
 
The negative portrayal of the role of Islam in social change processes put 
forward by CMT has been challenged by scholars of NMT such as Niklas 
Luhmann (1984) as well as by sociologists of religion such as Bryan S. Turner 
(1984) who point out that characteristics of Islam – such as its emphasis on the 
contribution of merchants to society and praise of trade – are actually 
compatible with the concept of a modernity defined as an industrialised 
capitalist society. The idea of compatibility and a mutually supportive 
relationship between religious ethics and modernity have been strongly voiced 
by supporters of NMT (see, for instance, Mardin 1989; Atasoy 2005; Yavuz 
2013; Güngör 1991; Luhmann 1984; Tripp 2006; Göle 1997). Akin to CMT, NMT 
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bases its argument on the seminal work of Max Weber (1930). The perception 
of some forms of religion is highly positive in the understanding of NMT as it is 
argued that religious ethics accelerate modernisation via positively impacting 
on highly transformative processes such as industrialisation and 
commercialisation (see Table 2.1.). 
 
Not unlike NMT, MMP strongly challenges the understanding of religion 
proposed by CMT, arguing that secularisation is not a prerequisite for 
modernity (Wagner 2012:VIII; White 2002). As MMP acknowledges the 
existence of many unique types of non-Western modernities across the world, it 
also argues that there are many possible readings of religious belief-systems 
such as Islam (Kaya 2004:11; Göle 2002; Kamali 2005). Islam as a whole cannot 
possibly be evaluated as incompatible with modernity since some of its 
interpretations may positively impact on economic, political and social 
development processes which may eventually produce a capitalist and 
democratic modernity or an entirely different type of modern society that do 
not conform with the values of the Western world (see Table 2.1.). In contrast 
to CMT that perceives Islam to be preserving pre-modern socio-economic and 
political structures, MMP even envisages the manifestation of unique and hybrid 
non-Western modernities in the Muslim world that could potentially combine 
Islamic values with elements of the Western modernity model such as 
neoliberal economics (Eisenstadt 2003:96).    
 
2.3.2 Modernity, Economic Development and Democratisation  
  
CMT and NMT have long argued that economic development would lead to 
democratisation in modernising societies (Przeworski and Limongi 1995; 
Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Vanhanen 2003; 
Yıldız 2011). This is derived from an established view in social theory proposed 
by thinkers such as Karl Marx and Barrington Moore (Arat 1988:21). The link 
between economic development and democratisation can be described as a 
positive feedback loop in which both processes ‘feed’ from one another and 
sustain the continuation of each other (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996:23; 
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Wejnert 2005:54; Rustow 1970; Lu 2005; Goldsmith 2007:90). The positive 
feedback loop thesis has two variants: the Marxist approach (see Leftwich 
1996) bases its argument on the connection between working classes and 
democratisation while liberal theorists (see Moore 1966) see the bourgeoisie as 
the engine of the democratisation process. The Marxist approach perceives the 
formation of social movements by the working class as the basis for 
democratisation. Liberal modernisation theory, on the other hand, notes that 
economic development fosters a rational middle class which is aware of its 
rights, one that sees the establishment of political institutions based on 
democratic representation as a strategy for increasing its chances to protect its 
socioeconomic interests (Inglehart and Welzel 2009:37). 
 
Most economically undeveloped countries are authoritarian and most 
developed countries are democracies in the world. On this basis, CMT and NMT 
derive their argument for the positive correlation between economic 
development and democratisation. However, it is not clear whether democracy 
is a product of economic development or that democracy is simply more able to 
survive in prosperous nations (Przeworski et al. 2000:78). Nevertheless, since 
Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) published his famous work, both mainstream 
theories have claimed that democracy is the ‘latter stage’ of the modernisation 
process. When authoritarian nations experience economic development 
processes (i.e. urbanisation, industrialisation and increase in literacy), they are 
said to gradually become more democratic as the technological and 
socioeconomic changes supposedly produce self-conscious citizens that would 
be willing to demand more political rights (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 
2000:89).  
 
The positive feedback loop is one of the most critical hypotheses of both 
mainstream theories that MMP strongly contests in its framework of modernity 
(see Table 2.1.; also Arnason 2000; Preyer 2007; Wagner 2008, 2012). The 
concept is evaluated by MMP as a key indicator that reveals the Eurocentric bias 
of both CMT and NMT as the formulation of a positive correlation between 
economic development and democratisation is mostly based on the experience 
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of modernisation in the Western world (Kaya 2004). As such, the positive 
feedback loop can be evaluated as potentially not applicable to non-Western 
cases, because many of the most economically modernised countries of the non-
Western world such as Russia, the People’s Republic of China and Singapore are 
authoritarian regimes which have not formed liberal democratic state 
structures despite their high levels of industrialisation, urbanisation and 
mechanisation. The modernisation experience of Japan from the mid-19th 
century until the 1950s implies that it is possible to achieve rapid economic 
development without democratisation (Morishima 1995). The century-long 
Japanese economic development did not result in the emergence of a liberal 
democratic regime as democratisation was imposed on Japan by a foreign 
power, the US that occupied the country from 1945 to 1952, following the 
defeat of Japan in World War II (Gbosoe 2006:194; Morishima 1995).            
 
In this context, MMP suggests that the interaction between development and 
democratisation may actually be characterised by the absence of any correlation 
or even a ‘negative feedback loop’. Democracy could possibly hamper economic 
growth in developing countries as an elected government would be likely to use 
the state budget for responding to public demand for the immediate supply of 
services in order to get re-elected, rather than ensuring stable long-term 
economic development of the country through investing in production sectors 
(Przeworski and Limongi 1995:6). Rather than putting forward a specific model 
to define the link between economic development and democratisation such as 
the positive feedback loop of CMT and NMT, ‘uncertainty’ is the principle 
adopted by MMP as it is possible to refer to country cases supporting or 
contesting the existence of a strong correlation between the two variables 
(Roemer 1995:52-53).  
 
2.4 A CRITIQUE OF MAINSTREAM THEORIES: RE-CONCEPTUALISING 
MODERNITY AND MODERNISATION   
 
Though the rivals of CMT and NMT such as dependency theory and world-
system theory could not entirely weaken the hold of these mainstream theories 
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over modernisation studies, their established conceptualisations have been the 
subject of ever-intensifying sociological and philosophical scrutiny in recent 
years. In this regard, critics such as Anthony Giddens, Michael Mann, Jeffrey C. 
Alexander and Kamran Matin offer insightful analyses that are very helpful for a 
more realistic and objective comprehension of modernity and modernisation 
through the lens of MMP (Giddens 1990; Giddens and Pierson 1998; Mann 
2005; Alexander 2013, Matin 2013).  
 
2.4.1 ‘Side Effects’ of Modernisation 
 
Theorists such as Talcott Parsons and Emile Durkheim, who strongly believed in 
the idea of evolutionary social change, provided the sociological basis for CMT 
and NMT (Giddens and Pierson 1998:52-56). According to Parsons, for instance, 
the ultimate destination of modernisation according is the formation of a society 
that resembles American modernity in every way as the USA is depicted as the 
most advanced country in the world (Erkilet 2007:113).  
 
Modernity has been equated with concepts such as ‘progress’, ‘perfection’, 
‘ideal’, namely words that have highly positive connotations in the deterministic 
and evolutionary model of conceptualisation put forward by CMT and NMT 
(Alexander 2005:5). The excessively optimistic perception of modernity is not 
exclusively adopted by CMT and NMT as Marxism also offers a ‘unidirectional 
meta-narrative of universal progress’ in which modernisation process is 
imagined to occur via predetermined stages and culminating towards a ‘golden 
age’ of prosperity, peace and superior organisation (Giddens 1990:5). According 
to Karl Marx, this golden age can be realised through transition from capitalism 
to socialism and finally to communism, whereas it is referred to as the ‘free-
market, liberal democrat modernity’ by proponents of CMT and NMT such as 
Rostow, Lerner, Huntington and Fukuyama. 
 
In reality, the history of modernisation and the characteristics of modernity are 
far more complex than commonly imagined. A more effective understanding can 
be obtained once we stop romanticising these notions. Throughout the history 
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of modernisation, noteworthy achievements were made such as the 
development of modern medicine which has offered invaluable cures to many 
terminal diseases, largely eliminated or minimised childbirth and infant 
mortality, ultimately contributing to average life standards of many countries 
across the world – including the less-developed ones to some extent. Much 
progress has been made in the field of human rights as well, many previously 
marginalised religious and racial groups gaining civil and political rights in 
addition to the improvement of gender equality indicators between men and 
women in many modern and modernising societies (Alexander 2005:9). 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that not all groups have equally benefited from 
modernisation as there remain many global problems such as the wide income 
gap between rich and poor. In fact, many problems of our globe have emerged 
as side effects of modernisation such as imperialism, global environmental 
pollution, extinction of various animal species, total industrialisation of war, 
nuclear weapons, totalitarian political systems and many others (Giddens 
1990:7-9; Keskin 2009:1-2; Alexander 2005:8-13).   
 
Modernisation, the path that presumably leads to modernity, can be confidently 
said to have been a highly complex process in Western and non-Western 
societies alike, filled with its own contradictions, crises at least as well as its 
achievements:  
 
We tend to think of President Thomas Jefferson as embodying 
Enlightened reason. Indeed, it was in the name of the advance of 
civilization that he declared that the “barbarities” of the native American 
Indians “justified extermination.” A century later, President Theodore 
Roosevelt, a decent modern man, agreed, saying of the Indians, 
“extermination was as ultimately beneficial as it was inevitable.” Forty 
years on, a third leader said, “It is the curse of greatness that it must step 
over dead bodies to create new life.” This was SS Chief Heinrich Himmler, 
who is rightly considered as the personification of evil. Yet he and his 
colleague Adolf Hitler said they were only following in the Americans’ 
footsteps… [M]urderous ethnic cleansing has been a central problem of 
our civilization, our modernity, our conceptions of progress, and our 
attempts to introduce democracy. It is our dark side (Mann 2005:VII). 
 
Hence, modernity itself should be subjected to critical reflection, a position that 
stands in contrast to the way modernity has been presented for long by its 
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proponents that developed the CMT and NMT. The concept of democracy, for 
instance, has been portrayed as ‘the best of all possible political systems’ 
humanity has developed, yet it has been pointed that many crimes against 
humanity were committed in the name of modernity and democracy from the 
19th century onwards, ranging from ethnic cleansing to mass genocide (see 
Mann 2005).  
 
Democracy, as a political system, emerged within the framework of nation-
states in the Western world from the late 18th century onwards, and the 
Western model of political organisation have been taken as models by non-
Western societies as well, resulting in democratic regimes and nation-state 
structures to spread to hitherto tribal, sectarian or multi-cultural imperial 
societies. During the formation of modern nation-states, violence has become 
the norm, both in Western and non-Western worlds as the democratic principle 
of the rule of the people have often been understood as the ‘unopposed 
hegemony’ or ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Mann 2005:3). In fact, a key argument of 
Mann’s work (2005) is that modernisation, democratisation and ethnic 
cleansing accompanied each other in the history of the so-called ‘developed 
West’, a phenomenon that have been repeating itself in so-called ‘developing 
societies’ such as the former Ottoman countries in the early 20th century and 
former Yugoslavian countries in the late 20th century.  
 
The unwavering and unquestioning belief of CMT and NMT in the virtues of 
modernity and their depiction of it as the ‘pinnacle of human civilisation’ are 
very problematic. A more objective way to reflect upon modernity is provided 
by MMP as this school of thought aims to study the process of modernisation 
and all its contingent consequences without presenting the path and its results 
as virtuous or even ideal. Instead, the lens provided by MMP is to comprehend it 
impartially as part of the human experience, with its usual risks and troubles 
(see Wagner 2012). MMP strictly refrains from charging modernity, or more 
accurately ‘modernities’, with a positive value judgement. Modernity is 
conceptualised by MMP in terms of institutional centralisation and economic 
development, lacking the liberal democratic element found in CMT and NMT. 
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Arguably, this approach could also be problematic as it could potentially serve 
to justify violations of human rights by so-called ‘modern’ regimes across the 
world. Nevertheless, MMP is superior to mainstream theories of modernity as 
its framework acknowledges the possibility of ‘the dark sides’ of modernity 
which has been badly neglected by CMT and NMT.  
 
2.4.2 Determinism and Eurocentrism in CMT and NMT   
 
Apart from overlooking negative elements of modernity, another problematic 
issue within the frameworks of CMT and NMT is determinism and 
Eurocentrism. CMT and NMT can be thought as the voice of Western cultural 
hegemony, reproducing a universalist discourse to legitimise the existing world 
order that is based on an unequal balance of power between Western and non-
Western societies (Gencer 2008:51). Deconstructing this discourse enables us to 
see the purpose of these theories: the Western supremacy over the world would 
become a permanent feature of global social life only if all other societies accept 
the Western modernity model based on cultural codes (Gencer 2008:51). In this 
regard, a strong critique can be found in Giddens who states that globalisation 
should be conceptualised as a ‘process of uneven development’ that does not 
necessarily result in convergence but also divergence from the characteristics of 
Western modernity:  
 
Is modernity peculiarly Western from the standpoint of its globalising 
tendencies? No. It cannot be, since we are speaking here of emergent 
forms of world interdependence and planetary consciousness. The ways 
in which these issues are approached and coped with, however, will 
inevitably involve conceptions and strategies derived from non-Western 
settings. For neither the radicalising of modernity nor the globalising of 
social life are processes which are in any sense complete. Many kinds of 
cultural response to such institutions are possible, given world cultural 
diversity as a whole (Giddens 1990:175).  
 
Giddens’ critique of deterministic/evolutionary theories of modernity – CMT 
and NMT – provides the philosophical justification for MMP as it highlights their 
ontological weaknesses, creating a lacuna in terms of re-conceptualising the 
essence of modernity. As Western modernity interacted with non-Western 
societies, the initial conditions and divergent characteristics of the latter 
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produced disparate outcomes, i.e. ‘multiple modernities’. The replacement of 
the deterministic convergence thesis of CMT and NMT with historical 
contingency and path dependency in the MMP framework enables it to offer a 
more nuanced framework of modernity than can be used to understand non-
Western cases such as Turkey.  
 
2.4.3 International Context  
 
A third crucial element of the non-determinist MMP framework is the 
acknowledgement of the impact of Western modernity on the modernisation 
trajectory of non-Western societies. As examined in detail in Chapter 1, 
international context is presented by MMP as a key factor that causes the 
modernisation experience of non-Western cases to be unpredictable (see 
Wagner 2012:168-169; Arnason 2003:287-295; Eisenstadt 2000:14). In this 
regard, MMP’s understanding is compatible with the ‘uneven and combined 
development theory’ (U&CD), which offers insights into the crucial role of the 
‘international’ in modernisation and social change processes of non-Western 
countries (see Matin 2013). In the case of international context, this thesis will 
combine the frameworks of MMP and U&CD and this approach will be applied to 
the case of Turkish modernity in the following empirical chapters.  
 
U&CD theory introduces three generalizable principles related to the impact of 
international context or external actors on the modernisation experience of 
non-Western societies: the whip of external necessity, substitution and historical 
reshuffling. The whip of external necessity suggests that modernisation 
programs in less-developed countries are initiated as the result of a survival 
instinct (Matin 2013:18). Historically, as less-developed non-Western societies 
such as Japan, Iran and the Ottoman Empire engaged technologically advanced 
expansionist Western powers such as Britain, France and the USA, they 
developed modernisation programs for preventing themselves from becoming 
dependent colonies and preserving their independence. Hence, the 
phenomenon of socio-political and economic transformation did not emerge in 
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less-developed countries as a natural result of their own domestic conditions, 
but because of the impact of external actors.  
 
Both of the other two principles – substitution and historical reshuffling – can 
be said to be the consequences of the whip of external necessity as they only 
manifest after modernisation process is launched, following interaction with 
more advanced countries. The concept of substitution refers to the 
unpredictable impact of foreign ideas and products on a modernising society. 
Once modernisation process begins, the more advanced external force becomes 
a guide or ‘model’ for the less-advanced country.  
 
Through imitating, the less-advanced country introduces foreign institutions, 
technology and lifestyle that were not organically produced by that society. As a 
result of the mix of domestic and foreign elements, the initial modernisation 
trajectory is subverted; producing an unforeseen experience whose direction 
and outcome cannot be predicted by any determinist theory such as CMT and 
NMT. Simply, this country could no longer possibly replicate the path of original 
modernity, i.e. the case of Western modernity developed in countries such as 
Britain, France and the USA:  
 
A key aspect of uneven and combined development is… the fact that a 
society can, and almost always does, adopt and adapt other societies’ 
products without undergoing the developmental processes from which 
these products had originated in their host societies. Uneven and 
combined development therefore not only pre-empts historical and 
developmental repetition but also enables a variety of apparently 
paradoxical patterns of development and political strategies (Matin 
2013:17). 
 
Stimulated by the entry of foreign elements to its domestic social, political and 
economic life, the society reacts and historical reshuffling manifests as a result. 
Historical reshuffling refers to situations, particularly seen in the case of non-
Western countries, where the sequence of development in the less-developed 
country that adopted the more-developed country as its model occurs in 
radically different ways that diverge from the historical experience of the model 
country (Matin 2013:19). Hence, the experience of the model country would not 
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necessarily be replicated by the less-developed country as the interaction 
between foreign elements and domestic elements could produce a divergent 
modernity.  
 
Precisely because CMT and NMT do not consider the contingency of the role of 
international context for modernisation, both theories presuppose that all of 
humanity would eventually converge towards Western modernity, gradually 
building liberal democratic, free-market capitalist and secular or ideologically 
moderate societies. As such, the MMP framework – reinforced by the 
aforementioned insights of U&CD – can more effectively comprehend the 
transformation experience of a non-Western case such as Turkey, whose 
modernity has been dramatically shaped by the interaction between its 
domestic conditions and the international context in the form of Western 
models it had followed.      
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
  
This chapter presented the various understandings of modernity within 
modernisation studies and identified a common characteristic possessed by 
three schools of thought – CMT, NMT and MMP – namely that modernisation is 
defined as the economic, political and social development experience of a society. 
Nevertheless, it has also been shown that the methodology offered by MMP to 
the study of modernisation radically differs from that of the two mainstream 
theories. While CMT and NMT utilise the concept of positive feedback loop 
between economic, political and social development processes and argue that 
all three should be studied together in examination of modernisation 
experiences, MMP refuses to presuppose such a correlation and assesses each 
processes separately in non-Western country cases (i.e. the ‘flexible trinity’ of 
MMP vs. the ‘holy trinity’ of CMT and NMT; see Table 2.1.).   
As discussed in part three, the theories differ in understanding the interaction 
between modernity, religion, economic development and democratisation. 
Deriving its framework from the historical Western development experience, 
CMT offers the most exclusionary formulation of modernity by perceiving Islam 
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as incompatible with modernisation and secularisation as an inevitable product 
of material development. NMT also partially bases its methodology on the 
Western experience by correlating democratisation and economic development, 
but it re-conceptualises Islamic ethics as a factor that strongly contributes to 
modernisation process of predominantly Muslim societies by encouraging 
capitalist development. MMP refuses to base its framework on the Western 
experience via acknowledging the existence of many different trajectories to the 
achievement of modernity in the non-Western world, indicating that a secular 
and liberal democratic society is not necessarily the outcome of a given 
modernisation process.   
 
Part four offered a critique of the various dimensions of the CMT and NMT 
frameworks, arguing that MMP – with its focus on historical contingency, path 
dependency and international context – offers a far more nuanced approach for 
understanding the complexities of modernisation and modernity.  
 
The following three empirical chapters of the thesis will build upon the 
literature review and theoretical context provided so far, deconstructing the 
narratives of structural and societal models through the lens and methods of 
MMP. Chapter 3 will focus on Turkey’s economic modernisation experience; 
Chapter 4 will examine its political modernisation and Chapter 5 will cover 
social modernisation.       
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CHAPTER 3: THE ECONOMIC TRAJECTORY OF TURKISH MODERNITY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
A world-renowned academic and advisor to various European and Middle 
Eastern governments, Azeem Ibrahim (2013:32) recently wrote: 
  
Turkey’s economy is the envy of most Middle Eastern countries. The 
World Bank’s Country Brief 2010 classifies Turkey as an upper-middle 
income country in terms of its per capita GDP in 2007. Mean graduate 
pay was $10.02 per man hour in 2010.     
 
Since the 1970s, the Middle East average has lagged behind other less-
developed and so-called peripheral regions of the global economy such as South 
America and South-East Asia in terms of development indicators such as per 
capita income, urbanisation, literacy rate, industrialisation and average life 
expectancy (Pamuk 2006:826; Karshenas 2001:59). By the beginning of the 21st 
century12, the average per capita income difference between the MENA region 
and Western European economies such as Britain, France and Germany 
remained roughly the same as it was in 1913, constituting a failure for many 
Middle Eastern societies in terms of shortening the modernisation gap with the 
West (Pamuk 2006:810; Page and Van Gelder 2001:15).   
 
Turkey, on the other hand, has been an exception to the relatively slow pace of 
development common to the region: its GDP rose from about $17 billion in 1970 
to approximately $800 billion in 2012, while within the same period the average 
life expectancy rose from 58 years to 75 years, the adult literacy rate from 52 
percent to 95 percent, the urban population from 39 percent to 72 percent, the 
per capita income (in terms of GDP) from $539 to $10,810, the share of industry 
in the economy from 17 percent to 27 percent and the share of services sector 
from 47 percent to 64 percent (World Bank 2013, 2014b). Particularly as a 
result of the rapid economic development13 of the country since the early 2000s, 
the so-called Turkish economic model has caught the attention of scholars, 
                                                        
12
 The year the data refers in particular is 2005.  
13
 Within a decade from 2002 to 2012, the size of the Turkish economy in terms of GDP almost 
quadrupled with an average of 5.1 percent growth rate per annum (World Bank 2013).  
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journalists and policy-makers with observers such as Ibrahim (2013) arguing 
that the Turkish experience carries significant lessons that could be of 
assistance to other developing countries in the MENA region and beyond (See, 
for instance, Kirişçi 2009, 2011; Tziarras 2013:6; Dede 2011; Atasoy 2011). As 
the acclaimed economic success of Turkey constitutes one of the most crucial 
elements of the Turkish model, this chapter will examine the economic 
modernisation trajectory in the country to shed light on the historical 
conditions and factors that produced it.     
 
The objective of this chapter is to re-conceptualise the economic modernisation 
experience in Turkey in light of a methodology drawn from MMP. According to 
MMP, economic modernisation is ‘a gradual process of shift from pre-industrial 
and less complex economic systems towards structural differentiation 
developed across a wide range of institutions in the organisation of economic 
policy-making units, urbanisation, modern education and mass communication’ 
(Eisenstadt 2002:1). An economically modern society, therefore, is one that is 
industrialised, urban and literate with effective economic policy-making 
mechanisms and an advanced infrastructure in transportation and 
communication.  
 
It is important to note that the conceptualisation of economic modernity by 
MMP does not include the principle of ‘liberal, free-market, capitalist economy’ 
that has formed an essential element of modern life as seen by CMT and NMT. 
Any society that is complex enough to fulfil the aforementioned criteria of 
‘structural differentiation’ can be considered as modern in this approach. For 
instance, the communist economy of the former Soviet Union, and the state 
capitalist economies of contemporary People’s Republic of China and Russia are 
considered economically modern societies (Arnason 2000, 2002). The chapter 
will utilise this understanding of economic modernity to assess whether 
contemporary Turkey can be considered a modern economy.        
       
Other crucial elements of the framework of MMP are the roles of path 
dependency, historical contingency and international context on a modernisation 
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process that produces economic modernity. The chapter will highlight the 
significance of the three factors in the economic trajectory of Turkey and 
contest the analyses offered by the structural and societal models. In contrast to 
the earlier approaches that emphasise the impact of only a particular era of 
economic history, it will be shown that the performance of the post-1980 period 
of export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) strategy is rooted in the achievements 
and failures of the pre-1980 state-led import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) 
policy. In this regard, the impact of state policies as well as the activities of 
social forces such as the capitalists on the economic trajectory of Turkish 
modernity will be highlighted. The sui generis elements of the Turkish case that 
may not be found in other non-Western societies such as its close economic 
relations with the EU will also be acknowledged.   
 
The main variable analysed in this chapter is the economic growth rate as 
progress in all major elements of economic modernisation according to MMP 
such as industrialisation, urbanisation, income per capita growth and rise in 
education levels are tied to the state of this indicator (Staehr 2005:1). 
Nevertheless, the impact of the economic growth rate on other indicators of 
economic modernisation will be consistently examined throughout the chapter.  
 
The analysis of the economic trajectory of Turkish modernity will show that 
Turkey can be classified as a modern economy in accordance with the definition 
of the concept by MMP. However, it will be argued that the nature of the Turkish 
economy modernity differs from the Western model14 which is characterised by 
a less interventionist state and a more independent and assertive private sector. 
The difference will be attributed to the contingent historical starting conditions 
of Turkey and the nature of the global international system based on Western 
economic hegemony, which shaped the trajectory of modernisation in Turkey. 
The state played a leading role in the economic modernisation process while the 
capitalist class remained largely dependent on the state and it was not as 
influential as its counterparts in the West in terms of shaping the political 
economy of the country. The divergence of the Turkish economic modernity 
                                                        
14
 The definition of Western economic modernity is based on Lipset (1959) and Rostow (1960).  
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from the Western path has significant implications for the democratisation 
process in the country; therefore, the conclusion of this chapter will pave the 
way for an in-depth analysis of the issue in Chapter 4 on the political 
modernisation trajectory of Turkey.              
 
The chapter consists of five sections. After this introduction, part two explores 
the origins of Turkey’s economic modernisation process in the pre-1980 period. 
The initial starting conditions inherited by the Ottoman Empire and the impact 
of the statist economic policies followed for most of the pre-1980 Republican 
period are analysed to show how this period of economic modernisation laid the 
groundwork for the post-1980 development efforts in the country. Part three 
examines the profound economic change experienced in the post-1980 period 
with the transition from ISI to EOI and the implementation of a liberalisation 
program. The effects of the transition on various indicators of economic 
development in Turkey are studied while the role of the continuing legacy of 
pre-1980 era on economic modernisation is highlighted. Part four discusses the 
insights provided by the study of the Turkish case in juxtaposition with the 
conceptualisation of modernisation offered by MMP in order to show that this 
theory offers a more efficient understanding of the phenomenon than the 
structural and societal models that use frameworks based on CMT and NMT. 
Part five contains the brief summary of the chapter and the concluding 
remarks.   
                      
3.2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF TURKEY’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
PRE-1980 ERA  
 
Time and again, statism has been adopted by policy-makers of developing non-
Western countries to ensure their economic independency from developed 
Western economies. Particularly in the post-World War II period after the 
decolonisation process of the 1950s, many newly-independent non-Western 
countries were sceptical of the benefits of free-trade policy and the statist model 
was implemented instead to initiate economic modernisation processes (Cohn 
2008:307). This strategy is based on triggering rapid industrialisation and 
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mechanisation through a state-led development process where the state 
imposes protectionist measures (e.g. tariffs on imported goods, restrictive 
quotas and other regulations) in order to shield state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and indigenous capitalists from competition with foreign enterprises within the 
national market. A key objective of ISI is to mobilise domestic savings for 
investment into production sectors rather than consumption. In this model of 
development, the state is envisaged to have the leading role in ensuring the 
economic modernisation of the country through building new industries, 
initiating the mechanisation of agriculture via the introduction of more effective 
production methods, building an integrated national market via the 
construction of an infrastructure network across the country (e.g. railroads, 
highways, ports, airports, other methods for the transportation of goods and 
services), encouraging the rise of education levels via building public schools 
and research-oriented higher education institutions and enabling the 
emergence of indigenous entrepreneurs via providing subsidies and credits 
(Aydın 2005:25).  
 
In the years following the foundation of the Republic in 1923, the statist model 
quickly became the main strategy of the economic development program in 
Turkey. Yet, it is important to note that before statism, Turkey had a brief trial 
with free-market policy in the 1920s. In this regard, the post-1980 economic 
liberalisation period of Turkey is oft compared with the free-market economics 
of the early 1920s (See Nas 1992:13). Akin to the post-1980 period, the 
economy was based on export-oriented production in the 1920s as trade 
barriers were absent and the interest and exchange rates were free of state 
interventionism, yet the Turkish economy was actually very different from that 
of the 1980s.  
 
In the early years of the Republic, Turkey's exports consisted entirely of 
agricultural products and raw materials as the country lacked the advanced 
industrial base of the developed nations of the time, which were exporting 
manufactured goods (Nas 1992:13). Moreover, the role of the industrial  private 
sector during the 1920s was negligible due to various reasons such as the lack 
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of accumulated capital for investment, the lack of an ability to compete with the 
manufactured goods of large-scale foreign producers due to the absence of 
protective tariffs and the relatively low risks involved in the banking sector 
which encouraged the emerging business class to engage with finance and 
commerce rather than industry (Nas 1992:13). Following the brief period of 
liberalism in the 1920s, the regime adopted statist policies in the 1930s, 
initiating the modern debate within the literature on Turkish development. To 
understand the rationale behind the adoption of statism, one has to start in the 
early years of the Republic. 
 
3.2.1 The Economic Legacy of the Empire and the Forced Free-Trade 
Period (1923-1929)   
 
When the Republic was founded in 1923, Turkey was a typical undeveloped 
economy with low average living standards even compared with MENA 
countries under direct colonial rule such as Egypt at the time (Hansen 1991). 
Even though there were piecemeal efforts to initiate an economic 
modernisation program in the 19th century as part of the ongoing 
Westernisation process of the Ottoman Empire, the attempts for 
industrialisation through establishing SOEs by the bureaucracy did not achieve 
considerable success due to the pressure of military expenses and external debt 
on the state budget.  
 
By 1913, more than a century after the Westernisation program of the Ottoman 
Empire had begun, industrial production accounted for a mere 10 percent of the 
total GDP and most of the relatively industrialised provinces were concentrated 
in the European territories which had been lost to expanding Serbia, Greece and 
Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 (Hale 1981:36). Subsequently, the 
economically significant Ottoman provinces in the Balkans such as Selanik 
(Thessaloniki in Greek) did not form the national territories of the Republic of 
Turkey.  
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The educated population was disproportionately concentrated in bureaucracy 
and military employment while the largely illiterate masses formed the 
peasantry. The industrial sector was dominated by foreign capital and non-
Muslim minority ownership (Sönmez 2001:141; Hale 1981:36). The 
development of railway infrastructure from the imperial capital Istanbul to the 
major urban centres in Asia Minor (known as Anatolia in Turkey) was sporadic 
and largely built by foreign governments in piecemeal efforts, in particular by 
the rising European power of the late 19th century, Germany. From the early 
years of the 20th century until the end of World War I, the most noteworthy 
railway construction plan of the Ottoman Empire – the Berlin-Baghdad project – 
was designed, financed and built by Germany, which aimed to survey and 
extract the natural resources of the oil-rich Middle Eastern territories of the 
Ottomans (Pamuk 1987:80-81; Ortaylı 1981:76). In addition, the railway was 
envisaged to carry the German armed forces to the Middle East in a bid by 
Kaiser Wilhelm II to weaken the global hegemony of the British Empire via 
directly threatening the Suez Canal that connected Britain with its most 
economically significant colony, India (Jastrow 1917; McMeekin 2010). The 
beginning of World War I in 1914 prevented the completion of this project.  
 
In sum, the territories that constituted the Republic of Turkey inherited a poor 
state of material development level from the Ottoman Empire (See Table 3.1.; 
Yenal 2001:7; Sönmez 2001:141; Kepenek and Yentürk 1983:9; Aydın 2005:26; 
Keyder 1989:39-70; Hansen 1991). By the end of the 19th century, the Ottoman 
Empire had been reduced to a semi-colony15 of industrialised European powers 
such as France, Britain and Germany, serving these economies as a source to 
extract natural resources and a market to import manufactured goods (Aydın 
2005:26; Keyder 1989:60; Berberoglu 1992:93). As can be seen Table 3.1., the 
early Republic lacked most of the essential characteristics of economic 
modernity as seen by MMP.    
                                                        
15
 As a result of the inability of the Empire to pay its debts, an organisation called the Düyun-u 
Umumiye İdaresi (The Ottoman Public Debt Administration) was established in 1881 by European 
public and private creditors to supervise and collect a portion of the tax income of the state until the 
debt was paid. The organisation quickly took control of more than one-third of all the income of the 
Empire, emerging as an international technocratic agent to jointly manage the economic affairs of the 
state (Keyder 1989:60). The institution symbolised the incompetence of the declining Ottoman state 
and became a main source of anti-Westernism in the country (Keyder 1989:61).    
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Table 3.1. The Political Economy of the Early Republic (1920s)  
Elements of Material 
Development16 
 
mechanised agriculture Negligible (traditional production methods)  
integrated national 
market 
Limited infrastructure (railroads existed only 
between major cities of western and central 
Turkey) 
 
industrialisation Very limited and mostly controlled by foreign 
enterprises 
role of bureaucracy  Highly centralised  
role of landowners Political alliance with the CHP in return for 
preserving regional hegemony over 
predominantly Kurdish south-eastern Turkey  
role of capitalists Negligible presence   
urban middle class  Negligible presence  (rural peasantry make up 
for most of the population)  
Source: Author.  
 
Most of the Turkish territory lacked modern infrastructure and other means of 
transportation, which prevented the formation of an integrated national market 
economy, negatively affecting early economic prospects of the Republic. The 
frequent internal and external military conflicts that engulfed the Ottoman 
Empire throughout the 19th and 20th centuries had devastated the economic 
and human resources of the country in addition to adding a massive burden of 
debt to its successor state.  
 
Despite its lack of material development, however, Turkey's economic 
foundations were based on the bureaucratic tradition inherited from the 
Empire, such that the roots of its modern economic development emerged in the 
                                                        
16
 Based on Berberoglu (1977); Rostow (1960).  
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early Republican years of the 1920s. The Ottoman Empire contributed to the 
process of modernisation in Turkey by providing an educated military officer 
class, bureaucracy, intellectuals and reformed Western-style institutions 
(Weiker 1981:1; Keyder 1995:195).  Berch Berberoglu (1977:28) notes that:  
 
The social and class structure of Ottoman Turkey in the early decades of 
this century [20th century] was essentially a product of the interaction of 
the traditional (pre-capitalist) mode of production of the Empire with 
European commercial capital, especially since the seventeenth century. 
  
Thus, the society that the Republic inherited from the Empire was a direct 
product of the modernisation process that first began spontaneously when the 
pre-industrial Ottoman economy encountered industrialising Western 
European economies, a process that rapidly accelerated with the advent of the 
Industrial Revolution in the first half of the 19th century. The late Ottoman era 
witnessed the emergence of state-directed modernisation in Turkey as the 
ruling elites of the time, the Western-educated imperial bureaucracy, initiated a 
series of reform programs such as the Tanzimat (1838) and Islahat (1856).  
  
Even though the state collapsed after the Allied invasion at the end of World 
War I, the bureaucratic and military classes of the Empire led the nationalist 
movement during Turkey’s Independence War (1919-1922) and later formed 
the ruling elite of the Republic via the formation of a one-party, authoritarian 
regime under the leadership of the founder and first president, Kemal Ataturk 
(Keyder 1989; Berberoglu 1977:25). The main governance agent of the new 
regime was the Kemalist CHP that gradually assumed full control of Turkish 
politics, economy and social life.  
 
At the inception of the republic in 1923, industry played little role in the 
national economy (12 percent share in total GDP) and the sector was almost 
entirely controlled by capitalists among non-Muslim minorities and foreign-
owned enterprises, Muslim capitalists possessing approximately 15 percent of 
all the manufacturing industries (Hale 1981:36; Berberoglu 1977:62). 
Moreover, industry was concentrated in two major cities, Istanbul (55 percent) 
and Izmir (22 percent) (Berberoglu 1977:63). The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 that 
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recognised the formal independence of Turkey also imposed a set of economic 
concessions provided earlier by the Ottoman Empire to Western economies, 
forcing the Republican government to not increase the tariffs for the duration of 
five years until 1928 (Hale 1981:39). This condition prevented the Republican 
regime from protecting indigenous industrial enterprises from competition with 
large-scale enterprises of developed Western European economies, negatively 
affecting the industrialisation process throughout the 1920s.  
 
The legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the agricultural sector was also very 
problematic as the peasantry was poor and entirely dependent on landowners 
within a feudal structure. Mechanisation and the use of modern tools were 
virtually non-existent, agricultural production was labour-intensive, the heavy 
income taxes imposed on small-sized landowning peasants had prevented the 
accumulation of capital in their hands and most landlords had tax collection 
agreements with the central government that gave control of tax-collecting to 
the landlords for a fixed-amount of fee, sustaining and further intensifying the 
dependence of peasants on landlords (Berberoglu 1977:55).  
  
Due to the poorly developed state of the economy, the Republican 
administration felt the need to focus most of its energy and resources on 
economic affairs from 1925 onwards and a series of initiatives to reform and 
develop the agricultural sector began that year. The ‘tithe tax’ that forced the 
land-owning farmers to pay a significant portion of their profits to the 
government was abolished in 1925 to enable farmers to sell their surplus 
products on the market and ensure capital accumulation in their hands in the 
long term (Keyder 1981:32). The advent of an integrated national market 
economy in this era was as a key turning point for the modernisation of the 
Turkish economy as the new regime helped connect provinces through 
railways, enabling cheaper and faster transportation of products across the 
connected major cities of the country17. From 1923 to 1934, a large portion of 
state-owned land was distributed to the peasantry by the state, but a 
                                                        
17
 Early examples of infrastructure development in the 1920s include the construction of Ankara-
Kayseri, Kayseri-Ulukışla and Ankara-Sivas railways (Yenal 2001:71).  
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comprehensive land reform that would ensure the redistribution of land from 
large landowners to peasants never occurred in Turkey (Berberoglu 1977:79-
80).    
 
Even though there were discussions of a land reform in the parliament since the 
early years of the Republic, this action was not undertaken by the government. 
This can be attributed to the close ties the ruling bureaucratic elite had built 
with the landowners (eşraf) during the Turkish Independence War (Keyder 
1989). The eşraf was essential in mobilising the masses for the military and this 
class also made up a large portion of elected representatives of the new 
parliament in Ankara, filling the ranks of the CHP and playing a role in 
sustaining the mass support for the Kemalist regime through their patronage 
over the peasantry (Aydın 2005:26). This link to the new regime had paid off for 
the eşraf as this class benefited most from the removal of the tithe tax and the 
newly-established subsidies and credits the state provided to develop 
agriculture throughout the 1920s (Keyder 1989; Asutay 2010:109). These 
policies that served the interests of the eşraf resulted in widening the income 
distribution gap at the expense of the peasantry via rapid expansion of 
agricultural exports which yielded high profits for landowners (Berberoglu 
1977:81-82). In terms of the absence of land reform, Turkey's experience of 
development is noteworthy as it clearly differs from many other developing 
countries across the non-Western world. Rather than the support of the 
peasantry, the CHP relied on the landowners to sustain and consolidate its rule 
over the country.    
 
By the end of the 1920s, the Turkish economy had made a sharp recovery from 
the devastation of a decade of continuous wars (1912-1922) that ravaged its 
human and economic resources. A centralised state structure that could 
effectively shape policy-making was established, the first significant step 
towards economic modernisation according to MMP. Agricultural output 
increased by 115 percent between 1923 and 1929 (Keyder 1981:37). Due 
mostly to increasing production levels in agriculture, the annual economic 
growth rate reached approximately 9 percent in 1929 (Yenal 2001:71).  
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In addition to developing the agricultural sector, industrialisation was another 
key objective of the new regime in Ankara. Due to the imposed conditions of the 
Lausanne Treaty, the government could not increase tariff rates and throughout 
the 1920s, direct state intervention into the economy remained limited. Yet, 
considerable influence was exercised to gain the support of indigenous 
capitalists by encouraging capital accumulation in their hands in order to foster 
a strong economic base for the new regime (Keyder 1989:132-133). The state's 
role was mainly complementary to the private sector in the 1920s as it was 
concentrated on developing the physical and financial infrastructure in order to 
support entrepreneurs, though the state also began to invest in manufacturing 
industries and establish public enterprises in sugar, glass, textiles and cement 
sectors. A key development of this early era was the foundation of Türkiye İş 
Bankası – the first national bank of the Republic – in 1924 to provide funding for 
the private sector. 
 
Despite the aforementioned efforts of the state, the economic policies of the 
1920s failed to achieve the stated objective of industrialising the country. By the 
end of the 1920s, the share of industry in the national economy remained at its 
1923 level, around 12 percent (Hale 1980:103). This can be attributed to a 
number of factors, namely the unfavourable economic conditions imposed on 
the government through the Lausanne Treaty, the success of the lobbying of the 
eşraf to prioritise the state support for agricultural sector over industry and the 
inability of small-sized local enterprises to accumulate capital and expand 
activities despite substantial state support (Berberoglu 1977: 83). 
 
The failure of industrialisation through the free-market model coincided with 
the Great Depression in 1929, which deeply affected the Turkish economy as its 
main trade partners such as France and Germany were directly hit by the global 
economic crisis. The demand for Turkish exports dropped dramatically in the 
years following 1929. This factor, coupled with a dramatic decline in the supply 
of manufactured goods to the country, caused a drastic fall (23 percent in 1929) 
in the volume of Turkey's total trade (Nas 1992:13, Hansen 1991:266). A third 
and key factor that led the government to a radical policy change was the 
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success of the planned economic model of the Soviet Union, as the protectionist 
Soviet economy was less affected from the Great Depression than the free-
market economies of the West, the Stalinist administration initiating a series of 
Five-Year Industrialisation Plans throughout the 1930s (Cohn 2008:307; 
Berberoglu 1977:89). The Soviet model based on planning and inward-looking 
production became a major inspiration for the Turkish development policy 
thereafter. 
 
3.2.2 Assessing the Impact of the Statist Era (1930-1950)  
 
The statist experience of Turkey throughout the 1930s and 1940s – along with 
that of Argentina and Brazil within roughly the same period – can be seen as one 
of the early precursors of national development strategies followed by many 
non-Western countries in the 1960s and 1970s based on the objective of freeing 
themselves from the economic hegemony of the Western world (Keyder 
1989:150-151). The rationale behind the implementation of statism in Turkey 
can be attributed to the desire of the Kemalist policy-makers to ensure the 
economic independence of the country through building an industrialised and 
mechanised economy that would be as self-sufficient as possible (Kepenek and 
Yentürk 1983:32). During the Izmir Congress of Economics in 1923, long before 
statism was implemented in the 1930s, Kemal Ataturk stated his belief that no 
country would ever acquire full political independence without economic 
independence (Sönmez 2001:159). However, the economic impositions of the 
Lausanne Treaty were in effect until 1929, which prevented the Republican 
regime from developing a comprehensive industrialisation policy until the 
1930s.  
 
It can be argued that the Kemalist policy-makers followed statism as part of a 
broader nationalist agenda as they were against foreign influence of all kinds. 
Even the promise of aid and direct investment by developed Western economies 
such as Britain and France could not convince the Kemalist leadership to open-
up the economy in the 1930s (Togan 1996; Grigoriadis and Kamaras 2008:55). 
This attitude can be attributed to the lessons the Kemalists drew from the late 
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Ottoman economic history, as the Empire was largely unable to control its 
finances in its last years due to excessive foreign influence over the economy. 
The Kemalist regime initiated a full-scale nationalisation program, ’autarky’ 
becoming simultaneously an objective and a key element of Turkey's national 
development strategy. It is important to note that statism was so influential in 
this era that it was included among the main principles of the party program of 
the CHP in 1937, constituting one of the so-called ‘six-arrows’18 of the Kemalist 
ideology.  
 
Hence, two inter-related factors strongly determined the Republican Turkey’s 
early economic modernisation trajectory: firstly, the path dependent legacy of 
the late Ottoman period – as seen in Table 3.1. – left materially strained 
conditions the new regime desperately and rapidly sought to overcome and; 
secondly, the international economic system limited the options of the policy-
makers since the less-developed Turkish economy could not possibly hope to 
have a fair competition with industrialised Western economies under free-
market conditions. In this regard, the Soviet model of protectionist state-led 
modernisation offered a potentially successful route that could rapidly mobilise 
resources around an industrialisation drive as well as enabling Turkey to avoid 
becoming an economic dependency of the developed West as the Ottomans 
experienced while trying to modernise via free-market policy.           
 
The development program of the 1930-1950 era was strongly shaped by the 
belief of the CHP leadership that the Ottoman Empire collapsed because it did 
not possess an ‘indigenous capitalist class’ that could lead the economic 
modernisation effort in the country (Grigoriadis and Kamaras 2008:56). In this 
context, it is easy to understand the dedication of the new regime in Ankara to 
fostering Turkish capitalists, an objective that would remain a key concern for 
policy-makers of Turkey well into the 1980s (Öniş and Türem 2002). As will be 
shown below, the objective of fostering a national capitalist class constitutes a 
crucial path dependent element within the modernisation experience of Turkey 
                                                        
18
 The other five arrows being republicanism, populism, nationalism, secularism and reformism.   
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– remaining a key element of economic development programs in the pre-1980 
and post-1980 periods.  
 
In the 1930s, the adoption of statism resulted in the emergence of an 
intensifying ideological rift within the ranks of the CHP. While a radical group of 
intellectuals and politicians perceived statism as a permanent ‘third way’ to 
capitalist and socialist development trajectories, a second liberal group led by 
the minister of economy (later president from 1950 to 1960), Celal Bayar, 
perceived the program to be merely ‘a pragmatic step’ on the road to the 
formation of a capitalist free-market economy in Turkey (Hale 1981:56). The 
ideological struggle between the two groups would surface after the transition 
to multi-party elections in 1950. This difference in economic visions was most 
pronounced in opposing party programs adopted by the CHP and DP (Demokrat 
Parti) after 1950, the former adhering to a Soviet-style planning strategy while 
the later adopted laissez-faire liberalism. Until the mid-1940s, however, the 
internal difference within the party remained dormant.  
 
Regardless of whether the adoption of statism was a result of ideology or 
pragmatism, the government genuinely attempted to encourage the private 
sector to take a role in economic development in the 1920s, but the inability of 
the private sector to fulfil this envisaged proactive position led policy-makers to 
adopt the statist model in the 1930s. The two decades were very different from 
each other as the nature of the state's approach to the economy in the 1920s 
was limited to preparing programs and reinforcing the private sector rather 
than directing all economic activities as seen in the 1930s and 1940s (Ülgener 
1972:3).  
 
In the early 1930s, as part of the new economic direction, quotas were 
introduced, tariffs were raised dramatically and the state took control of foreign 
exchange entirely. The statist development policy was implemented through 
several complementary initiatives, namely the nationalisation of foreign 
enterprises, the implementation of Five-Year Development Plans, the 
establishment of new public banks to fund development projects (e.g. Halk 
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Bankası and İller Bankası) and attempts to generate foreign aid in order to 
provide capital and technical expertise for an extensive industrialisation 
campaign (See Table 3.2.). As part of the nationalisation policy, the state took 
over large numbers of foreign enterprises during the 1930s and early 1940s, 
particularly in fields with strategic importance such as railways, utilities, 
transportation and ports. The nationalisation efforts of the Republican regime 
are credited with having strengthened the structure of the economy and 
preparing the pre-conditions for a full-fledged planning program that was going 
to be implemented through the Five-Year Development Plans (Berberoglu 
1977:100).   
 
Table 3.2. Elements of the State-led Development Program of the 
1930s  
 Mechanisation of agriculture 
 Increases in total cultivated land in agriculture 
 Construction of consumer goods industries 
 Industrial production for domestic consumption  
(Import-substitution industrialisation) 
 Improvement of infrastructure (new railways across the country) 
 Emerging state-dependent capitalist class (crony capitalism)  
 Source: Author.  
 
The first Five-Year Industrialisation Plan that came into effect in 1933 was 
based on a report prepared by a commission of Soviet experts as part of the 
friendship agreement between Turkey and Soviet Union (Hale 1980:105). 
Nevertheless, the Turkish policy-makers were reluctant to publically 
acknowledge the Soviet Union as the inspiration for the program:   
 
[O]fficially, etatism [statism] was usually defined as a home-grown plant, 
specifically evolved for Turkish conditions. In Atatürk's words, ‘Turkish 
etatism is not a system translated from the socialist theories developed 
since the nineteenth century… instead, it is a system that emerges from 
the specific needs of Turkey, a system peculiar to her’ (Hale 1980:105).  
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The objectives of the first Five-Year Industrialisation Plan were for Turkey to 
acquire the ability to produce consumer goods in the short-term and capital 
goods in the long-term (Nas 1992).  
 
Industrial centres would be dispersed across the country to provide 
employment and create urban centres in what had been hitherto agrarian areas 
of the countryside, rapidly accelerating the pace of urbanisation akin to the 
Soviet development experience during the Stalinist era of 1924-1953. Twenty 
factories for producing textiles, paper, ceramics, glass, cement, chemicals, iron 
and steel were built in a number of provinces as part of the plan and all were 
operational by 1938. In total, 79 various industrial SOEs in industry and 
agriculture were established between 1932 to 1938 (Yenal 2001:89). Building 
upon the considerable success of the first plan in terms of industrialisation, a 
second program was prepared by the Ministry of Economy and approved by the 
government in 1938. The Second Five-Year Plan envisaged the construction of a 
hundred new factories concentrated in minerals, coal, electricity plants, marine 
transport, chemicals, engineering and home fuels.  
 
The focus of the first plan was consumer goods whereas the second plan 
emphasised the production of capital goods. Unlike the first plan, the source of 
funds and technical assistance was designated as Western European economies, 
primarily Britain and Germany as the Turkish government signed numerous 
loan and construction agreements with firms from these countries (Berberoglu 
1977:111). However, World War II broke out in 1939 and prevented the 
implementation of the plan. Turkey and its partners in the program had to 
channel their resources towards military expenditures even though Turkey 
itself remained neutral throughout the war. From 1939 to 1945, the Turkish 
economy was fully geared for war due to fears of invasion by the Axis powers – 
Italy and Germany. The military expenditures of Ankara amounted to more than 
half of the total state budget during the 1940-1945 period (Berberoglu 
1977:179). The 1940s were consequently a lost opportunity for Turkish 
industrialisation. 
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In contrast to the agriculture-oriented development of the 1920s, the focus of 
the state policies throughout the statist period of 1930-1950 was industry. Even 
though the mechanisation effort in agriculture resulted in increased production 
levels, progress in this sector was clearly over-shadowed by the success of 
industrial development:  
 
The agricultural sector, given the resistance throughout Anatolia of 
powerful landlords and the eşraf, never became successfully 
incorporated into the Five-Year Plans and remained in the periphery of 
the industrialization process (Berberoglu 1977:121).  
 
Yet, a noteworthy effort to develop agriculture emerged in the late 1930s and 
1940s as a Four-Year Plan came into effect in 1937, launching a series of 
intensive state initiatives such as the centralisation of production through 
uniting villages into agricultural production units in order to maximise the 
usage of modern tractors and other effective equipment. In addition, the regime 
established the so-called Village Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri) in which the 
graduates of agricultural engineering programs taught modern production 
techniques to peasants. 
  
The effects of the statist policies on development in Turkey can be assessed 
using available data that shows the economic performance for this period. 
During the 1930-1939 period, GNP (Gross National Product) grew at an average 
of 6 percent per annum (5 percent growth rate in agriculture, 11 percent 
growth rate in industry) (Hale 1981:75). Between 1933 and 1939, real GDP 
grew at an average of approximately 8 percent per annum which can be 
considered a major success if compared with the average of 3,2 percent for the 
1927-1932 period and the average of 5,8 percent for the 1960-1978 period, the 
share of industry reaching 18 percent in national economy by 1938 (Hale 1980; 
Altuğ and Filiztekin 2006:18). It has been shown that labour productivity 
increased roughly six-fold from 1923 to 2003, the most significant increase 
occurring in the statist period of 1929-1939 (Altuğ and Filiztekin 2006:17).  
 
In addition to success in industrialisation, the significance of the modernisation 
of agriculture for the achievement of high economic growth rates of the era 
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should also be noted (See Pamuk 2000; Owen and Pamuk 1998:21-23). The 
abolition of the agricultural tithe tax, the construction of railroads and the 
demographic recovery following a decade of ‘total war’ in the late Ottoman 
period all contributed to the rapid growth of the economy in the 1930s.  
 
The data regarding the performance of the statist period presented here 
strongly contests the arguments of the societal model in terms of the economic 
trajectory of Turkey. It shows that long before the 1980s, Turkey already made 
great strides towards laying the groundwork for the industrialisation, 
urbanisation and self-sustaining economic growth of the economy (see Table 
3.3.). As such, the assessment of the early Republican economic development 
experience remains essential to understanding the origins of the economic 
aspect of Turkish modernity today.  
 
The state-led industrialisation, the absence of a noteworthy amount of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), the emphasis on infrastructure (particularly railroads) 
development and a disciplined budget were key characteristics of Turkish 
political economy in the statist period. Despite its positive effects in terms of 
kick-starting the economic modernisation in the country through progress in 
infrastructure, education levels, establishment of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and banks, however, it has been noted that that ‘there was little increase 
in per capita income and in standards of living’ (Weiker 1981:183).  
 
The dominant state mentality of the time was ‘long term development at the 
expense of today’, which might explain the accumulated grievances against the 
CHP rule that would lead to the victory of the DP in the 1950 parliamentary 
elections after the transition to multi-party elections. Also, it is essential to note 
that the development of a national economic market lagged behind 
industrialisation as a majority of the population – particularly in rural areas – 
were not connected with each other due to ongoing deficiencies in the 
transportation infrastructure. Moreover, the successful economic performance 
of the 1930s could not be sustained in the 1940s as World War II proved 
disastrous for Turkish economy. During the war years of 1939-1945, the 
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national income is reported to have fallen an average of 5 percent per annum, 
forming one of the major preconditions for widespread public disillusionment 
with the CHP rule (Altuğ and Filiztekin 2006:19).  
 
Table 3.3. Growth Rates by Production Sector, 1923-1951  
(percent) 
1923 to 1938                                1938 to 1953 
Category                                    Growth Rate                                  Growth Rate 
Gross Domestic Product                              6,8 3,0     
 
Agriculture                                                      7,4 
 
2,7 
Mining                                                              7,7 0,9 
Manufacturing                                                8,7 2,2   
Electricity                                                      14,5 7,0 
Construction                                                   7,1 3,8 
Finance                                                           10,7 2,2 
 
Source: World Bank (1988).  
   
It has been argued that the 1930s also ‘sharpened the contradictions inherent in 
the system’ of Turkey (Berberoglu 1977:134). The problems of the statist era 
can be said to have prepared the stage for the collapse of the Kemalist political 
economic structure in the late 1940s. Even though the landlords initially 
supported the regime, a clash of interests between this class and the Kemalist 
bureaucracy emerged in the 1930s and 1940s as the massive state-led 
industrialisation, the agricultural mechanisation program and the Village 
Institutes increasingly posed a threat to the traditional hegemony of landlords 
over the peasantry.  
 
The question of land reform was the main problem between the bureaucracy 
and the landlords as the latter effectively blocked all attempts for the pursuit of 
this policy until 1945 via utilising its significant influence within the CHP and 
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the parliament (Berberoglu 1977:140). The resistance to this policy by 
landlords within the CHP such as the influential member of parliament, Adnan 
Menderes (later the leader of the DP and the prime minister from 1950 to 1960) 
would eventually constitute the genesis of the DP and its emergence as the main 
opposition party to the CHP. Tensions peaked when the government introduced 
the land reform bill to the parliament in 1945. In retrospect, the unprecedented 
inter-party opposition that emerged as a result was the beginning of the end for 
the one-party regime of the CHP.   
 
The land reform bill was finally approved by the parliament, but only after five 
months of deliberations, deadlock and heated debates that resulted in the 
original plan being modified to better fit the interests of landlords. Yet, it must 
be noted that even in its amended version, the bill would dramatically damage 
the interests of landlords as all private lands in excess of 123.5 acres were to be 
nationalised and distributed to landless peasantry. The maximum limit of 
allowed private land was later raised tenfold after severe pressures exercised 
on the government through the utilisation of the media by landowners 
(Berberoglu 1977:148).  
 
Shortly after the contentious land reform issue, the CHP was split into two in 
1946 as the inter-party opposition formed the DP. Most of the first members of 
the DP originated from landowner, clerical and capitalist social classes 
(Berberoglu 1977:149). The coalition that the CHP bureaucratic elite had 
formed with eşraf finally collapsed, leading to the end of authoritarian one-party 
rule in Turkey. From the beginning, the DP exhibited the character of a 
‘coalition’ rather than a party with a fixed ideology, consisting of different 
groups united only in their opposition to the increasingly left-wing economic 
and social policies of the CHP. In addition to the landowners, the local clergy and 
the rural masses, a key pillar of the DP was the growing capitalist class that had 
close ties with the former prime minister, founder and first chairman of the 
party, Celal Bayar, who had been a colleague of Kemal Ataturk from the early 
days of the Republic.  
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Akin to the landowners, the capitalists had been allies of the Kemalist regime 
throughout the 1920s, but their subsequent relations followed the downhill 
trend as the regime's relations with landowners: when the central regime began 
to pursue statism and prioritised public enterprises over the private sector, the 
profit margins of the capitalists dropped while their main source of revenues – 
imported goods – were being blocked through protectionist tariff measures, 
causing the capitalists to be increasingly disillusioned with the regime (Keyder 
1989). From 1946 onwards, they shifted their support from the CHP to the DP.  
 
3.2.3 An Intermission for Planned Development: The DP Decade (1950-
1960) 
 
The DP came to power after their electoral victory against the CHP in 1950, 
initiating the era of a competitive multi-party political life in Turkey. It would 
not be an exaggeration to state that the DP era was the exact opposite of the 
preceding CHP rule in terms of all aspects of economic policy. Main components 
of statist development such as its protectionism and the public sector-led 
industrialisation were replaced with a free-market strategy. The first phase of 
the liberal transformation was the privatisation of a number of lucrative SOEs 
(Berberoglu 1977:190-191). This was followed by the law of ‘Encouragement of 
Foreign Capital’ implemented in 1954, establishing the preconditions for the 
entry of foreign capital into the Turkish economy by creating favourable 
incentives for foreign investors.  
 
As the DP had to compete in free and fair elections (unlike the CHP in the 
preceding era), the DP's economic policies were naturally poised towards 
gaining votes in the short-term rather than long-term development planning for 
the future. Yet, rather than possessing a pragmatic approach to economy, the 
leading cadre of the DP exhibited a strong ideological stance in their 
commitment to economic liberalism. Hale (1981:88) reports some speeches and 
public statements given by the DP leaders to explain the economic mentality of 
the party: 
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The DP leaders seem to have had an almost pathological opposition to 
the principle of overall economic planning. Adnan Menderes 
…maintained that ‘the [State] Budget is a plan’… When Fahri Belen, the 
Minister of Works in Menderes’ first cabinet, prepared a five-year plan 
for the construction of railways, roads, dams and waterways, he was told 
by the Prime Minister that planning was based on a ‘Communist 
principle’. 
  
A key pillar of the economic policy of the DP was to strengthen the private 
sector at the expense of the public sector and privatisation was initiated with 
the aim of realising this policy. Despite the government's continuous campaigns, 
however, the Turkish capitalists remained reluctant to purchase most of the 
public enterprises. Taking over the large industrial plants that were not 
constructed by the state in accordance with the ‘profit maximisation principle’19 
must have seemed unprofitable for the capitalists.  
 
Contrary to the CHP era, the DP prioritised the development of agriculture over 
industry and the only noteworthy direct state intervention to economy during 
the DP rule occurred in this sector. The main promise stated repeatedly by the 
DP during its electoral campaign in 1950 was to support agricultural sector 
(Sönmez 2001:90; Yenal 2001:98). As the peasantry formed most of Turkey’s 
population, this politically successful strategy contributed to the electoral 
victory of the party in 1950 and subsequent elections (Yenal 2001:98-99). As 
promised, several initiatives were implemented with the rationale of developing 
agricultural production, namely the subsidy of the sector through ‘high 
minimum price regulation’, supplying credits via state-owned banks to farmers 
and the mechanisation of production by importing large amounts of tractors 
and other modern equipment.  
 
Coupled with a dramatic increase in the amount of cultivated land through 
distribution of public lands to farmers, these initiatives managed to achieve and 
sustain a substantial increase in agricultural production levels, leading some 
observers to refer to the development of the decade as an ‘agricultural 
revolution’ in Turkey (See Table 3.4.; Hale 1981:95-97; Yenal 2001:98). During 
                                                        
19
 The capitalist pursuit of gaining highest possible profits with the smallest amount of capital.   
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the decade, the average annual GNP growth rate was 6.3 percent, which was 
partially due to a boom in agricultural exports in the early 1950s caused by the 
extraordinary high global demand for agricultural goods during the Korean War 
(Hale 1981:108). However, after that extraordinary war period, Turkey's 
exports began to rapidly fall from 1953 onwards. 
   
A key development of the DP years was the shift to an oil-based economy. The 
preceding Kemalist governments concentrated their efforts on building railways 
instead of highways for automobiles. Therefore, by 1950 – after 27 years of the 
CHP rule – only 1.600 kilometres of highways had been constructed (Hale 
1981:89). Within a decade from 1950 to 1960, the DP governments constructed 
7.000 kilometres of hard-surfaced highways and approximately 35.000 
kilometres of loose-surfaced roads for automobiles, which resulted in the 
creation of an integrated national economy as many towns and villages were 
connected together via a modern transportation network for the first time in the 
history of the country (Hale 1981:90). The formation of a fully integrated 
national market economy was arguably the main achievement of the DP era and 
its primary contribution to Turkey's economic modernisation in the long-term.  
 
Throughout the 1950s, the DP administration attempted to stimulate economic 
growth via expansionist financing (Weiker 1981:183). A key part of this policy 
was to attract foreign capital. Economic growth dramatically increased in the 
early 1950s, accompanied by a rising private sector, emergence of a national 
market, accelerated urbanisation and agricultural mechanisation. However, 
there were also side effects to the DP's policy as this era was characterised by 
uncoordinated development, leading to high inflation, a budget deficit and the 
accumulation of a massive foreign debt (Weiker 1981:183; Yenal 2001:107). 
The negative consequences of the liberal economic policy included a severe 
balance of payments crisis in 1958, driving the government to seek aid from the 
IMF.  
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Table 3.4. Agricultural Production Growth (1950-1960)  
 
1950 1960 
Agricultural labour force 
(millions) 
9,0 9,7 
Cultivated area 
(millions of hectares) 
 
8,2 12,9 
Tractors 
(thousands) 
17 42 
 
Annual average growth 
rate of agriculture (1950-
1960)  
 
2.7 percent 
Source: State Institute of Statistics of Turkey (1991); Owen and Pamuk 
1998:250; Hansen 1991:268-269.   
  
 
The DP era of 1950-1960 constitutes one of the most badly neglected periods of 
the Turkish economic modernisation experience. As analysed in Chapter 1, 
while the narrative of Turkish modernity developed by the structural model 
solely focuses on the statist policies of the 1930-1950 and 1960-1980 periods, 
the competing paradigm put forward by the societal model searches the origins 
of modern Turkish economy in the post-1980 years. Contesting both of these 
approaches, this part of the chapter showed that, despite its aforementioned 
shortcomings, the 1950-1960 period had a major impact on the economic 
modernisation of the country by creating an integrated national market and 
strongly accelerating the mechanisation of agriculture. The emergence of these 
two crucial developments in this era should be acknowledged to understand the 
origins of Turkey’s economic modernity.      
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3.2.4 A Return to Planned Economy: The Rule of ISI (1960-1980)     
 
The first Republican experiment with liberalisation in the 1920s was by 
imposition of the Lausanne Treaty, not by design. In contrast, the DP 
consciously undertook the second liberalisation experience in the 1950s. 
Despite its successes mentioned previously, various problems caused by the DP 
policies led to the failure of the liberal economic strategy in 1958.  Following a 
military coup in 1960 that ended DP rule, the Kemalist bureaucracy once again 
took control of the economic modernisation process. One of the reasons behind 
the 1960 coup was that the purchasing power of the salary of military officers 
steadily decreased during the 1950s, the military blaming the economic policies 
of the DP government for their loss of ‘socio-economic status’ (Jacoby 
2003:673).  
 
A key factor that shaped the development policy of the 1960-1980 period was a 
strong critique of the DP's policies as the absence of development plans or any 
kind of concerted strategy to accelerate the industrialisation process were 
considered to have caused the economic crisis of 1958 (Hale 1981:117). ISI, 
referred to as ‘mixed economic strategy’ by Turkish policy-makers of the 1960-
1980 years, was not based on an a priori economic thought or ideology, but it 
was a result of the particular economic conditions and trajectory of the country 
from the 1920s onwards. The primary objective of ISI, in the Turkish context, 
was to create large-scale state-owned manufacturing industries in the absence 
of a noteworthy number of capitalists that possessed an interest20 for 
investment in that sector (Kılıçbay 1972:84). 
 
The military junta that came to power in 1960 set about creating a framework 
for a sustained development policy largely autonomous from the control of 
elected governments. Economic development was seen by the Kemalist military 
and bureaucracy as ‘too important’ to be left in the hands of populist politicians 
(Hale 1981). With this rationale, the Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı (DPT) was 
                                                        
20
 The entrepreneurs of Turkey in this era preferred to concentrate on short-term investments in trade 
and the financial sector (Kılıçbay 1972:84). This was the case since the 1920s.  
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established. The ISI policy was designed and directed by the DPT, which had a 
special mandate over economic affairs, based on the model of economic policy-
making institutions in the Soviet Union and other socialist economies in Eastern 
Europe at the time. The DPT directed investments into manufacturing industries 
of the public sector in addition to providing financial support to the private 
sector.  
 
The main rationale behind the development strategy of the 1960-1980 period 
was the principle of the ‘social state’. The emphasis given to the concept can be 
seen in Article 2 of the 1961 Constitution that defined the Turkish state as such:  
 
The Republic of Turkey is a national, democratic, secular and social state 
governed by the rule of law based on human rights and the basic 
principles stated in the preface (T.C. Resmi Gazete 1961).   
 
Social state in this context was roughly the equivalent of the ‘welfare state’, 
namely a society where the state is designed as primarily responsible for the 
well-being of its citizens measured in terms of two key indicators, income per 
capita and equitable wealth distribution. The Turkish state was expected to 
interfere in economic affairs regularly to achieve these two objectives. This 
definition of the state's responsibilities and prerogatives were significantly 
different from those of the new state that would later emerge after another 
military coup in 1980, this time designed in accordance with a neo-liberal view 
of political economy. It is also important to note that the policies of the 1960-
1980 period indicate that socio-economic problems posed by rapid population 
growth in the country were noticed for the first time by Turkish policy-makers 
and an initiative to publicise the use of birth control methods were launched in 
the 1960s and 1970s (Hiç 1972:15).  
 
ISI was implemented by the DPT through five-year plans akin to the pre-1950 
statist strategy (1963-67, 1968-72, 1973-1977). Yet, there was a fundamental 
difference between the post-1960 ISI model and the statist model of 1930-1950. 
The early statist planning was almost exclusively concentrated on 
industrialisation, whereas the ISI strategy of post-1960 was more balanced in 
128 
 
its contents, taking into account the importance of both the agricultural and 
industrial sectors and emphasising the balance between public and private 
sectors (Ülgener 1972:5-6).  
 
The overall performance of the first three plans (1963-1977) was largely 
impressive as GNP and the industrial and agricultural growth rates continued to 
increase (See Table 3.5.; Weiker 1981:184). However, the envisaged targets 
indicated in the plans for the share of industry in total production lagged behind 
the services sector and two side effects emerged over time, namely an 
unexpected and unprecedented increase in consumer demand and an 
uncontrollable increase of imports. The most problematic issue was the 
structure of Turkish foreign trade as Turkey's exports became heavily 
dependent on imported materials, laying the groundwork for a chronic trade 
deficit that, even today, remains as the principal problem and risk for the 
Turkish economy. After its initial success in the 1960s and early 1970s, the ISI 
strategy failed to achieve sustainable economic growth as the low level of 
exports and dependence on imports of industrial production goods by local 
industries led to a severe foreign exchange problem in the late 1970s (Şenses 
1988:9). 
 
Over the years, Turkey rapidly diversified its import-substitution industries, 
constantly re-investing savings in industrialisation programs (Nas 1992:14). 
Between 1963 and 1977, labour productivity steadily increased, ensuring the 
achievement of very high economic growth rates amounting to roughly 9 
percent per annum between 1970-1976, making Turkey one of the fastest 
developing economies of the era (Altuğ and Filiztekin 2006: 19). Despite the fact 
that the Turkish economy had deeply troubled years and poor performance in 
the late 1970s, it can be argued that by the end of the decade, Turkey had clearly 
achieved the ‘take-off’ to self-sustaining economic growth as described in Walt 
Whitman Rostow’s material development model (See Rostow 1960): 
 
GNP has grown at an average of 6.6 percent between 1950 and 1976, one 
of the highest among the OECD countries, though real per capita income 
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had grown more slowly due to inflation and rapid population growth 
(Weiker 1981:182). 
 
The success of Turkey in economic growth was due to a dramatic increase in the 
production of goods and services, the shift from agrarian to industrial-oriented 
production, the rapid development of infrastructure by governments and rising 
standards of living for most of the population despite ongoing problems in 
equitable wealth distribution (Weiker 1981:182).  
  
Between 1963 and 1975, the technological change rate was 2.23 percent per 
annum, leading to the emergence of a highly capital-intensive manufacturing 
sector that could potentially compete with its European counterparts (Cecen et 
al. 1994:40). Turkey successfully built a ‘large and diversified base’, which 
would serve as the basis for the achievements of the export-led era after 1980 
(Celasun 1994:50; Cecen et al. 1994; Ahmad 1993). The strength of the 
manufacturing industry was demonstrated after the adoption of EOI in 1980, 
when the indigenous industries managed to challenge the primacy of European 
manufacturing firms across the continent in sectors such as automotive and 
white goods.  
 
The data presented here indicates that the success of ISI between 1960 and 
1980 greatly contributed to Turkey's modernisation, forming a suitable 
groundwork to launch an export drive in the 1980s. As with the impact of the 
statist era (1930-1950) and the DP era (1950-1960) analysed above, the ISI 
period (1960-1980) contests the claims of the societal model regarding the 
origins of the economic modernity of Turkey. Without the essential background 
of the pre-1980 period, the subsequent trajectory of economic development 
cannot possibly be understood. Hence, the post-1980 trajectory was a path 
dependent outcome of the pre-1980 years.   
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Table 3.5. The Economic Development Performance of the 1963-1980 
Period 
(percent) 
1963-1977 1978-1980 
GNP  
(Gross National 
Income) 
% 6 % 1,3  
Per Capita Income 
(In terms of GNP) 
% 3,5 % -1,1 
Industrial 
Production 
% 9,1 % -0,9 
Agricultural 
Production 
% 3,4 % 2,8 
Source: State Institute of Statistics of Turkey (1991).  
 
  
Nevertheless, the success of ISI came at a price for the Turkish economy. After 
1968, Turkey entered the second and more advanced stage of the strategy as the 
aim became the substitution of imported ‘intermediate and capital goods, 
consumer durables, and the domestic production of related technologies’ (Cecen 
et al. 1994:39). The first stage of ISI, namely the achievement of local production 
of consumer durables and low-skilled production of intermediate goods was 
complete by the late 1960s. However, the increasing dependence on short-term 
loans to build second-tier industries led to a vicious cycle of import bills, debt-
servicing payments and declining exchange reserves in the absence of available 
accumulated domestic capital and savings (Nas 1992:14; Cecen et al. 1994:44). 
Due to this factor, the balance of payments continued to deteriorate in the late 
1970s, resulting in a severe debt crisis in 1977.  
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Another key problem of the 1960-1980 period was the inconsistency of 
economic policies as bureaucrats and politicians often had different visions. The 
inconsistency within the policy-making mechanism prevented the formation of 
a stable relationship between private businesses and policy-makers in the era. 
This was only exacerbated with the unstable nature of Turkey's democratisation 
experiment, occasionally manifesting itself as parliamentary gridlocks, political 
crises interrupted with military interventions (1971, 1980) and short-term 
technocratic governments that lacked political legitimacy. The private sector 
began to emerge as an influential actor in the 1960s and 1970s, benefiting from 
state subsidies and incentives. However, this resulted in the consolidation of the 
state-dependent private business structure in the country, an outcome that was 
largely engineered by elected populist governments through awarding state 
contracts to capitalists that supported their electoral campaigns (See Öniş 
1992:87-88; Asutay 2010:108; Özel 2014). Thus, the deficient nature of the 
democratisation process had negatively impacted on economic modernisation 
in the country (See Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 for a more detailed analyses of the 
interplay between economic development and democratisation processes in 
Turkey). 
 
The political life of Turkey was highly unstable in the 1970s due to the inability 
of a series of coalition and minority governments to fully control the parliament 
and effectively direct policy-making. Even though Turkey achieved high 
economic growth rates in the relatively stable 1960s and early 1970s, a severe 
economic crisis emerged from 1977 onwards, resulting in hyper-inflation and 
very high unemployment rates (reaching more than 20 percent by 1979) while 
the account deficit reached approximately 78 percent of the value of total 
exports in 1979 (Hale 1981:128). The economic crisis of the late 1970s was 
accompanied by a low-intensity civil war between socialist and ultranationalist 
militias across the country, the political conflict resulting in the lives of more 
than 5.000 citizens by 1980 (Hale 1981:128). The political and economic crises 
eventually triggered another military coup in 1980.     
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3.3 A NEW PATH OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE POST-1980 PERIOD (1980-
2013)  
 
Even though the economy started to show signs of collapse in the late 1970s, the 
insistence on ISI by successive governments and the inability of policy-makers 
to respond to the Oil Crisis of 1973 exacerbated the severe problems 
characterising the 1977-80 period as the inward-looking production proved 
detrimental in the face of falling domestic demand (Altuğ and Filiztekin 
2006:20; Shambayati 1994:312). It has been argued that in the late 1970s, 
Turkey was in a severe economic crisis and the country had to choose one of 
two available options to get out of the crisis, either shift the orientation of the 
economy towards an export-oriented strategy or proceed with an advanced 
stage of ISI which meant the replacement of the imports of durable consumer 
goods with domestic production (Togan 1996).  
 
Turkish policy-makers within the government and the DPT chose the second 
option and strove to build new capital-intensive industries through using short-
term foreign loans. In retrospect, the more effective option would have been the 
first strategy as financing ISI with short-term loans imposed a massive debt 
burden on the fragile budget, constituting one of the factors that led to the 
collapse of the economy in 1979. As a result, an IMF structural adjustment 
program was adopted to stabilise and reform the economy in 1980. The option 
that the policy-makers did not choose in the late 1970s was subsequently 
implemented by the military government after the coup in 1980. Throughout 
the 1980s, the liberalisation program achieved its main objective of reducing 
the account balance deficit as the budget had a 1.5 billion USD surplus by 1988 
while the exports rapidly rose from $2.9 billion in 1980 to  approximately $13 
billion in 1990 (Nas 1992:15).  
 
As the statist program of the 1930s was inspired by the Soviet model of planned 
development, the EOI strategy adopted in the post-1980 period was also based 
on the experiences of other countries. This time, the Turkish policy-makers 
studied the East Asian model of development based on the successful EOI 
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strategies of Japan and South Korea (Kaynak and Gürol 1987:61; Öniş 1992:75). 
The importance of EOI for the economic modernisation of developing countries 
is succinctly explained by Erdener Kaynak and Metin Gürol (1987:54):  
 
Less-developed countries (LDCs) rely heavily on export marketing to 
obtain much needed foreign currencies necessary for their socio-
economic and technological development. Marketing domestic products 
in foreign countries provides LDCs with a reliable source of income to 
purchase capital goods they need for their development from the 
industrialized countries of the West.   
 
In initial stages of economic modernisation, due to the tendency of less-
developed countries to possess comparative production advantages in 
agricultural products and raw materials, these primary goods automatically 
form the majority of their total export goods. However, exporting primary goods 
have disadvantages for the achievement of economic modernisation in the long-
term, namely the low-profit margins of these goods vis-à-vis manufactured 
products and the over-reliance on weather conditions for agricultural 
production. The main principle of EOI is to rapidly change the nature of a 
country’s exports from primary goods to manufactured industrial goods that 
would yield high profit margins.  
 
Primary commodities constituted the bulk of Turkey’s exports in decades prior 
to the 1960s, but the share of manufactured products within Turkey’s total 
exports dramatically rose from 13,5 percent in 1968 to 18,4 percent in 1980 
(Kaynak and Gürol 1987:55). A key objective of EOI of the 1980s was for Turkey 
to sustain the growing share of industrial goods exports and further increase it 
through transforming its economy.  
  
In the following sections, the key characteristics of the post-1980 trajectory of 
economic modernisation in Turkey will be analysed.  
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3.3.1 The Rise of Turgut Özal and the Role of the Military Rule  
 
The 1980 military coup that preceded and prepared the conditions for the 
economic liberalisation program of the 1980s was radically different from the 
previous military interventions in 1960 and 1971 (Sayarı 1992). The political 
crisis of the late 1970s was accompanied by economic and financial crises of 
unprecedented scale in Turkey. Because of the deep crises, the scope of the 
socio-economic and political engineering project undertaken by the military 
government was considerably wider than previous military interventions 
(Sayarı 1992:28). In contrast to the earlier short-term military interventions, 
the junta led by the Chief of Staff (later president) General Kenan Evren 
remained in power for almost three years before elections for a new parliament 
were allowed to take place. This relatively long period of unrestricted rule 
allowed the junta to have a direct impact on the reformation of the Turkish 
political economy after 1980.  
 
The architect of the IMF economic stabilisation program initiated by the last 
government before the coup, Turgut Özal, was allowed by the junta to keep his 
influential position as the chief economic advisor to the government. Shortly 
after the coup, Özal was appointed as deputy prime minister for economic 
affairs in the military government, eventually emerging as the most influential 
policy-maker of the 1980s after the electoral victory of his newly founded ANAP 
(Anavatan Partisi) in 1983. Özal's influence over political economy in Turkey 
throughout the 1980s cannot be overlooked in any analysis of the period:  
 
First, as the ‘economic czar’ of the military regime, and later as prime 
minister... Özal became the leading proponent of economic liberalisation 
and market-oriented policies. For a country that had a long tradition of 
state-controlled and inward-oriented economic strategies, Özal's 
neoliberal strategy of economic growth, with its emphasis on an 
outward-looking economy, represented a significant new phase in its 
post-war development (Sayarı 1992:29).    
  
Özal perceived ISI as detrimental to economic development in Turkey due to its 
alleged protection of ‘weak’ domestic industries that would not be able to 
compete internationally and for its creation of a state subsidy-reliant public 
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sector (Sayarı 1992:30). It has been argued that prior to the implementation of 
the liberalisation program of 1980s, Turkey was an undeveloped country, 
having problems common to these economies such as high budget deficit, 
unstable exchange rate, inflation, over-reliance on public enterprises and 
excessive state intervention which supposedly resulted in the emergence of an 
inefficient public sector that covered most of the economic activities in the 
country (Morrissey 1996:89). In light of these critiques of the pre-1980 period, 
a radical economic reform program was implemented in 1980 to severely 
reduce domestic demand in order to re-orient the production towards exports. 
 
Turkey's economic liberalisation process began in 1980 with the so-called 
‘January 24 decree’ and later gained momentum with the foundation of Istanbul 
Stock Exchange and the implementation of Law No. 2983 in 1984, ultimately 
leading to the removal of all legal barriers for foreign investments (Simga-
Mugan and Yüce 2003:84). A privatisation program was also initiated based on 
the neoliberal assumption that SOEs are a financial burden on state budgets and 
that the private sector would more effectively manage these enterprises. The 
alleged inefficiency of the public sector vis-à-vis the private sector was 
repeatedly voiced in public by Özal during the 1980s (Simga-Mugan and Yüce 
2003:85).  
 
The economic development strategy adopted under the leadership of Özal was 
linked to the presence of the military as radical austerity measures imposed 
during the period of military rule (1980-1983) paved the way for the 
achievement of the main objectives of the plan, namely to transform the Turkish 
economy from ISI model to export-led model through cutting down state 
subsidies for all SOEs, privatising most of the SOEs and increasing the share of 
FDI (foreign direct investment) in the economy. Austerity measures included 
the elimination of state subsidies for the consumer goods produced by the 
public sector and the severe reduction of the wages of public sector employees 
(Sayarı 1992:31). The political context of the early 1980s should be emphasised, 
as it would have been extremely difficult to implement any of these policies 
during Turkey's highly bipolarized and unstable democratic environment in the 
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late 1970s when labour unions and socialist student organisations were 
influential in organising mass demonstrations across the country.    
 
A ‘military-industrial complex’ had emerged in the country from the 1960 coup 
onwards as the military officer class began to foster closer ties with capitalists, 
an attitude that became more apparent after the 1980 coup. The junta arrested 
122,609 citizens on charges of terrorism and 54 percent of these were classified 
as ‘left-wing terrorists’ whereas 7 percent were referred to as ‘Kurdish 
separatists’, 25 percent as ‘unknown’ and 14 percent as ‘right-wing terrorists’ 
(Jacoby 2003:678). It was clear that a disproportionate amount of people 
imprisoned by the military had a left-leaning ideology compared to the ones 
leaning towards the right of the political spectrum. The government closed 
down labour unions, the post-1980 legal framework making it de facto possible 
for the government to postpone and outright ban strikes (Jacoby 2003:678). 
The new repressive framework of Turkish political economy was highly 
beneficial for the interests of the capitalist class.  
 
The centralised control and heavy-handed approach of the military prevented 
the manifestation of any noteworthy public opposition to the aforementioned 
structural adjustment policies. Most of the leadership and cadres of political 
parties, labour unions, student organisations and other non-governmental 
organisations were imprisoned by the junta (Ahmad 1993). The military rule 
and the harsh measures it adopted in dealing with political opposition have 
been argued to be noteworthy elements of the Turkish development experience, 
enabling the effective implementation of a very radical liberalisation program 
relatively easy compared to the governments of other developing countries such 
as Argentina and Chile that had to face organised public opposition within the 
same period (Şenses 1988).  
  
The military rule in Turkey officially ended in 1983, but even though the 
political system began to democratise to some extent after the parliamentary 
elections held the same year, the ANAP administration led by Özal was able to 
govern without strong opposition due the ongoing ban on the participation of all 
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the major political parties and party leaders of the pre-1980 era. Another 
element that made the post-1980 liberalisation program of Turkey different 
than its counterparts across the non-Western world was the determination of 
the administration to sticking with the original plan and to execute all of its 
measures consistently, which enabled the liberalisation program to fully 
transform the economy in all sectors (Şenses 1988:11).  
 
3.3.2 The Urbanisation Process and the Emergence of the Middle Class   
 
By the 1980s, it was clear that Turkey had made considerable progress in 
urbanisation, a key indicator of economic modernisation. Yet, rapid population 
growth and the uncoordinated urbanisation process impacted negatively on the 
economic performance of the country. Turkey's population rose from about 14 
million in 1900 to approximately 45 million in 1980 (Hale 1981:17). As with 
many other developing nations, rapid population growth, mass internal 
immigration to urban areas and increasing percentage of youth within the 
population began to be major sources of economic problems from the late 
1960s onwards.  
 
The governments had to cope with a massive pressure to provide employment, 
primary and higher education and infrastructure to urban areas in order to 
sustain the needs of a dramatically larger population. This was a massive drain 
on the limited resources of Turkey. In 1935, the urban population amounted to 
16.6 percent, rising to 18.7 percent in 1950, 29.8 percent in 1965 and to 41.4 
percent in 1975 (Hale 1981:26). By 1980, the urban population overtook the 
rural population for the first time (Özcan and Turunç 2011:66). The trend 
accelerated over the years, the urban population reaching 74 percent of the 
total population by 2012 (World Bank 2014b). The acceleration of urbanisation 
in this era was accompanied by two essential elements of economic modernity 
according to MMP – the expansion of the manufacturing sector and the 
manifestation of sizable middle class.   
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After the adoption of EOI in the 1980s, the role of the manufacturing sector 
dramatically increased over the years, accounting for approximately 80 percent 
of total exports by 1990 and over 90 percent by 2000 (See Table 3.7.). Since 
1980s, a culture of entrepreneurialism has been promoted by virtually all 
elements of life in Turkey, namely policy-makers, media, civil society and 
religious orders (Özcan and Turunç 2011). The culture of entrepreneurialism 
was supported by state banks with long-term credits and it was accompanied by 
internal migration and capital flight to urban centres. This resulted in the 
emergence of what came to be called the ‘Anatolian Tigers’, namely a large 
number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in second wave 
industrial cities of Anatolia such as Denizli, Eskişehir, Gaziantep, Konya and 
Kayseri, many of which had witnessed a massive surge in their population in the 
post-1980 period, some even exceeding the one million threshold (Özcan and 
Turunç 2011:68).     
  
There exists a strong link between the liberalisation program of the 1980s and 
the rise of the SMEs as these enterprises utilised the free market economics and 
the export drive for their benefit (Kirişçi 2009:43). The influence of EOI policy 
on the social and economic life of newly-industrialised areas such as Gaziantep, 
Denizli and Kayseri cannot possibly be overstated as in addition to the SMEs, an 
urban middle class began to emerge in the 1980s and 1990s in these hitherto 
rural and poor provinces (Tok 2008:83).  
 
The liberalisation of finance in the 1980s allowed foreign capital – particularly 
from the Gulf countries in the Middle East – to pour into the Turkish economy. 
In this context, the inception of the Islamic finance banks21 (IFBs) with a special 
legislation by the government in 1983 was a turning point for attracting Middle 
Eastern investors to Turkey (Hosgör 2011:345). Initially, a number of IFBs were 
founded as joint ventures between Turkish enterprises and their partners from 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE (e.g. Albaraka Türk, Family Finans, Faisal 
Finans and Kuveyt Türk). Since then, the Turkish entrepreneurs have also 
                                                        
21
 Please note that due to the negative perception of the label ‘Islamic’ by the secular regime in 
Turkey, these banks have been referred initially as ‘Special Finance Houses’ and after 2005, as 
‘Participation Banks’.   
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established their own IFBs, namely Anadolu Finans, İhlas Finans and Asya 
Finans. Even though the economic influence of the IFBs in Turkey remained 
limited22 compared to the economies of other pre-dominantly Muslim societies, 
these institutions contributed to economic development by channelling 
significant amounts of capital into investments and gradually acquiring 
noteworthy shares in the national banking sector (See Table 3.6.; Asutay 2013; 
Hosgör 2011:346).  
 
The link between the emergence of an Islamic finance sector, the rise of the 
SMEs and the Islamic political movement in the post-1980 period led to public 
debates and proliferation of works on the concept of Islamic Calvinism. As 
examined in Chapter 1, the scholars of the societal model within Turkish 
studies were inspired by the Islamic Calvinism concept of NMT and applied the 
hypothesis of compatibility between Islamism and capitalist modernity on the 
Turkish case (See Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 for a detailed analysis on this 
issue).   
 
It is important to note that the origins of the SMEs and the Anatolian 
industrialisation – which constitutes one of the most significant elements of the 
trajectory of economic modernity in Turkey – can be traced back to the 1960s. 
In the pre-1980 period, governments attempted to reduce the regional 
disparities in the country through an effort to industrialise the inner Anatolian 
provinces, initially by channelling the Turkish workers' remittances from 
Europe to village cooperatives in the 1960s, then through providing credits 
from state banks for the establishment of the SMEs in the 1970s. (Hosgör 
2011:344). The DPT, a key institution of the ISI, had a major role in directing 
this process. In the post-1980 period, a second wave of industrialisation in these 
relatively developed areas began, the export-drive and the inflow of FDI further 
contributing to the rise of the SMEs.  
  
                                                        
22
 Mehmet Asutay (2013:218) shows that Turkey was ranked eighth among predominantly Islamic 
countries in terms of shari’a compliant assets of Islamic finance banks in 2010, behind Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Malaysia, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar.    
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The roots of the SMEs in the pre-1980 period strongly challenges the narrative 
of Turkish economic trajectory offered by the societal model, which puts heavy 
emphasis on the post-1980 era as Chapter 1 showed. The experience of the 
industrialisation of Anatolia and the emergence of the SMEs provide one of the 
most noteworthy examples of the high level of continuity between the pre-1980 
and post-1980 periods as the latter developments built upon the groundwork 
provided earlier, once again highlighting the crucial role of path dependency.            
 
Table 3.6. The Asset and Share Growth of the Islamic Finance Banks in 
Turkey  
(percent)  
Year Asset Growth Shares in the National Banking 
Sector  
2002 - % 1.83 
2003 % 29 % 2.01 
2004 % 42.7 % 2.33 
2005 % 36.2 % 2.44 
2006 % 38 % 2.75 
2007 % 41.5 % 3.35 
2008 % 32.5 % 3.52 
2009 % 30.4 % 4.03 
2010 % 28.8 % 4.31 
2011 % 23.6 % 4.41 
Source: Asutay (2013:218).   
 
It has been suggested that the main beneficiaries of the export drive and the 
liberalisation program of the 1980s were the large conglomerates concentrated 
in western regions of Turkey, yet a large number of SMEs were also able to 
utilise the opportunities to rapidly re-orient their marketing towards exports, 
particularly in the textiles, construction and service sectors (Hosgör 2011:344). 
Akin to the pre-1980 years, the state was influential in directing the economic 
development process via providing subsidies and loans to exporters in addition 
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to building organised industrial centres. The liberalisation process dramatically 
altered the nature of Turkish economy as ‘more than 500.000 firms were 
established between 1983 and 2000; and in 1990 the SMEs accounted for 
almost 90 percent of all manufacturing firms in Turkey and employed more 
than one-third of the workers in the manufacturing sector’ (Hosgör 2011:345).  
 
3.3.3 The Export Boom and the Role of Economic Relations with Europe   
 
After the adoption of EOI and the liberalisation of the financial structure by 
allowing the fluctuation of interest rates in 1980, the overall trade volume of 
Turkey quadrupled within only a decade (Nas 1992:11). During the 1983-1987 
period, the scope and size of Turkey's exports to Western Europe and Middle 
East rapidly expanded, which enabled the economy to sustain high economic 
growth rates (Sayarı 1992:36). The share of exports within the GNP was an 
average 3,9 percent during the 1975-1979 period, but it rapidly rose in the 
1980s, reaching 16,4 percent in 1988 (Öniş 1992:73).  
 
The export boom that characterised the 1980s had a substantial effect on the 
Turkish economy as the whole structure of export goods radically changed. The 
share of industrial goods within total exports rose from 18.4 percent in 1980 to 
79,9 percent in 1990 and to 91,9 percent in 2000, demonstrating the positive 
impact of Turkey's considerable success with EOI on economic modernisation 
(See Table 3.7.). The success of Turkey's export drive constitutes an acclaimed 
aspect of Turkish economic modernity:  
 
No other developing country that has changed development strategy in 
the period 1965-85, achieved such a rapid transformation of export 
structure (Taskin and Yeldan 1996:159).   
    
Rather than heavy investment into export-oriented sectors, the Turkish export 
model was based on three factors: a real decline in wage share in the production 
process, export subsidies provided by the state and the devaluation of currency 
(Onaran and Stockhammer 2005:74). By keeping the wage levels low 
throughout the 1980s, Turkey gained a comparative international advantage as 
the wages rose considerably in the newly industrialised countries of East Asia 
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during the same period (Leander 1996:140). Political governance was another 
significant factor that resulted in the success of Turkey's export-drive as the 
state managed to positively impact on the process through currency 
devaluations (13,5 percent fall vis-à-vis US dollars between 1979-1991) 
(Leander 1996:140-141).  
 
Table 3.7. Total Export Development, 1950-2000 
 
                                                                         Sectoral distribution of exports (percent) 
                                      Total export 
Years                            (Million $)                   Agriculture        Mining         Industry        
  1950                                 263                               88,0                    2,5                  9,4             
  1960                                 321                               92,9                    5,6                  1,4 
  1970                                 589                               76,0                    6,1                  17,9 
  1980                                 2,910                            74,9                    6,6                  18,4 
  1990                                12,959                          17,4                     2,5                  79,9   
  2000                                27,775                           6,0                      1,4                   91,9    
Source: Turkish Treasury (2006); Tanrıvermiş and Bülbül (2007).   
 
 
A third factor that positively affected the export drive was the trade agreement 
between Turkey and the EC (European Community, later the EU). The 
exemption of Turkey from trade quotas exercised to the exports of other non-
European countries within European markets provided Turkish exporters with 
a significant comparative advantage against both the producers with lower 
wage levels (e.g. India and Pakistan) and those with a more technologically 
advanced manufacturing industry (e.g. Hong Kong and South Korea) (Leander 
1996:140-141).  
 
At first, the ‘Customs Union Agreement’ signed with the EC resulted in a 
disproportionate increase in Turkey's imports compared to its exports, but an 
export boom towards Europe occurred from the late 1990s, as Turkish 
enterprises gained considerable market shares in sectors such as textiles, 
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electrical machinery, iron, steel, chemicals,  automotive and white goods 
(Lohrmann 2002:47). Turkey's geographical proximity to European markets 
was utilised to attract foreign investors, particularly in the automotive industry 
as major international companies such as Renault, FIAT, Honda and Toyota built 
factories across the country. As a result of all these factors, Turkish exports rose 
from $2.9 billion in 1980 to $27.7 billion in 2000 (See Table 3.7.).   
 
In the late 2000s, the Turkish white goods sector became the largest in Europe, 
a Turkish enterprise, BEKO, acquiring leadership in the UK market by 2012 as 
well as large market shares in countries such as Germany and Belgium (Bombey 
2012). Another enterprise, Vestel, gained a significant presence in European 
markets of electronics and home appliances (particularly television sets) as 
with its 18 percent share in the Eurozone in 2013, it was the second largest TV 
producer in the continent after the South Korean company, Samsung (Bombey 
2013). The automotive industry of Turkey also contributed heavily to the 
industrialisation of the country. In 2010, Turkey was the 7th largest automotive 
producer in Europe and the 16th in the world (The Republic of Turkey Prime 
Ministry Investment Support and Promotion Agency 2013). Especially in the 
last few years, the sector expanded rapidly and Turkey is expected to become 
the 3rd largest producer in Europe by the end of 2014 (The Republic of Turkey 
Prime Ministry Investment Support and Promotion Agency 2014b).  
 
The pre-1980 period enabled Turkey to build a diversified industrial economy, 
which was capable of competing with European economies in the post-1980 
period under free-market conditions. Hence, the largely beneficial role ties with 
Europe played on Turkey’s subsequent economic development trajectory were 
a direct path dependent outcome of earlier years.            
  
3.3.4 A ‘Coming of Age’: The Private Sector as the New Engine of the 
Turkish Political Economy   
  
The 1980s were characterised by high productivity growth in the economy 
(Altuğ and Filiztekin 2006:20). Even though radical changes within the 
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economic structure resulted in negative short-term consequences such as 
declining average living standards, the privatisation of the SOEs actually led to 
an increased efficiency in the production sector, particularly in manufacturing, 
as Turkish enterprises had to compete with the goods of other producers from 
all around the world. Increased political and economic stability enabled the 
government to attract unprecedentedly higher levels23 of FDI, which had a 
positive impact on the performance of local producers by driving the public and 
private enterprises to be more competitive in order to not lose their shares to 
foreign enterprises in the Turkish market (Sayarı 1992:37). 'Survival of the 
fittest' was the new governing principle of economic activity in the country and 
all producers had to adapt to the new economic conditions.  
 
Even though the share of the public sector in the Turkish economy had been 
sustained throughout the 1980s, levels of public employment declined 
(Waterbury 1992a:55). Thus, it can be argued that the long habit of Turkish 
governments of using SOEs to provide employment for their supporters had 
been curbed to some extent. Moreover, the SOEs had to be managed more 
effectively than before under free-market conditions. In 1987, public sector 
employees amounted to 2.3 million people, constituting 14 percent of the entire 
workforce (Waterbury 1992a:57). However, apart from the continuing 
existence of a large number of SOEs, there existed other options such as credits 
from state-owned banks and provision of state contracts for governments to 
sustain a patronage relationship with the private sector (Asutay 2010:113-117). 
Thus, even after the liberalisation program, the clientelism that characterises the 
link between the state and the capitalist class in Turkey remained. As a result, 
despite the rise of a number of influential business associations throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, the capitalist class in Turkey did not emerge as an 
independent actor, unlike their counterparts in the Western world (Özel 2014).    
 
A middle class that was autonomous from the public sector and any affiliations 
to the state did begin to emerge in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Waterbury 
                                                        
23
 Turkey received $26.1 billion worth of FDI in the 1980-2000 period which was larger than the 
amount received for the whole of the pre-1980 Republican history (Loewendahl and Ertugal-
Loewendahl 2000:4).  
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1992b:129; Özcan and Turunç 2011:83). As shown in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, 
CMT and NMT long argued that the strength and independence of the middle 
class determines the quality of democratic system and that economic 
development would eventually produce a liberal democratic system (Lipset 
1959; Apter 1965; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). It is important to note that the 
emergence of a capitalist class and an urban middle class in Turkey in the post-
1980 period constitutes a significant case to test the validity of these arguments. 
The political implications of the economic development process will be analysed 
in detail in the following Chapter 4 on the democratisation process of Turkey.   
  
One of the key products of the post-1980 liberalisation program was the rise of 
big businesses as key actors of Turkish political economy. Business groups have 
oft been associated with authoritarian regimes in the literature of 
democratisation as their primary concern is supposedly not democratisation 
but to ensure political stability – under any circumstances – which is paramount 
to consolidate their economic interests (Sorensen 2008:10; Grugel 2002:21; 
Vanhanen 2003:87). However, this view has changed in recent years, business 
groups being depicted as a driving force of democracy building by NMT and the 
societal model that applied this hypothesis to the Turkish case of modernisation 
(Öniş and Türem 2002). The link between the business class and democracy is 
explained as such:  
 
Elite groups will support democracy only in so far as they feel certain 
that their interests will be backed under more democratic conditions. 
The logical corollary of this proposition is that business wants more 
democracy because it feels more secure in terms of property rights, 
legitimacy of its dominant status in society, and the weakness of 
demands for radical redistribution from below in the current 
international order (Öniş and Türem 2002:442).  
 
Until the 1970s, the business class of Turkey was represented by an official 
organisation that was closely supervised by the state, TOBB (Türkiye Odalar ve 
Borsalar Birliği). The first independent business association of the country, 
TÜSİAD (Türk Sanayiciler ve İş Adamları Derneği), was founded in 1971 when a 
number of big businesses seceded from TOBB. The influence of the independent 
private sector on policy-making in Turkey started to be visible from the 1970s 
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onwards. In the late 1970s, TÜSİAD emerged as a vocal opponent of ISI and 
applied pressure on coalition governments with a widely advertised criticism of 
their economic policies published in the most popular newspapers of the time 
(Öniş and Türem 2002:443). The Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit of the CHP 
repeatedly blamed TÜSİAD for supposedly orchestrating the collapse of his 
government in 1979, leading some observers to label TÜSİAD as ‘the 
organization that topples governments’ (Shambayati 1994:315).  
 
It has been noted that TÜSİAD, the ardent supporter of democratisation in the 
post-1980 period, initially was not concerned with democratisation in the 
1970s to the extent of not questioning the legitimacy of the 1980 military coup 
and the subsequent junta rule with the hope that the military would bring 
political stability (Öniş and Türem 2002:439). Nevertheless, the post-1980 
period further consolidated the emerging influence of the private sector on 
Turkish political economy, as through joining their forces in organisations such 
as TÜSİAD, the business groups emerged as a class that gained considerable 
bargaining power against labour unions, the military and the bureaucracy. Still, 
it is not possible to argue that the state-dependent nature of the private sector 
completely changed as the generation of profits through the patronage of 
governments continued (See Yenal 2001:153; Ayata 1996; Asutay 2010; Heper 
and Keyman 1998; Özel 2014).    
 
The radical change in the approach of TÜSİAD towards democratisation in the 
1990s became evident in its publications and public speeches of its key figures. 
This can be attributed to the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which 
was interpreted as the proof of the ‘inevitable victory’ of the liberal-capitalist 
democratic model of the West, a belief that shaped the worldview of TÜSİAD 
(Öniş and Türem 2002). Since the 1990s, the organisation has also been a key 
supporter of Turkey’s EU membership, perceiving democratisation as a key 
prerequisite for the political and economic modernisation of Turkey. Ties 
between Turkey and Europe have been a noteworthy element that shaped the 
economic development trajectory of Turkish modernity in this regard.  
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Despite the ongoing liberalisation process, the Turkish economy was still 
heavily protected before the EU-Turkey Customs Union became operational in 
1995 as the average economy-wide nominal protection rate was 10,22 percent 
for the EU and it was 22,14 percent for third-party countries before the 
implementation of the agreement (Togan 2000:5). By 1999, protection rates for 
all industrial products between Turkey and the EU were removed. The process 
of ‘Europeanisation’ emerged as part of Turkey’s EU accession process and 
many Turkish cities built partnerships with the EU economic agencies and 
institutions. The European financial support enabled many SMEs to gain funds 
required to kick-start their operations and development projects (Tok 2008:86). 
A noteworthy example in this regard was the construction of an organised 
industrial zone in the Turkish province of Şanlıurfa with an EU grant (Tok 
2008:86).  
  
3.3.5 The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Aid on 
Development     
 
Turkey initiated a key reform in the 1980s by beginning to provide foreign 
investors with open access to official data and statistics. Evaluations about the 
national economy and credit ratings could now be made publicly as the banking 
sector also distributed information, reducing the perceived risks attributed to 
investing in Turkey (Tırtıroğlu and Tırtıroğlu 1992:185). Compared to other 
developing middle-income economies, Turkey had received low levels of FDI 
since the 1920s (Balasubramanyam 1996:112). It is important to note that this 
had been the case even though Turkish governments were not particularly 
unwelcoming to FDI and in fact, during the 1950s and the 1970s, the policy-
makers overtly emphasized the role of FDI. Especially after the 1980s, the Özal 
administration publically endorsed FDI at every opportunity and the response 
of foreign investors to the liberalisation program in the country has been noted 
as largely positive, FDI levels increasing visibly in this decade albeit Turkey still 
lagging behind many other developing countries. Even though FDI levels 
increased over the years, Turkey's share in the total FDI received by all 
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developing countries has never exceeded an average of 1 percent per annum 
between 1971-1991 (Balasubramanyam 1996:114).  
 
Among the developing countries, Turkey has had a highly developed 
infrastructure in terms of transportation and finance, rapid economic growth 
(particularly in the 1960s and 1980s) in addition to a potentially profitable 
geographical location placed between large regional markets in Europe, the 
Middle East and Africa, yet its FDI levels remained low. Cumbersome 
bureaucratic procedures may be offered as a reason, but that argument would 
fail to explain why countries with even more inefficient bureaucracies such as 
Nigeria and Indonesia received more FDI than Turkey (Balasubramanyam 
1996:117). If one considers how Turkey received more FDI in the 2003-2012 
period than all the history of the Republic combined, the key reason for the low 
level of FDI in previous years appears to be the long absence of macroeconomic 
and political stability due to high-level inflation, exchange rate instability and 
political crises (See Table 3.8.). Conversely, the post-2002 era has been 
characterised by the stable macroeconomic rule of a one-party government.  
 
Unlike FDI, foreign aid had long been an important source of capital for Turkish 
economy. In the 1950s, Turkey received aid from the US, which was largely 
channelled into the most important production sector of Turkish economy at 
the time, the agriculture (Morrissey 1996). Throughout the 1960s, foreign aid 
continued to play a significant role as it amounted to an average of roughly 3 
percent of GNP per annum during the decade (Morrissey 1996:88). Throughout 
the 1980s, Turkey received considerable amounts of foreign aid, ranking 14th in 
the world in 1989-90 (Morrissey 1996:90). 
 
It is important to note that even though the main rationale behind the receipt of 
foreign aid is to sustain economic growth, the nature of aid matters greatly in 
terms of the effect it has on economy. As foreign aid is often tied to some 
conditions, it may actually be detrimental to sustain long-term economic 
development. In this context, the case of the US aid to Turkey highlights the 
potential risks of receiving large amounts of foreign aid. The post-World War II 
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US aid via the Marshall Fund was concentrated on agriculture and 
infrastructure, boosting economic growth in the short-term but proving very 
problematic in the long-term. The US aid was tied to the condition of the import 
of capital goods from the US, gradually causing a large trade deficit in Turkish 
economy (Krueger 1974, Morrissey 1996:92). Turkey was forced into importing 
goods for much higher prices than normal and the type of foreign aid resulted in 
the manifestation of a dependency relationship between Turkey and the US, the 
former becoming highly dependent on the technology of the latter (Morrissey 
1996:93). One of the key reasons behind the failure of the free trade experience 
of the ‘DP decade’ in the 1950s was the growing trade deficit that originated in 
the negative impact relations with the US, an external factor, has on Turkish 
economy.          
 
Table 3.8. Foreign Direct Investment to Turkey under the AKP Rule (2003-
2012) 
(USD billion) 
 
Source: The Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Investment Support and 
Promotion Agency (2014a).  
  
Yet, the foreign support that Turkey received since 1980s impacted positively 
on its economic development. A key lesson that Turkey's experience provides 
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for development is that the continued support of international financial 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank is essential to sustain 
liberalisation programs in developing countries. A deficit in balance of 
payments often emerges because of the transition process from ISI to market-
driven economy and this can only be mitigated with the support of these 
organisations during the process (Şenses 1988:23). This issue is highly related 
with the foreign policy of governments and the orientation of the state within 
the existing international system. Among developing countries, Turkey had the 
advantage of possessing close affiliations to the developed economies of the 
Western world from which it was able to garner support for its economic 
program. Compared to the pre-1980 period, external factors have had a more 
benign role on Turkey’s economic modernisation in the post-1980 years.          
 
3.3.6 The Privatisation Process and the Legacy of the Pre-1980 
Institutional Framework      
 
Starting from the liberalisation program of the 1980s that reduced the salaries 
of public officials, the strength of the Turkish bureaucracy rapidly decreased as 
the appeal of civil service dropped considerably (Öniş 1992:88). A privatisation 
program was initiated in 1985 as part of the broader liberalisation process. The 
objectives of the program were to reduce state interventionism, increase 
competitiveness and efficiency of SOEs, reduce the share of subsidies on the 
budget and gain revenues with the sale of SOEs.  
 
In Turkey, the main reason behind the privatisation policy was to prevent the 
usage of the SOEs by populist governments to provide employment to their 
voters, which had been the case in the 1970s (Asutay 2010; Ökten 2006:232). 
However, the pace of Turkish privatisation program was slow as the generated 
revenues from the program reached only $9.4 billion in 2005 after two decades 
(Nas 1992:16; Ökten 2006:227). It is important to note that even though the 
privatisation effort began in 1985, most of the sales of SOEs actually took place 
after the 1999 Stand By Agreement was signed with the IMF, which greatly 
emphasized the role of privatisation to reform the Turkish economy. 
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The slow pace of privatisation can be attributed to the strong opposition the 
governments had faced from different segments of the society, particularly the 
senior officials within the SOEs, labour unions, left-wing political parties, non-
governmental organisations and major newspapers such as the Kemalist 
Cumhuriyet (Asutay 2010:108; Ökten 2006:233). A key factor that curtailed the 
whole endeavour was the influence of statist bureaucrats who successfully 
resisted repeated attempts of the government through erecting legal barriers to 
stop the privatisation drive (Leander 1996:137). For instance, the 
Constitutional Court repeatedly blocked the privatisation of Türk Telekom, the 
large state-owned telecommunications company, in the 1990s. As a result of the 
clash between the free-market ideology of governments and the state 
institutions that continued to remain loyal to the tenets of the ISI policy, only 8.3 
percent of all the SOEs were privatised between 1985 and 1998 and the 
generated revenues remained low (Simga-Mugan and Yüce 2003:83). 
Nevertheless, even though the pace was slow, the opposition failed to stop the 
rise of the private sector in the long term as the share of the public sector in the 
national economy dropped from 40 percent in 1986 to 18,5 percent in 2000 
(Ökten 2006:241).   
 
In their comparative study of EOI experiences in Turkey and South Korea, 
Özlem Onaran and Engelbert Stockhammer (2005) argue that the different 
economic growth rates (South Korea's growth rate had been higher than 
Turkey's until the 2000s) were due to institutions, power structures and state 
policies. While Turkey had decreasing shares of wages in production, relatively 
low growth, low investment and low employment levels, South Korea displayed 
the opposite characteristics due to efficient state intervention that exercised 
export-led strategy through a regulated financial system and foreign trade 
regime rather than leaving these to control of market forces (Onaran and 
Stockhammer 2005:67). Following the footsteps of the South Korea, Turkey 
reformed its system towards a more regulatory structure after the 2001 Crisis, 
hence achieving rapid economic growth in the 2002-2012 period.  
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The Turkish economic liberalisation experience can be seen as part of a global 
phenomenon that spread to developed and developing economies throughout 
the 1980s, namely the drive towards neo-liberal policies. Yet, it is important to 
note that even though similar liberalisation programs with the same objectives 
were implemented in a number of developing countries, the results were quite 
dissimilar. Akin to other economies that went through this process, the 
liberalisation program in Turkey resulted in the deregulation of product prices, 
exchange rates and interest rates. The role of the state as a direct producer in 
manufacturing sector decreased dramatically because of privatisation. These 
consequences were in line with the initial aims of the program and with 
experiences of other developing economies, particularly South American 
countries such as Argentina and Chile. However, Turkey’s liberalisation cannot 
be evaluated as a conventional example of such programs as the process 
actually contained elements that were contrary to the tenets of neo-liberal 
economics (Öniş 1999:186). A most notable factor that stood in stark contrast to 
the neo-liberal understanding of political economy was the increase of the 
economic and political influence of the Turkish state. In fact, this contingent 
factor constitutes the main reason behind the increasing divergence of 
contemporary Turkish economic modernity from the Western model.  
  
The export drive strengthened the power of the large-scale Turkish 
conglomerates at the expense of smaller-sized private enterprises during the 
1980s as these companies with large amounts of accumulated capital were in a 
comparatively more favourable position to benefit from the state-provided 
incentives (Odekon 1992:168; Leander 1996:134). Another paradox of Turkish 
liberalisation was the continued influence of the public sector in the 1980s. In 
terms of capital formation and their share in gross national income, there was 
not a visible decline in the role of the SOEs. Moreover, the prerogatives of the 
policy-makers, particularly that of the prime minister, over economic affairs had 
been continuously increased after 1983. Particularly in regards to the control of 
the financial system, the power of the government reached unprecedented 
levels by the end of the 1980s (Öniş 1999:187-188).   
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There exists a strong connection between the outcome of liberalisation 
programs and the historical and institutional conditions of a country. The 
political economy of Turkey has long been characterised by ‘the tradition of a 
highly centralized, patrimonial state with the concomitant weakness of “civil 
society”’ (Öniş 1999:242-243). The pre-1980 era of economic modernisation in 
Turkey was completely directed by a bureaucratic elite based in statist 
institutions such as the DPT within a highly centralised institutional framework. 
The pre-1980 legacy of state-led development in Turkey strongly impacted on 
the post-1980 trajectory of economic modernisation in the country.  
 
While the entrenched statist ideology of bureaucratic institutions such as the 
Constitutional Court slowed down the privatisation program, the export drive 
initially consolidated the monopoly of large conglomerates over the Turkish 
market as business groups such as Koç and Sabancı accumulated a considerable 
amount of capital in the pre-1980 era through the incentives provided by the 
state to create an indigenous capitalist class. Moreover, although the 
liberalisation program decreased the share of public sector in the Turkish 
economy, the state had increased its influence over economic policy-making 
through new regulations. Therefore, the post-1980 experience of liberalisation 
in Turkey strongly challenges the arguments put forward by the societal model 
in terms of the role of the pre-1980 era on economic development. It is clear 
that without the continuing legacy of the statist background of the Turkish 
economy, the post-1980 experience cannot be fully understood.            
    
3.3.7 The Turkish Export-Oriented Industrialisation Model in Comparative 
Perspective  
 
In the 1980s, the Japanese and South Korean EOI experiences were perceived by 
Turkish policy-makers such as Özal as successful development models and a key 
element of their policies was the utilisation of intermediaries – the so-called 
foreign trading companies (FTCs) – to market the products of indigenous 
manufacturers to the global market, a practice that contradicts the conventional 
neoliberal ideology of ‘every enterprise for itself’ (Kaynak and Gürol 1987:61; 
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Öniş 1992:75). The rationale behind the use of the FTCs was to bring together 
the buyers and sellers of products in the global market, thus remarkably easing 
the export-import process and accelerating the pace of the EOI in Turkey.   
 
In 1980, the Turkish government announced the formal criteria required for 
consideration of the FTCs and the privileges provided by this status. The criteria 
for the FTCs required a fixed amount of annual earnings, initial capital and a 
certain annual growth rate for exported goods. If these conditions were met, 
FTCs could benefit from a set of state subsidies such as the special credits 
provided by the Central Bank and the joint monopoly rights in selected sectors 
with SOEs (Öniş 1992:76-77). It is clear that an extremely high level of state 
support that even bestows monopoly rights is contradictory to free-market 
principles, yet the FTCs proved essential to the success of the export-led 
strategy in the 1980s as the share of foreign trade companies in Turkey's total 
exports rose from 5,8 percent in 1980 to 49,4 percent in 1986 (Öniş 1992:77).  
 
A crucial element of EOI in Turkey had been the strong links between the FTCs 
and domestic manufacturing conglomerates. Particularly in the early years of 
the export drive in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, the relationship between 
conglomerates such as Koç and Sabancı and FTCs such as Ram and Exsa had a 
positive impact on the rapid expansion of Turkish exports (Öniş 1992:78-79). 
Akin to the Sogo Shosha general trading companies in Japan, the Turkish FTCs 
that had close links with large-scale local manufacturers led the export drive of 
Turkey as their size enabled these enterprises to penetrate the markets of even 
more developed economies in Western Europe such as Britain, France and 
Germany (Öniş 1992:81).  
 
The Turkish and Japanese exporting strategies had another key similarity. 
Japan's export destinations changed over the years, beginning with exporting to 
less-developed countries in the 1950s, then after the 1960s re-orienting heavily 
towards the developed economies. In this regard, Japan's experience is 
summarised as such:  
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First, Japanese manufacturers satisfied internal demand for products 
that were produced overseas [ISI strategy of development]. They had to 
purchase technology, usually from the U.S., to accomplish this. Then they 
started exporting to LDCs in Asia where there was a growing demand for 
the product and no domestic competition. Frequently Asian LDCs served 
as a testing ground for Japanese manufacturers in the world market… 
After a firm gained worldwide competitive strength, the Japanese 
manufacturers started exporting to industrial nations (Kaynak and Gürol 
1987:61).  
 
Turkey's geographical situation is similar to that of Japan, being placed between 
more developed European markets and less-developed MENA and newly 
independent former Soviet republics. If Japan's experience is an indicator for 
the stages of economic modernisation through transition from ISI towards EOI, 
Turkey has been undergoing the same process. As such, Turkey's exports to 
less-developed countries in MENA and former Soviet republics steadily 
increased along with its exports to developed countries in Europe (See 
Kaminski and Ng 2006).  
 
It has been argued that the successes of EOI in both South Korea and Japan were 
due to the flexibility of the economic modernisation process in these countries 
as the development policies were changed over time in accordance with the 
needs of their economy and the global conditions (Sönmez 2001:21). The 
developing non-Western economies that were able to use their comparative 
advantages within the global international economy proved successful with EOI 
and shortened the material modernisation gap with Western countries (Page 
and Van Gelder 2001:15). In this regard, the experiences of Japan and Turkey 
imply that EOI is more successful if it is based on the groundwork of a 
developed industrial capacity and infrastructure established prior to transition. 
Nevertheless, it has been noted by Emma C. Murphy (2001:135) that there is no 
universally applicable model of transition from ISI towards relatively more 
market-driven policies such as EOI and the particular political institutional 
framework and economic conditions of every country case would shape their 
trajectory of development.  
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The sequencing of development in the Turkish case occurred through initially 
creating a number of large-scale industries and fostering the growth of an 
indigenous capitalist class through ISI in the pre-1980 period. After the 
transition to EOI with the liberalisation program in the post-1980 period, 
Turkey was able to take advantage of its earlier successes in industrialisation 
and the aforementioned comparative advantages in global market (e.g. 
geographical location, low share of wages and the tariff and quota exemptions 
provided by the Customs Union Agreement with the EU) to achieve a successful 
export-drive. The trajectory of Turkish economic development, therefore, 
contests the arguments of both the structural and societal models regarding the 
origins of the Turkish economic modernity model. Without the pre-1980 
background of industrialisation, the EOI strategy would not have achieved 
success in Turkey. ISI contributed to industrialisation, but it had reached its 
limits by the late 1970s. This was due to the absence of new markets as the 
limited size of the Turkish market constrained the production capacity of the 
manufacturing sector. From the 1980s onward, the EOI enabled Turkey to find 
markets for the large manufacturing sector it created by protecting them from 
foreign competition in the pre-1980 period. Thus, the economic origins of 
contemporary Turkish modernity should be attributed to the way in which ISI 
and EOI had complemented each other in contributing to the industrialisation 
process.    
 
So far, this chapter has covered the major characteristics and results of the post-
1980 liberalisation program and the EOI strategy, discussing mostly its positive 
impact on economic modernisation in Turkey. In the following two sections, the 
chapter will analyse the negative effects of the transition process on the Turkish 
economy.  
 
3.3.8 The Side Effects of the Liberalisation Program: The ‘Lost Decade’ of 
the 1990s and the 2001 Crisis (1987-2002)  
       
Despite all the successes of the liberalisation program presented in the 
preceding sections of the chapter, the radical transition process also had 
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negative consequences for the socio-economic life in Turkey. The main side 
effect of the program was a rapidly widening income gap as the share of wage 
earners and agricultural producers in national income fell by approximately 50 
percent between 1980 and 1988 (Nas 1992:12; Cecen et al. 1994:51). The 
economic growth of the 1980s, in this context, can be argued to have been 
achieved at the expense of welfare in the short term. Until the late 1980s, the 
ever-intensifying liberalisation process led by Özal’s ANAP continued without 
any visible opposition, but the tenets of the program started to be questioned 
from 1987 onward with the emergence of a number of popular opposition 
parties in the parliament.  
 
The political developments of the late 1980s and early 1990s can be understood 
within the context of public frustration at the social consequences of the 
neoliberal economic policies. After a closely contested referendum, the banned 
party leaders of the 1970s were allowed to return to politics and the primacy of 
the ANAP in Turkish political economy began to wane after its second 
parliamentary victory in 1987. The rising popularity of the major party 
chairmen of the pre-1980 period such as Bülent Ecevit (CHP), Süleyman 
Demirel (AP), Necmettin Erbakan (MSP) and Alparslan Türkeş (MHP) and their 
new parties can be possibly read as an expression of a growing disillusionment 
with the ANAP in this era (Sayarı 1992:39; Öniş and Türem 2002:441).    
 
It has been argued that the private sector, especially the big businesses that had 
close links with the Özal administration, had disproportionately benefited from 
the export-drive as exporting companies received strong support and subsidies 
from the government while the bargaining rights of organised labour 
movements were steadily curbed over the decade, giving rise to the popular 
idea that the economic development of Turkey and the rise of capitalists in the 
1980s came at the expense of the working class (Waterbury 1992a:49; Miller 
2006:450; Odekon 1988:33). The consolidation of the hegemony of 
conglomerates over the SMEs in the 1980s was also one of the most criticised 
side effects of the liberalisation program and the export drive (Odekon 
1992:168; Leander 1996:134). This consequence of the liberalisation program 
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emerged due to the nature of EOI that requires highly skilled human resources 
and large amounts of capital.  
 
In the case of Turkey, the tendency of EOI to favour big businesses was 
aggravated by the policies of the government, which provided subsidies for 
exports that exceeded certain amounts, disproportionately benefiting large 
companies (Leander 1996:134). The resentment of the SMEs towards these 
policies was often expressed in the media, paving the way for the establishment 
of the second major independent business organisation of the country, MÜSİAD 
in 1990 (Leander 1996:136). The SMEs that founded MÜSİAD aimed to 
challenge the dominance of the business association of big businesses, TÜSİAD, 
by uniting their resources. In the 1990s and 2000s, MÜSİAD emerged as a key 
actor of Turkish political due to ties they built with the Islamic political 
movement. The rise of the Islamic political movement and MÜSİAD occurred 
simultaneously in Turkey, challenging the long established primacy of centre-
right parties and their conventional business partners, TÜSİAD. Chapter 5 will 
provide for a detailed examination of the TÜSİAD-MÜSİAD divide and the links 
between the SMEs and the Islamic political movement.    
     
The focus of another criticism of the liberalisation process in Turkey was the 
over-reliance on foreign sources of capital as the national debt of Turkey quickly 
rose from approximately 40 percent of GNP in 1989 to over 55 percent of GNP 
in 1992 (Waterbury 1992a:45). During the 1990s and early 2000s, the 
economic development process of Turkey stagnated as a series of economic 
crises severely hit the Turkish economy, most notably in 1994 and 2001. It can 
be argued that the accumulated negative consequences of the radical 
liberalisation program of the 1980s resulted in the poor economic performance 
of the 1990s, the period commonly referred as  a ‘lost decade’ for Turkish 
economic development (See Table 3.9.; OECD Report 2004; Özel 2014:169).  
 
The crises of 1994 and 2001 resulted from the inability of Turkey to sustain its 
loan interest payments to foreign creditors. This can be attributed to three 
major problems in the implementation of EOI in Turkey: firstly, the over-
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reliance on foreign aid, FDI and short-term loans rather than domestic savings 
meant that the export-drive of the 1980s could not be sustained without a 
massive accumulation of debt. Secondly, the populist coalition governments of 
the 1990s that were most concerned about winning the next elections utilised 
the borrowed funds for social welfare programs rather than investment in 
export sectors of the economy (Öniş and Aysan 2000:128-135; Öniş 2003:6). 
Thirdly, when the Özal administration deregulated the financial system in the 
1980s, a potentially detrimental effect entered the Turkish economy, namely the 
highly unstable capital flows. Most of the foreign capital inflow to the Turkish 
economy in the 1990s was short-term, not long-term stable FDI (Altuğ and 
Filiztekin 2006:21). The effects of these short-term inflows, known colloquially 
as ‘hot money’, were particularly devastating during the 2001 crisis as a severe 
economic contraction (-7,5 percent loss of the total GDP) that followed the 
balance of payments bottleneck was caused by the sudden withdrawal of capital 
by foreign investors at the first sign of political and economic instability (Tunç 
2003).  
 
The liberalisation program had negative effects for the industrialisation process 
as the state subsidies provided for the private sector led to rent-seeking 
behaviour. Rather than ‘real’ investment in major export sectors of the industry, 
many private enterprises established the so-called ‘paper businesses’ in order 
to claim bonuses from the state, resulting in a patronage relationship between 
the ANAP-led government and the private sector (Asutay 2010:110). It is 
important to note that this did not emerge in the 1980s for the first time, as it 
was a long established characteristic of the link between the state and the 
private sector since the early years of the Republic (Berberoglu 1977:84; Asutay 
2010). Nevertheless, the rent-seeking behaviour was particular disruptive for 
industrialisation in the post-1980 period due to the unprecedentedly large 
amounts of subsidies provided to encourage the EOI drive in the economy. 
Ultimately, Turkey seemed to be incapable of achieving stable economic growth 
in the long-term as periods of ‘boom and bust’ followed each other in close 
succession between the late 1980s and the early 2000s.  
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A number of factors prevented Turkey from achieving stable economic growth 
until the structural adjustment of the early 2000s, namely the ‘inability to 
generate sustained increases in savings and investment rates’ and ‘excessive 
reliance on exchange-rate adjustments’ (devaluation of currency) (Nas 1992:12; 
Taskin and Yeldan 1996:174). The export drive was mainly achieved through 
suppressing the domestic demand via wage reduction and currency 
devaluation. The severe suppression of the demand in Turkish national market 
in order to re-orient the economy towards production for foreign markets was a 
risky method of EOI, resulting in an over-reliance on demand in foreign markets 
(Taskin and Yeldan 1996:174).  
 
It has been argued that the export drive had failed to achieve one of its main 
objectives in the 1980s, namely the diversification of manufactured exports as 
only five sectors covered 92.4 percent of total industrial exports by 1990, after a 
decade of EOI: textiles (31.3 percent), iron and steel (15.7 percent), hides and 
skin products (7.3 percent), chemicals (6 percent) and electrical machinery (4.3 
percent) (Taskin and Yeldan 1996:165). It is also important to note that these 
are all labour intensive sectors, not capital intensive industries that indicate a 
more advanced stage of industrialisation. Throughout the 1990s, Turkey's GDP 
growth fluctuated dramatically, scoring huge losses in 1994 (minus 6 percent), 
1999 (minus 5 percent) and in 2001 (minus 7.5 percent) due to a series of 
economic crises (See Table 3.9.). This trend shifted after the radical reforms 
undertaken in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis, the size of the economy and 
trade volume rapidly increasing from 2002 to 2012 (See Table 3.10.; Altuğ and 
Filiztekin 2006:22).   
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Table 3.9. The Economic Performance in the 1990s and the 2001 Crisis 
 
(percent) 
Year Annual Economic Growth Rate 
(GDP) 
1990 % 9,2 
1991 % 0,8 
1992 % 6 
1993 % 8 
1994 % -6 
1995 % 7 
1996 % 6,7 
1997 % 7,7 
1998 % 3 
1999 % -5 
2000 % 6,6 
2001 % -7,5 
 Source: World Bank (2014b); Yendi, Çetin and Gallo (2012:47).  
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Table 3.10. The Economic Growth Performance of Turkey between 2002-
2012 
(percent) 
Year Annual Economic Growth Rate 
(GDP) 
2002 % 6,2 
2003 % 5,3 
2004 % 9,4 
2005 % 8,4 
2006 % 6,9 
2007 % 4,7 
2008 % 0,7 
2009 % -4,8 
2010 % 9,2 
2011 % 8,8 
2012 % 2,1 
 Source: World Bank (2014b).  
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3.3.9 The Aftermath of the 2001 Crisis: The Post-Washington Consensus in 
Turkey and the ‘AKP Decade’ (2002-2013) 
 
The 2001 crisis was one of the most devastating setbacks experienced during 
the economic modernisation process of Turkey (Cizre and Yeldan 2005). 
However, its impact on the development trajectory of Turkey would prove to be 
highly positive in the following years. The dramatic collapse of the economy 
under the pressure of a severe balance of payments bottleneck triggered a 
genuine systemic effort by policy-makers and bureaucrats to reform the system 
through a new structural adjustment program developed jointly with the IMF.  
 
The coalition of the DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti) chairman and prime minister 
Bülent Ecevit invited Kemal Derviş, an acclaimed economist in the World Bank, 
to take up the position of the Minister of State for Economic Affairs. Derviş was 
given full control over the structural adjustment program and as a practitioner, 
he had advantages not possessed by politicians such as not being concerned 
about the next elections and being independent from ties with domestic political 
and economic actors. This allowed Derviş and his technocratic team of experts 
to develop a radical stabilisation program and enact a number of highly 
transformative reforms in the economy within only a few months, particularly 
focusing on the fragile financial system of Turkey (Öniş 2010:49). The reforms 
re-oriented the neoliberal nature of the Turkish economy towards a more 
regulatory governance system based on the principles of the so-called Post-
Washington Consensus24, culminating in the formation of the economic-
financial model that was inherited by the AKP in 2002. The AKP rule of the last 
decade did not alter the principles of the model and it is still operational in 
Turkey today.  
 
  
                                                        
24
 Criticism of many elements of the neoliberal Washington Consensus agenda promoted by 
international financial institutions such as the IMF resulted in the emergence of a revised program 
called the Post-Washington Consensus. The new understanding of economic development puts more 
emphasis on regulation of economy and finance by the state while it also includes policy objectives 
such as poverty alleviation and equitable income distribution in contrast to the original Washington 
Consensus that focused heavily on economic growth.   
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A key element of the reform program concerned the banking sector. The 
regulatory powers of the BRSA (Banking Regulation and Supervisory Agency) 
over the public and private sectors were increased in order to improve capital 
adequacy levels. The transparency of the BRSA and the activities of banks were 
enhanced and reforms to ensure financial stability were undertaken. In this 
regard, the debt burden of the public sector was reduced and ‘the Maastricht 
criteria concerning the ratio of public sector budget deficit to GDP was met in 
2004 by the success of financial reforms’ (BDDK 2010:35).     
 
In addition to the new financial structure adopted after the 2001 crisis, another 
key factor that positively impacted on economic development in the last decade 
is the dispersion of wealth across the country, giving rise to a large number of 
SMEs and a new middle class across Anatolian urban centres (See Table 3.10.; 
Table 3.11.; Tok 2008; Dede 2011; Hoşgör 2011). Despite the fact that 
inequality continues to be a major problem – especially in the predominantly 
Kurdish eastern and south-eastern regions which remain less developed 
compared to the rest of the country – it can be argued that the rapid economic 
development of the 2000s produced a vibrant economic life beyond 
industrialised major cities such as Istanbul, İzmir, Ankara and Bursa as 
globalisation penetrated the continental Anatolian heartland (Tok 2008:81). 
Unlike the business elites centred on Istanbul, which have close economic ties to 
Europe, the rising enterprises, the so-called Anatolian Tigers, possess strong 
trade ties to the MENA region, contributing to Turkey's exports by diversifying 
its markets.  
 
The 2001 crisis and the structural adjustment program were shortly followed 
by the victory of the AKP in 2002 elections. At first, the AKP was rather critical 
of the IMF and the economic transformation program, but it changed its stance 
during the election campaign in 2002 in order to reassure the capitalist class in 
the country that macroeconomic stability would continue (Miller 2006:459). 
During the 2002 election campaign, the chairman of the AKP, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, publicly stated that the party would abide by the terms of the IMF 
program that had been signed by the coalition government of Ecevit. However, 
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Erdoğan also emphasised the need to revise the agreement towards a more 
social welfare orientation, although the content of this ‘revision’ was not 
articulated clearly and the party strictly abstained from altering the agreement 
after coming to power (Patton 2006:515-516). In the early years of the AKP 
rule, the party’s willingness to stick with the IMF program contributed to its 
carefully constructed image as a supporter of political and economic stability 
(Öniş and Aysan 2000). During the 2000s, the party consistently emphasised 
stability in the public speeches of its leaders and international platforms in 
order to attract FDI to Turkey (Patton 2006:515-516).  
 
Sadık Ünay (2006:167) encapsulates the character of the economic policy of the 
AKP:  
In retrospect, the particular importance attached by the AKP leadership 
to administrative competence, fair and responsive governance, and 
democratic consolidation…enabled the party to forge intimate links with 
a range of socio-political groups associated with diverse political 
movements and institute a broad-based electoral coalition. The political 
rhetoric that held this coalition together was based upon a 
communitarian liberal synthesis which asserted a juxtaposition of free 
market liberalism with communal values, societal norms and local 
traditions. In this context, values such as freedom of enterprise, 
innovation and investment generally associated with conservative 
political parties in Europe and the US were merged with the ideals of 
social and distributive justice characteristics of European social 
democracy, the end result being a peculiarly Turkish style ‘third way’ 
formula based on trust and politico-economic stability complete with a 
degree of personal charisma and popular appeal [referring to the 
influence of Erdoğan].  
 
A key reason behind the rapid economic growth of the Turkish economy in the 
last decade was the receipt of high levels of FDI. Under the AKP rule in the 2002-
2013 period, Turkey received more FDI than the preceding 20 years combined 
(See Table 3.8.; Grigoriadis and Kamaras 2008:53).  
  
The AKP administration emphasised the objective of integration into global 
markets and attracting FDI, but it is important to note that the approach of the 
party was rooted in the mind-set of Özal and the ANAP in the 1980s 
(Griogoriadis and Kamaras 2008). The difference in the generated amounts of 
FDI between the ANAP rule of 1983-1991 and the AKP rule of the 2002-2012 
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can be attributed to the success of the public relations campaigns25 of the AKP 
(Grigoriadis and Kamaras 2008:59).  
 
Following several years of rapid economic growth from 2003 onwards, the 
Turkish economy faced the 2008 Financial Crisis under the AKP government 
and the economy shrank by 4,8 percent in 2009 (See Table 3.10.). The nature of 
the 2008 Financial Crisis was different to previous domestic economic crises 
which the country faced such as the 2001 crisis. The 2008 Crisis was based in 
the so-called ‘global North’, namely the most industrialised countries in the 
world, resulting in a reduction of capital inflows and export revenues for Turkey 
as these economies constitute Turkey’s most noteworthy economic partners. 
Unlike the previous domestic-based crises, however, Turkey did not experience 
a balance of payments problem as the structural reforms undertaken as a 
response to the 2001 crisis greatly improved the resilience of the banking and 
financial sectors (Öniş 2010:58). After 2009, the Turkish economy rapidly 
recovered, the GDP growing by 9.2 percent in 2010 and 8.8 percent in 2011.  
 
A key factor that minimised the potentially negative effects of the 2008 Crisis 
was the stance of the AKP government. The policy-makers portrayed a highly 
confident posture in their public speeches which proved sufficient to relay a 
positive image to foreign investors, resulting in Turkey to be perceived as a ‘safe 
heaven’ amidst the ongoing crisis in the US and the Eurozone (Öniş 2010:60). In 
addition, three other factors have been argued to have contributed to the 
amelioration of the 2008 Crisis in the Turkish context: ‘a robust banking sector 
that was formed after the 2001 crisis’, ‘strong budget figures and fiscal 
discipline’ and ‘a low-averaged yet growth-oriented market’ (Akkurt 2010:40). 
The strength of the banking sector during the 2008 Crisis was based on its 
increased capital adequacy ratio (19 percent) which constituted a strong capital 
base to absorb sudden shocks (Akkurt 2010:42-43).  
                                                        
25
 It is important to note that the political and economic stability provided by the AKP began to 
deteriorate since the last electoral victory of the party in 2011, the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the 
ensuing violent clashes reflecting the image of increasingly unstable country (See Edgerly 2013). 
Nevertheless, as this thesis does not cover the period after 2013 and the latest political tensions 
occurred very recently, the economic implications of the aforementioned phenomenon has not been 
studied (See Chapter 4 for the analysis of the impact of the Gezi protests on the democratisation 
process of Turkey).  
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In the 2002-2013 period, the AKP's relations with business groups differed as 
the party developed close ties with MÜSİAD which represents mostly the SMEs 
of the country (mainly concentrated in the new industrial centres of Central 
Anatolia) while the party was not close with the big businesses centred around 
TÜSİAD (mainly concentrated in the old industrial centres of Western Turkey). 
In this regard, it is important to note that TÜSİAD traditionally possessed 
stronger links with centre-right parties such as the ANAP and identifies with 
liberal European values, pro-EU foreign policy for Turkey and secularism, 
whereas MÜSİAD espouses a nationalist and social conservative stance, leaning 
towards Euro-scepticism and endorsing closer ties with the MENA societies and 
the broader Muslim world (Öniş and Türem 2002). In regards to its relations 
with the private sector – not unlike the governments that preceded it – the AKP 
has been accused of utilising the state resources and the vast prerogatives of the 
government to build and sustain patronage ties with enterprises that share an 
ideological affinity with it (See Özel 2014:173; Bank and Karadag 2012; Ilhan 
2013).  
 
The clientelism that characterised the Turkish political economy under the AKP 
rule functioned through public-private partnerships in several areas of the 
economy, most notably the construction sector which experienced a rapid 
expansion since the party came to power in 2002 (See Karatepe 2013; Ilhan 
2013). The AKP administration developed a major initiative in the construction 
sector and utilised a state agency, the Housing Development Administration of 
Turkey (TOKİ), to construct ‘more than 500.000 residential units, costing more 
than $35 billion’ (Karatepe 2013:3). It has been noted that enterprises owned 
by the political allies of the AKP – such as the İhlas, Çalık and Kombasan groups – 
disproportionately benefited from the ‘construction boom’ as they were given 
most contracts by the TOKİ (Karatepe 2013:7-8). Contracts provided by the 
AKP-controlled municipalities across the country – particularly in populous 
metropolitan areas such as Istanbul, Kocaeli, Ankara and Kayseri – had been 
another major source to establish a patronage relationship with the capitalist 
class as the local governments channelled public funds to businesses that 
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financially support the electoral campaigns of the party (Bank and Karadag 
2012:11; Ilhan 2013:194).                  
 
Table 3.11. Trends in the National Poverty Rate26 2002-2012 
 
(percent)  
Poverty headcount ratio 
(% of total population) 
2002 30,3 
2003 23,8 
2004 20,9 
2005 16,4 
2006 13,3 
2007 8,4 
2008 6,8 
2009 4,4 
2010 3,7 
2011 2,8 
2012 2,3 
Source: World Bank (2014b).  
 
 
Despite its proven ability to withstand the negative consequences of a shock as 
large as the 2008 Crisis, the Turkish economy is not without structural 
weaknesses today. Turkey’s continuing over-reliance on external financial 
sources for sustaining its economic growth, its chronic inability to increase 
domestic savings and the dependency of the industrial sector on foreign 
technology in the absence of a domestic research drive may negatively affect the 
                                                        
26
 National poverty rate is the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line.  
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economic growth of the country in the forthcoming years (Öniş 2010:60). Also, 
it is important to note that even though it has become commonplace in the 
scholarly literature developed by both the structural and societal models to see 
Turkey as a successful model, the economic modernisation of the country is still 
far from being a completed project:  
No matter how dynamic the economy, it has the appearance of a house of 
cards. Widespread default on debt held by banking system could end the 
miracle. The loss of a few foreign markets could lead to such a default. If 
external creditors find their confidence in the export drive flagging, the 
flow of external credits that have sustained Turkey's high rate of imports, 
themselves crucial to sustain the export drive, could come to an end 
(Waterbury 1992b:127-128).  
  
An established political economist wrote the words above more than two 
decades ago and they remain relevant today. In retrospect, the analysis of John 
Waterbury who highlights the deficiencies of the economic development 
process of Turkey proved to be an accurate portrayal of the Turkish economy as 
the 1994 and the 2001 crises hit the country. 
 
Today, the financial system is more regulated than those years and the banking 
system is closely monitored and robust. The loss of significant European 
markets due to the ongoing financial crisis in the Eurozone and the loss of major 
MENA markets such as Syria and Libya due to the instability of the region since 
the 2011 Arab uprisings have not led to a collapse in Turkish exports. 
Nevertheless, contemporary Turkey remains to be heavily dependent on short-
term inflows and possesses a large trade balance deficit that amounted to 
$99.78 billion in 2013, which constitutes roughly 15 percent of its GDP 
(Hurriyet Daily News 2014; Finkel and Ant 2014). In addition, a future problem 
could be in the field of the export structure of the country. Turkey’s trade is 
mostly concentrated with European economies (46 percent in 2010) and MENA 
(26 percent in 2010) while Turkey's exports to East Asia, South Asia, South 
America – the fastest growing regions of the global economy – remain strikingly 
low (Goldman 2012:27).  
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Despite the ongoing deficiencies and risks in the Turkish economy, it can be 
argued that Turkey made great strides towards economic modernity in the post-
1980 period. Particularly in the last decade, the rapid economic development of 
the country positively impacted on the daily lives of a large number of citizens 
as the percentage of people living under the national poverty line dropped from 
over 30 percent in 2002 to 2,3 percent in 2012, indicating a major success in 
terms of poverty alleviation (See Table 3.11.). In addition, the 2000s witnessed 
a noteworthy improvement in the equitable income distribution in the country, 
though this trend seemed to be on the reversal in 2010 (See Table 3.12.). A 
crucial factor that contributed to the considerable increase in the living 
standards of many citizens since the late 1990s was the declining population 
growth rate in the country as the demographic pressure on the provision of 
services by the state has been reduced (Yenal 2001:224).  
 
Table 3.12. Trends in the Income Distribution Level in Turkey - GINI 
Index27 (2002-2010) 
(percent)  
GINI Index 
2002 42,7 
2003 43,4 
2004 42,7 
2005 42,6 
2006 40,3 
2007 39,3 
2008 39,0 
2009 38,7 
2010 40,0 
Source: World Bank (2014b).  
                                                        
27
 Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income of consumption expenditure 
among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A 
Gini index of ‘0’ represents perfect equality while an index of ‘100’ implies perfect inequality.  
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A qualification on the context of poverty alleviation is necessary for truly 
compherending the nuances of Turkey’s contemporary economic model and its 
radical divergence from the Western economic modernity type envisaged by 
CMT and NMT. The state-defined minimum wage is considerably low in Turkey, 
being just below net 1,000 Turkish liras while the officialy recognised povery 
line for a family of four persons is around 4,500 liras (Kaya 2015). Even though 
Turkey spends more than other developing countries such as Mexico and South 
Korea on its public social program, Turkey’s institutional social security system 
does not cover a large portion of its citizenry as the records show that 
approximately 40 percent of the population does not have healthcare, because 
about half of the workforce are employed without any insurance in the informal 
sector (Buğra and Adar 2008; Eder 2010:156). Nevertheless, the percentage of 
population living below the poverty line has actually decreased during the AKP 
years, a phenomenon that clearly illustrates the peculiarity of the Turkish case 
of economic transformation. In this regard, a key question is that how the AKP 
administration did manage to reduce the number of people living below poverty 
line without dramatically raising the level of minimum wage and/or building a 
structured welfare state? 
 
After the AKP came to power following the 2001 economic crisis, the Turkish 
state has begun to privatise the provision of welfare as charities and 
municipalities have filled the vacuum left by the absence of an extensive and 
institutionalised welfare state (Eder 2010). At first sight, Turkey’s social system 
might have looked as if it was converging towards the predominant global 
neoliberal paradigm which envisages the civil society to play a leading role in 
social welfare provision (Kaya 2005:49). However, the same period has also 
witnessed to a surge of state power in economic activities, municipalities 
becoming the main conduit for providing social welfare through cooperating 
with private actors. The AKP’s social policy vision, as formulated in the party 
program of 2012, has heavily stressed the role of the family and Islamic 
charities for welfare provision and poverty alleviation, while keeping direct 
references to the responsibilities of the state in this regard to a minimum (AK 
Parti 2012). As the central state organisation partially withdrew from the field 
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of social policy and steadily adopted a non-interventionist stance, municipalities 
have more than made up for the role of the state (Eder 2010:156). 
 
Turkish political economy witnessed a profound transformation as successive 
AKP administrations have followed a hybrid social policy based on mixing 
neoliberal free-market capitalism with communitarian Islamic ethics centred on 
solidarity (Tuğal 2002:107). Marcie Patton (2009) refers to this model as 
‘neoliberal communitarianism’ or the ‘AKP’s third way’, namely a discourse in 
which values such as ‘responsible individualism’, ‘self-help’, ‘market-based 
inclusion’ and ‘Islamic communitarian ethics’ are synthesised. Accordingly, the 
state must be free of the ‘burden’ imposed on it by a welfare system which 
supposedly promotes rent-seeking and state-dependent culture; the energy of 
the state instead being concentrated on empowering capitalists enterprises, 
charities and creating more employment opportunities for the citizenry (Patton 
2009:443-447). Hence, Turkey’s social security system displays sui generis 
characteristics that contain elements from both the established neoliberal 
models of Europe and the clientelist pattern of Middle Eastern countries such as 
Egypt (Aybars and Tsarouhas 2010). This Turkey-specific social policy model 
largely delegates the provision of social welfare to ‘moral capitalists’ rather than 
a state-designed ‘mature welfare system’, the likes of which can be found in 
Western countries such as Germany, France and Sweden (Tuğal 2002:99).  
 
The AKP rule resulted in the rising influence of non-governmental organisations 
in socio-economic life as new legal regulations considerably decreased state 
control over their activities and also enabled them to collect vast sums of 
donations for ‘causes of their own choice’ (Eder 2010:156). Charities such as 
those affiliated with the Islamic Gülen movement and Deniz Feneri have 
emerged as key players in the newly privatised framework of social welfare, 
cooperating with municipalities and generating hundreds of millions of dollars 
(Eder 2010:179). In this regard, Metropolitan Municipality Law (No. 5216), 
Provincial Special Administrations Law (No. 5302), Local Administration Unions 
Law (No. 5355), Municipalities Law (No. 5393) dramatically increased the 
responsibilities and capabilities of municipalities in social welfare provision, 
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easing the legal procedures for cooperation with private actors (Eder 2010:177-
178). Since the AKP came to power, the central government budget allocated for 
poverty alleviation has considerably declined (Kaya 2015:61). 
 
The hybrid welfare governance has had three major consequences: firstly, 
decreasing the fiscal burden of the government; secondly, proving to be more 
much more successful than past policies in terms of poverty alleviation; and 
thirdly, consolidating patronage politics through the utilisation of municipal and 
private funds (Kaya 2015:59; Tuğal 2012; Buğra and Candas 2011).  
 
Limited supervisory state control and the discretionary nature of funds used in 
social welfare caused the system to be politicised, political parties utilising 
welfare provision as part of their election strategies. By creating ‘social 
dependencies’ out of those citizens in desperate need of aid, political parties 
have aimed to consolidate their electorate in municipal districts under their 
control. As shown in several studies, the amount of funds transferred to citizens 
via the social programs of municipalities increase before parliamentary and 
municipal elections while it decreases considerably after elections (Eder 
2010:175; Kaya 2015). The AKP, as the ruling party since 2002, has been the 
primary beneficiary of the politicisation of social welfare, but the major 
opposition parties such as the CHP and MHP, have also used similar strategies in 
municipalities they dominate (Eder 2010; Kaya 2015; Patton 2009):   
 
[T]he enhanced power of the municipalities created ample room for 
patronage politics, as they were allowed to use private sector and/or 
wealthy organizations for various services and funding. Municipalities 
have thus become very visible by way of organizing soup kitchens for the 
poor, building giant food tents for iftar meals during the month of 
Ramadan, and, most importantly, in-kind assistance to the poor. Very 
little of the funding for these services, however, actually comes directly 
from the municipalities, but rather from those who contribute to the 
municipalities’ charity funds (Eder 2010:178). 
 
As the structured welfare system is very weak and the number of citizens that 
benefit from public social policy are very low compared to various developed 
and developing countries, unstructured provision of welfare through patronage 
politics has been sustained and even deepened over the years (Buğra and Adar 
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2008). The weakness of the centrally controlled systemic welfare system causes 
the problematic elements of Turkey’s hybrid social policy model, such as limited 
transparency and politicisation, to be not questioned by a considerable portion 
of the public and by mainstream media. A better alternative does not seem to 
exist and the model has been largely successful in terms of poverty alleviation 
albeit falling short of ensuring an equitable income distribution (Eder 
2010:182).  
 
Path dependency has played a key role in the manifestation of Turkey’s current 
social policy model, because the failure of the more systemic ‘social state’ of the 
pre-2002 years to alleviate poverty led to a search for a different approach – 
which has been designed by the AKP throughout the 2000s. The AKP's 
socioeconomic approach truly fit the MMP framework, as Turkey's economic 
modernity is entirely different from the Western modernity based on either an 
entirely neoliberal system as in the USA or a structured welfare system as in 
Germany. Family ties, municipalities and private actors have covered social 
welfare provision more so than the central state, distinguishing Turkey from the 
experience of the West as well as from that of the developing countries in South 
America and Southern and Eastern Europe (Eder 2010:173).  
 
In the following section, the trajectory and current outcome of Turkey’s 
economic development experience will be assessed through the perspective of 
MMP. It will be shown that the analysis presented in this chapter based on the 
framework of MMP is a more effective understanding of the origins of Turkish 
economic modernity than the narratives offered by the structural model and the 
societal model.                    
 
 
3.4. READING THE ECONOMIC TRAJECTORY OF TURKEY THROUGH THE 
MULTIPLE MODERITIES PARADIGM    
 
So far, the chapter analysed the economic modernisation trajectory of Turkey 
through a methodology based on MMP. As stated in the introduction of the 
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chapter, the main objective was to uncover the roots of Turkey’s widely cited 
success in economic modernity. So, in light of the historical analysis presented 
above, can Turkey be evaluated as an economically modern society today?  
  
Part one of this chapter provided the understanding adopted by MMP to define 
economic modernity. The key indicators in this approach are industrialisation, 
urbanisation, a centralised economic management structure, literacy and 
advanced infrastructure in transportation and communication (See Eisenstadt 
2002; Wagner 2012; Arnason 2000). The features of the contemporary socio-
economic life of Turkey are shown in Table 3.13.  
 
Today, Turkey possesses a high industrialisation level, a large services sector, a 
large number of urbanites, a high literacy rate and a developed infrastructure. 
Moreover, as can be seen in the level of indicators such as access to clean water, 
average income per capita, national poverty line and the percentage of internet 
users, a considerable portion of the population was profoundly affected by the 
economic modernisation process in the country. Thus, Turkey of the 21st 
century can be considered an economically modern society based on the 
definition of MMP. Although Turkey continues to have deficiencies such as the 
considerably low level of labour force participation of the female population vis-
à-vis the male population, this is not one of the preconditions for economic 
modernity according to MMP.    
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Table 3.13. Economic Development Indicators of Turkey, 2012  
 
Category 
Year 
2012 
Gross Domestic Product (million $) 789 
Agriculture (% of GDP) 9 
Industry (% of GDP) 27 
Services (% of GDP) 64 
Income Per Capita28 ($) 18,390 
National Poverty Line29 (% of total population) 2,3 
Urban Population (% of total population) 72 
Life Expectancy at Birth (year) 75 
Adult Literacy Rate (% of total population) 95 
Access to Clean Water (% of total population) 99 
Paved Roads (% of total roads) 89,9 (in 2010) 
Internet Users (per 100 people) 45,1 
Labour Force Participation30 (% of total male population) 71 
Labour Force Participation (% of total female population) 29 
Source: World Bank (2014b) 
                                                        
28
 Gross national income (GNI) per capita, PPP (current international $).  
29
 Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line. This indicates the percentage of the population 
living below the national poverty line. National estimates are based on population-weighed subgroup 
estimates from household surveys.  
30
 Above the age of 15.  
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In this context, it is important to note that the state of Turkish economy today 
also fulfils the criteria of economic modernity put forward by the rival theories 
of MMP, namely CMT and NMT which use the same conceptualisation. For 
instance, if the ‘take-off model’ of classical modernisation theorist Walt 
Whitman Rostow (1960) is applied to the case of Turkey, the so-called ‘take-off 
to modernity’ stage could be seen as the 1960-1980 period in which the 
groundwork of the Turkish industrialisation success was built – which itself was 
based on the development policies of the post-1930 period. After the transition 
to EOI through liberalisation in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, Turkey built upon 
the earlier efforts, reaching the final stage of economic modernisation, the so-
called ‘age of mass consumption’, as it fully displays the characteristics of such a 
society described by Rostow (1960:10): 
 
As societies achieved maturity in the twentieth century two things 
happened: real income per head rose to a point where a large number of 
persons gained a command over consumption which transcended basic 
food, shelter, and clothing; and the structure of the working force 
changed in ways which increased not only the proportion of urban to 
total population, but also the proportion of the population working in 
offices or in skilled factor jobs – aware of and anxious to acquire the 
consumption fruits of a mature economy.  
 
Despite fulfilling their basic criteria for economic modernity, however, 
contemporary Turkey contests the expectations of CMT and NMT in regards to 
the impact of economic modernisation on the state and society as a whole. Both 
the classical modernisation theorists (e.g. Rostow 1960; Lipset 1959) and the 
neo-modernisation theorists (e.g. Huntington 1968; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) 
envisage that a modern society would possess a liberal free-market economy, a 
largely non-interventionist state, a highly influential capitalist class and a 
politically active middle class. Economic modernity is expected to have a 
significant impact on political modernisation, which is defined as 
democratisation. All these features of a modern society are expected to 
constitute the founding principles and/or protectors of a liberal democratic 
regime.  
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The economic modernisation experience of Turkey challenges this vision as this 
chapter showed that a noteworthy capitalist class in the country emerged only 
after the state deliberately set out to create one from the 1920s onwards. From 
the 1930s onwards, the economic modernisation process was entirely led by a 
highly centralised state in a top-down fashion, the economic policies designed 
and executed by a bureaucratic class along the tenets of statism. This statism 
was interrupted in the 1950s with the implementation of free-market 
economics under the DP rule, but the emergent capitalists remained highly 
dependent on their ties with the state; the contracts, incentives and subsidies 
provided by governments serving to consolidate a patronage relationship (See 
Sönmez 2001; Asutay 2010; Keyder 1989; Özel 2014).  
 
As shown in part three, even after the transition to EOI through liberalisation 
in the post-1980 era, the pre-1980 institutional framework of the state 
persevered, highly constraining the autonomy of the capitalist class. Though the 
various business groups of the country founded independent business 
associations (e.g. TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD), the state-led nature of the economic 
modernisation continued due to patronage ties. As a result, unlike their 
counterparts in the Western world, the capitalist class of Turkey never asserted 
itself as a force that could overtly challenge31 the primacy of the state within the 
modernisation process. As such, a bourgeois-led social movement did not 
emerge to build a new political economic system throughout the history of the 
country.  
 
In light of the Turkish case, it can be argued that CMT and NMT as well as the 
literature of Turkish studies based on their theoretical frameworks – the 
structural and societal models – cannot account for the nuances of the 
modernisation experience in this non-Western society. This is due to two 
factors: Firstly, the understandings of CMT and NMT are overly dependent on 
                                                        
31
 As mentioned earlier, the only notable exception to this was the extraordinary influence possessed 
by TÜSİAD in the late 1970s. Using the power vacuum that emerged because of the political and 
economic stability in the country, the capitalist class centred around the organisation overtly 
challenged the authority of governments for a short period. Nevertheless, this did not materialise as a 
political change in the form of a drive toward democratisation as TÜSİAD ultimately did not challenge 
the military rule of the early 1980s.   
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the historical modernisation experiences of Western European and Northern 
American societies in which political revolutions led by middle classes proved 
successful in setting up liberal democratic regimes (e.g. Britain, the US, France). 
Secondly, the application of the frameworks of CMT and NMT by the structural 
and societal model narratives to the case of Turkey overlooks the role of path 
dependency within the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods of economic history in 
the country, which prevent them from fully explaining the origins of Turkish 
modernity. 
 
In the studies of non-Western country cases by CMT and NMT, the trajectory of 
change is conceptualised as one that would inevitably produce the same 
characteristics seen in the Western modernity today. This chapter showed that 
this approach cannot grasp the unique features of the non-Western modernity 
of Turkey because it does not take into account the differences in the 
circumstances of non-Western countries.  
 
One of the most crucial elements that differentiated the Turkish case from the 
historical Western modernisation experience was the interaction between 
Turkey and its more economically counterparts in the Western world. When the 
Western experience of industrialisation occurred in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, the high level of communication and inter-dependency between 
economies across the world were far less influential than it was throughout the 
20th century. The trajectory of Turkey evolved through interaction with 
Western modernity as well as the modernities of other non-Western societies. 
The legacy of the Western economic hegemony over the Ottoman Empire 
shaped Turkey from the start as the country inherited a materially less-
developed economic structure and a desire to gain independency from the West 
through autarky. In the 1920s and 1930s, the ruling Kemalist elite were inspired 
by the success of a non-Western planned development model, the Soviet Union 
(Yenal 2001:85). In this regard, it should also be noted that the country did not 
possess an indigenous capitalist class that would launch an industrialisation 
drive by itself. Akin to many non-Western countries that faced the hegemony of 
the West over the global economy (e.g. South American and East Asian country 
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cases), there was a strong need in the early Republican period to accelerate the 
process of economic modernisation through extraordinary measures such as 
heavy state intervention into economy (Berberoglu 1992:49-66; Page and Van 
Gelder 2001:15). All these factors led to the adoption of statism in the country in 
1930.  
 
The state-led economic modernisation of the early Republican years strongly 
affected the subsequent trajectory of the country. The state set out to create a 
large public sector in addition to fostering an indigenous capitalist class through 
the provision of contracts, subsidies, credits and various other incentives. The 
post-1980 period should be evaluated as a continuation of the-pre-1980 era in 
this regard, as the legacy of the earlier policies could be seen in many aspects of 
the political economy of Turkey. The considerable success of the export drive in 
terms of industrialising the economy was based on the formation of large-scale 
public and private enterprises in the statist era, many of which proved 
successful in competing with the firms of developed Western economies as seen 
in the example of BEKO in the post-1980 era (founded by the Koç conglomerate 
in 1967). In this context, the role of Turkey’s strong economic relations with the 
EU should be acknowledged which contributed to its EOI through the providing 
it a comparative advantage in global economy, namely the removal of tariff and 
quotas for Turkish industrial goods in European markets. Akin to the role 
played by the Soviet modernity model in the statist era, the Turkish policy-
makers were inspired by the non-Western modernity models of Japan and 
South Korea and formulated their EOI policy based on these examples in the 
post-1980 period.    
 
The rise of the SMEs and the industrialisation of Anatolia in the post-1980 years 
were rooted in the establishment of village cooperatives by the state and the 
provision of credits from public banks to the SMEs in the pre-1980 period. Apart 
from its contributions, the elements of continuity within the economic 
trajectory also had negative effects on the post-1980. The old legacy of Turkish 
political economy continued after the liberalisation process in the form of 
patronage between the governments and the private sector. In addition, the 
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statist ideology of the state institutions slowed the privatisation efforts of 
governments in the post-1980 period.  
 
Even though the liberalisation process forms one of the key tenets of the liberal 
economic tradition that seeks to reduce the role of the state, the state 
bureaucracy and the governments actually increased their prerogatives over the 
economic and financial policy-making in Turkey in the post-1980 period (Öniş 
1999:187-188). This trend intensified after the transition to the Post-
Washington Consensus through a banking and financial reform in the aftermath 
of the 2001 crisis which further increased the control of the government over all 
dimensions of economic activity, consolidating the ‘illiberal regulatory role’ of 
the Turkish state (Özel 2014:170). The AKP rule of the last decade continued to 
increase the powers of the government and sustaine the patronage relationship 
with the private sector through the ‘selective distribution of state resources’ 
(Özel 2014:173). In sum, the outcome of the particular historical conditions and 
continuities of the economic modernisation process in Turkey is a modernity 
that does not conform to the values of the Western model.  
 
The framework of economic modernity developed by MMP is more suited than 
its rivals to explain modernisation processes in non-Western cases. Unlike CMT 
and NMT, MMP acknowledges the uniqueness of the experiences of the non-
Western world. In this regard, the impact of path dependency, globalisation and 
Western hegemony on the divergence of trajectories in the non-Western world 
have been highlighted by the scholars of MMP (See Wagner 2012:168-169; 
Eisenstadt 1999; Kaya 2004). As a result of the economic hegemony of the West, 
many non-Western countries such as Turkey needed to develop rapidly through 
economic modernisation processes fully led by the state. Moreover, trajectories 
of non-Western countries such as Turkey were influenced by the success of 
other non-Western modernity models that were different from the Western 
case (e.g. the Soviet socialist modernity and East Asian modernities such as 
Japan and South Korea). The result of these factors was an economic trajectory 
that was distinct from the liberal capitalist path envisaged by CMT and NMT. In 
this regard, non-Western cases such as Turkey demonstrate that there are 
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various ways to achieve economic modernity, strongly validating the 
understanding put forward by MMP while contesting the Eurocentric 
frameworks of CMT and NMT (Becker 2014:1-26).    
 
3.5 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter had three objectives: first, to assess whether Turkey can be 
considered an economically modern society according to MMP. Second – in 
accordance with the framework of MMP – to re-conceptualise the economic 
trajectory of Turkey through highlighting the continuities between the pre-1980 
and post-1980 modernisation process in the country. Third, to interpret the 
economic trajectory of Turkey and its contemporary product – economic 
modernity – in light of MMP.  
 
In part four, it was shown that contemporary Turkey can indeed be classified as 
an economically modern society. To achieve the second aim, the effects of the 
pre-1980 and post-1980 eras on economic modernisation in the country were 
studied throughout the chapter. Part two focused on the pre-1980 era, showing 
how the state was able to establish a solid base of centralised policy-making 
structure, industrialisation, urbanisation and infrastructure. Part three 
examined the characteristics of the transition to EOI from ISI through a 
liberalisation program and the effects of the new development strategy on 
economic modernisation in Turkey. It was shown in this section that the legacy 
of the pre-1980 strongly affected the subsequent economic trajectory of the 
country, having both positive and negative consequences on the economic 
modernisation process. This section argued that the pre-1980 and post-1980 
periods should be seen as inseparable parts of a non-Western path to economic 
modernity. This argument offered by the thesis strongly challenges the 
conceptualisation of the Turkish economic modernisation by the structural and 
societal models within the literature.  
 
Part four focused on the final objective of the chapter by assessing the Turkish 
experience in light of MMP. It was shown that the trajectory and outcome of the 
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economic modernisation process in the country diverged from the historical 
Western experience in a number of ways, most notably the role of the state 
versus the capitalist class. Today, the Turkish case represents an illiberal 
capitalist economic modernity where the state continues to have a leading role 
in directing the modernisation process while the capitalist class remains weaker 
in comparison, being dependent on the state through a patronage relationship. 
The case of Turkey can be successfully comprehended by MMP as this theory 
acknowledges the possibility of unique paths of modernisation in non-Western 
countries, which would not necessarily conform to the features of the Western 
model. This implies that the socio-political implications of this type of a non-
Western economic development may be different from the historical trajectory 
of the West. In this regard, the following Chapter 4 will assess the 
democratisation process in Turkey to observe if the political trajectory of the 
country also diverges from the Western modernity.     
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CHAPTER 4: THE POLITICAL TRAJECTORY OF TURKISH MODERNITY: A 
PROTRACTED DEMOCRATIC (UN)CONSOLIDATION EXPERIENCE  
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Chapters 1 and 2 showed that political modernity is conceptualised by CMT 
and NMT as the establishment of a liberal democratic regime. Moreover, both 
theories envisage economic modernisation as impacting positively on the 
process of democratisation in non-Western societies. MMP, however, does not 
perceive political modernity as an inevitable outcome of economic 
modernisation nor does it see political modernisation as synonymous with 
democratic consolidation process (Arnason 2003). Any country that possesses 
centralised and effective decision-making mechanisms could be considered 
politically modern in this approach. Democratisation may manifest as part of 
the political modernisation experience of a society or it may not (Wagner 2012).  
 
The preceding Chapter 3 concluded that contemporary Turkey is an 
economically modern society based on the definitions of the concept by all the 
aforementioned theories of modernity. In this regard, the analysis of the 
political modernisation experience of an economically modern non-Western 
country case such as Turkey is helpful to test the validity of hypotheses offered 
by these theories on the issue of political modernity.  
 
The main objective of the thesis is to show that the framework of MMP can 
reflect the modernisation process in Turkey more efficiently than the two 
mainstream approaches. The aim of this chapter is to present an analysis of the 
political modernisation trajectory of Turkey to conduct this assessment. The 
chapter will study the Turkish case to highlight the shortcomings of the 
understandings of political modernity by both CMT and NMT. In this regard, the 
chapter will argue that the political trajectory of Turkey diverged from the 
Western path to modernity due to the role played by path dependency, 
historical contingency and international context. In addition, the chapter will 
deconstruct the narratives of both the structural and societal models by arguing 
that neither the secularisation program of Kemalism nor the economic 
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liberalisation and the rise of the Islamic political movement in the post-1980 
period resulted in the consolidation of a liberal democratic regime in Turkey. 
The definition of the liberal democratic regime that will be utilised in this 
context is the one developed within the scholarly literature of democratisation 
and commonly used by international indexes that measure levels of 
democratisation across the world (See, for instance, Freedom House 2014b; 
Dahl 1971, 2000; Munck 2009; Stepan 2000; Grugel 2002; Diamond and 
Plattner 2001; Lijphart 1999; Held 2006; Sorensen 2008).  
 
The chapter consists of five sections. Following this introduction, part two will 
examine the commonly used theoretical conceptualisation of liberal democracy 
by scholars of democratisation and international indexes. This section will allow 
the chapter to clearly define the criteria that will be utilised throughout the 
chapter to assess the democratisation experience of Turkey. Part three will 
study the political trajectory of Turkey based on the framework of MMP, but it 
will particularly focus on the democratisation process to show that the 
mainstream understandings of political modernisation offered by CMT and NMT 
– the one applied by the structural and societal models to the case of Turkey – 
neglect the divergent path that Turkey followed over the years. It will be shown 
that political modernisation process does not necessarily result in convergence 
towards the Western model of modernity via the consolidation of liberal 
democratic regimes. Part four will assess to what extent the contemporary 
state of political life in Turkey could be considered ‘modern’ according to three 
schools of modernity. In addition, that part will utilise the perspective of MMP in 
order to highlight the key divergences of the political trajectory of Turkey from 
the historical Western path to modernity. Part five contains the brief summary 
and concluding remarks of the chapter.                 
 
4.2 DEFINING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY  
 
In order to assess to what extent contemporary Turkey can be classified as a 
liberal democracy as suggested by the societal and structural models, an 
operational definition of this regime type is required. As noted in Chapter 1, 
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one of the main shortcomings of existing studies on political modernisation in 
Turkey is that the concept of liberal democracy has not been clearly defined 
based on its most common understanding by scholars of democratisation and 
international indexes. As a result, narratives propagated about the ‘Turkish 
model of democracy’ remains subjective. The chapter will remedy this by 
examining the characteristics of liberal democratic regimes before assessing the 
Turkish case of democratisation. In this regard, it is important to note that the 
research objective of this chapter is not to comparatively examine all the 
various variants of democracy, but solely focus on the concept of liberal 
democracy.  
 
The literature on democratic theory and practise is vast. According to one 
scholar, ‘more than 550 sub-types of democracy’ have been identified in the 
academic literature (Vanhanen 2003:48). A noteworthy difficulty involved in 
the assessment of democratic regimes is the practice of democratic governance, 
a controversial issue as all kinds of regimes have defined themselves as 
‘democratic’. This can be attributed to the belief that this vague concept 
provides legitimacy to governments, which makes it difficult to define what a 
democracy is, a conundrum highlighted by David Held (2006:1):   
  
[P]olitical leaders of extraordinarily diverse views profess to be 
democrats. Political regimes of all kinds describe themselves as 
democracies. Yet what these regimes say and do is often substantially 
different from one to another throughout the world.  
 
Regardless of the official statements of policy-makers, however, observers are 
entitled to offer their own judgement on whether a country is democratic or not, 
based on a clear and objective set of criteria (Dahl 2000:100). Although there 
are different understandings that produce a wide range of democratic models, it 
is important to note that democracy, as a governance system, is not entirely 
subjective. In terms of basic electoral procedures, political rights and civil 
liberties, it is possible to identify an established understanding (Munck 
2009:129). 
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A commonly used definition can be found in Georg Sorensen (2008:3): 
‘Democracy is a form of government in which the people rule’. This simple 
definition consisting of a few words has been the source of scholarly debates as 
differences of opinion arise from various ways the terms of ‘people’ and ‘rule’ 
are interpreted. The term of democracy existed for a long time before the 
emergence of liberal democratic regimes in Western Europe and Northern 
America, yet it is important to note that the contemporary form that constitutes 
a key pillar of the understanding of modernity by CMT and NMT is a new 
phenomenon that emerged during the 20th century (Dahl 2000:3).  
 
In contrast to the ancient Greek version that entailed different types of rights 
depending on the social class of a person, the most common characteristic of the 
post-20th century democracy of the Western world is its inclusivity as it grants 
voting rights to all adult citizens regardless of their ethnicity, religious belief, 
and gender or income level. In this conceptualisation of democracy, ‘the rule of 
the people’ refers to the influence of a large number of citizens on the 
governance of a country through regular elections. However, the principle of the 
rule of the people contains within itself a fundamental conundrum, namely ‘who 
will do the governing and to whose interests should the government be 
responsive when the people are in disagreement and have divergent 
preferences?’ (Lijphart 1999:1). Different understandings of democracy emerge 
out of the various answers given to this question.  
 
The spectrum of conceptualisations are wide, ranging from Joseph Schumpeter's 
minimalist understanding of solely having regular elections to a social 
democracy-oriented broad formulation offered by David Held that takes into 
account not only the criteria of liberal democracy but also the role of the state as 
a fair distributor of resources (Schumpeter 1947; Held 2006; Sorensen 
2008:11). Based on the possible answers to questions about the rule of the 
people, Arend Lijphart (1999) defines two main variants of contemporary 
democratic system: the ‘majoritarian model’ and the ‘consensus model’. While 
the former refers to a governance type that is responsive to the demands of the 
majority at the expense of minorities, the latter describes a system in which the 
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state aims to serve the interests of maximum number of citizens through 
incorporating minorities into the system. This dichotomy allows us to 
differentiate between different types of democracies across the world.  
 
The contemporary conceptualisation of the ‘majoritarian model’ is commonly 
traced to Joseph A. Schumpeter (1947) who defined it as ‘competition for power 
through free elections’, producing the minimalist understanding of democracy 
commonly referred to as majoritarianism. Robert A. Dahl (1971) added a 
number of other principles such as the freedom of expression, equality before 
law and universal suffrage to this model. The rule of law is another recent 
addition to the expanding list and, though it is also contested, it can be defined 
as the equal application of laws regardless of one's ethnic, religious or political 
identity and socioeconomic status (Moller and Skaaning 2013:143). Thus, 
emerged the concept known as ‘liberal democracy’ or ‘the consensus model’ that 
covers the aforementioned criteria of majoritarianism and extends the meaning 
of democracy to include a number of civil liberties and the rule of law (Moller 
and Skaaning 2013:144; Diamond 2008).  
 
The liberal democratic regime rests on several foundations, namely effective 
and equal participation for all citizens, voting equality and provision of equal 
opportunities for citizens to make an informed judgement (Dahl 2000:37-38; 
Doran 2008:32-33). The reason behind the use of this specific criteria is that all 
these factors are required to ensure political equality, as even if one of them is 
violated, some members of the society would be more privileged than others to 
shape the policy-making process (Dahl 2000:38). A key scholar of 
democratisation, Dahl (1971; 2000:85) offers eight basic requisites for a regime 
to be defined as a liberal democracy:  
 
1. freedom of association,  
2. freedom of expression,  
3. the right to vote,  
4. eligibility for public office,  
5. the right of political leaders to compete for votes,  
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6. alternative sources for information,  
7. free and fair elections,  
8. institutions for making government policies depend on votes.  
 
Free and fair elections refer to the absence of coercion that would violate the 
freedom of choice and unequal treatment that would violate the impartiality of 
the process (Elklit and Svensson 2001:203; Diamond and Plattner 2001:XI). The 
rule of law prevents the abuse of power by the executive via placing the values 
of freedom and equality beyond the domain of politics in order to guarantee 
their protection (Munck 2009:124). These are the key requisites for a liberal 
democracy to be established, yet a few more principles should be added for a 
regime to be classified as such, namely ‘the protection of minority rights’, ‘ the 
existence of a free media’ and ‘a robust civil society that can check the executive 
power of the government’ (Stepan 2000:39; Plattner 2012:65; Grugel 2002:94; 
Dodd 1988:17-18). In the modern age of mass communication, the political role 
of media and civil society in terms of constraining the power of the executive 
has dramatically increased and the lack of such powerful checks or their 
manipulation by a government would fully jeopardise the liberal democratic 
nature of a regime. Without the existence of free media and civil society that 
would enable access to reliable information, citizens cannot possibly be 
expected to make informed judgment in elections (Munck 2009:125).  
 
Using the conceptualisation of consolidated liberal democracy explained above, 
the Freedom House Index categorises regimes according to two sets of criteria, 
the political rights (participation, competition and functioning of government) 
and the civil liberties (freedom of association and expression, rule of law). 
Based on this, countries are evaluated to be free, partly free or not free. A 
consolidated liberal democracy is a free society that fulfils a large degree of the 
aforementioned set of qualifications (Linz and Stepan 2001:93-94). In the 
following section, the chapter will use these criteria to analyse the 
democratisation32 experience of Turkey, assessing whether the historical and 
                                                        
32
 Democratisation can be defined as ‘the process by which societies develop towards democracy’ 
(Ishiyama 2012:30).  
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the contemporary political regime in Turkey can be considered a liberal 
democracy. The chapter will examine the democratisation process as part of a 
broader phenomenon of political modernisation based on the framework of 
MMP.  
 
4.3 THE DIVERGENT POLITICAL TRAJECTORY OF TURKEY  
4.3.1 An Ottoman Paradox: Political Modernisation without Economic 
Modernisation (1838-1922)   
 
Political modernisation is understood by all the theories of modernity – CMT, 
NMT and MMP – as the establishment of centralised and effective decision-
making processes in a society (See Rustow 1960; Huntington 1968; Arnason 
2003; Wagner 2012). Unlike CMT and NMT, however, MMP does not equate the 
consolidation of a liberal democratic regime with political modernity – the 
inevitable outcome of a political modernisation process. Although the 
democratisation process began with the transition to free and fair multi-party 
elections in 1950 – political modernisation can be argued to be a relatively old 
phenomenon Turkey, initially manifesting in the late 18th century and early 
19th century with the implementation of a number of administrative reforms by 
reform-minded sultans33 and the bureaucratic elite of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
The rule of Sultan Mahmud II was particularly influential for the acceleration of 
political modernisation as the Empire was rapidly re-organised from a de-
centralised structure consisting of diverse communities, autonomous rulers and 
provinces with differing legal statuses into a centralised organisation that would 
be governed strictly by the bureaucrats of the imperial capital (Shaw 1976; Göl 
2003; Berkes 1964). The reforms launched by Sultan Mahmut II continued after 
his successor Sultan Abdülmecit I came to power, the proclamation of the 
Imperial Edict34 of Gülhane in 1839 marking the beginning of the 
Westernisation period known as Tanzimat (1839-1876). By the end of the 
                                                        
33
 Within this period, the rulers who oversaw profound administrative reforms in particular were 
Sultan Selim III (1789-1807), Mahmud II (1808-1839) and Abdülmecit I (1839-1861).    
34
 Known in Turkey as the Gülhane Fermanı, the document was publically proclaimed in the imperial 
garden of Gülhane in 1839. It introduced many new institutions and laws modelled after the Western 
state and legal structures, particularly France where many Ottoman bureaucrats were educated.     
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Tanzimat period in 1876, the Ottoman state possessed a considerable degree of 
centralised control over its territories, indicating a high level of political 
modernity in terms of decision-making mechanisms (Shaw 1976; Ahmad 1993).  
 
Starting with the reforms of Sultan Selim III, the phonemenon of political 
modernisation in the Ottoman Empire manifested via interaction with Western 
modernity. This external factor, that dramatically shaped the entire subsequent 
political transformation trajectory, arose from continuous military defeats, 
which had traumatised the Ottoman policy-makers (Kara 1994). Attributing the 
weakening of the Empire vis-à-vis Western states such as France, Britain and 
the Habsburgs to alleged weaknesses of its institutional framework, the 
Ottoman bureaucracy launched the political modernisation process as part of an 
attempt to re-organise the Empire on the model of the West (Kansu 1995).   
 
A crucial event within the political modernisation trajectory was the 
proclamation of a constitutional monarchy in 1876 by a group of officers, 
intellectuals and bureaucrats known as the Young Ottomans. This political 
movement mostly consisted of people educated in European countries and they 
believed that forming a political structure based on the Western model was the 
means to shortening the development gap with the West and stopping the 
decline of the state (Cleveland 2000). Based on this rationale, a constitution 
(Kanun-u Esasi) was prepared and a bicameral parliament was established. The 
bicameral parliament consisted of a Sultan-elected Senate and a generally 
elected35 Chamber of Deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan). During this first 
experimentation with constitutionalism, there were no official political parties 
within the parliament and the cabinet was solely responsible to the Sultan – its 
ministers appointed by him. The parliament and the constitution remained 
operational for less than two years as Sultan Abdülhamit II suspended both in 
1878. Despite the return to absolute monarchy from 1878 onwards, however, 
the brief 1876-1878 period left an enduring legacy of constitutionalism in the 
country.  
                                                        
35
 There was a two-tier election method: the eligible populace elected delegates who then chose the 
deputies.  
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A secret society known as the Young Turks emerged in the early 20th century, 
taking their inspiration from the experience of the Young Ottomans (Ahmad 
1993). In 1908, a number of Ottoman army units in the Balkans that were allied 
with the Young Turks rebelled against the rule of Sultan Abdülhamit II, resulting 
in an uprising that restored the 1876 Constitution and the parliament. 1908 was 
a turning point for the history of political modernisation in Turkey as for the 
first time, a constitutional monarchy with a government accountable to a 
democratically elected parliament was established. In contrast, the 1876 was 
only a movement to reform the structure of absolute monarchy, providing with 
a constitution that limited the executive power of the sultan. In this regard, 
Aykut Kansu (1995:3) argues that the 1908 uprising was a genuine ‘social 
revolution’ supported by large segments of people organised into various 
revolutionary cells and underground opposition movements. Hence, the 
influence of ‘the 1908 Revolution’ should not be under-estimated by labels such 
as the ‘Second Constitutional Era’:  
 
To refer to the 1908 Revolution as the ‘Second Constitution’… does not 
indicate a scientific but an ideological position. In terms of constitutional 
law, absolute monarchy – ancien regime – became ‘history’ in the July of 
1908 (Kansu 1995:4).  
 
This time, there were a number of political parties – the most influential ones 
being the Turkish nationalist CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) and the 
liberal, multi-national FAP (Freedom and Accord Party) – which competed with 
each other in elections held across the country. The Constitution and the 
parliament remained in effect from 1908 until 1920. The 1908-1913 years 
witnessed, for the first time, to a competitive multi-party political life in the 
country, which ended with the coup of the CUP that established an authoritarian 
one-party rule until the end of World War I in 1918. The Ottoman parliamentary 
life and the constitutional tradition strongly influenced the emergence and 
subsequent political trajectory of the Republic of Turkey.  
 
Firstly, the parliament that was established in Ankara by the Turkish nationalist 
movement during the Turkish Independence War (1919-1922) was a direct 
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product of the Ottoman constitutional monarchy. The last Ottoman parliament 
convened in Istanbul in 1920 and it was forcefully disbanded by the invading 
Allied authorities due to the refusal of nationalist deputies to recognise the 
territorial gains of Greece, Britain, France and Armenia in Asia Minor at the 
expense of the Empire. The unlawful closure of the Ottoman parliament allowed 
the nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha (later Ataturk) to call for 
the establishment of a new parliament in Ankara to lead the Turkish 
independence movement legally. Therefore, the legitimacy of the new regime in 
Ankara was at least partially derived from the constitutional experience of the 
late Ottoman years (Ahmad 1993). Based on this claim to represent the people 
of the country, the parliament in Ankara would later abolish the sultanate and 
proclaim a republic in 1923.  
 
Secondly, the Ottoman constitutional tradition impacted on Turkey as the 1876 
Constitution was a precursor to the 1921 and the 1924 constitutions of the 
Republic. Thirdly, the ruling elite of the Republic such as Kemal Ataturk (first 
president), Ismet Inönü (second president), Celal Bayar (third president) and 
Fevzi Çakmak (first chief of staff of the armed forces) were trained in 
Westernised education institutions of the Empire, their mind-set shaped by 
ideas of modernisation based on the model of Western societies such as France 
and Germany (Hanioğlu 2011). In sum, the key components of the institutional 
structure of the Republic were directly inherited from the political trajectory of 
the Empire. 
 
The declaration of republic in 1923 is commonly portrayed as a breaking point 
in Turkey’s modernisation, the implication being that the Republican regime 
was a historic ‘anomaly’ that only manifested due to the vision of Kemal Ataturk 
rather than being understood as a product of the path dependent political 
development trajectory of the country (Kansu 1995:6). This account neglects 
the origins of Republican Turkey’s political modernisation process in the late 
Ottoman era because attempts to model Turkey on the basis of the Western 
political modernity framework had long become an established feature of 
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Ottoman political life from 1839 onwards. In this regard, the 1876 Constitution 
and the 1908 uprising were notable examples of such efforts.   
 
Long before the Republican regime was founded in 1923, the political trajectory 
of Turkey had diverged from the Western path of modernisation. If reviewed in 
light of the understandings of CMT and NMT, the Ottoman experience appears 
paradoxical as the state achieved a noteworthy progress with political 
modernity via establishing centralised institutions, a Westernised bureaucracy, 
a constitution and a functioning parliament, however as shown in Chapter 3, 
the economic modernisation in terms of industrialisation, urbanisation, 
mechanisation and high education levels lagged behind the political 
modernisation process. As such, the Ottoman case stands in contrast with the 
hypotheses of the scholars of CMT and NMT such as Seymour Martin Lipset 
(1959) who assumed that economic modernisation would precede political 
modernisation such that material developments in a society would lead to the 
emergence of political modernity over time. Conversely, the Ottoman state had 
modernised politically without a noteworthy progress in economic 
modernisation. In this regard, CMT and NMT cannot account for the 
transformation process of the Ottoman state because they overlook the role 
played by the interaction of non-Western societies such as the Ottomans with 
the Western world.  
 
As mentioned above, the Ottoman Empire designed its political modernisation 
program based on the Western state organisations in order to stop its decline 
vis-à-vis the expanding Western colonial empires. Even though the country 
lacked most elements of Western economic modernity by remaining a largely 
agrarian and less-developed economy until its dissolution, it possessed many 
political institutions of the West by the early 20th century as the imperial elite 
implemented reforms from above. In this regard, the Ottoman case shows that 
the encounter between Western modernity and a non-Western society resulted 
in the emergence of a hybrid modernity that the mainstream theories of 
modernity do not envisage, but one that the inclusive approach of MMP can 
explain. MMP recognises the global significance of the Western model of 
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modernity as it affected all societies across the world, yet the theory envisages a 
plethora of different patterns to emerge from this influence rather than a 
replication of the Western path to modernity:  
 
Modernity has indeed spread to most of the world, but did not give rise 
to a single civilization, or to one institutional pattern, but to the 
development of several modern civilizations, or at least civilizational 
patterns, i.e. of  civilizations which share common characteristics, but 
which yet tend to develop different even if cognate ideological and 
institutional dynamics (Eisenstadt 1999:285-286). 
  
The divergence of the political trajectory of Turkey from the Western model 
continued during the Republican period as well, which will be shown in the 
following sections. 
 
4.3.2 The Kemalist Republic and the Rule of the CHP (1923-1950)   
 
A crucial junction within the political trajectory of Turkey was the approval of 
the 1921 Constitution by the Ankara parliament. The 1921 Constitution stated 
that ‘sovereignty belongs to the nation without any condition or restriction and 
as the director of the Turkish state, the Grand National Assembly [Turkish 
parliament] is entitled to use all powers in the name of the people’ (Karpat 
2010:125). This was a radical departure from the monarchist idea that the 
Ottoman sultan was the director of the Turkish state and that he was entitled to 
rule in the name of the people. Before the transition to a competitive multi-party 
parliamentary system in 1950 and the imminent abolition of the sultanate in 
1922, the theoretical framework for the ideas of ‘republic’ and ‘democracy’ was 
embedded in the legal structure of the country. With the 1921 Constitution, the 
political legitimacy of the state in Turkey was officially based on the concept of 
the ‘national will’ for the first time (Mandacı 2012:63).  
 
Nevertheless, the 1921 Constitution did not produce a democratic regime in the 
country, as the principle of the rule of the people was solely understood at the 
time as the end of monarchy, not the holding of competitive, free and fair 
elections. The early years of the Republic in the 1920s and 1930s were shaped 
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by the rise and consolidation of a one-party authoritarian regime ruled by the 
Kemalist CHP. After the formation of the second Republican parliament 
consisting mostly of loyal Kemalists and the implementation of a new and highly 
restrictive constitution in 1924, the CHP completely dominated Turkish politics, 
eliminating political opposition through banning parties such as the Progressive 
Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) and the Free Republican 
Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Partisi) (Tunçay 1981; Koçak 1989; Mandacı 
2012:64). Civil liberties were guaranteed in the 1924 Constitution, yet the 
document also gathered all powers – executive, legislative and judicial – in the 
hands of the parliament which then delegated them to the government, 
essentially rejecting the principle of the ‘separation of powers’ that is a 
prerequisite for liberal democracy (Koçak 1989; Karpat 2010:225). Under such 
a regime, the full practice of civil liberties could not be possible as the 
government had dictatorial powers at its disposal to restrict personal and 
political freedom.  
 
The republicanism of the CHP can be seen as a product of the interaction 
between Turkey and the political ideas developed in Western societies, 
however, the Kemalists derived their ideology not from the republican liberal 
democratic tradition of the USA but the authoritarian state structure of the First 
French Republic that emerged after the 1789 Revolution (Hanioğlu 2011; 
Tunçay 2005; Koçak 1989). The influence of the Jacobin republican tradition 
that gathers all executive, legislative and judicial responsibilities in the hands of 
a single authority can be seen in many of Kemal Ataturk’s public speeches as he 
often quoted the writings of thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau to 
legitimise the concept of fusion of powers which stands in contrast with 
separation of powers (Tunçay 2005:135). In this regard, it should be noted that 
the ‘six arrows’ of the party program of the CHP which listed the main tenets of 
the regime contained the principle of republicanism, but it did not include any 
references to democracy or liberalism. Despite its influences from the French 
republican tradition, it should be noted that the Turkish bureaucrats and the 
military founded the Republic of Turkey rather than the urban middle classes of 
the First French Republic. This crucial difference between the historical 
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trajectories of the two countries shaped the subsequent evolution of their 
political regimes, resulting in Turkey to diverge from the 20th century liberal 
democratic model of Western societies such as France.                          
 
Once the rule of the CHP was secure after the elimination of political opposition 
in the 1930s, the regime implemented its ambitious ‘cultural revolution’ 
program based on a thorough secularisation of state and society. It has been 
argued that popular opposition to the social reforms and the large scale of the 
economic modernisation programs that could only be financed by the state 
necessitated authoritarianism in this era (Aydın 2005:96). The state structure of 
Turkey in this period resembled the totalitarian countries of the 1930s and 
1940s such as the Soviet Union, Fascist Italy and Germany. Akin to these 
regimes, the relationship between the ruling party and the state in Turkey was 
‘symbiotic’, unlike in liberal democracies such as the US and Britain where there 
are strict boundaries between bureaucracy, government, parliament and 
political parties based on the principle of separation of powers (Altunışık and 
Tür 2005:25; Koçak 1989:154; Tunçay 1981). Another similarity with 
totalitarian regimes was that the official ideology of the Turkish Republic – not 
unlike Stalinism – was based on a ‘cult of charismatic personality’ centred on 
Kemal Ataturk himself:  
 
Shortly after the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, the new ruling 
cadre mobilized the limited resources of the new state to create and 
disseminate the Atatürk cult as the new symbol to unify the nation. As 
early as 1927, Atatürk himself defined his role as a charismatic and 
authoritarian leader of the new regime and nation in his famous 
marathon speech… Early representations of the leader depict him as the 
sole victor of the Greco-Turkish war and the creator of the new nation. 
Such portrayals aimed to legitimate the new leader by locating him at a 
higher position than the sultans of the Ottoman Empire he had replaced 
(Özyürek 2006:95-96).  
 
The roots of the democratisation process that first emerged in the late 1940s in 
Turkey can be tracked to two sources – internal and external factors. There has 
been a long and ongoing debate within the discourse on Turkish 
democratisation about which have been more influential. The first view 
attributes the transition to a multi-party system in the late 1940s and the 
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subsequent democratisation attempts to the pressure of external actors such as 
the US and/or the EU (Yılmaz 1997; Aydın 2005:96). The second view 
developed by scholars such as Çağlar Keyder (1987) and Korkut Boratav 
(1994), on the other hand, focuses on domestic factors, particularly the social 
contract the CHP formed with influential classes of society such as capitalists 
and landowners. Arguably, the external and domestic factors complemented 
each other, though the impact of external forces far outweighed that of domestic 
ones, which will be shown below.   
 
The main domestic factor was the rise of opposition to the policies of the CHP. 
However, this opposition was not in the form of a popular social movement, but 
rather as inter-elite competition. The CHP leadership mainly consisted of the 
Kemalist elite with a background in either the bureaucracy or the military, yet 
the source of its support within the society at large was derived from two social 
groups, namely the emerging capitalist class of urban centres and the 
landowners of rural areas (Keyder 1989; Berberoglu 1977; Boratav 1989). The 
economic policies of the CHP in the 1940s alienated both of these classes from 
the party (Altunışık and Tür 2005:26). As shown in Chapter 3, while the wealth 
tax and the protectionist trade policy weakened the support of capitalists, the 
proposed land reform that envisaged the distribution of lands to landless 
peasants resulted in the party to lose the crucial support of landowners, 
triggering a power struggle within the party.  
 
The land reform proposal crystallised the intra-party opposition as four 
members36 of the CHP signed a petition calling for democratising reforms 
including more individual liberties and room for legal opposition to the policies 
of the government (Altunışık and Tür 2005:26; Aydın 2005:99; Koçak 
1989:177). When the CHP leadership rejected the petition, a group of deputies 
supportive of the proposal resigned from the party, setting the stage for the 
formation of an opposition party, the DP in 1946. At this critical juncture, the 
decision of President Ismet Inönü determined the subsequent political 
                                                        
36
 The group is known as ‘Dörtlü Takrir’ in Turkey. It consisted of influential CHP members Celal 
Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü and Refik Koraltan who later founded the DP.   
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trajectory of the Turkey. Inönü encouraged the intra-party opposition to form 
another party rather than tightening the grip of the regime over the political 
system (Koçak 1989:177).  
 
The transition from an authoritarian one-party rule towards a multi-party, 
competitive system in the country was achieved via the unilateral decision of 
President Inönü in a top-down fashion, rather than because of significant social 
pressures, though the growing dispute and emerging factions within the CHP 
deserve to the acknowledged. As the former Prime Minister, Inönü had been 
highly influential in the previous decisions of the regime to ban opposition 
parties – the Progressive Republican Party and the Free Republican Party – 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Karpat 2010:225-255). There was intra-party 
opposition to some policies of the regime in the 1920s and 1930s as well, yet 
the CHP did not hesitate to eliminate opposition in the previous instances. Why 
did Inönü change his stance this time and allow the formation of opposition 
parties and the holding of competitive, free and fair parliamentary elections? 
The reason can be found in the international political system of the post-World 
War II years, as external factors entirely shaped the political trajectory of 
Turkey in this period. 
 
In the years following the end of World War II in 1945, the national security of 
Turkey was being threatened by the Soviet Union that demanded eastern 
provinces of the country such as Artvin and Kars as well as military bases in the 
straits of Istanbul and Çanakkale which served as a gateway between the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Soviet shores in the Black Sea. In this political 
conjuncture of the late 1940s, the Turkish policy-makers began to align towards 
the emerging NATO and the anti-Soviet bloc led by the US in order to ensure the 
national security of Turkey. In an attempt to gain the support of Western 
European countries and the US for the full membership of Turkey to NATO, 
President Inönü initiated a transition process in the late 1940s, believing that 
Western democracies would be more likely to protect a fellow democratic 
regime against the expansionism of the Soviet Union (Keyder 1989; Koçak 
1989:174-179).     
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The expectation of the Turkish government of economic aid (i.e. the Marshall 
Fund) from the US also affected the decision for democratisation (Aydın 
2005:96). As shown in Chapter 3, at the end of World War II, the Turkish 
economy was suffering under the effects of the wartime mobilisation that 
resulted in severely deteriorating living conditions; therefore, the country was 
in dire need of foreign aid (Koçak 1989:170-171; Boratav 1989). In an 
international political economic system dominated by the US and its 
predominantly liberal democratic allies in Western Europe such as Britain, 
France and West Germany, democratisation seemed the only means to enhance 
the prestige of Turkey (Mandacı 2012:66; Karpat 2010:229; Koçak 1989:1979). 
In this context, it is important to note that Turkey was able to qualify for the 
post-war economic aid program of the USA – the Marshall Plan – only after it 
initiated a democratisation process. This was followed by full membership of 
Turkey into NATO in 1952 under the first democratically elected government of 
the country. In sum, the first step in a democratisation process in 1950 occurred 
mainly because of the pragmatic national security and economic development 
strategy of the ruling elite.  
 
Multi-party political life in Turkey was not born as an outcome of socio-
economic triggers in the domestic realm such as a class struggle. This stands in 
contrast with modernisation experiences of consolidated liberal democracies 
such as Britain, France and the US in which democratic regimes were 
manifested as a result of internal struggles for political and economic power 
between social classes such as the landed aristocracy, capitalist bourgeoisie, 
peasantry and urban workers (Moore 1966). In the 1950s, the socio-economic 
roots of liberal democracy were weak in Turkey as no noteworthy social 
movements consisting of urban classes and/or peasantry demanded a regime 
change. As such, the particular transition of Turkey from one-party 
authoritarianism to multi-party life in 1950 constitutes a major divergence from 
the Western path to political modernity. As the preceding section of the chapter 
showed in the case of the Ottoman Empire, the political modernisation of 
Turkey continued to evolve through an intense interaction with the Western 
world rather than because of its own process of socio-economic change. Not 
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unlike the Ottoman era, the ruling bureaucratic elite took the key decisions 
regarding the modernisation of Turkey.        
 
4.3.3 The Advent of the Democratisation Process in the Multi-Party Era 
(1950-1980)  
 
In 1946, the first multi-party elections of the Republican era were held, yet this 
cannot be seen as the beginning of democratisation because it is noted that the 
elections were manipulated37 by the ruling CHP (Akşin 1996:216; Koçak 
1989:182). After the elections, the DP demanded an official parliamentary 
inquiry to investigate the claims for fraud but this was rejected by the 
incumbent CHP administration. On the eve of the 1950 elections, however, the 
request of the DP to adopt a secret ballot system was adopted. In contrast to the 
1946 elections, the 1950 multi-party elections were free and fair and resulted in 
the DP to win an electoral victory, ending the 27-year one-party rule of the CHP.  
 
In the 1950-1960 period, the political life of Turkey was characterised by a de 
facto two-party system in which the CHP and the DP competed for power albeit 
there were smaller and less influential parties such as the MP (Nation Party). 
The parliamentary and municipal elections held during the 1950s were free and 
fair, yet the transition to a genuine liberal democracy in this decade proved 
highly problematic as the authoritarian essence of the political system remained 
intact (Rustow 1970:362; Karpat 2010:63). When the DP was in opposition 
during the 1946-1950 period, its party program emphasised the need to 
democratise the institutional structure of the country, even promising to 
legalise the workers’ right to strike, yet the DP did not implement any of its 
promises after it came to power (Akşin 1989:215).  
 
The restrictive 1924 Constitution which constrained civil liberties and the 
authoritarian state framework based on a centralised decision-making process 
directed by the bureaucracy were neither modified by the CHP before the 1950 
                                                        
37
 The secret ballot system was not used. Instead, the votes were cast openly and counted secretly by 
the bureaucrats. As such, the ballot box officials could clearly see the choices of every citizen while 
there was no judicial supervision over the whole election process.    
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parliamentary elections nor in its aftermath during the rule of the DP 
throughout the 1950s. Because the transition from an authoritarian regime to 
multi-party elections occurred as the result an external factor and by fiat of the 
existing political elite, the policy-makers did not feel pressure from social forces 
for a change in the institutional structure. In the absence of an effective 
separation of powers and influential social forces that could check the 
government, the democratically elected DP administration gained near-absolute 
authority over the political system not unlike the CHP of the preceding decades 
(Rustow 1988:243; Özdemir 1989:227). Again, there was no legal boundary 
separating the government, the bureaucracy and the ruling party from one 
another (Ahmad 1977:1). The only noteworthy difference between the political 
system of the early years of the Republic and that of the 1950s was the holding 
of regular, free and fair elections in the latter. The freedom of the media and the 
autonomy of civil society from state control were just as constrained in the 
1950s as it had been the case under the rule of the CHP (Akşin 1989).   
 
Most of the leadership and cadres of the DP consisted of former members of the 
CHP, therefore the party can be considered a product of the mentality of the 
one-party regime of the pre-1950 period, underlining the negative impact of 
path dependency on Turkey’s democratisation process. As the practise of 
democracy in Turkey remained limited to the holding of regular elections 
during the 1950s, the concept of the ‘national will’ – an abstract notion without 
any substance – was utilised by the incumbent DP government, the leaders of 
the party perceiving themselves as the sole representative of the ‘nation’ due to 
their parliamentary majority (Ahmad 1977:44-45). Thus, the government did 
not see the monopolisation and the subjugation of state institutions, judiciary, 
media and academia as a violation of democracy, rather as a prerogative of a 
government that had the support of the majority of voters (Akşin 1989; Ahmad 
1993:102-120). This was best demonstrated during an interview between the 
journalist Ahmed Emin Yalman and the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in the 
aftermath of the second electoral victory of the DP in the 1954 elections:   
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The elections have revealed just how much the citizens like the road I 
have taken. Thus far I used to think it worthwhile to consult you 
journalists. But the people’s lively confidence suggests that there is no 
further need for such consultations (Ahmad 1993:112).     
 
Once in power, rather than reforming the system towards a liberal democratic 
institutional structure, the party leadership utilised it for its own advantage, 
particularly from the second half of the 1950s onwards when popular support 
for the party began to decline because of an intensifying economic crisis (Karpat 
2010:55; Ahmad 1993; Akşin 1989). After the 1954 parliamentary elections, the 
DP assumed an increasingly majoritarian understanding and gradually shifted 
further towards authoritarianism, perceiving criticism of the opposition in the 
parliament and media as illegitimate attacks on the ‘national will’ which they 
allegedly represented (Mandacı 2012:68-69).  
 
In the 1957 elections, the share of votes for the DP dropped to 48.6 percent, 
barely ahead of the CHP's 41.4 percent, resulting in a crackdown on the 
opposition within the media, academia and non-governmental organisations 
(Mandacı 2012:70). Between 1955 and 1960, the DP administration arrested 
many critical journalists, sentencing them to prison without even providing 
them the opportunity to defend themselves in court (Akşin 1989:216). 
Hundreds of academics, prosecutors, mayors and judges suspected of 
sympathising with the opposition were also removed from their positions 
(Akşin 1989:216-217).  
 
By 1960, an economic crisis considerably worsened the living conditions of a 
sizable portion of the citizenry and the DP expected the CHP to defeat them in 
the upcoming parliamentary elections of 1961 (Akşin 1989:218). The same 
year, the DP formed a series of parliamentary commissions (solely consisting of 
the DP deputies) in an attempt to ban the CHP and a number of smaller 
opposition parties. If the DP attempts to ban the opposition parties had been 
successful, a second period of one-party authoritarian rule in the Republic 
would have started. However, hundreds of cadets of the military academy in 
Ankara organised a demonstration against the DP on 21 May 1960, leading the 
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Prime Minister Menderes to issue an order to close the academy temporarily 
(Akşin 1989:223). The crisis between the government and the officers was 
shortly followed by a military coup in 27 May 1960. The coup did not lead to the 
formation of a military dictatorship as the junta managed a transition process 
and allowed the multi-party life to resume by holding a free and fair 
parliamentary election on 15 October 1961.      
 
In light of the failed decade-long democratisation experience of Turkey in the 
1950s, it can be argued that the absence of social forces that could support the 
democratisation drive was the primary source of problems. The 1960 military 
coup was a direct consequence of the lingering authoritarianism within the 
institutional framework of the state (Yalçın 1967:709). Paradoxically, the 1960 
coup that overthrew a democratically elected government – albeit  one that was 
on the verge of building a fully authoritarian one-party regime – also marked a 
key turning point for the advancement of the democratisation process (Aydın 
2003:318; Özdemir 1989; Ahmad 1993; Altunışık and Tür 2005). The 1961 
Constitution was the most democratic constitution in the history of the country 
to date, one that granted extensive political and civil liberties to citizens in 
addition to building a number of strong checks and balances to constrain the 
excessive executive powers of the government (Özdemir 1989:228; Ahmad 
1993:129).  
 
The country had made the first stage of a transition to liberal democracy in 
1950 by beginning to hold regular, free and fair elections, yet its institutions had 
remained organised according to the mechanisms of a one-party authoritarian 
regime during the 1950s. The 1961 Constitution was a major attempt to remedy 
this by setting up institutional checks on the power of the executive branch via 
an independent constitutional court (Anayasa Mahkemesi), an upper house of 
parliament called the Senato (Senate), a proportional election system and an 
increased autonomy for media and universities from the control of the 
government. Moreover, the autonomy of local governments was increased while 
the freedom of association was enhanced, enabling the civil society to flourish in 
the post-1960 period (Yalçın 1967:710). The new ‘Political Parties Law’ reduced 
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the influence of party chairpersons on the intra-party decision-making process. 
Despite its positive effects on the democratisation drive, however, the 1961 
Constitution also legalised the influence of the military over Turkish politics by 
establishing an institution called the MGK (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu). Officially, the 
duty of the MGK was to advise the government, yet its influence and jurisdiction 
increased over time, particularly after the 1980 coup. The military tutelage over 
elected governments rapidly became a key deficiency of the democratisation 
process in the post-1960 period.  
 
A noteworthy civil society emerged for the first time in Turkey in the 1960s and 
1970s due to the relatively liberal constitution of 1961, yet the country was 
beset by ideological polarisation in these years. A key consequence of the 1961 
Constitution was the rise of Marxist political movements such as the TİP 
(Türkiye İşçi Partisi) and numerous non-governmental organisations such as 
labour unions and university students’ movements as these groups benefited 
from the liberties provided by the document (Altunışık and Tür 2005:35). The 
proportional election system and the increased freedom of association enabled 
diverse political views to be represented in the parliament, transforming the 
political life from a de facto two-party system towards a highly competitive and 
multi-party system. In addition to the two mainstream parties – the 
secularist/social democrat CHP and the social conservative AP (Adalet Partisi) – 
the socialist TİP, the Turkish nationalist MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi), the 
Islamic MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi) and its successor, the MSP, were able to assert 
themselves via gaining notable influence in the parliament. For instance, the 
MSP and the MHP were junior partners of a number of coalition governments 
during the 1970s.  
 
It can be argued that the accelerated economic modernisation process of Turkey 
impacted for the first time on the political life of the country in the 1960-1980 
period. As explained in the preceding parts of this chapter, there was no visible 
interaction between the economic and political modernisation processes until 
these years. However, the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of Turkey 
began to affect political life in the 1960s and 1970s by triggering the rise of 
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influential social forces. Benefiting from the increased freedom of association, 
both the capitalists and the workers became ‘class-conscious’ by forming class-
based organisations to defend their interests more effectively against other 
social groups and the state (Özdemir 1989:259; Ahmad 1993:134).  
 
A large group of factory workers in major urban areas of the country formed the 
DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu) in 1967 to collectively bargain 
with their employers and governments for the improvement of safety 
regulations in workplaces, higher wages, provision of better health care and 
retirement pensions and various other social and economic rights. The 
politicisation of university students also intensified in this era, resulting in the 
formation of numerous organisations based on diverse ideologies and links with 
the political parties of the country. One of the largest and most influential 
student movements of the 1960s and 1970s was the DEV-GENÇ (Türkiye 
Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu) founded in 1969. The mass 1970 demonstrations 
jointly launched by the DİSK and DEV-GENÇ members in the most industrialised 
two cities of the country at the time – Istanbul and Kocaeli – demonstrated the 
extent of the noteworthy influence gained by Marxist social movements in 
Turkey (Özdemir 1989:260). Partly as a reaction to the rise of socialist activism 
among the labour force, the capitalist class formed its own union in 1971 – the 
TÜSİAD – to avoid losing the upper hand against the workers in the social and 
economic decision-making processes in the country (Ahmad 1993:134).                   
 
Basic liberties and political rights were granted to citizens by the 1924 
Constitution, yet the same document also indicated under what conditions these 
liberties could be restricted, in effect, empowering the state disproportionately 
over the citizenry (Cook 2007:100). The 1961 Constitution was much more 
liberal than its predecessor was, but its liberal nature was limited after the 1971 
military intervention. Through threatening to use force on the government, the 
military demanded the constitution be amended due to the perception of the 
political liberties it provided as being ‘excessive’ to the extent of posing ‘a threat 
to the unity of the country’ via empowering Marxist groups that were allegedly 
aligned with the Soviet Union (Özdemir 1989:261). Before the military 
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intervention of 1971, the country experienced a brief decade of unprecedented 
political freedom, enhanced civil liberties and rising social movements, the 
1960s constituting a noteworthy progress for democratisation in the country 
(Ahmad 1993:121-147; Akşin 2000:266-267). However, the state establishment 
(i.e. the military offiers) overpowered the social forces and gained control of the 
political modernisation trajectory once again. From 1960 onwards, the 
overwhelming power of the military and its incessant political interventionism 
became rhe main contingent force that subverted the experience of Turkey from 
that of the Western model.   
 
The 1971 intervention resulted in the repression of left-wing social movements, 
thousands of academics, lawyers, high school teachers, artists, labour union 
leaders and university students being arrested while many were reported to be 
tortured by members of the security forces (Selçuk 1987; Özdemir 1989:261). 
In this political conjuncture, the technocratic government and the parliament 
that were put in place by the military approved the death sentences for the 
three leaders – Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan and Yusuf Aslan – of an armed 
communist organisation, the THKO (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu). This was 
followed by the closure of the socialist TİP and various labour unions and 
students’ organisations by the Constitutional Court.  
 
It can be argued that the execution of the three communist leaders, the complete 
elimination of democratic space and the draconian measures adopted by the 
military against the socialist movements resulted in the emergence of numerous 
highly militant and armed organisations in the 1971-1980 period (Cem 1980; 
Ahmad 1993:148-180). As a result of the 1971 amendment to the constitution, 
the rise of the political violence between ultranationalist and left-wing militias 
and a series of short-lived and unstable coalition governments, the 
democratisation drive of the 1960s could not be sustained in the 1970s. As 
noted in Chapter 3, the intensifying political chaos of the late 1970s was 
worsened by an economic crisis from 1977 onwards, culminating in another 
military coup in 1980. 
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The 1961 Constitution had a largely positive influence on the democratisation 
process in Turkey, but it has been argued that the relative weakness of elected 
governments due to the restriction of their powers by various institutions such 
as the Constitutional Court, the Senate and the MGK negatively affected political 
stability (Mandacı 2012:75-76). This perceived weakness and failure to ensure 
political stability caused initially the 1971 military intervention in which the 
military forced the elected government to resign. When the political violence 
reached unprecedented levels in the late 1970s – to the extent of a low-intensity 
civil war – accompanied by a severe economic crisis, the military once again 
launched a coup in 1980, this time changing the overall institutional structure 
rather than merely changing the government (Cem 1980; Özdemir 1989:275; 
Donat 1987). In 1971, the constitution was amended and some liberties were 
curtailed, while in the post-1980 years, the constitution was replaced by a 
highly restrictive one that sought to eliminate political dissent and freedom of 
association altogether.  
 
A product of the 1980 coup, the 1982 Constitution was more similar to the 1924 
Constitution than the 1961 Constitution. The 1982 Constitution – which is still 
in effect in Turkey today – protected the state against the political actions of the 
citizens, the opposite of what a liberal democratic constitution is supposed to do 
(Özbudun 2012b:149; Coşkun 2013:95). Even though the 1982 Constitution 
provided basic liberties, it also restricted them heavily. For instance, Article 68 
granted the right to establish political parties, but it also indicated that parties 
cannot challenge or violate ‘the indivisible integrity of the State with its 
territory and nation, human rights, national sovereignty, and the principles of 
democratic and secular principles’ (T.C. Resmi Gazete 1982). Since 1982, the 
governments and the state bureaucracy utilised such restrictive clauses against 
pro-Kurdish and Islamic political parties, effectively constraining the freedom of 
association and the freedom of expression (Cizre 1999; Cook 2007).  
 
The 1982 Constitution also increased the role of the MGK in Turkish politics, 
prioritising the ‘suggestions’ of this institution in the policy-making process 
Thus, the institution evolved from being an advisory council in the 1960-1980 
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period towards sharing executive responsibility with the government in the 
post-1980 years, gaining the ability to directly impose its will onto elected 
governments which further consolidated the military tutelage. In the post-1980 
period, the strength of the state vis-à-vis the society increased to such extent 
that Turkey has been defined as a ‘transcendental state’ in which the citizenry 
‘do not have rights, but duties, service and obligations towards the state’ (Kılıç 
1998:92). The post-1980 institutional framework of the state became rather 
effective at providing immunity to public officials for violations of the rights of 
citizens, resulting in the state to be not accountable (Turam 2012b:110). The 
1982 Constitution also dismantled the Senate and strengthened the executive 
vis-à-vis the legislative branch while increasing the prerogatives of the 
presidency and the Constitutional Court to act as checks on the power of the 
government (Balkır 2007:415).  
 
Between 1982 and 2013, the constitution was amended many times, however, it 
is important to note that the strongly established tradition of ‘reform from 
above’ via the will of the state in contrast to the demands of social forces 
continued (Aydın 2005:101). In the following part of the chapter, it will be 
shown that the political trajectory of Turkey before and after 1980 
demonstrated continuity in terms of not being able to consolidate liberal 
democracy. In light of the criteria of liberal democracy, so far, the chapter 
focused on the pre-1980 period and highlighted the reasons behind the absence 
of a liberal democratic regime in these years. As such, the chapter contested the 
narrative offered by the structural model, which is based on the hypothesis that 
the secularisation program of the 1930s and the state-led modernisation effort 
of Turkey laid the groundwork for a liberal democratic regime to manifest.  
 
4.3.4 The Travails of Democratisation in Contemporary Turkey (1980-
2013)  
This part of the chapter focuses on the post-1980 political trajectory of Turkey 
and contests the narrative of the societal model, which claims that 
contemporary Turkey is a consolidated liberal democracy that emerged as the 
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result of a ‘democratisation from below’, namely the rise of social forces. In 
order to determine whether a liberal democratic regime emerged in this period, 
the characteristics of the political regime in the 1980-2013 period will be 
analysed thematically in light of the criteria established to identify such regimes 
in part two. This section will conclude with an examination of the political life 
of contemporary Turkey ruled by the AKP since 2002. It will be shown that a 
number of path dependent deficiencies that were inherited by the pre-1980 
period (e.g. the military tutelage) and the contingent new products of the post-
1980 years (e.g. the lack of intra-party democracy) characterised the protracted 
unconsolidation process of liberal democracy in contemporary Turkey.     
 
4.3.4.1 The lack of intra-party democracy (1983-2013) 
 
In the wake of the 1980 military coup, a new phenomenon that manifested in 
Turkish politics was the elimination of intra-party democracy. Compared to the 
preceding military interventions in 1960 and 1971, the junta of 1980 was 
exceptional in regards to the long duration of its rule – almost three years until 
1983 – and the extent of its political engineering program that sought to design 
a completely new political system based on what the junta called ‘a disciplined 
democracy’ (Akşin 2000:286; Ahmad 1993:181-212). An essential element of 
this vision of was the introduction of the new ‘Political Parties Law’ in 1983.  
 
With the law, party chairpersons became the sole authority regarding the 
preparation of candidate lists for the parliament. This was in contrast to the 
norm of the preceding 1960-1980 period when the party organisation was 
selecting the members of parliament (Tanör 1995:55-59). With the new system, 
the responsiveness of members of parliament towards voters in their 
constituent areas decreased considerably, while their need to gain the approval 
of party leaders increased. The result was an extremely strong party discipline 
that resembled the strict chain of command and the culture of unquestioned 
obedience to superiors seen in military units rather than democratic 
deliberations that characterise decision-making mechanisms of political parties 
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within liberal democratic regimes (Freedom House 2008; Toker 2008; Tanör 
1995). 
 
The Political Parties Law allows the party leader to cancel any intra-party 
elections at the local level, completely subjugating the provincial and district 
organisations to the control of the chairperson (Toker 2008:31). Party members 
cannot act independently from party chairpersons unless they are willing to risk 
not being nominated in the next elections or direct expulsion from the party. 
Even when a party is in power, party members and the members of parliament 
experience difficulty in shaping the decision-making process as party leader and 
a select clique of advisors hold monopoly over decisions of parties, and by 
extension, the government (Aydın 2005:103). 
 
In addition, the law forces all political parties to adhere to a single model of 
organisational framework, preventing them from forming different 
organisations for specific districts, opening branches abroad and forming 
official ties with civil society organisations (Cizre 1999:23). Party chairpersons 
and members of the executive committees are elected by delegates of parties 
who have no accountability to the citizenry, rather owing their positions and 
loyalty to party leadership. Moreover, party leaders often abuse the law to 
‘cherry-pick’ their supporters and place them in strategically vital positions of 
the party hierarchy while eliminating their political opponents within the party:  
 
It is apparent that political parties compete in national elections which 
provide legitimacy to the governing power, yet competitive and fair 
elections within the party are seen as threatening to their monopoly of 
power (Cizre 1999:23-24).  
   
The existing ‘Electoral Law’ constitutes another serious defect that hampered 
democratic consolidation process in Turkey. Unless a party obtains the 10 
percent of all votes in the entire country, the national election threshold 
imposed by the law prevents that party from gaining seats in the parliament, 
even if it wins all the votes in specific provincial districts. This leads to the 
monopoly of a few major political parties of the entire political system, 
excluding the smaller parties while discrediting the votes of many citizens. 
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Moreover, only the parties that gain more than 7 percent votes in parliamentary 
elections are entitled to financial assistance from the state treasury, further 
consolidating the hegemony of major parties (Toker 2008:28).  
 
In the post-1980 period, the Political Parties Law produced ‘a cult of charismatic 
leadership’ as the party leaders are allowed to be re-elected without any term 
limits which means that the same chairpersons manage to remain in power 
indefinitely even if they consistently fail to achieve any success in parliamentary 
elections (Jenkins 2010:240; Aslan-Akman 2012:158; Taşkın 2013:300). As 
shown in Canan Aslan-Akman’s study (2012:168), interviews conducted with 
many current and ex-members of the ruling AKP and other major political 
parties of the country such as the CHP and MHP highlight the importance 
attached to personal loyalty rather than merit in the eyes of party leaders for 
promotion – resulting in intra-party democracy to remain weak due to the 
absence of criticism and competition.  
 
Political parties are the main agents of liberal democratic regimes across the 
world and the absence of democracy within the organisational structures of 
parties in Turkey constitute one of the key deficiencies of the democratisation 
process (Freedom House 2008:11; Toker 2008; Vardan 2009:50; Aydın 
2005:103; Aslan-Akman 2012:174). It is important to note that today, the 
authoritarian framework of the Political Parties Law is still in effect in Turkey.   
 
4.3.4.2 The rise and decline of military tutelage (1980-2013) 
  
As explained in the preceding section, the military played a major role within 
the policy-making process in Turkey, directly interfering in politics in 1960, 
1971 and 1980 while indirectly exerting influence over the elected governments 
through the utilisation of the MGK. The military tutelage constitutes one of the 
key ‘anomalies’ of the political trajectory of Turkey, one that fully differentiates 
its experience from that of the Western path of modernity envisaged by the 
mainstream theories, CMT and NMT. Such an influential position for a military is 
unseen in the political life of consolidated liberal democracies of the West 
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(Rustow 1988; Hale 1994; Aknur 2013; Polat 2011; Cizre 1999; Jenkins 2010; 
Cook 2007; Aydınlı 2009). 
 
After the 1980 coup, the military tutelage continued in the 1980s and 1990s, 
leading some scholars to brand Turkey as ‘the country with two governments’ 
(Cizre 1999:58; Jenkins 2010; Cook 2007). The role of the MGK had been 
paramount for the consolidation of military tutelage as this institution extended 
its mandate from the narrowly-defined field of national security to developing 
policies for unrelated issues to military matters such as determining the 
contents of textbooks in primary schools, the content of news in television 
channels, the closure of newspapers and television channels and even advising a 
government about the election coalitions between political parties on the eve of 
the 1994 municipal elections (Cizre 1999:70; Rouleau 2000:105). 
 
For most of the post-1980 period, the military preferred to impose its will 
indirectly ‘from the shadows’, acting as the ‘supervisor’ of the political system 
based on the Kemalist ideology. In addition to the utilisation of the MGK, the ties 
that the military formed with other elements of the state establishment with a 
similar dedication to Kemalist ideology such as the Constitutional Court also 
proved influential in ensuring the continuation of the Kemalist rule over the 
state (Cook 2007; Cizre 1999). The multi-party political life of the 1980-2002 
period did not prove sufficient to constrain the military tutelage as arguably, it 
was even reinforced during the 1990s due to the inability of coalition 
governments to direct policy-making effectively. Throughout the 1990s, the 
military managed to steer the course of political life via encouraging parties (e.g. 
the DYP-RP and later the ANAP-DSP-MHP) to form coalition governments and 
establishing a de facto political rule of consulting prime ministers on the 
selection of ministers and policy-making (Jacoby 2005:654).  
  
In 1997, the military was involved in another direct intervention to political life 
– the so-called 28th February Process – when it formed a coalition with the 
Constitutional Court, sympathetic elements of the media and the secularist 
political parties to pressure the Islamic RP-led coalition government to resign 
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(Cizre 1999; Jenkins 2010; Cook 2007). In retrospect, the turning point for the 
role of the military in the country was the 2002 parliamentary elections that 
brought the AKP to power. 
 
The AKP rule of the 2002-2013 period resulted in a dramatic decline in the role 
of the military in politics. The increasing power and legitimacy of the AKP 
derived from three successive electoral victories – in 2002, 2007 and 2011 – 
and the heavily publicised investigations of alleged coup attempts against the 
government constituted the main factors that weakened the military tutelage 
(Aknur 2013:132). The decline of the military tutelage initially began during 
Turkey’s EU accession process in the early 2000s. After the EU confirmed the 
official candidacy of Turkey for full membership into the organisation in 1999, it 
presented a list of reforms called the ‘accession partnership document’ to the 
Turkish parliament. The implementation of these political reforms was the 
precondition for the EU membership.  
 
The most critical reform expected from Turkey was in regards to the role of the 
military as the EU demanded the institutional source of the military tutelage to 
be removed from the political system (EU Commission 2007). This was mainly a 
reference to Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution, which had established the 
MGK as a highly influential institution in policy-making. Before the EU accession 
process, the MGK was comprised of six top-ranking officers from the military 
and five ministers from the elected government, therefore enabling the former 
to have the majority vote in the meetings.  
 
In 2001, the membership structure of the MGK was reformed to include more 
civilians than military representatives in order to ensure the civilian control 
over the institution (Kaloudis 2007:57). The AKP administration further 
amended the status of the MGK in January 2004, entirely limiting the use of this 
institution by the military to impose its will: the secretary-general of the MGK 
would no longer be appointed by the military but selected by the government. 
Thus, the government took control of the agenda and policy recommendations 
of the institution.  
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The EU harmonisation packages that were implemented by the AKP had major 
implications on the overall influence of military as the ‘State Security Courts’ 
that consisted of a mix of civilian and military judges were abolished and the 
military representatives appointed by the chief of staff of armed forces were 
removed from the YÖK (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu) and the RTÜK (Radyo ve 
Televizyon Yüksek Kurulu) which used to be utilised by the military to effectively 
censure the press and academia, eliminating expressions of alternative 
ideologies and criticism of Kemalism (Cook 2007:128). The military did not 
overtly object to any of these changes due to concerns regarding Turkey's EU 
membership process. If the military were to be seen as directly affecting the 
policy-making process, the EU accession process could have been negatively 
affected.  
 
It is believed by many secularists in Turkey that the AKP – which originated 
from the Islamic political movement of Turkey known as the ‘National View’ – 
pragmatically implemented the reforms required for Turkey’s EU accession for 
the purpose of eliminating the influence of military rather than genuinely 
aiming to consolidate liberal democracy (Usul 2008:179; Duran 2010:333; 
Jenkins 2010:236). As such, secularist political organisations such as the CHP 
and the ADD (Atatürkçü38 Düşünce Derneği) repeatedly accused the AKP 
administration of abusing the EU accession process to purge the country of 
Kemalist secularism (Çınar 2008:122; Göl 2009:796). Since the latter half of the 
1990s, the intellectuals and reformists politicians of the Turkish Islamic political 
movement had begun to believe that the religious freedom of Sunni Muslims 
and their right to express themselves in public space could be effectively 
protected against the assertive secularist regime via the democratisation 
program required for Turkey's accession into the EU (Duran 2010:336). 
 
The EU accession process resulted in a dilemma for the military as the 
membership was seen as necessary to become part of the European civilisation, 
a long objective of Kemalism, yet it was also known that the reforms would 
                                                        
38
 Ataturkism is the Turkish equivalent of Kemalism. This study prefers to use ‘Kemalism’ as this is 
the term used in the scholarly literature in English language, whereas the same concept is commonly 
known as ‘Ataturkism’ (Atatürkçülük) in Turkey.    
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result in the military losing its influential role in Turkish politics (Bilgiç 
2009:817). The military remained sceptical about the willingness of the EU to 
grant full membership to Turkey, yet the accession was seen as the final stage of 
Kemal Ataturk's Westernisation program, preventing most elements of the 
armed forces from overtly questioning the reforms implemented as part of 
Turkey's harmonisation with the legal and political system of the EU (Jenkins 
2010:235). Paradoxically, the key goal of its own Kemalist ideology – being part 
of the Western civilisation – ‘entrapped’ the military into abiding by the reforms 
that were the prerequisites for the EU accession process to continue (Jacoby 
2003:674; Sarıgıl 2007:39; Burak 2011:145).  
 
Despite the elimination of its official authority over the government through 
amendments to the status of the MGK, however, the military was still able to 
exercise indirect influence in the early years of the AKP rule. Until 2007, the 
military effectively constrained the ability of the AKP administration to act 
independently through making constant references to the threat against 
secularism in regular public statements which were complemented with the 
highly critical stances adopted towards the government by the secularist 
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the Constitutional Court (Çınar 2008:113). In 
this context, it is important to note that the position of the chief of staff of the 
Turkish military remained under the supervision of the Prime Ministry, not the 
Ministry of Defence as is the case in liberal democratic regimes of the West. 
Thus, in terms of the official hierarchy and actual influence on the decision-
making process pertaining national security matters, the chief of staff still 
possessed more power than the minister of defence had (Cizre 1999:72). 
 
Despite the chronic mistrust of the military for the AKP, however, the presence 
of a moderate general known as a ‘dove’ as the chief of staff – Hilmi Özkök – 
ameliorated the tensions between the military and the government in the early 
years of the AKP rule (Jenkins 2010:244). Nevertheless, General Özkök was 
under heavy pressure from radical Kemalist officers, resulting in the military 
clashing with the AKP as key leaders of the party such as Abdullah Gül and 
Bülent Arınç were personally visited by Özkök and other high-ranking generals 
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in the parliament and were warned about their various statements seen by the 
military as violating secularism (Jenkins 2010:244-247). One particularly 
heated clash between the military and the AKP occurred in May 2004 when the 
government announced a reform package to ease the entry of religious school 
graduates into universities, leading the military to issue a statement that overtly 
criticised the package. Shortly after, the government abandoned its reform 
package and shelved the proposal. This incident clearly demonstrated the 
continuing ability of the military to pressure the government even in issues that 
were not related to national security in the early years of the AKP rule. After the 
successive victories of the AKP in the parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2011, 
however, the military had diminished its early zeal for confrontation and 
adopted a compromising stance, particularly since the non-interventionist chief 
of staff, General Necdet Özel, was assigned to this once-influential position by 
the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in August 2011 (Aknur 2013:139). 
 
The influence of the military in Turkish politics decreased in parallel with the 
increasing legitimacy of the AKP administration, derived from its electoral 
victories. A key factor that facilitated the elimination of military tutelage since 
2007 was the so-called Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, the two major 
investigations into allegations of conspiracy against the government by some 
elements of the military and security services. A faction within the armed forces 
– often referred to as the ‘Euroasianists’ (Avrasyacılar) – opposed EU 
membership due to the reduction of the influence of military and the 
intensifying reforms that would allegedly result in the collapse of the nation-
state via the secession of Kurds from the Republic with European aid (Cizre 
2008:141). According to this faction, Turkey's fate lay elsewhere, in forming 
alliances with non-Western countries such as Russia, Iran and China, in addition 
to joining the Shanghai Pact rather than the EU (Cizre 2008:141). The 
Eurasianist group was accused of planning a coup to overthrow the AKP 
government. Allegedly, the culprits had planned a series of assassinations and 
bombings in order to create a security crisis in the country and trigger a military 
coup against the AKP government.  
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The Ergenekon and Balyoz cases resulted in a strong division of opinion in the 
country. While many liberal columnists and scholars perceived the trials as a 
major step in entirely eliminating the military tutelage and advancing liberal 
democracy in Turkey, the critics of the government pointed to the high number 
of imprisoned journalists who were critical of the AKP, claiming that the trials 
were utilised by the government to eliminate its critics within the media, 
academia and military (Polat 2011:213). It is important to note that regardless 
of whose claims are accurate, the trials revealed the weakness within the 
judicial process in the country as they were characterised by excessive pre-trial 
detention periods extending up to a few years, questionable connections 
between suspects and cases as well as the lack of strong evidence (Polat 
2011:214). Nevertheless, the alleged coup cases that resulted in the 
imprisonment of hundreds of officers severely tarnished the reputation of the 
Turkish military as the popularity and credibility once possessed by the armed 
forces declined considerably (Cizre 2008:162; Aydınlı 2012:104; Aknur 
2012b:238). Until the last few years, the military was consistently ranked as the 
most trustworthy institution in all the public opinions polls made in Turkey, 
possessing a high degree of public support (Aydınlı 2012:101). In the aftermath 
of the publicised cases, even the secularist civil society organisations and 
protestors began to display scepticism of the role of military in politics as 
witnessed during the 2013 Gezi Park protests, one of the highly popular slogans 
of the demonstrators being ‘we want neither shari'a nor coup’ which was also 
used during the 2007 ‘Republican demonstrations’ (Göle 2013; Göl 2009:801; 
Aydınlı 2009:587).   
 
Today, it is clear that the once-mighty military tutelage over Turkish politics has 
disappeared. The decline of the military as a determinant factor of Turkish 
politics signifies one of the most profound changes in the political trajectory of 
the country. Since the late Ottoman era, the Westernising forces of the central 
state – the military and the bureaucracy – were the main agents that shaped the 
modernisation process. The removal of military tutelage by an elected civilian 
government was expected to impact positively on the consolidation of liberal 
democracy as a key difference between the political system of Turkey and that 
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of the Western countries was finally eliminated (Cook 2007:X). However, a 
variety of factors has prevented this outcome.  
 
In the wake of the removal of the military tutelage, a type of system referred to 
as majoritarianism began to characterise the political life of Turkey since 2011 
(Özbudun 2014; Göle 2013). As explained in part two of this chapter, 
majoritarianism is a regime type that downgrades the practice of democracy to 
its most rudimentary version – the holding of regular, free and fair elections – in 
the absence of other prerequisites of liberal democracy such as checks and 
balances, intra-party democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of the press and 
protection of minority rights (Lijphart 1999). With the gradual rise of a 
majoritarian one-party regime ruled by the AKP, Turkey shifted towards 
another form of divergence from the Western liberal democratic modernity 
rather than converging towards its values. 
 
4.3.4.3 Civil liberties in the post-1980 period         
 
Civil liberties refer to personal freedoms that are subject only to laws 
established for the good of the community, therefore they cannot be restricted 
arbitrarily by the government through laws or judicial interpretation. As noted 
in part two of this chapter, the legal protection of civil liberties such as freedom 
of expression, freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of 
religion are among the essential criteria required for a liberal democratic 
regime to function (Dahl 1971; 2000). In this regard, neither the pre-1980 era 
nor the post-1980 years of the political regime in Turkey can be effectively 
identified as a liberal democracy as the violation of civil liberties by the state 
was commonplace in both periods (Alpay 2010:370; Aydın 2005:104; Hürsoy 
2012:116; Vardan 2009:50; Dodd 1988:21; Rustow 1988:242; Usul 2011:143; 
Aknur 2012a:1; Kılıç 1998:104; European Commission 2012).      
 
The low intensity civil conflict of the late 1970s shaped the characteristics of the 
post-1980 political and legal system (Jacoby 2005:645). The military elite 
identified two mutually inclusive groups as the main potential enemies of the 
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state, namely the leftists of various strands and the suspected sympathisers of 
’Kurdish separatism’ (Jacoby 2005:646). The new institutional system was 
designed mainly against the two groups, the 1982 Constitution and many 
complementing articles of criminal law aiming specifically to curb and eliminate 
all possible expressions of these groups’ view in public space, effectively making 
it a crime for a citizen to voice any ideas perceived as a danger to ‘national 
integrity’, a concept interpreted highly subjectively by judges and prosecutors 
(Jacoby 2005:645-647).  
 
In the post-1980 period, the 1982 Constitution, the Penal Code, the Press Law 
and the Anti-Terror law have been the legal sources that regulated freedom of 
expression and freedom of association in Turkey. The constitution severely 
restricted freedom of association and freedom of expression in the country. 
Article 28 that focuses on the practice of civil liberties indicates that 
‘publications which would endanger the national security are prohibited’ (T.C. 
Resmi Gazete 1982). In this regard, the restriction of civil liberties by the 
constitution was complemented by Article 301 of the Penal Code that envisages 
severe penalties for ‘the crime of insulting Turkishness’. The inclusion of 
vaguely defined concepts such as ‘the endangerment of national security’ and 
‘insulting Turkishness’ into the main legal documents of Turkey allowed 
governments and judicial authorities to prosecute political opposition and 
critics of the illiberal practices of the state, effectively constraining freedom of 
expression and freedom of the press (Usul 2011:156; Freedom House 2008:16; 
Hayes 2007:12).  
 
Public intellectuals such as minority rights activist and journalist Hrant Dink, 
columnist and academic Murat Belge, novelists Orhan Pamuk and Elif Safak 
were among those who were prosecuted under Article 301 of the Penal Code. 
Hrant Dink was convicted and given a suspended six-month prison sentence for 
‘insulting Turkishness’ in an article published in the newspaper Agos that 
discussed the killing of Armenians in 1915. The publication of Agos was 
suspended briefly in 2001. Murat Belge, Orhan Pamuk and Elif Safak also faced 
charges for publicly discussing the killing of Armenians and Kurds by the 
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Ottoman and Republican states respectively. In one of his articles written 
shortly before he was shot and killed by an ultranationalist Turk in 2007, Dink 
(2007:25) argued that the judiciary in Turkey is not an independent institution 
that protects the liberties of citizens, but it is actually a device of the state 
establishment designed to constrain freedom of speech and prosecute all those 
who criticise the policies of governments, the official ideology of the state and 
the deficiencies within the democratisation process.   
 
In this context, one particular trial case reveals the way Article 301 has been 
used to constrain freedom of expression:    
For example, one interesting case concerns two professors, Baskın Oran 
and İbrahim Kaboğlu, who are now awaiting trial. They were asked to 
work for the Committee of Human Rights established by the office of the 
prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The government asked them for a 
report on identity questions in Turkey. Their argument was that ‘Turk’ is 
an identity of one ethnic group (albeit much the largest) and that the 
country also includes other ethnic groups such as ‘Kurd’ or ‘Arab’. 
Therefore Türkiyeli (Türkiye being the name of the country) should be 
the ‘higher’ identity. In this way they sought to create a nuance between 
‘Turkish’ and 'of ‘Turkey’. The idea was to find the equivalent of a neutral 
term, like ‘British’ or ‘the United Kingdom’, one that can accommodate 
the identities of ‘English’, ‘Scottish’, and ‘Welsh’ people… But then a 
prosecutor decided to open a case charging two professors with dividing 
the Turkish nation (Belge 2007:45).  
            
The 1982 Constitution and the ‘Law of Association’ both regulate freedom of 
association in Turkey, imposing numerous requirements for establishing an 
association. The difficulty involved in fulfilling an extensive list of requirements 
results in complete state control over the activities of non-governmental 
organisations as one scholar notes: ‘[O]ne might think that law-makers had 
deliberately aimed to restrict them [associations]’ (Usul 2011:161). The Law of 
Association was amended in 2004 as part of Turkey's EU accession process. The 
original law had banned all ties between political parties and civil society, 
whereas the amended version allows associations to form official ties with 
political parties, therefore potentially enabling the civil society to take a more 
influential role in politics of Turkey (Usul 2011:161). 
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Arguably a result of the amended liberal version of the Law of Association, more 
than 100.000 civil associations exist in Turkey as of 2013, some of them capable 
of mobilising masses on major political issues as witnessed in the 2007 public 
protests against the murder of journalist Dink and the Gezi Park protests of 
2013 (Kubicek 2011b:920). If it is well organised and pro-democratic, civil 
society may play a key role in checking the power of the executive branch and 
contributing to the consolidation of liberal democracy through expressing 
public demands for reforms in the political and legal system. Civil society is 
required to sustain a consolidated liberal democracy, yet it is no guarantee of 
the system by itself as authoritarian forces may also manipulate this sphere 
(Keyman and İçduygu 2003:232). Moreover, the number of civil society 
organisations does not necessarily mean that liberal democracy is emerging. In 
2007, there were over 19.000 registered civil society organisations in Egypt and 
this number had already reached 65.000 in Turkey in the mid-1990s – both of 
them can hardly be described as liberal democracies – while in Argentina which 
had been thoroughly democratised since the 1980s, this number remained 
around only 1.000 in the 2000s (Cook 2007:7). In the case of Turkey, the 
primacy of the state within the direction of the political life continued in the 
2000s despite the increasing number of non-governmental organisations.  
 
In the early decades of the Republic, the authoritarian state did not allow any 
room for the existence and growth of an independent civil society, rather 
seeking to eliminate all manifestations of a potential challenge to its total 
control (Erdoğan-Tosun 2012:179). Civil society strongly emerged in the 1960s 
and 1970s, bolstered by the liberal 1961 Constitution, yet it was repressed once 
again with the 1980 coup. The second rise of civil society began in the late 
1980s and 1990s as a result of the economic liberalisation process, rapidly 
expanding in size, scope and variety across the country (Erdoğan-Tosun 2012). 
Nevertheless, the presence of a highly centralised bureaucracy and the state-led 
decision-making process limited the impact of civil society on the political 
trajectory of Turkey (Heper 1992; Altan-Olcay and İçduygu 2012).     
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As with the aforementioned elements of civil liberties, ensuring freedom of the 
press remained a problematic issue in the post-1980 democratisation 
experience of Turkey. The media had been susceptible to the disruptive 
influence of governments and business groups in Turkey, resulting in its limited 
potential to provide reliable information for citizens. The economic 
liberalisation program of the 1980s, in particular, impacted negatively on the 
objectivity and impartiality of the press. In this regard, the rapid 
commercialisation of newspapers and television channels resulted in the media 
being transformed into a tool of business corporations to pursue their interests 
via negotiating state contracts with governments in return for providing 
supportive broadcasting (Alpay 2010:376; Freedom House 2008:18). Patronage 
politics considerably weakens the principle of the freedom of the press. This 
was particularly the case in the 1990s as highlighted by a political scandal in 
1998:    
   
The nature of the relationship in the late 1990s between media control 
on the one hand and commercial and political power on the other is 
perhaps best demonstrated by the case of a businessman named 
Korkmaz Yiğit. Mr Yiğit, after winning the public tender for the 
privatisation of the state owned Turkish Trade Bank (Türk Ticaret 
Bankası) in 1998, moved to purchase two national dailies (one from each 
of the two big media groups, Milliyet and Yeni Yüzyıl) and two television 
stations. Soon after being arrested on charges of having links to 
organised crime, he stated that he had been encouraged to buy the media 
outlets by Motherland Party ministers [ANAP], anxious to have a media 
group that would loyally support them. The scandal led to the 
resignation of the government led by Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz in 
1998 (Alpay 2010:378).  
 
The restriction of this crucial element of liberal democracy in the country 
continued in the 2000s and early 2010s as Turkey is ranked 154th out of 179 
countries assessed in a 2013 report by Reporters Without Borders Press 
Freedom Index (Reporters Without Borders 2013; Kubicek 2013a).  
 
4.3.4.4 Citizenship and identity in the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods    
 
Even though the society in Turkey is highly pluralistic in terms of containing a 
number of different ethnic and religious communities, the official ideology of 
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the state did not reflect this variety of identities due to the particular nation-
state formation of the country in the 1920s and 1930s (Özkırımlı and Sofos 
2008; Navara-Yashin 2002). The Kemalist Westernisation program of the 1930s 
attempted to form a secular and Turkish identity in Turkey, resulting in the 
marginalisation of ethnic Kurds and conservative Muslims who did not adopt 
this homogenous vision of a nation (Cook 2007:99; Ergil 2000:123; Navara-
Yashin 2002). The conceptualisation of citizenship in this manner overlooked 
the rights and liberties of the individual, instead opting to define a 
communitarian identity based on exclusionary Turkish nationalism (Hann 
1997:32-33; Cizre 1999:9; Özbudun 2012a:61). The opposition of conservative 
Muslims and Kurds resulted in various uprisings against the regime in the 
formative years of the Republic (e.g. the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925). The 
clash between the ‘Turkishness’ of the state and the resistance of the Kurdish 
minority to it lied at the heart of the violent conflict between the Turkish armed 
forces and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) which resulted in the deaths of 
over 30.000 citizens in the 1984-2013 period (Rouleau 1996; Ergil 2000:122).  
 
The PKK grew within the ideologically-charged political context of the 1970s, 
initially emerging as a radical Marxist movement supported by Kurdish 
students, later evolving into a militant organisation that utilised terrorist 
methods, targeting mostly Turkish military personnel as well as civilians in its 
struggle for Kurdish political rights (Güneş 2012). In the mobilisation of Kurdish 
citizens of Turkey around the PKK, the repressive measures of the 1980 coup 
was influential as the junta banned the use of Kurdish names and resorted to the 
torture of prisoners within the predominantly Kurdish region of south-eastern 
Turkey (Ergil 2000:127). After the 1980 coup, approximately 81,000 Kurds 
were arrested, many being subjected to various forms of inhumane treatment 
while imprisoned (Jacoby 2005:648-649).  
 
The Kurdish language is estimated to be the mother tongue of about 20 percent 
of the citizens in Turkey, yet the state long prohibited its teaching in schools and 
its use in broadcasting and printing (Ergil 2000:122). For long, the issue of 
Kurdish rights in Turkey was portrayed by the governments, the mainstream 
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media and the military as either a socio-economic problem that supposedly 
emerged due to the poverty of the predominantly Kurdish region or a problem 
facilitated by the ‘conspiracies of foreign powers’ (Göçek 2008:91).   
 
The first steps towards reconciliation with the Kurds emerged in the late 1980s 
under the rule of Prime Minister (later president) Turgut Özal. A number of 
political and economic reforms such as the removal of the ban on the usage of 
Kurdish language and the recognition of the European Commission of Human 
Rights jurisdiction in human rights abuses in the country were implemented in 
the Özal period, attributed at least partially to Özal's desire for Turkey to join 
the EU (Vardan 2009:51). In 1991, for the first time in Republican history, 22 
Kurdish deputies representing a pro-Kurdish party – the HEP (Halkın Emek 
Partisi) – were elected to the parliament as a result of the electoral coalition 
between the social-democrat SHP (Sosyal-demokrat Halk Partisi) and the HEP. 
When a member of parliament from the HEP used the Kurdish language in the 
parliament, the Constitutional Court banned the party and many of its members 
were arrested. The reconciliation did not continue during the coalition 
governments of the 1990s. Concrete initiatives re-emerged only in the political 
reformation period following Turkey's official candidacy to the EU in 1999.  
 
One of the most critical reforms implemented as part of the EU accession 
process was the lifting of the ban on the usage of non-Turkish languages such as 
Kurdish and Armenian in teaching and broadcasting (Vardan 2009:51-52). 
When the AKP came to power in 2002, emergency laws and special courts 
existed in nine provinces of southeastern Turkey, populated mostly by Kurds 
(Rouleau 2000:112). Abolition of special courts and lifting of the emergency 
laws were the first initiatives of the new government. Unlike most Turkish 
political parties and the state establishment, the AKP's understanding of the 
Kurdish issue was reformist as it did not see it as a national security problem 
but ‘within the parameters of political freedoms and rights’ (Duran 2008:96). 
The legitimacy and the representation capability of the parliament increased 
since 2002 as the long repressed Kurdish movement entered the parliament via 
227 
 
their own parties (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009:148; Baran 2008:56; İnsel 
2003:306).   
 
The issue of Kurdish rights and identity was a ‘taboo subject’ until the 2000s as 
even mentioning words such as Kurdish rights or ‘Kurdistan’ could lead to 
prosecution and subsequent imprisonment (Göle 2000:55). In this regard, 
considerable progress has been made in the 2000s under the AKP rule and 
today; the government, wide sections of media and civil society as well as most 
major political parties – with the exception of the Turkish nationalist MHP – 
acknowledges the Kurdish rights issue in Turkey. The rise of the pro-Kurdish 
BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi) with more than 30 members of parliament in 
2011 and the increasing number of peaceful negotiations between the 
government and representatives of Kurdish political movement signifies a 
profound change of perspective in Turkey (Updegraff 2012:119). In recent 
years, representatives of the Kurdish movement such as the BDP publicly 
demanded more political and cultural rights for the Kurdish minority as well as 
regional autonomy from the central state based in Ankara (Updegraff 
2012:120).  
 
Despite the improvements of Kurdish rights in recent years, major problems 
remain today, barring a final peaceful resolution of the issue: the absence of a 
reference to the Kurdish identity in the constitution and the continuing 
utilisation of the Anti-Terror Law and the Penal Code by judicial authorities to 
prosecute the expression of Kurdish identity (Usul 2011). A number of 
initiatives, dubbed the ‘Kurdish Openings’ by the media in Turkey, were 
launched by the AKP administration to implement reforms to resolve the 
conflict, yet the first round of negotiations failed in 2009. The second initiative 
was launched in 2013 and it continues at the time of the writing of this thesis. It 
is important to note that despite the recognition of the Kurdish language, the EU 
reports and those of notable international non-governmental organisations such 
as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch continue to be critical of 
deficits regarding minority rights in Turkey, arguing that more cultural and 
political rights should be granted to those communities who demand them such 
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as Kurds and Alevis (EU Commission 2012:18-26, 2013:13-16; Human Rights 
Watch 2014:500-504; Amnesty International 2014).  
 
In an attempt to respond to demands for more rights by Alevis and Kurds, the 
AKP launched an initiative to draft a new constitution after the 2007 
parliamentary elections. However, the government unilaterally organised a 
committee to draft the constitution and refused the presence of representatives 
from a wide range of civil society organisations and opposition parties in the 
parliament (Gümüşçü and Sert 2010:63). This attitude reflected the 
authoritarian decision-making process that has characterised constitution 
making in Turkey for so long, as none of the constitutions of the country 
emerged as products of a social contract with wide participation into 
discussions. A new initiative was launched by the AKP after the 2011 elections - 
this time with the participation of the three opposition parties in parliament as 
well as representatives from some civil society organisations – yet this attempt 
also failed to produce a draft constitution as of 2015 due to disagreements 
between parties. 
 
The similarity between the AKP and the Kemalist establishment in terms of 
their conceptualisation of politics as the monopoly of a ruling class and top-
down approach to decision-making process has been noted (Özbudun 2014). 
Under the AKP rule of the last decade, the Press Law, the Anti-Terrorism Law 
and the Penal Code were consistently used by courts to constrain freedom of 
expression – particularly in terms of the repression of dissenting voices on the 
Kurdish issue – imprisoning many scholars, journalists, activists and politicians 
with charges of ‘treason’ and ‘terrorism’ on the basis of their public speeches 
and/or writings (Göçek 2008:90; Gunter 2012:120-121). During the AKP rule 
since 2002, none of the legal foundations for the repression of minority rights 
were eliminated from the legal system, continuing to constitute a deficit for the 
consolidation of liberal democracy. For instance, a key principle of liberal 
democracy is the creation of an environment suitable for the expression of all 
identities, yet the contemporary Turkish political system continues to restrict 
the political participation of pro-Kurdish parties through the national election 
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threshold of 10 percent, which limits the influence of a particular community on 
the policy-making process. 
 
In addition to Kurds, Turkey contains a number of other minorities such as 
Alevis. The Alevis long demanded to be officially regarded as a community by 
the Turkish state via the recognition of their worship places – the Cemevleri – as 
an equivalent to mosques that possess privileges such as the provision of a large 
budget from the state to cover the cost for praying services. The AKP leadership 
made a number of public statements about this matter, revealing the view of the 
party that perceives Alevism as differing merely in interpretation of Islam not as 
a community in its own right, continuing to see mosques as the sole worship 
places for all Muslims (Usul 2008:188). It is important to note that the Alevis are 
not represented in the official institution, the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious 
Affairs). While the AKP argues that the Diyanet is not a Sunni institution, the EU 
perceives it as a device of the state designed to spread a Sunni understanding of 
Islam (European Commission 2006; Usul 2008:188). Another contentious issue, 
in this context, is the compulsory religious classes in schools where it is claimed 
by the EU report that Alevis are instructed only in Sunni interpretations (EU 
Commission 2006:16). 
 
The AKP initiated the so-called ‘Alevi Opening’ and organised meetings with 
several Alevi organisations; however, the government did not accept any of the 
demands of Alevi groups with the exception of the introduction of a section on 
Alevism in the textbooks of religion courses. Other demands were the abolition 
of the compulsory religious courses, abolition of the Diyanet or equal 
recognition of Alevis and Sunnis within the institution and the official 
recognition of the Cem Evleri as places of worship (Gümüşçü and Sert 2010:66). 
It can be argued that the Alevis do not enjoy the same rights granted to Sunni 
citizens as the costs for the worship places of Sunnis and the salaries of 
clergymen are covered by the Diyanet whereas the Alevis lack any state support. 
It is important to note that the prioritisation of the rights one religious group 
over others by the state in a pluralistic society violates the principle of 
secularism and the criteria of liberal democracy. 
230 
 
As analysed above, neither the Kurds nor the Alevis have been incorporated into 
the political system of Turkey yet, therefore, both communities remain 
marginalised: 
 
While being a Sunni-Hanefi-Turkish-male would increase your chances 
to climb up in the social ladder, being an Alevi-Kurdish-female would 
similarly push you to the bottom (Taşkın 2013:299). 
   
In addition to Kurds and Alevis – the two largest minority groups of the country 
– sexual minorities constitute another discriminated-against community in 
contemporary Turkey. In recent years, the country witnessed a number of street 
protests launched by activists affiliated with LGBTT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender/Transsexual) associations aiming to draw attention to the struggle 
of this community for legal recognition of their rights such as gay marriage 
(Amnesty International 2014). So far, it is not possible to state that these 
activities produced a visible change in the policy-making of the government, 
which overlooks the existence of these communities.  
 
The issue of identity is directly linked with the democratisation process in the 
country as liberal democratic model dictates that all citizens must have political 
and civil equality in terms of their representation in the public sphere (Dahl 
2000). The official ideology and the political system of the state continue to 
exclude or restrict alternative expressions of identities by non-Muslims, Alevis 
and Kurds in addition to those of various smaller minorities (Taşkın 2013:299; 
Çınar 2008; Kılıç 1998). In sum, as the establishment of liberal democracy 
requires the recognition of cultural, religious and sexual differences and the 
equal treatment of all communities in the legal and political system, 
contemporary Turkey could not be argued to fulfil these criteria (Özbudun 
2012a:87).  
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4.3.4.5 A report card on the AKP rule: the democratisation drive (2002-2007) and 
the shift towards majoritarianism (2007-2013) 
   
The rule of the AKP can be roughly divided into two periods based on the 
contrasting policies the government adopted: the early years of progress 
towards democratisation through the EU accession process (2002-2007) and 
the later years characterised by an increasing shift towards majoritarianism 
that began to curtail civil liberties in fields such as freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press (2007 - 2013).  
  
Right at the beginning of the new millennium, Göle (2000:60) wrote that 
‘Turkey is in search of a new political movement that could synthesise tradition 
and modernity, unite Turks and Kurds, shorten the gap between the social 
centre and periphery, offering solutions derived from political liberalism rather 
than authoritarianism’. The AKP, during its first years in power, seemed to be 
that long expected progressive/liberal democrat political movement to many 
observers in Turkey and abroad (see Çınar 2005:175; Dağı 2004; Morris 2005; 
Dede 2011). Shortly after it came to power in 2002, the AKP built on the 
democratisation packages initiated by the preceding coalition government of 
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit to harmonise Turkey's legal and political system 
with the EU standards. The party rapidly accelerated the pace of the 
democratisation drive in order to gain the support of Western European 
countries, legitimising the Turkish regime in their eyes for the aim of joining the 
EU (Aydın 2005; Freedom House 2008:6; Yıldız 2012:281; Örmeci 2012:208; 
Duran 2010:348). Therefore, not unlike the late 1940s, the democratisation 
program emerged in the country due to Turkey’s interaction with Western 
modernity, rather than the pressure of domestic social forces.  
 
Enhancement of human rights formed a key element of the reform packages 
initiated by the AKP, the government appearing supportive of cultural pluralism 
and the provision of more political rights to the Kurdish minority. The program 
included the abolition of capital punishment, lifting of the ban on broadcasting 
and publishing in minority languages and the improvement of women’s rights 
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through an amendment to the 1982 Constitution. In this context, the Ministry of 
Education developed a program popularly called ‘Let All Girls to School’ aimed 
to increase literacy levels of female children in Turkey. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that these reforms were implemented with the initiative of 
the government based on an external incentive, the EU accession process, 
continuing the state-centric decision-making mechanism of the country. The 
willingness of the AKP to undertake all the required reforms for the EU 
accession and the vocal support of party leadership to the process led observers 
to associate the party with ‘Europhilia’ (Dağı 2004:143). The AKP's initial 
enthusiasm for democratisation should be sought in the party's expected 
outcomes of the process, namely the elimination of the military influence over 
civilian policy-making (Özel and Özcan 2011:127; Aydın 2005:243; Gümüşçü 
and Sert 2010:59).  
 
Since the electoral victories of the party in 2007 and 2011, the AKP leadership 
appears to have lost its initial enthusiasm for the democratisation process as the 
party consistently reacted harshly to any criticism of its policies in the media 
resulting in the claim that ‘criticism may cost one's column in a newspaper’ 
which is rapidly becoming a well-known norm in the media (Taşkın 2013:299). 
Why did the AKP change its approach over the years, moving from a progressive 
stance towards an increasingly unilateral and top-down decision-making 
mechanism? The answer lies in the combination of several reasons: the 
deterioration of Turkey-EU relations, the elimination of the restraining 
influence of the Kemalist military, the increasing hegemony of the AKP in 
Turkish politics derived from its electoral successes and the chronic weakness 
of the institutional checks and balances in containing the power of the executive 
branch in the country.  
 
The EU's influential role in shaping the political trajectory of Turkey began to 
decline after 2005 as the government and the public opinion started to show 
signs of fatigue with the accession process. This can be attributed to the 
widespread belief in the Turkish public that the organisation would never admit 
Turkey as a full member as Western European countries appeared to 
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consistently favour Turkey's regional rivals, Greece and Cyprus, in political 
conflicts such as the Cyprus dispute, resulting in the Turkish government and 
media accusing the EU of ‘double standards’ (Duran 2008:101). The feeling of 
unfair treatment of the AKP administration was further enhanced by reports of 
the organisation that overlooked the problems experienced by conservative 
Sunni citizens due to the assertive secularism that banned all expressions of 
religiosity in public space, whereas the same EU reports consistently 
highlighted the ongoing problems about the expression of identity and civil 
liberties of Alevi and Christian minorities (ECHR 2005; Çınar 2008:123). 
Particularly, the European Court of Human Rights' approval of the ban on 
headscarves in Turkish universities imposed by the Turkish Constitutional 
Court on 11 November 2005 led to the alienation of the AKP from the EU and its 
affiliated institutions. 
 
In the aftermath of the five democratisation packages implemented by the AKP, 
the EU began to voice its warnings by 2005, indicating that the reform process 
in Turkey had slowed down and the regime could still not be evaluated as a 
consolidated liberal democracy (EU Commission 2005, 2007, 2012). In order to 
enhance the quality of democracy in Turkey, the EU suggested a number of 
reforms: the reduction of the 10 percent threshold required for parliamentary 
representation of parties, the introduction of legal rights for sexual minorities, 
the provision of equal rights and religious freedom for the Alevis, the resolution 
of the Kurdish rights issue through negotiation with representatives from 
Kurdish political organisations and ending the repression of non-Muslim 
minorities through measures such as the seizure of their assets and bans on 
religious teaching in schools belonging to these communities (EU Commission 
2012, 2013).  
 
The annual European Union Commission reports had been critical of the 
democratisation process in Turkey since 2005, citing the ‘Political Parties Law’, 
‘the absence of labour union rights’, ‘bans on Internet sites’, ‘allegations of 
torture’, ‘discrimination towards lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals’ and 
the ‘Anti-Terror law’ as key deficits (EU Commission 2012, 2013; Kubicek 
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2011b). In response to the EU's demands for more reforms, the AKP adopted a 
defensive stance as public statements of the AKP leaders accused the EU of 
‘double standards’, ‘supporting Kurdish terrorism’ and ‘attempting to divide 
Turkey’ through demanding more political rights (amounting to autonomy) for 
Kurds (Usul 2008:187). Also, the reforms that were implemented as part of the 
EU accession process in the early 2000s did not reflect in the practices of the 
state, especially in terms of local governance as the highly bureaucratic 
decision-making process of the centre continued to overlook the demands of 
citizens across the country (Çelenk 2009). For instance, the 2004 reform 
package that legally provided the same power to the local governments with 
their EU counterparts had not been put into practice as the democratically-
elected mayors continued to share their responsibilities with bureaucratic 
governors appointed by the central government in Ankara as well as remaining 
heavily dependent on Ankara for funds (Thumann 2010:33). 
 
Since the 2008 Financial Crisis, Turkish leaders such as the Prime Minister 
Erdoğan emphasised the strength and resilience of Turkish economy vis-à-vis 
the fragility of EU economies such as Greece, Spain and Ireland, which also 
weakened the initial public zeal for the EU membership in Turkey (Kubicek 
2011b:921-23; Vardan 2009:52; Lagendijk 2012:169). Public opinion polls 
show that support for the EU membership dramatically decreased in Turkey 
over the years, from 73 percent in 2004 to 33 percent in 2013 (Eurobarometer 
2006; Usul 2008:189; Kubicek 2011b:922; The Economist 2013). 
 
The AKP's political reforms since 2002 largely focused on empowering the 
elected government and weakening the influence of the Kemalist elite in the 
military and bureaucracy, whereas enhancing the practice of basic rights and 
liberties of the citizens lagged behind (European Commission 2012; Öniş 2013; 
Taşkın 2013; Turam 2012b; Lagendijk 2012; Kubicek 2011a). The sporadic 
negotiations with the Kurdish and Alevi citizens did not produce visible results 
in terms of fully integrating these marginalised communities into the political 
system yet. A key issue that characterised the later years of the AKP rule had 
been the increasing utilisation of the Anti-Terror law by the judiciary to target 
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political opposition to the government, resulting in the imprisonment of many 
journalists, academics and activists. There were 273 people convicted of the 
charge of terrorism in 2005, rising to 6.345 in 2009 and approximately 12.000 
by the end of 2012, making Turkey the first country in the world in terms of the 
number of convicted peoples with charges of terrorism, ahead of authoritarian 
states such as China (Cop 2013:66; Kubicek 2013a:43). 
 
The AKP continued Turkey's authoritarian tradition of using tax investigators of 
the Ministry of Finance to punish opposition media corporations such as the 
Doğan group that owns a number of influential opposition newspapers such as 
Hürriyet and Radikal (Thumann 2010:33; Akser and Baybars-Hawks 2012:302). 
Since the party came to power, a dramatic change in the ownership of media 
assets was witnessed as numerous popular newspapers and television channels 
of conglomerates such as Doğan, Ciner and Uzan groups were taken over by the 
AKP administration based on allegations of tax fraud and transferred to ‘more 
government friendly owners’ (Akser and Baybars-Hawks 2012:307).  
 
By 2014, a significant section of the media outlets in Turkey such as Sabah, 
HaberTürk, Star, Yeni Şafak, Takvim, Show TV, SKY Türk TV, NTV and ATV is 
allegedly under the control of the AKP and its supporters within the business 
world, resulting in an excessively positive portrayal of the policies and 
leadership of the party (Akser and Baybars-Hawks 2012; Çınar 2008:122; 
Baydemir 2011:44; Lagendijk 2012:173; Tibi 2009). Since 2007, the AKP 
leadership continuously referred to elections as the sole source of legitimacy for 
their rule, overlooking other key characteristics of liberal democratic regimes 
such as the rule of law, civil liberties, protection of the identities of minorities 
and freedom of the press, thereby displaying a majoritarian understanding of a 
democracy limited only to the holding of regular elections (Çınar 2008:123; 
Akser and Baybars-Hawks 2012; Özbudun 2014; Öniş 2013). Not unlike the DP 
in the 1950s, the AKP leadership portrayed the party as the sole representative 
of the ‘national will’ in reference to its three parliamentary election victories, 
overlooking the fact that opposition parties collectively gained an equivalent 
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amount or more votes than the AKP in these elections (Taşkın 2013:294; Öniş 
2013).   
 
One of the most noteworthy factors that produce majoritarianism in 
contemporary Turkey is the absence of checks and balances, a crucial 
prerequisite for liberal democracy. By 2007, three forces that were capable of 
checking and balancing the executive power of the AKP administration existed: 
the presidency, the military and the judiciary. Until that year, all three were 
controlled by the political rivals of the AKP as a well-known Kemalist ex-judge, 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer was the president, the military was able to impact on 
policy-making and the judiciary also acted in unison with the military via 
utilising the authority of the Constitutional Court. As analysed in the preceding 
sections, the military tutelage came to an end in 2007. The same year, the term 
of President Sezer ended, leaving the election of the next president in the hands 
of a parliament dominated by the AKP. The AKP successfully elected a key 
leader of the party, the foreign minister Abdullah Gül to the presidency in the 
second round of votes in the parliament.   
 
After the elimination of the extra-judicial check the military imposed on the AKP 
government and the election of Abdullah Gül to the presidency, the 
Constitutional Court assumed the role of balancing the AKP government. In 
liberal democratic regimes, the main purpose for the existence of Constitutional 
Courts is to protect the citizens against the actions of the executive branch and 
the supervision of the actions of the government in terms of their compatibility 
with the constitution. In the Turkish case, the Constitutional Court played a 
different role. The Kemalist military's closest ally within the state had long been 
the Constitutional Court that dedicated itself to protecting the official Kemalist 
ideology via containing the two alleged threats against the regime, the Kurdish 
nationalists and Islamists (Özbudun 2012b:156; Cizre 2012:122). In 2008, the 
Constitutional Court accused the AKP administration of ‘being a centre of anti-
secular activities’, the party barely managing to escape closure due to the 
absence of majority vote in the court (Göl 2009:795).  
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The failed attempt of the Constitutional Court was followed by the AKP 
preparing a constitutional amendment to change the status of the institution. 
The voters approved the constitutional referendum on 12 September 2010. The 
number of judges in the Constitutional Court rose from eleven to seventeen 
while the influence of the parliament and presidency (both controlled by the 
AKP) over the selection of these judges increased. In effect, the amendment 
increased the power of the government over this institution, weakening the 
checks and balances via jeopardising the autonomy of the judiciary from the 
other two branches of the state (Freedom House 2008:20; Turam 2012b:111; 
Kubicek 2011a:444; Aknur 2012c:440). As the systemic opposition to the AKP 
government from the Kemalist state establishment had been eliminated and the 
political opposition within the parliament remained weak due to the relatively 
small numbers of seats obtained by the three opposition parties CHP, MHP and 
BDP vis-à-vis the AKP, the party strongly consolidated its rule over the political 
trajectory of Turkey. 
 
In this context, an opposition to the AKP administration recently manifested via 
street protests. The Gezi Park protests of the summer of 2013 quickly expanded 
its original aim of protecting a park at the heart of Istanbul and transformed 
into a movement that targeted the ruling AKP, in particular the Prime Minister 
Erdoğan (Göle 2013:8; Yayla 2013:13). It has been argued that the increasing 
interference of the prime minister in the lifestyles of non-conservative citizens 
of the country via public statements and policies (e.g. attempting to limit the 
alcohol consumption and restricting abortion and Caesarean section) resulted 
in the marginalisation of secularist sections of the public and its subsequent 
mobilisation as an opposition movement in the streets (Ete 2013:16; Atay 
2013:39; Yayla 2013:11; Abbas 2013:24).  
 
A key factor that caused the rapid expansion of uprisings across the country was 
the heavy-handed approach of the security forces against the protestors as 
Web-based social networks such as Facebook and Twitter were filled with 
images of police brutality, resulting in the victimisation of the protestors in the 
eyes of some segments of the public (Abbas 2013:21). The Gezi Park protestors 
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were comprised of many diverse groups such as LGBTT associations, Kurdish 
rights activists, social-democrats, liberals and environmentalists, though the 
majority appeared to be of secularist and/or left-wing ideological stance 
(Eşkinat 2013:45; Ete 2013:20; Yayla 2013:9-10). The protestors lacked a clear 
ideology – similar to the Arab uprisings of 2011 – and the factor that united 
activists from a wide spectrum of political identities was their common 
opposition to the government, many participants referring to the alleged shift 
towards authoritarianism as the main reason for their protests (Abbas 
2013:26). Ultimately, the protest movement failed in its objective of forcing the 
government to resign, yet it was reflective of the disillusionment of various 
groups from the government. The increasing marginalisation of these groups in 
contemporary Turkey is reminiscent of the disenfranchisement of the Islamic 
political movement in the era preceding the AKP rule. It appears that the 
country achieved little success in consolidating liberal democracy over the last 
decade as the roles of the social conservatives and their non-conservative 
opponents had simply been reversed. A majoritarian understanding that 
excluded and repressed political opposition continued its hold over Turkish 
politics. The failure of the Gezi social movement to reach its objective also 
signified the continuing primacy of the central forces (the state and/or the 
government) over the social forces in shaping the political trajectory of Turkey.   
 
4.4 READING THE POLITICAL TRAJECTORY OF TURKEY THROUGH THE 
MULTIPLE MODERNITIES PARADIGM  
 
As stated in the introduction of the chapter, the three theories of modernity 
have different understandings regarding political modernity. While CMT and 
NMT equate it to the gradual formation of liberal democracy, MMP 
conceptualises it as a broader process that solely refers to the emergence of 
centralised and effective decision-making mechanisms. In the model of MMP, 
democratisation may or may not be part of the political modernisation process 
of non-Western societies. The two mainstream approaches to the study of 
modernisation in Turkey – the structural and societal models – applied the 
hypotheses of CMT and NMT respectively, claiming that contemporary Turkey 
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constitutes a successful model of liberal democracy. Nevertheless, the structural 
and societal models did not base their claims on a fully explained definition of 
liberal democracy.  
 
The study of the Turkish case conducted in the preceding part three showed 
that rather than converging towards the Western liberal democratic modernity, 
the democratisation process in Turkey suffered from numerous deficiencies 
which prevented the formation of a liberal democracy, based on the commonly 
used understanding of this regime type within the scholarly literature of 
democratisation analysed in part two. In this context, can we evaluate 
contemporary Turkey as a politically modern society? Contrary to the claims of 
the structural and societal models, Turkey is characterised by majoritarianism 
rather than liberal democracy. As such, Turkey cannot possibly be identified as 
a modern society through the utilisation of CMT and NMT frameworks, which 
are based on the Western model of modernity that excludes any society that 
does not conform to its values. However, Turkey could be considered modern 
according to MMP because it possesses a central state structure that possesses 
effective control over all spheres of life in the country. 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, Turkey could be defined as an economically modern 
society by CMT and NMT. As both of these theories presuppose that economic 
modernisation would result in the consolidation of liberal democracy, they fail 
to provide an answer to this question: how an economically modern country 
such as Turkey cannot possess liberal democracy? In contrast to CMT and NMT, 
MMP argues that modernisation is a transformation process that ultimately 
produces different outcomes (modernities) which do not necessarily reflect the 
features of the Western model. Therefore, MMP provides more appropriate 
conceptual framework to study modernisation, because it can successfully 
explain the differences between the ‘political modernities’ of non-Western cases 
such as Turkey and that of the West. Accordingly, the origins of the various 
forms of modernities are rooted in the divergences within the historical 
trajectories of societies from one another (Wagner 2012; Eisenstadt 2000; 
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Arnason 2002). The validity of this idea can be seen in the case of political 
modernisation in Turkey.                 
 
The late Ottoman era was marked by major progresses in political 
modernisation, yet there was not a noteworthy development in the field of 
economic modernisation. This phenomenon continued during the early years of 
the Republic as well.  The country had made the transition from a monarchy to a 
republic that was de jure based on ‘the rule of the people’ as written in the 1921 
and 1924 constitutions, yet the state was an authoritarian construct ruled by a 
one-party regime. The rapid economic modernisation of the 1920s and 1930s as 
shown in Chapter 3 did not impact on the political trajectory as the transition 
from authoritarianism towards a multi-party life with free and fair elections 
was made as a consequence of national security concerns rather than a 
considerable amount of pressure from the citizenry.  
 
Reading from the perspective of MMP, a key divergence of the political 
modernisation trajectory of Turkey from the Western experience was the 
extraordinary impact of the military on the whole process. The military played a 
paradoxical role: on one hand it contributed to the democratisation process by 
designing a liberal democratic constitution in 1961, but on the other hand it 
wished to control ‘the ebb and flow’ of the political life in the country through 
building a tradition of interference in policy-making. The MGK was the main 
agent to legitimise this culture of military interventionism.  
 
When the 1961 Constitution succeeded in liberalising the political life and led to 
the rise of left-wing social movements, the very force that created it in the first 
place restricted the institutional structure. Through the 1971 intervention, the 
military eliminated the influence of social forces that had begun to affect 
political life of the country for the first time, namely the labour unions of urban 
workers and the students’ movements (Boratav 1989:371). As such, the state 
elite re-gained the control of the modernisation process from the social forces, 
resulting in a significant deviation in Turkey from the Western trajectory of 
political modernity, which was historically based on the emergence of social 
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forces such as the urban middle class and the capitalist class that posed a 
challenge to the authority of the state and its elites (Moore 1966; Boratav 
1989:377-378). In sum, regardless of whether one perceives the overall 
influence of the military on the political trajectory of the country as positive or 
negative, it is clear that the role of the military constitutes one of the most 
crucial differences between the path of modernity between Turkey and the 
West.       
 
The legacy of a state-centric modernisation process continued to shape the 
political life of Turkey as even after the military tutelage had been weakened by 
the AKP during the EU accession process in the 2000s, this phenomenon did not 
result in a dramatic change in the direction of Turkey’s political trajectory (Göl 
2008:19). The legal system of the country was still based on the authoritarian 
1982 Constitution and a number of its products such as the Political Parties Law 
and the Anti-Terror Law that continued to restrict civil liberties in the country. 
The contemporary political system of Turkey ruled by the AKP proved that an 
elected government could be as successful as the military in terms of containing 
the rise of social forces and severely limiting their influence on politics, which 
was demonstrated in the aftermath of the Gezi Park protests.  
 
The result of the particular trajectory of Turkey – which was directed by the 
state forces in contrast to the influential role played by social forces in the 
Western trajectory – is a majoritarian regime whose legitimacy is solely based 
on the holding of regular, free and fair elections as other prerequisites of liberal 
democratic life are absent. The effects of external forces (the USA in the 1950s 
and the EU in the 2000s) on the democratisation process remained limited as 
domestic social forces that could sustain the drive towards the formation of a 
liberal democratic regime were initially lacking due to the absence of economic 
modernisation. When they began to emerge from the 1960s onwards, the state 
forces continuously repressed them and preserved their primacy over the 
direction of the political trajectory of Turkey. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
domestic social and economic conditions of a society play a larger role than 
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external forces in terms of shaping the outcome of a political modernisation 
trajectory.  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION  
 
In an attempt to show that MMP is more efficient than its rival theories in 
explaining the phenomenon of political transformation in non-Western cases, 
this chapter studied the case of Turkey. Two bodies of literature were contested 
throughout the chapter: first, it was argued that the portrayal of Turkey as a 
liberal democratic model by the structural and societal models of Turkish 
studies was not based on solid evidence and that Turkey could be more 
realistically identified as a majoritarian regime. Second, it was maintained that 
the political trajectory of Turkey diverged from the Western historical 
experience, resulting in a different type of modernity that cannot be understood 
through the ‘convergence towards the West’ hypothesis of CMT and NMT. The 
main reason behind that divergence was that the political modernisation 
process of Turkey evolved in a completely different period of time than the 
Western historical experience and that the interaction between the Western 
modernity and the society in Turkey led to the emergence of a hybrid form of 
political system.  
 
The following Chapter 5 will focus on the social dimension of modernity in 
Turkey. Once again, the Turkish case will be evaluated to determine which 
theory of modernity is most successful in terms of grasping the nature of 
modernisation processes in non-Western contexts.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE SOCIAL TRAJECTORY OF TURKISH MODERNITY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Social development constitutes one of the most contentious issues within 
modernisation studies that clearly differentiate the frameworks of the theories 
of modernity from each other. As explained in Chapter 2, CMT perceives social 
development as the gradual replacement of traditional/religious values with a 
secular worldview based on the Enlightenment tradition of Western Europe. In 
the case of predominantly Muslim societies such as Turkey, CMT claims that the 
implementation of secularisation programs is the only means to achieve social 
modernity as Islamic values are supposedly incompatible with the vision of a 
liberal democratic and capitalist society. Conversely, NMT rejects the 
incompatibility hypothesis by contending that religious values such as Islamic 
ethics could be harnessed to accelerate the modernisation process in the 
Muslim world. A third conceptualisation is put forward by MMP that does not 
presuppose a link between modernity and religion, suggesting that religious 
values may positively or negatively impact on modernisation depending on the 
particular economic and political context of a society (Wagner 2012; Kaya 
2004). As such, MMP suggests that the role played by religious interpretation 
within the social transformation process is fully shaped by the economic and 
political changes in a country rather than the intrinsic nature of the religious 
texts.  
 
As noted in Chapter 1, social modernisation in the Turkish case has been 
identified within the literature on the Turkish model as the ideological 
transformation of political Islamism in Turkey, shifting from a revolutionary 
movement aiming to build an Islamic state through violence (early 20th 
century) towards one that adopted a non-violent method of competition into 
multi-party elections to legally expand the influence of religiosity in public 
space (late 20th and early 21st century). Ideological change, in this context, 
refers to the particular trajectory the mainstream Islamic movement 
experienced in Turkey. Within the existing literature, the structural model 
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adopts the view of CMT and claims that the state-led secularisation process of 
the pre-1980 era and the continuing role of the Kemalist military in Turkish 
politics forced the Islamic movement to moderate its discourse and methods. 
However, the societal model focuses on the post-1980 period of economic 
modernisation and contends that the link between the Islamic movement and 
the rising conservative capitalist class of Turkey led to the ideological change.     
 
This chapter has two objectives: first, contemporary Turkey will be assessed to 
determine whether it could be considered a ‘socially modern society’ according 
to the theories of modernity. Second, the trajectory of ideological 
transformation of the Islamic political movement will be interpreted via the 
conceptual framework of MMP. This will provide the chapter with a multi-
dimensional understanding of social modernisation through highlighting the 
influence of both the state and the social forces in addition to the significance of 
path dependency between different eras of history (the pre-1980 and the post-
1980 periods), international context and historical contingency.  
 
The chapter will challenge the approaches offered by both the structural model 
and the societal model through arguing that the ideological change of the 
Islamic movement should be attributed to the impact of two path dependent 
factors which complemented each other: the provision of ‘political opportunity 
space’ in the pre-1980 years to the movement by the state and the emergence of 
‘economic opportunity space’ with the rise of a conservative capitalist class in 
the post-1980 period. The political opportunity space manifested because from 
the 1960s onwards, the secularist state establishment allowed Islamic parties to 
compete in multi-party elections and reformed the official ideology of the state 
over the years to incorporate them into the political system of Turkey. The 
economic opportunity space occurred because – as explained in Chapter 3 – the 
economic liberalisation program of the 1980s led to the establishment of 
numerous SMEs that formed a strong link with the Islamic political movement, 
shaping its ideology and objectives. As such, the Turkish case will show that 
Islamism is a changeable phenomenon that is shaped by the economic and 
political conditions of a predominantly Muslim society, taking various forms 
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under different circumstances. This validates the hypothesis of social modernity 
developed by MMP.    
 
The chapter consist of four sections. Part two will analyse the changes in the 
nature of state-religion relations in Turkey with a particular emphasis on the 
interaction between the Kemalist secularisation project and the Islamic social 
and political movements over the years. The impact of the transition to a 
competitive multi-party system, the softening of the state’s approach on Islamic 
groups and the economic development process on the ideological discourse and 
methods of the mainstream Islamic movement (the National View) will be 
studied. Part three will assess if contemporary Turkey can be evaluated as a 
socially modern society according to three main theories of modernity. In 
addition, the socio-political development experience of Turkey will be 
interpreted through MMP in that section, highlighting the differences between 
the Turkish case and the historical trajectory and current state of Western 
modernity. Part four contains the summary and concluding remarks of the 
chapter.              
 
5.2 THE STAGES OF AN IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION TRAJECTORY  
 
The interaction between the Islamic movement and the state in Turkey evolved 
over time (see Table 5.1.). As such, the framework of MMP that emphasises 
path dependency within modernisation efforts is particularly helpful in 
comprehending the continuities and discontinuities within the social trajectory 
of Turkish modernity (Wagner 2012). Initially, Islamic groups and secularists 
were engaged in a violent conflict to control the fate of the post-Ottoman society 
as the socio-political visions of the ruling Kemalists and the Islamic movement 
clashed with each other (1923-1950). Islamic revolutionaries reacted to the 
Kemalist secularisation program through launching a number of armed 
uprisings in this era. The state-Islam relations have become more complex over 
time, characterized by periods of conflict and rapprochement from the 1950s 
onwards (Hann 1997:42). 
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After the transition to multi-party life (1950-1960), religious orders such as the 
Naqshbandis and the Nurcus utilised the limited political opening and gathered 
around the socially conservative DP, providing it with support in order to 
expand their activities and gradually increase religiosity in public space (Toprak 
1981). This was a key turning point for the socio-political trajectory of Turkey 
as Islamic groups – for the first time in the Republican era – began to place their 
struggle within legally defined boundaries. In the second multi-party period of 
the 1960-1980 years, Islamic groups benefited from the increased freedom of 
association provided by the liberal 1961 Constitution by forming their own 
political movement, the National View and its affiliated political parties (Kanra 
2013). The trajectory of the Islamic movement in the post-1980 period was 
shaped by the contrasting waves of political opening (1980-1997) and 
restriction of political space (1997-2001) imposed by the secularist military. 
The intensifying economic modernisation process of the era also impacted on 
the trajectory, forming one of the key drivers of ideological transformation 
within the movement, eventually culminating to the emergence of a new Islamic 
paradigm in Turkey with the formation AKP in 2001.  
 
The following sections of the chapter will analyse the trajectory of the Islamic 
movement and its interaction with the Turkish state in detail. In contrast to the 
narratives of the structural and societal models analysed in Chapter 1, the 
chapter will highlight the how the state itself was gradually shaped by its 
engagement with the Islamic movement. Thus, it will be argued that the 
transformation of political Islam in Turkey manifested through a process of 
‘reciprocal compromises’ in which both the regime and Islamic groups 
negotiated with each other and changed their ideologies over the years. While 
the mainstream Islamic movement officially renounced its commitment to 
shari'a and the concept of the Islamic state, the Turkish state also moderated its 
position, shifting from a more ‘assertive understanding of secularism’39 towards 
‘passive secularism’ (Turam 2006; Kuru 2009).     
                                                        
39
 Assertive secularism refers to the French model Kemalists adopted in late 1920s, a model that 
envisages the regular intervention of state into religious realm to contain and control it, while passive 
secularism refers to the American model in which the state does not interfere in religious sphere at all.   
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Before delving into the analysis of the Islamic political movement in the 
Republican era, a brief overview of the late Ottoman period is required, because 
the origins of the violent confrontation that characterised the interaction 
between the state and Islamic groups in the formative years of the Republic 
(1923-1950) lie in the legacy of the imperial modernisation program.        
 
5.2.1 The Legacy of Ottoman Westernisation on the Trajectory of Social 
Change in Turkey: An Emerging Power Struggle (1839-1923)   
 
The Ottoman Westernisation program left its mark on the Republic as the 
Westernised education system of the Empire fostered the emergence of secular 
bureaucratic and military elites. The secularisation in Turkey began before the 
establishment of the Republic, in the Tanzimat era (1839-1876). The 
understanding of social modernisation put forward by CMT emphasises the 
‘need for changing religious values’ in predominantly Muslim societies (Apter 
1965; Lerner 1958; Berkes 1964). An example of this narrative is as follows:  
 
We may say that the value system of such a society [traditional, pre-
modern] must change from a prescriptive type to a ‘principal’ type, to 
borrow again from Becker. Traditional societies… tend to have a 
normative system, in which a comprehensive, but uncodified, set of 
relatively specific norms governs concrete behaviour. But in a modern 
society an area of flexibility must be gained in economic, political, and 
social life in which specific norms may be determined in considerable 
part by short-term exigencies in the situation of action, or by functional 
requisites of the relevant social subsystems (Bellah 1958:1-2). 
 
Based on this definition, the Ottoman Empire of the pre-Tanzimat era was a 
traditional society with a prescriptive value system as the religious law - shari'a 
- was in practise. In the Ottoman Empire, the Sunni ulema (clergy) not only 
monopolised theological interpretation but also controlled law-making, judicial 
processes and the education system via madrasas (Kara 1994:46). The chief of 
the ulema was the Sheik-ul Islam who was a permanent member of the Ottoman 
cabinet and a chief advisor to the sultans.  
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The Ottoman monarchs and bureaucrats initiated an ever-intensifying process 
of Westernisation from the late 18th century onwards. However, the sphere of 
religion could not be touched by the reformers due to strong opposition from 
the ulema which had strongly established itself within the imperial political 
economic system (Kara 1994; Ahmad 1993; Berkes 1964). The pro-Western 
bureaucracy avoided direct confrontation with the ulema by circumventing 
their sphere of influence and building a separate secular institutional structure 
without eliminating the traditional-religious one (Toprak 1981:32). As a result, 
the Ottoman state structure, bureaucracy, and secular education system was 
thoroughly Westernised by the end of the 19th century. In the late Ottoman 
years, there existed not one but ‘two Ottoman Empires’, one that was providing 
secular education with curriculums imported from Western European countries 
such as France, while the other continued to train pupils in Islamic schools - the 
madrasas - with Islamic teachings and instil in them traditional values.   
 
The state-engineered social change process of the late Ottoman era inevitably 
brought the clergy and pro-Westernising bureaucracy against each other (Kara 
1994:47). Throughout the 19th and early 20th century, the social Westernisation 
program of the reformers – particularly the debate on the necessity of 
secularism among Ottoman intellectual circles – attracted the hostility of the 
clergy and other conservative groups as any attempt to distinguish between 
religious and political realms was considered as ‘heresy’ (Toprak 1981:32). The 
first popular Islamist discourse in Turkey emerged within the Young Ottomans 
in the late 19th century, an intellectual movement that contained diverse 
ideologies (Göl 2003:15). Islamist thinkers of the era attributed the decline of 
the Empire to the alleged decay of moral values that was said to have occurred 
because of the Westernisation program (Cizre-Sakallioglu 1996:223; Göl 
2003:15).  
 
The marginalisation of Islamic groups in Turkey did not emerge with the 
Republic, rather it had already begun during the late Ottoman period (Ahmad 
1988). As the socio-political influence of the clergy vis-à-vis the bureaucracy 
over education and policy-making faded during the 19th century, political Islam 
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began its shift from the centre of power towards the periphery of the society, 
expressing itself as an opposition movement through religious orders beyond 
the control of the centralised polity.  
 
Calls for a return to traditions and Islamic values intensified in the conservative 
segments of the Ottoman media in early 20th century (Ahmad 1988; Yıldız 
2006; Kara 2003; Gencer 2008). One particularly influential newspaper, Volkan 
and its continuous critique of Westernisation was partially responsible for 
triggering the armed Islamic uprising on 13 April 190940 (Yıldız 2006). In this 
first revolutionary Islamic uprising of Turkey, a large group of soldiers led by 
Muslim clerics revolted in Istanbul against the restoration of the constitutional 
system that had taken place the previous year, demanding a return to absolute 
monarchy and the country to be ruled strictly according to shari'a (Islamic law). 
The soldiers and masses mobilised by revolutionary clerics lynched many 
deputies, officers and journalists during the 11-day rebellion which was 
eventually suppressed by secularist elements of the Ottoman armed forces 
(Yıldız 2006). The rebellion was a clear sign that a clash between secularist and 
Islamic forces in Turkey was surfacing.  
 
The Ottoman Empire collapsed after the end of World War I as the Allies 
captured virtually all of its state functions after the occupation of Istanbul in 
1919. The armed forces of the nationalist movement led by the new parliament 
in Ankara proved successful against the invading Allied forces such as Greece 
and France, resulting in the fate of Turkey to be decided by Kemal Ataturk and 
his followers. After the military victory, the Ankara parliament dominated by 
the Kemalists abolished the sultanate, ending the rule of Istanbul. Ataturk and 
most of the cadres that would rise to higher echelons of power in the Kemalist 
Republic were officers educated in the Ottoman Royal Military Academy in 
which they were introduced to a number of materialist publications (Hanioğlu 
2012:40). 
                                                        
40
 This incident is known as ‘31 Mart Vakası’ (The 31st March Rebellion) in Turkey, in reference to 
the date the uprising occurred, 31st of March in the Rumi calendar used by the Ottoman Empire at the 
time.  
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Table 5.1. The Transformation Trajectory of the Islamic Political Movement  
 
 
Authoritarianism                           1950                                                  1960 Coup                                           1980 Coup                                          1997 Intervention                           2002- Onwards 
     Democratic Elections                     
 
1920s      1930s        1940s 
 
1950s 
 
   1960s               1970s 
 
     1980s            Early  1990s 
 
    Late 1990s                2000s 
 
 
Clashes between the regime 
and revolutionary Islamists  
 
 
Political Opportunity 
Space: transition to 
competitive multi-
party life 
 
 
1961 Constitution: 
increased freedom of 
speech and association 
 
 
The ‘Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis’: Islamism as part 
of the official state ideology 
 
 
The Kemalist crackdown on 
Islamists in 1997 
 
 
Radical secularisation from 
above 
 
 
Softening of assertive 
secularism 
 
 
Emergence of the 
National View 
 
 
Economic Opportunity 
Space: rise of the 
conservative capitalist class 
through their association – 
MÜSİAD 
 
 
An alliance between the 
MÜSİAD and the reformist 
faction of the National View is 
formed 
 
 
Repression of Islamic 
groups  
 
 
Emergence of Islamic 
networks as lobby 
groups  
 
 
The National View as 
coalition partners in the 
1970s (MSP) 
 
 
The Islamic RP wins a 
major electoral victory in 
1995 
 
 
Ideological Moderation: the 
formation of the AKP  
Source: Author.
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It can be argued that the secularisation program of the early years of the 
Republic was a by-product of the Ottoman Westernisation reforms that founded 
a secular education system:  
 
[T]he famous Westernization plan published in two instalments in the 
scientist journal İctihad in 1913 looks like a blueprint of both the early 
Republican reforms and the later Kemalist version of modernity. This 
plan, presented as a report of a dream revealed to the author to avoid 
legal charges by public prosecutors, proposed a thorough Westernization 
through changes such as the abolition of the fez [the traditional Ottoman 
hat], the emancipation of women, the closure of dervish lodges [religious 
orders], and a reformation of Islam (Hanioğlu 2012:45-46). 
 
In the context of social change, the impact of the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II 
should be acknowledged as mass education campaigns beyond the imperial 
capital Istanbul first started under his rule and many private and public 
education institutions were founded (Gencer 2008:76). Though Sultan 
Abdülhamit II implemented an extensive national education program for the 
purpose of preserving and consolidating the rule of Ottoman dynasty via 
catching up with the West, his policies paradoxically established the social 
origins of the rise of Kemalists in the 1920s. After all, the genesis of Kemal 
Ataturk’s worldview was shaped in the secularised military schools of the 
Empire (Gencer 2008:784; Hanioğlu 2012). As such, the Kemalist Republic can 
be evaluated as a path dependent – albeit not designed – outcome of the 
Ottoman social change program of the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
 
It would be ahistorical to assess the secularism of the new Republic as a 
‘revolutionary break’ in Turkish history as it is often referred to by the Kemalist 
discourse (Kansu 1995; Kara 1994; Gencer 2008). In fact, the late Ottoman state 
was already on the fast track towards conforming to Western social modernity 
via secularisation and the reign of Abdülhamit II – which is often glorified by 
conservative accounts of history in contemporary Turkey – actually accelerated 
this trend (Kansu 1995). Various Islamic groups such as the Naqshbandis were 
so alienated from Sultan Abdülhamit II that they were initially supportive of the 
revolutionary CUP which eventually overthrew the sultan in 1909 (Kara 
1994:74-75). Nevertheless, once the social policies of the CUP began to take 
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shape, Islamic intellectuals and orders became critical of the new administration as 
well, because the CUP soon proved that it did not intend to stop the state-led 
secularisation program, which seemed bent on minimising the socio-political 
influence of the Sunni clergy (Kara 1994:118-119).   
 
In sum, the impact of Western modernity on the Ottoman state and society laid 
the groundwork for Turkey’s subsequent trajectory of social change. In fact, 
İsmail Kara (2003:199) traces the origins of the so-called concept of ‘Islamic 
modernity’ to the late Ottoman era. As a result of increasing interaction with 
Western socieities and a feeling of ‘inferiority’ due to the large technological gap 
between Ottomans and their Western counterparts, Ottoman intellectuals and 
bureaucrats felt forced to re-interpret their own traditions and religious values 
through the lens of ‘modern life’, a perspective entirely infused with Western 
social codes. The Kemalist interpretation of modernity was an archetype of this 
type of reaction among the late Ottoman intelligentsia, which desperately 
searched for a ‘miracle cure’ to save the country from falling under the control 
of industrialised Western states such as Britain, France and Germany.      
 
5.2.2 The Era of Clash: An Assertive Secularist Regime versus Islamic 
Revolutionaries (1923-1950) 
5.2.2.1 The Kemalist social modernisation program 
    
A lesson the Kemalists drew from the collapse of the Empire was that the state 
was ‘not socially modernised enough’, particularly in reference to the ongoing 
influence of the clergy in the cultural sphere (Bellah 1958:2). The main 
difference between the Ottoman reformers and the Kemalist elite was that the 
Ottoman modernisation program attempted to manage a system where 
Westernised institutions co-existed with religiously-oriented ones while the 
Kemalists were dedicated towards building a thoroughly secularised state 
structure in terms of institutions and the legal system (Akyol 2008:79). The 
Kemalists perceived the ulema as responsible for the collapse of the Empire by 
preventing the implementation of a far-reaching social modernisation program, 
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which would have supposedly stopped the decline of the Ottoman state (Toprak 
1981:38).  
 
It is important to note that modernisation, in the eyes of the Kemalists, referred 
exclusively to Westernisation (Çınar 2005:5). The existence of a clergy with its 
control over the education and legal system was contradictory to the Kemalist 
vision of a ‘modern Turkey’ that would supposedly join the Western civilisation 
as a developed nation. It can be argued that for the Kemalists who were creating 
a secular Republic with nationalism as its legitimising ideology, the existence of 
an organised network with a proven ability to appeal to the masses (e.g. the 
1909 Islamic rebellion) with its references to much more established values – 
traditions and religion – was a clear threat. The Westernisation program of the 
Republic aimed to constitute a break from the traditional/religious values of the 
Ottoman Empire through replacing them with a Turkish nationalist and 
secularist official ideology (Aydın 2005:185).  
 
Nevertheless, Islam initially remained as the official state religion of the 
emerging Kemalist Republic that was still in the process of consolidating its 
authority over the country in the 1920s. The crucial issue that triggered violent 
clashes between the regime and Islamic groups was the abolition of the 
caliphate in 1924. Beginning from 1925, the Republican regime was challenged 
by a series of armed rebellions (e.g. the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925) led by 
Islamic groups that aimed to build a new caliphate which would be strictly ruled 
according to shari’a (Ahmad 1988:754). One such example occurred in a town 
called Menemen in western Turkey:    
 
In December of that year [1930] there was a dramatic and violent 
reactionary incident in Menemen, Izmir that alarmed the government. A 
large crowd, led by Dervish Mehmed Efendi, a member of the Naqshbandi 
order, left the mosque after morning prayers vowing to restore the 
Caliphate. The commander of the gendarmerie saw this demonstration as 
a rebellion and sent a young officer to restore order. The officer was 
seized by the impassioned crowd and beheaded. His head was stuck on 
top of a pole bearing a green flag and paraded around the town (Ahmad 
1988:754-755). 
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The Islamic challenge that manifested with uprisings such as the Sheikh Said 
rebellion (which had both Islamic and Kurdish separatist claims) in 1925 and 
the Menemen incident in 1930 led to the crystallisation of the secularist 
tendency of the emerging regime into a fully developed anti-clerical ideology. 
Religious orders – particularly the Naqshbandis – played major roles in inciting 
conservative masses for revolt across the country (Toprak 1981; Ahmad 1988; 
Geyikdağı 1984). In this regard, the Kemalists identified religious orders as the 
primary threat to the sustainability of the Republican regime, triggering a 
concerted effort to eradicate the orders (Ahmad 1988; Küçük 2007). As a result 
of the increasingly anti-clerical policies of the regime, the pact between the 
Kemalists and conservative intellectuals that was formed during the national 
struggle against the Allies started to deteriorate towards the latter half of the 
1920s. Influential conservative figures who were supportive of the Ankara 
regime in the early 1920s such as the poet and member of parliament, Mehmed 
Akif Ersoy and the Islamic scholar and founder of the Nurcu religious order, Said 
Nursi were opposed to the Kemalist Westernisation program (Küçük 2007:128; 
Mardin 1989).  
 
From 1925 onwards, the Kemalists initiated a series of programs that targeted 
all remnants of Ottoman social life (See Table 5.2.). The language reform 
changed the alphabet from Arabic to Latin script in 1928. It is common to find 
lamentations in the literature over this act as it has been claimed by 
conservative thinkers that the essential cultural link between contemporary 
Turkish society and the Ottoman Empire was supposedly eliminated (Lewis 
1999; Azak 2010). All religious orders were banned based on the rationale that 
these had become the focus of revolutionary Islamic groups (Toprak 1981). The 
office of the Sheikh-ul Islam was abolished and its authority over religious affairs 
was delegated to a newly founded and state controlled institution, the Diyanet 
(Directorate of Religious Affairs). The shari'a was repealed and madrasas were 
closed. Islam as the state religion was removed from the constitution and the 
principle of secularism was added in its place, defined as the separation of state 
and religious affairs. A new legal system based on models imported from 
Western European countries was implemented as the Kemalist regime adopted 
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the Swiss civil code and the Italian criminal law. The continental European 
measurements system and the Gregorian calendar were also introduced as part 
of the social transformation program.  
 
Despite all these reforms, however, the role of religion in the new state 
remained a highly problematic issue. On the one hand, the Kemalists perceived 
it as ‘a relic of the past’, one that had allegedly imprisoned the society to a state 
of perpetual backwardness, while on the other hand, Islam was the only source 
of identity that could unite the people around the new regime in the absence of 
an established national consciousness (Aydın 2005:185). In contrast to the 
Bolsheviks who entirely eliminated religion and clergy in the emerging Soviet 
Union at the time, the Kemalists' contradictory policies in Turkey point to the 
difficulty the policy-makers experienced when dealing with the issue. Islamic 
orders were banned, religious education was restricted, while simultaneously, 
the state felt the need to establish the Diyanet and utilise a moralist discourse to 
reinforce Turkish nationalism.  
 
The secularisation process intensified over the years and by the end of the 
1930s, a proposal for ‘Islamic reform’ was developed by a commission of 
Kemalist bureaucrats. The commission suggested some radical changes to the 
practice of Islam such as the usage of Turkish language in all rituals of worship, 
redesigning the interior of mosques on the model of Christian churches with 
seats, allowing mixed gender praying and the introduction of musical 
instruments in mosques, all of which were rejected by scholars of the Diyanet to 
avoid a strong backlash from Islamic groups (Ulutas 2010:393; Azak 2010). 
Nevertheless, one key suggestion of the commission was adopted - the 
replacement of Arabic with the Turkish language in the ezan (adhan in Arabic), 
the Islamic call to worship recited five times a day from mosques.   
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Table 5.2. ‘The Kemalist Cultural Revolution’ 
 
1922   
 Abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate 
1923 
 Foundation of the Republic of Turkey 
1924 
 Abolition of the Caliphate, shari'a courts and the office of Sheikh-ul Islam 
 Establishment of the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs)  
 Elimination of the dual education system through the ‘Law of Unity of Education’ 
(Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunu) 
1925 
 The dress reform and the ‘Hat Law’, the prohibition of the wearing of religious and 
traditional clothes  
 Official closure of religious orders, dervish lodges and madrasas (religious schools) 
 Adoption of the Gregorian calendar  
1926 
 Adoption of the Swiss Civil Code instead of religious law 
 Adoption of the Italian Penal Code 
 Adoption of a new commercial law imported from various European countries 
1928 
 Introduction of the Latin alphabet  
1929 
 Removal of Islam from the constitution as the official religion of the state 
1933 
 Adoption of continental European system of measures (the metric system)  
1934 
 Introduction of the surname law 
 Provision of full political rights for women, to vote and be elected  
1937 
 Inclusion of the principle of secularism (laïcité) in the constitution 
Source: Author.  
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The secularisation program gradually became part of the Kemalist nation-
building process. As with the case of Turkish ezan, the regime used religion and 
nationalism to design a ‘new citizen’, the so-called ‘Turkified Islam’ being a key 
element of this ambitious social transformation project. This ‘Islamic reform’ 
program was inspired by writings of Turkish nationalist and sociologist, Ziya 
Gökalp as Kemalists such as Ismail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu (the first chancellor of 
Istanbul University in the Republican period and the translator of Quran to 
Turkish) and Reşit Galip (minister of education, 1932-1933) used his ideas 
(Azak 2012:61). Kemal Ataturk was personally involved in directing the so-
called Islamic reformation process until his death in 1938. Ismet Inönü – the 
longest serving prime minister of Ataturk – was elected as the second president 
of Turkey. During Inönü's presidency (1938-1950), the authoritarian one-party 
rule was further consolidated, yet the most radical phase of Kemalist 
secularisation was over as the new leader did not seem as willing as his 
predecessor to pursue further social reforms, shelving the idea for an Islamic 
reformation (Geyikdağı 1984:65).  
 
5.2.2.2 The Turkish secularisation experience vis-à-vis the Western model   
 
Fatih Sultan Mehmet transformed the Hagia Sophia from a church into a 
mosque, and Muslims used the Hagia Sophia as a mosque for almost 500 
years. However, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 
emergence of the new Turkey, the first president, Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk, transformed the building into a museum. In the modern world, 
what does this museum represent? Are museums related with an archaic 
and mystical past, or are they a product of modernity and an attempt by 
the modern world to capture and examine the past? What was the 
purpose of transforming the building into a museum, which has been a 
touristic attraction in modern societies for over 70 years? Does religion 
belong to a museum, and should it be expected to become obsolete one 
day? (Keskin 2009:2-3) 
 
To many, the turning of Hagia Sophia from a mosque into a museum was 
symbolic of the way in which the Kemalists understood Islam and its function in 
a modernising society: that Islam was rapidly becoming obsolete and that it 
would not play a big part in the new world that was expected to come, the ‘age 
of modernity’. The Kemalist thinking of religion was fully in-line with CMT’s 
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perception of inevitable convergence towards a universalised Western 
modernity. Nevertheless, beyond their ideological vision based on the 
Enlightenment ideals of secularism, rationality and scientism; the Kemalist elite 
also was pragmatic enough to see in Islam a potential source that could be 
harnessed to legitimise the regime – at least ‘for the time being’ during the 
transition phase to modernity. Hence, the practical realities of the socio-political 
life of the emergent Republican Turkey caused the social modernisation 
trajectory to diverge from the idealised Western path to modernity, the process 
gaining its hybrid characteristics – most notably seen in the case of the Diyanet. 
Paradoxically, the same force that wished Turkey to fully conform to Western 
modernity in terms of secularisation also played a key role in its further 
divergence away from the idealised model of social modernisation.   
 
Hence, though the French model inspired the secularisation program of Turkey, 
but it produced unique characteristics over time (Özyürek 2006:13; Göle 
2009:111; Mardin 1990; Tunçay 2005). The principle of secularism was defined 
in the constitution as ‘the separation of state and religious affairs’, however, it 
was utilised by the regime to establish state control over the religious sphere in 
practice (Mardin 2006:235; Eligür 2010:37; Jacoby 2004:82). The Diyanet was 
paramount for the efforts of the Kemalist regime to ensure control over religion 
(Göl 2008:22; Turam 2006). It was assumed that if the Republic could eliminate 
all alternative interpretations and present a ‘state Islam’ to the masses, the 
regime could gain legitimacy while the Islamic opposition groups would weaken 
(Hanioğlu 2012:42-43). In this regard, the Kemalist regime eliminated the 
ulema as an influential actor in politics, imams (worship leaders in mosques) 
and Islamic scholars becoming public officials of the Diyanet, which had to 
adhere to the official interpretation of Islam in a nationalised and secularised 
form. Loyal to the regime, the Diyanet defined the contents of Friday hutbas, 
assigned imams and managed the mosques, which were all owned by the state.    
 
The understanding of ‘national Islam’ as a legitimacy device of the regime 
extended beyond the practice of secularism seen in Western European countries 
such as France as religion was paradoxically placed at the centre of politics in 
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this approach. In an emergent nation-state that officially emphasised the ‘will of 
the people’ as the ultimate source of legitimacy for its government, the heavy 
emphasis on Islam as means to gain the support of the citizenry was 
contradictory. This can be attributed to the difficulty the regime experienced in 
consolidating its authority across the country. The secular nationalist ideology 
lacked legitimacy in the eyes of conservative citizens, as it appeared to threaten 
the established traditions and religious belief-systems of the society (Gürbey 
2012; Küçük 2007; Azak 2010; Yavuz 2003; Tunçay 2005; Mardin 1989). In this 
context, there was a need to refer to established norms and values of the society 
to reinforce the new official ideology.  
 
During the Turkish Independence War (1919-1922) and the formative years of 
the Republic in the 1920s and 1930s, Islamic concepts such as jihad (holy war or 
struggle), shuhada (matrydom) and ghazi (Islamic warrior) were heavily 
referred to by Kemalist leaders (Azak 2010:45-61). For instance, in honour of 
his leading role in the Turkish nationalist victory, it had become common 
practice in Turkey to use the honorific title ghazi (gazi in Turkish) prior to the 
name of Ataturk, usually in the form of ‘Gazi Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’ or simply 
‘Gazi Pasha’. In this regard, the idiosyncratic character of Turkish secularism 
indicates that the interaction between the Western social modernity based on 
secularisation and the particular socio-political conditions of Turkey led to the 
emergence of a hybrid social modernisation trajectory in the country (Çınar 14-
17). The Kemalists had based their understanding of secularism on the French 
model, but the regime utilised the concept in a completely different manner 
compared to France where the state did not refer to religious values in its 
official discourse (Tunçay 2005).  
 
Turkey’s social change experience reflects what Bedri Gencer refers to as 
‘mechanical secularisation’ in contrast to the ‘organic secularisation’ of the West 
(Gencer 2008:781). As such, Turkey’s domestic social conditions did not 
produce secularism, but it was imported from Western modernity because the 
ruling elites perceived it as a necessity of the modernisation path. Yet, the 
Republican secularism was only a more intense variant of a process that began 
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earlier in the 19th century when the Ottoman society, its intellectuals and 
statesmen faced the might of Western modernity, starting from the Tanzimat in 
1839 (see Gencer 2008). The subsequent history of Turkey’s social 
modernisation can be evaluated as natural consequence of a path dependent 
trajectory, the initial starting point being the encounter with a technologically 
superior external force in early 19th century.                
 
5.2.2.3 The difficulty with the ‘periphery’: The Islamic resistance to secularisation 
 
The aforementioned attempts of Ankara to monopolise Islamic interpretation 
through a ‘state Islam’ were not sufficient to prevent it from becoming an 
ideology of opposition to the regime. The explanation for the emergence of 
Islamic revolutionary movements in this era should be sought in the failure of 
the Kemalist state to penetrate the traditional value system of the periphery in 
Turkey, the rural areas (Geyikdağı 1984:61; Saeed 1994:165; Zürcher 2004). 
The secularist ideology of the central state organisation could not be effectively 
extended to the peasantry, which formed most of the population, as the 
influence of Ankara remained very limited beyond the cosmopolitan urban 
centres such as Istanbul and Izmir (Jacoby 2004:83; Toprak 1981:1-2; 
Karasipahi 2009:93):  
 
Behind the facade of secularism, strictly maintained in the national 
education system and in the state-controlled media, it is clear that Islam 
never lost its hold on the great majority of the population. Within or 
parallel to the Sunni orthodox tradition, tarikat brotherhoods attracted 
many adherents (Hann 1997:34). 
 
Alternative sources of socio-political networks remained intact in rural areas, 
surviving even the most radical phase of the so-called ‘Kemalist Revolution’, 
namely the mass executions of members of opposition to the Republican regime 
by Istiklal Mahkemeleri41 in a manner reminiscent of the French Revolution of 
1789. 
                                                        
41
 Can be translated as the ‘Independence Tribunals’. These institutions were founded with a special 
mandate during the Turkish War of Independence to prosecute deserters, spies and those who were 
against the regime. After the end of the war, the court in Ankara continued to operate and judge the 
opponents of the Republic, executing rebels involved in uprisings.      
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The ‘forces of the periphery’ were mainly composed of landowners (often 
referred to as ağalar in Turkey) and the remnants of the Ottoman ulema, which 
were organised within religious orders such as the influential Naqshbandi 
groups across the country. The influence of these two social groups was 
particularly dominant in the least economically developed regions of the 
country, namely eastern and south-eastern Anatolia where the state authority 
remained considerably lower than the rest of Turkey. The Republican state was 
able to co-opt the landowners into the new regime and expand its sphere of 
influence through providing a de facto autonomy (Berberoglu 1977). However, 
the same conciliatory approach was not shown towards the ulema as the power 
of religious values in the hands of a class beyond the regime's control was 
perceived as a potential threat (Jacoby 2004). Nevertheless, the official 
dismantling of the conservative ulema – replaced by a state-assigned new 
religious class – did not result in the complete elimination of Islamic groups as 
religious networks were pushed into re-organising themselves as clandestine 
organisations (Jacoby 2004:85).  
 
The Islamic uprisings of the late 1920s prompted the Kemalist regime to 
accelerate its social Westernisation program through incorporating the 
ideological transformation of rural areas into the agenda (Yavuz 2003:54). Until 
the late 1930s, the CHP had focused on secular education in urban areas to 
foster the creation of a military-bureaucratic elite to be the flag-bearer of 
Kemalism rather than initiating a large-scale Soviet-style campaign to spread 
the new ideology of the regime to the masses (Arnason 2002). In the 1940s, 
however, a noteworthy program was initiated to spread the secularist ideology 
of the Republic to the periphery. Based on this rationale, official education 
institutions were founded in villages and towns across Turkey, the Village 
Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri) in the former and the People’s Houses (Halkevleri) in 
the latter. Nevertheless, the number of these institutions remained very limited 
and the DP closed them down in 1950, only a few years after their inception. As 
a result, they did not leave a lasting impact on the social development trajectory 
of Turkey.   
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5.2.3 The Shift towards Reconciliation between the State and the 
Movement (1950-1960)  
 
In 1950, a process defined as the ‘tempering of Kemalist Revolution’ began 
under the DP rule after the victory of the party in the free and fair parliamentary 
elections of this year, bringing an end to the 27-year one-party rule of the CHP 
(Yavuz 2003:59). Directed by the populist policy-makers of the DP for a decade 
between 1950-1960, the nature of the Kemalist state was transformed. The 
most noteworthy impact of this decade on the social trajectory of Turkey was 
that the wide gap between the official ideology of the state and the conservative 
masses was narrowed down after the DP adopted a reconciliatory approach 
towards the Islamic groups of the periphery (Turam 2006).  
 
After the transition to competitive multi-party life in 1950, the mainstream 
political parties in Turkey adopted contrasting approaches to the role of religion 
in political life. While the Kemalist CHP maintained that references to religious 
values should not have any place in politics, as it would allegedly violate 
secularism, the social conservative parties such as the DP and the MP 
extensively utilised religion in their electoral campaigns, managing to garner the 
support of conservative citizens to varying degrees (Toprak 1981). The ability 
of the DP to appeal to the conservative peasantry was the main reason behind 
their decisive electoral victory in 1950 as this class formed the majority of the 
population at the time (Roos and Roos 1971:45).  
 
The DP successfully utilised the widespread public discontent with some 
elements of Westernisation reforms of the CHP to its benefit, effectively carving 
itself the largest segment of the electorate (Toprak 1981:72). Throughout the 
1950s, the DP consistently branded the CHP as an ‘elitist’ party with an ideology 
that was supposedly ‘alien’ to the traditional values of the society, using a 
religious discourse to reinforce this image (Yücekök 1971:153). For instance, 
the most popular slogan used in the propaganda posters of the DP during its 
1950 electoral campaign was as follows: ‘Enough! It is time for the people to 
speak!’ (in Turkish: ‘Yeter! Söz Milletindir!’). This was a thinly veiled accusation 
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launched against the rule of the CHP, which was supposedly not representative 
of the ‘ordinary people’, therefore not receptive to the demands of the citizenry.   
  
The departure of the DP from the Kemalist understanding of secularism 
resulted in the party coming under strong criticism from the CHP throughout 
the 1950s and by secularist thinkers of Turkey ever since. The political alliance 
between various Islamic orders and the DP – particularly in the first half of the 
1950s – was interpreted as indicative of a ‘counter-revolution’, ‘vulgar 
populism’ or a ‘hidden Islamic agenda’ (Toprak 1981:72-73). One such critique 
traces the origins of all the subsequent ‘ills’ within the socio-political 
modernisation process in Turkey to the DP rule:  
 
When Turkish political life is examined carefully, it is possible to 
determine that the institutionalization of Kemalism was cut in 1950 and 
a semi-counter-revolution process began then. Although the 
institutionalization process was re-started by the 1961 Constitution, the 
politics of the 1960s brought a semi-counter-revolution back to the 
political scene. The military intervention in 1971 could not prevent the 
anomaly in the political structure (Çakmak 2009:842).   
 
In this narrative, the rise of Islamic values in Turkish politics is defined as an 
‘anomaly’ with a critical overtone, the DP decade being blamed for ending 
Kemalism. In this regard, it is important to note that most of these accusations 
are unwarranted, as the DP did not jeopardise key Kemalist principles and the 
public image of Kemal Ataturk as the national hero. The DP indeed altered the 
practice of secularism through policies such as the introduction of optional 
religious courses into the curriculum of public education institutions and 
establishment of faculties of divinity in universities (Cizre-Sakallioglu 
1996:237). However, these were hardly indicative of a radical counter-
revolution aimed to build an Islamic state. Among the aforementioned 
accusations, the most accurate one could be ‘vulgar populist’ as the DP leaders 
utilised religious values to gain the votes of conservative citizens, even though 
they were known for their Westernised personal life-styles not unlike the 
Kemalists that they repeatedly criticised for being distant from the traditions of 
the society (Toprak 1981:73; Altunışık and Tür 2005:30).  
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A crucial factor that restricted the revisionist tendencies of conservative 
members of the DP was the experience of previous opposition parties that 
implicitly challenged the Kemalist principles, especially its secularism. The 
Progressive Republican Party (founded in 1924) and the Free Republican Party 
(founded in 1930) were both banned in less than six-months after their 
establishment due to allegations of threatening the existence of the Republican 
regime by serving as platforms for Islamic revolutionaries. Many leaders of the 
DP were former members of the CHP and they personally observed the closure 
of these parties. Thus, the DP did not attempt to present an overt criticism of 
Kemal Ataturk and the Kemalist principles albeit the Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes made a number of public speeches that indicated his support for 
softening the assertive secularism. For instance, in 1950, Menderes made a 
controversial statement by declaring that the DP would preserve those Kemalist 
reforms that were adopted by the people, implying that the ones that were 
resisted by conservatives would have to modified or repealed (Toprak 1981:78-
79). The DP's understanding of secularism was different from the conventional 
Kemalist vision as it defended ‘passive secularism’ against the CHP's ‘assertive 
secularism’ (Kuru 2009). Article 14 of the DP program criticised the Kemalist 
approach to secularism and called for a ‘true understanding of secularism’ 
based on an actual separation of state and religion to minimise state 
intervention into the practice of religious belief and practices (Geyikdağı 
1984:69).  
 
Among the major changes the DP made to the Kemalist secularist practise was 
the lifting of the ban on Arabic ezan, permitting of the broadcasting of Qur'an 
readings over the state-owned radio channel and the relaxation of the ban on 
the wearing of religious clothes in public space. The DP expanded the Imam-
Hatip schools – which were initially founded by the CHP in the late 1940s in a 
late attempt to appeal to conservatives – and transformed these institutions into 
middle and high schools with religious curriculums. Rather than solely serving 
for the purpose of training a limited number of clerics for the Diyanet as the CHP 
envisaged them to be, Imam-Hatip schools began to gradually emerge as an 
alternative to the secular education system, resulting in a dualistic education to 
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be established in Turkey not unlike the 19th century Ottoman practice (See 
Table 5.3.).  
 
Table 5.3. ‘The Tempering of Kemalist Revolution’ by the DP  
Source: Author.  
 
The DP decade dramatically affected the interaction between the regime and the 
Islamic groups. In the 1950s, the Islamic social movements benefited from the 
softening of regime pressure, extending their influence through religious 
publications and forming civil society organisations (Toprak 1981:81). The 
Ticanis, Naqshbandis and Nurcus emerged as influential religious orders in this 
period (Toprak 1981:83). In the preceding section, it was noted that as a result 
of the elimination of the Ottoman clergy by the Kemalist regime, religious 
orders had emerged as the sole representative of conventional Islamist 
interpretation in the country-side. This led these orders to take an influential 
role in both the early resistance against the Republican regime and the 
subsequent trajectory of the Islamic movement in Turkey.  
 
1950-1960 
 Introduction of more voluntary religious courses in the curriculum of 
schools 
 Establishment of a faculty of divinity 
 Foundation and expansion of Imam-Hatip schools into middle and high 
schools with religious curriculum, triggering the emergence of a dualistic 
education system as these institutions gradually emerged as alternatives to 
the secular education system 
 Lifting on the ban on Arabic ezan  
 Permitting of broadcasting of Qur'an readings over the state-owned radio 
channel 
 Relaxation of the ban on wearing of religious clothes in public space 
 Relaxation of the ban on the social activities of religious orders 
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In the 1950s, the Ticanis appeared to be the most radical Islamic group in terms 
of its dedication towards overtly – and often violently – challenging the 
Republican regime. In the early 1950s, members of the Ticani order started a 
campaign to smash the statues of Ataturk and call for jihad in mosques (Mardin 
2006:235). Before the lifting of the ban by the DP, the Ticanis were also known 
for repeatedly violating the law on the use of Turkish in rituals, preferring to use 
Arabic instead (Azak 2012:63). A far more influential group with a lasting 
impact on the socio-political transformation process in Turkey was the Nurcus, 
the disciples of Said Nursi, who offered a critique of Kemalist reforms (Mardin 
2006:236). 
 
In contrast to the Ticanis, the Nurcus focused on preserving cultural and 
religious values rather than overtly challenging the regime in the streets, 
remaining non-violent. Initially, the DP formed political alliances with many of 
the Islamic orders, responding to their demands regarding the practice of 
religious rituals and change in religious education policies in return for their 
support in elections (Heper 1997:38).  
 
Whereas the religious orders had to operate secretly during the Kemalist one-
party period of the pre-1950 years, the 1950s was characterised by the 
emergence of a tacit agreement between the DP administration and the 
religious orders – in particular the Naqshbandis and Nurcus. The DP was vocally 
supported by the Nurcus, which can be seen in the letters written by the sheikh 
of the order, Said Nursi to his pupils at the time:  ‘We must help preserve the 
rule of the Democrats [the DP] for the sake of Quran and Islam’ (Yücekök 
1971:154). However, from the mid-1950s onwards, the ties between the DP and 
religious orders began to weaken as the DP relied more on its stronger ties with 
the business class of western Turkey (Azak 2010:107-122). 
 
After the DP consolidated its rule in the country in the latter half of the 1950s, it 
became less receptive to the demands of religious orders (Toprak 1981). Once 
its former allies became disillusioned from the DP and began to publicly oppose 
it, the DP administration did not hesitate to repress some of these orders. The 
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DP adopted a particularly strict policy against the revolutionary Ticanis as the 
so-called ‘Ataturk law’ resulted in the imprisonment of many members of the 
order under allegations of offending the memory of Ataturk. Nevertheless, the 
early alliance between the DP and Islamic groups had a profound impact on the 
nature of the regime. The Village Institutes that were founded by the CHP in the 
1940s to train villagers as teachers and instil in them the values of the new 
Republican regime (e.g. secularism and Turkish nationalism) were closed by the 
DP. The religious orders had perceived the secular worldview of the institutes 
as a threat to their ideological hegemony over the peasantry, requesting the DP 
to abolish the program of secularising the masses (Ahmad 1988:756). As such, 
the religious orders became influential lobby groups that could shape the 
policies of the regime in the 1950s.      
 
Even though the attitude of the DP towards Islamic groups did not follow a 
consistent trajectory and shifted from building partnerships to a policy of 
repression, this was the first time the policy-makers of the Republic interacted 
with Islamic networks. The responsiveness the DP initially displayed towards 
Islamic orders constituted the first break from the Kemalist policy of ostracising 
and marginalising these groups. The nature of interaction between the state and 
the Islamic movement was changed in the 1950s as it was gradually evolving 
towards a negotiation process in which both entities were shaping each other. 
The reason behind this noteworthy change in the trajectory of social 
modernisation in Turkey was Turkey's transition to multi-party life in 1950. 
Unlike the authoritarian one-party era of the preceding years, the political 
parties could not remain autonomous from the sentiments of different segments 
of the citizenry as they needed their votes to win elections. Therefore, political 
change in the form of a limited democratisation process influenced the 
trajectory of social development in the country.    
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5.2.4 The Provision of ‘Political Opportunity Space’: Integration through 
Electoral Participation (1960-1980)  
 
The softening of the state’s attitude towards Islamic groups emerged during the 
DP decade and it remained an integral element of Turkish politics, one that was 
not even challenged by the junta of the 1960 coup that overthrew the DP 
administration based on its alleged treason to the values of the Kemalist 
Republic. The junta that styled itself into an executive institution – the National 
Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi) – was characterised by its strict 
adherence to secularism and Turkish nationalism, therefore the moderate 
policy adopted towards Islamic groups can be evaluated as a pragmatic strategy 
that aimed to alleviate fears of conservatives for a new wave of repression after 
the coup (Geyikdağı 1984:90). The brief rule and the rapid withdrawal of the 
military from the political scene enabled the continuation of multi-party 
competition from 1961 onwards.  
 
The 1960 coup constitutes a critical juncture for the evolving role of Islamic 
groups in Turkey. The liberal 1961 constitution allowed Islamic orders greater 
freedom of expression and freedom of association as religious organisations and 
Islamic publications flourished in the 1960-1980 period (Çınar and Duran 
2008:29). Due to the liberalisation of assertive secularism, the Islamic groups 
were able to organise and spread their ideas, yet the policies of the state were 
not the only factor that led to the rise of political Islam in these years. Starting 
from the early 1950s, a wave of immigration from the countryside to urban 
areas began, re-shaping the socio-political and economic life of Turkey. The 
immigrants mostly settled in shantytowns of industrial metropolises such as 
Istanbul, Ankara, Bursa, Kocaeli and Izmir, bringing their traditional and 
religious values.  
 
Due to the aforementioned failure of the Kemalist state to spread its secular 
ideology in rural areas through institutions such as the Village Institutes, these 
new urbanites did not encounter the Westernised worldview promoted by the 
regime. As their prospects for social mobility and achieving economic 
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prosperity remained rather limited in the peripheries of industrial cities, Islamic 
values gained a new dimension, that of providing relief for the economically and 
socially disenfranchised masses. Gradually, Islamic values were to be 
transformed into a mobilising ideology in the shantytowns in addition to its 
continuing influence in rural areas. The impact of uncontrollable mass 
emigration on the socio-political trajectory of Turkey cannot possibly be over-
emphasised as the very foundations of the Republic, especially its assertive 
secularism and official ideology based on a culturally Westernised society, was 
shaken by the massive numbers of conservative peasants settling in cities (See 
Table 5.4.). In this context, Feroz Ahmad (1988:758) notes the effects of this 
phenomenon on urban social life:  
 
A city such as Ankara, built in the 1930s on the model of Balkan towns 
whence the Kemalist elite originated, was integrated into Anatolia, much 
to the bewilderment and annoyance of the elite. The same was true for 
other cities.  
 
 
Thus, ‘demography’ and ‘competitive multi-party life’ became the two key forces 
that shaped the interaction between the state and the Islamic movement. In 
order to contain the rapidly mobilising and marginalising communities, the 
state had to moderate its strict Kemalist ideology over time. As such, it can be 
argued that from the 1960s onwards, economic and political modernisation of 
Turkey profoundly affected its social development trajectory defined in terms of 
the transformation of the Islamic movement.  
 
After the closure of the DP by the junta, a tacit alliance was formed between the 
military and the CHP, the Kemalists returning to power through technocratic 
governments supported by this coalition, an era that frustrated the 
conservatives (Toprak 1981:92). In this conjuncture, the AP emerged as a 
successor to the DP. The AP adopted the DP's image of being the ‘party of the 
masses’, representing the interests of the conservative citizenry against the 
Kemalist secularism of the CHP which was being associated with communism 
and atheism in the eyes of its critics (Geyikdağı 1984).  
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Table 5.4. The Urbanisation Process 
 
 
Year 
 
Share of Urban 
Population 
 
Share of Rural 
Population 
 
1935 
 
% 16,6  
 
% 83,4 
 
1950 
 
% 18,7 
 
% 81,3 
 
1965 
 
% 29,8 
 
% 70,2 
 
1975 
 
% 41, 5 
 
% 58,5 
 
1985 
 
% 52,5 
 
% 47,5 
Source: World Bank (2014b); Hale (1981); Özcan and Turunç (2011).  
 
Building upon the policies of its predecessor, the AP further deepened the 
inclusiveness of the political system for Islamic groups, defined as a ‘ruralising 
process’ in the scholarly literature (Roos and Roos 1971:52). In contrast to the 
predominantly urban and business background of the DP members, the cadres 
of the AP consisted mostly of the lower ranking former members of the DP, 
whom came from a rural and lower-middle class background. The struggle 
between the CHP and the AP in the 1960s was a continuation of the ideological 
conflict between the former and the DP in the 1950s, the main field of debate 
being the issue of religiosity. The CHP consistently accused the AP of 
‘obscurantism’ and alliance with ‘reactionary forces’ such as the Nurcus while 
the AP attempted to form an all-encompassing coalition of conservatives, 
Turkish nationalists and liberals against what they termed the ‘anti-religious 
socialism’ of the CHP (Toprak 1981:93; Mardin 1989:40).  
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In the late 1960s, the AP had an intra-party conflict, leading to the purge of the 
Islamic faction known as the National View by the party chairperson, Süleyman 
Demirel. The struggle for leadership within the AP had a dramatic impact on 
Turkish political life. After the Islamic faction was expelled from the AP, the 
National View formed a party of its own in 1970 under the leadership of 
conservative politician Necmettin Erbakan – the first overtly Islamic-oriented 
party in Turkey – the MNP. The Naqshbandis were influential in the initial 
formation of the party and the development of its discourse over the years 
(Mardin 2006:239). A notable Naqshbandi sheikh, Mehmed Zahid Kotku, had a 
close relationship with the leader of the movement, Erbakan who often visited 
him to exchange ideas in the 1970s and 1980s (Atasoy 2005:82).     
 
With the formation of the MNP in 1970, the transition of Islamism from 
prosecuted social networks in the periphery (1923-1950) to lobby groups 
within centre-right political parties (1950-1970) and, finally, to a political party 
was complete. Prior to the emergence of their own party, the Islamic groups had 
located themselves as factions within the DP and the AP. After 1970, the Islamic 
movement acquired the ability to assert itself in Turkish politics as an 
independent and major political force, whereas in the preceding era of the 
1950s and 1960s, it was able shape the social policy-making of centre-right 
parties to some extent. However, shortly after the formation of the MNP, the 
military intervention of 1971 occurred. Subsequently, the party was banned by 
the Constitutional Court on the basis that it constituted a threat to the regime 
and the principle of secularism.  
 
This was a critical moment for the transformation trajectory of the Islamic 
movement as the leadership of the National View chose to form another party 
and remain within the boundaries of legal multi-party competition. Despite the 
closure of their first party, the Islamic movement was not repressed altogether 
by the regime and they were allowed to form another party called the MSP. 
After the 1971 intervention, the Kemalist military and the Constitutional Court 
focused primarily on eliminating Marxist political movements such as the TİP 
and the DİSK, which were perceived as more dangerous to the regime than the 
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Islamic movement within the bi-polarised international ideological conjuncture 
of the Cold War (Özdemir 1989:261). Some members of the technocratic 
government, which was placed by the military in the early 1970s, perceived the 
Islamic movement as a potential ally in the struggle to contain the rise of 
socialist movements, therefore the second party of the National View was not 
banned (Nebati 2014; Özdemir 1989:260-264). The MSP gained 11,8 per cent of 
total votes in the 1973 elections, becoming the third biggest party in the 
parliament after the AP and the CHP.        
  
The rise of political Islam as an ideology of opposition to the established 
political and economic system of Turkey in the 1970s stemmed from two social 
groups: the disenfranchised owners of the small and mediums-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) who were negatively affected from the state-directed economic 
development policy and the conservatives who criticised cultural 
Westernisation (Geyikdağı 1984; Özdemir 1989; Atasoy 2005). The critique of 
the Republican bureaucratic elite, their big business allies and their 
Westernised lifestyles had been common themes within Islamic discourses 
since the 1930s. Ahmet Yücekök (1971:90) reports one such example from an 
Islamic journal:  
 
The people, in their worn out and traditional garbs, could only see this 
new elite class [Kemalists] from the wreckage near Ankara Palas42, all 
dressed in Western suits, smoking and dancing like Westerners.  
 
Here, a single sentence reflects the two main elements of the Islamic critique of 
Kemalism, namely its promotion of Westernisation that was supposedly ‘alien’ 
to the values of the society and its alleged ignorance of the economic plight of 
lower classes. These two issues formed the main pillars of the party program of 
the National View in the 1970s. The solution offered by the Islamic political 
movement for the ongoing socio-economic problems was material 
modernisation and a revival of Islamic values (Toprak 1981:99).  
 
                                                        
42
 A hotel commonly used for receptions by members of parliament in the 1930s.  
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The statements of party chairperson, Erbakan and other members of the MSP 
displayed a mixed and confusing understanding of secularism as Erbakan often 
emphasised that state and religion affairs should be separated, implying a 
passive secularist approach, while the grassroots leaders of the MSP affirmed 
their commitment to shari'a, indicating that the party would be the vanguard of 
an Islamic revolution in Turkey (Geyikdağı 1984:122). It can be argued that 
after the closure of their first party, the leadership was aware of the need to not 
overtly antagonise the Kemalist military and the judiciary on the basis of the 
issue of secularism, but many members of the Islamic movement did not exhibit 
the same awareness (Ahmad 1993:159).     
 
The 1973-1980 period proved influential for the transformation of the Islamic 
movement as the National View cadres gained considerable political experience 
by entering into a number of coalition governments, both with the 
secularist/social-democrat CHP and parties of the right such as the AP and the 
Turkish nationalist MHP. Thus, the legitimacy of the Islamic movement 
increased in Turkish politics, but in the process, the state was also legitimised in 
the eyes of its critics within the Islamic movement (Kanra 2013:55). The 
decision of the MSP to form a coalition government with an ideological 
opponent – the secularist/social-democrat CHP – was indicative of the political 
pragmatism of the National View leadership. The MSP was becoming a dynamic 
actor of political life in Turkey, being incorporated into the mainstream political 
system rather than remaining a radical opposition movement on the fringes. 
The political mobility displayed by the MSP and the reconciliatory approach 
adopted by other political parties and the state establishment towards the 
Islamic movement provides a key insight for the broader literature as it 
demonstrates the significance of providing a political opportunity space for the 
moderation of anti-systemic political movements such as the National View. 
Before an economic opportunity space emerged in the 1980s – which would 
facilitate the rise of a conservative capitalist class – the Islamic political 
movement was already on the way to being transformed into a systemic actor 
through moderation of its Islamic revolutionary discourse.   
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5.2.5 The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and the Rise of ‘Economic Opportunity 
Space’ (1980-1997)  
 
The military coup on 12 September 1980 was a turning point in the history of 
Turkish modernisation as it dramatically impacted on all pillars of life in Turkey 
– economy, political culture and institutions. Its effects on economic 
development and democratisation were examined in Chapters 3 and 4 
respectively. The impact of the coup on the ideological transformation of the 
Islamic movement was also highly influential. The ideology that shaped the 
policies of the post-1980 junta was the so-called ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ 
which is defined as a ‘policy to guide the society with the understanding of 
national cultural values and principles’ and that ‘Islam would constitute the 
main point in this national culture’ (Altunışık and Tür 2005:42).  
 
According to the doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the alleged 
degeneration of national and religious values among the youth was the main 
reason behind the political violence of the late 1970s and the rise of socialist 
movements (Koyuncu-Lorasdaği 2010:222; Göl 2008:24; Ahmad 1988:762; 
Rashwan 2007:197; Aydın 2005:193). The solution to this alleged problem 
would be to put a heavy emphasis on Islam, utilising it to eradicate the influence 
of anti-religious ideologies such as communism within the society. Islam 
strongly entered the state discourse in this period as President Kenan Evren and 
Prime Minister Turgut Özal repeatedly made references to Islamic and national 
values in their public speeches, often using them interchangeably (Altunışık and 
Tür 2005:43). In the post-1980 period, the junta purged socialist and secularist 
officials, teachers, academics and journalists, replacing them with people of 
right-leaning convictions such as Turkish nationalists and conservatives (Kanra 
2013:56). Moreover, many figures of the leading cadre of the ANAP that won the 
parliamentary elections in 1983, including party chairperson and Prime 
Minister Turgut Özal, were former members of the MSP, increasing the influence 
of Islamic ideology in the new political conjuncture. For instance, it is noted that 
all Özal cabinets of the 1983-1989 period had at least three ministers who were 
Naqhsbandis, the Islamic order that heavily supported the MSP in the 1970s 
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(Ayata 1996:44 Atasoy 2005:82). The state elite cultivated Islamism to 
complement their right-wing/nationalist vision of an anti-Marxist coalition 
(Jacoby 2003:680).   
 
A key factor that accompanied a softened approach to political Islam was the 
ongoing economic transformation process from statist policies to an export-
oriented liberal economy. The rise of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in Turkey was facilitated in this era by the entry of heavy capital 
investment from Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar 
(Başkan 2011; Hoşgör 2011). These foreign investors formed ties with an 
influential Islamic network known as the Gülen movement and the conservative 
entrepreneurs of Turkey known as the ‘Anatolian Tigers’, contributing to the 
increasing role of Islamic groups within Turkish political economy (Eligür 
2010:85; Yavuz 2013; Atasoy 2009).  
 
Since the initial manifestation of the National View in the early 1970s, the link 
between the Islamic political movement and the SMEs had been very strong 
(Tuğal 2002:100; Cop 2013:31-33; Shambayati 1994:316). This can be 
explained through the alienation of the SMEs from the import-substitution 
industrialisation policy of the 1960-1980 period as the statist development 
program benefited big businesses of western Turkey at the expense of the 
smaller-sized Anatolian enterprises (Aydın 2005:201; Yücekök 1971:100; 
Gülalp 2001). This was due to the high tariff policy, which protected the large-
scale businesses from foreign competition while forcing the small sized 
Anatolian entrepreneurs to compete with these consolidated and large-scale 
enterprises within a closed national market.  
 
In addition, the big businesses centred on the business union, TÜSİAD had built 
a clientelist relationship with policy-makers of the AP in the 1970s, as they were 
the ones that were awarded with most contracts by the AP-led coalition 
governments of the era (Kurt 2009:22; Ahmad 1988:759; Atasoy 2005:118; 
Asutay 2010). It has been noted that small firms (employing less than 100 
employees) obtained ‘only 2.7 percent of total bank credits in 1974 although 
277 
 
they were responsible for 25 percent of total industrial production’ at the time 
(Atasoy 2005:117). Starting from the early 1970s, the National View affiliated 
parties acted as the political voice of the SMEs as the economic discrimination 
faced by these businesses was a key theme in their electoral campaigns (Buğra 
2001:102; Yavuz 2009). As the SMEs were a disadvantaged group within 
Turkish political economy in the pre-1980 period, the link between the Islamic 
political movement and the SMEs fed the frustration of the movement from the 
Turkish state (Buğra 2001; Özcan and Turunç 2011:69). As such, the Islamic 
political movement and their allies in the business sector were willing to 
endorse a revisionist vision to re-orient the political and economic system of the 
country towards what they referred as a ‘Muslim Just Order’ in the 1970s (Tuğal 
2009; Özdemir 1989:258-259). The concept of Muslim Just Order indirectly 
pointed to the direction of an Islamic political and economic system.      
 
The perception of the political and economic system of Turkey by the Islamic 
movement and its capitalist allies changed in the post-1980 era. The influence of 
the SMEs over the Turkish economy rapidly increased in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The economic liberalisation program of the post-1980 weakened the 
monopolistic structure of the Turkish national market, contributing to the 
emergence of a competitive economy (Hosgör 2011; Yıldırım 2009; Buğra 2002; 
Kirişçi 2011). As the SMEs become the main beneficiaries of the post-1980 
economic development strategy, they developed a stake in the continuation of 
the economic system and – by extension – the political system. These 
enterprises would no longer be willing to support political groups with 
revisionist aims such as a revolutionary Islamic movement that could have 
potentially brought instability to Turkey (Yıldırım 2009:69). The change in the 
approach of their allies in the business world reflected on the discourse of the 
National View affiliated party of the post-1980 era – the RP. 
 
The Anatolian SMEs founded an influential business association in 1991 – 
MÜSİAD – which became a major supporter of the RP in the 1990s, financing all 
the electoral campaigns of the party until its closure in 1998 (Buğra 2002; Cop 
2013:32-33; Shambayati 1994:316). Most members of MÜSİAD were family 
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companies originating from the rural areas and the newly industrialising, 
predominantly conservative cities of Anatolia such as Gaziantep, Kayseri, Konya 
and Denizli (Aydın 2005:213; Yavuz 2009; Atasoy 2005, 2009). The 
membership of the business association reached approximately 3,000 firms in 
1997, majority of which were founded in the post-1980 period (Yankaya 2012). 
The relationship between the SMEs and the Islamic political movement can be 
defined as ‘symbiotic’ as the rise of the weight of MÜSİAD over Turkish economy 
occurred in parallel to the success of the RP in elections (Aydın 2005:213). 
While the RP-led coalition government came to power in 1996, the share of 
MÜSİAD affiliated companies within the GDP of Turkey reached approximately 
10 percent by 1997 (Yankaya 2012:32;  see Table 5.5.).  
 
MÜSİAD affected the ideological transformation of the Islamic political 
movement in a number of ways. Above all, the documents published by the 
business association were influential in shaping the mind-set of the leadership 
of the RP, convincing them of the compatibility between capitalist free-market 
economics and Islamic ethics (Gümüşçü and Sert 2009:964; Atasoy 2009). 
Particularly a report published by the organisation in 1994 titled ‘The Muslim 
Person in Working Life’ proved extremely significant as the concept of ‘homo 
Islamicus’ emerged out of this report (MÜSİAD 1994). The economic 
development strategy espoused by MÜSİAD – the self-styled representative of 
the ‘Anatolian Tigers’ – was the East Asian model, which was perceived by the 
Turkish Islamic movement as based on the principles of ‘high morality’ and 
‘advanced technology’ (MÜSİAD 1994). The East Asian business culture that 
syntheses communitarian Confucianist ethics with innovation, discipline and 
hard work was applauded by MÜSİAD that aimed to build a similar 
understanding in Turkey with the utilisation of Islamic ethics (Hosgör 
2011:351).  
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Table 5.5. The Electoral Performance of the RP  
   
(percentage of total votes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: İhlas Haber Ajansı (2014).  
 
If the party program and policies of the RP in the 1990s are compared with the 
doctrines promoted by MÜSİAD in the same period, a striking similarity 
becomes noticeable.  The RP's official booklet titled the ‘Just Economic Order’, 
for instance, emphasised the convergence between free-market principles and 
Islamic ethics as the Muslim society during the Prophet's era was described as a 
non-interventionist, free-market economy with a strong 'welfare' component, 
the concept of zekat, which ensured equal income distribution (Refah Partisi 
1991; Hosgör 2011). Thus, following the vision of MÜSİAD, the Islamic political 
movement also stated its dedication towards free-market capitalism, yet one 
difference between the RP and MÜSİAD was regarding the notion of the welfare 
state as the former strongly emphasised its significance while the latter did not 
refer to it (Erbakan 1991). This difference would later be influential in 
triggering a schism within the Islamic movement in the early 2000s. 
Nevertheless, the similarities between the economic visions were more 
pronounced in the 1990s. For instance, MÜSİAD explicitly criticised Turkey's 
membership application to the EU in the 1990s, instead opting for the 
establishment of an alternative Islamic common market, which was adopted by 
 
1987 Parliamentary Elections 
 
% 7,16 
 
1989 Municipal Elections 
 
% 9,8 
 
1991 Parliamentary Elections 
 
% 16, 87  
(electoral alliance with the MHP) 
 
1994 Municipal Elections 
 
% 19,10 
 
1995 Parliamentary Elections 
 
% 21,38 
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the Eurosceptic RP as the Prime Minister Erbakan announced his D-8 project43 
(Developing 8) once the party was in power in 1997. 
 
On the level of society, the dramatic economic changes Turkey experienced in 
the post-1980 period had a profound impact as a conservative middle class 
emerged, providing the societal basis ideological change within the Islamic 
movement: 
 
The sociological base of the reformist movement within the Welfare and 
Virtue parties are the urban, educated and professional middle classes. 
The conservative discourse of the 1970s could not fully appeal to this 
social group, but the collective power and passion required for the 
formation of a new political movement was also not found. We may think 
that this is due to the end of the social mission of political Islam. Hence, it 
can be argued that rather than the end of Islamism in general, Islam as a 
collective opposition movement has served its function. The Islamic 
movement has created its own middle class, intellectuals and 
professionals; and the intensifying individualisation of these groups and 
their participation into the free-market economy, media and the art 
world have begun to transform the evolution and dynamics of the Islamic 
movement (Göle 2000:14).  
 
Socio-economic changes of the status of conservatives in the post-1980 Turkey 
gradually reflected on the intellectual realm as well, a radical transformation in 
the worldview of Islamic intellectuals becoming visible by the second half of the 
1990s. Islamic intellectuals’ understanding of modernity has evolved over time, 
as many initially perceived it through the form it had taken in Turkey under the 
state-led modernisation project (i.e. the Kemalist/secularist social engineering 
program) (see Kasaba 1997; Kara 1994; Gencer 2008). It was not uncommon 
for Islamic intellectuals to stress the necessity of eliminating the allegedly 
contagious influence of Western values (Kasaba 1997; Bulaç 1990; Göle 2000). 
However, this attitude changed over time as modernity, starting from the late 
1990s onwards, has been re-conceptualised and ‘localised’ as a phenomenon 
that could be suitable for Muslim societies – if infused with Islamic values and if 
modernisation can be taken in terms of technological and institutional change 
                                                        
43
 The D-8 is an economic development alliance founded by Erbakan in 1997, a group of 
predominantly Muslim developing countries consisting of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey.   
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but not in the form of the transformation of lifestyles (Kasaba 1997:17). This 
process of ideological change regarding the relationship between Islam and 
modernity is most clear in the case of Ali Bulaç, a well-known Islamic 
intellectual.  
 
Bulaç (1990) once believed that Islam and modernity were entirely 
incompatible, reflecting a ‘mirror image’ of CMT’s hypothesis albeit from a 
different point of view within Islamic circles (Göle 2000:13-15). Bulaç (1990:7) 
defined modernity as a destructive force that had emerged with the promise of 
universal salvation and building ‘a paradise on earth’, instead turning the entire 
planet into ‘hell on earth’. In fact, it was neither possible nor even desirable to 
try to improve human condition in our planet since the real and only paradise 
could only be seen in the afterlife, not in this world whose sole purpose was to 
test the resistance of virtuous individuals to temptation and sin (Bulaç 
1990:62). Accordingly, true salvation could only come from Islam and that 
arguments based on the compatibility of Islam and modernity were wrong – 
these two were direct opposites having originated in entirely different 
philosophical readings of human nature. Then, it was only natural for Bulaç 
(1990:8-9) to equate modernisation – the gradual process of becoming ‘modern’ 
– with the ‘destruction of virtuous religious lifestyle and the subversion of 
Allah’s words by the Satan’. 
 
From the late 1990s onwards, Bulaç altered his perception of modernity, 
becoming a determined proponent of the concept of ‘Islamic modermity’ and 
the synthesis of Islamic values with free-market liberalism, human rights and 
democracy (Çınar 2005:11; Göle 2000:15). Bulaç (1995) argues that a pluralistic 
Islamic political/legal system can be built based on a treaty – the Charter of 
Medina – drafted by the Prophet in the formative years of the Islamic State. 
Accordingly, all groups – Muslims, various non-Muslims and seculars – could 
have separate legal codes, the system envisaging peaceful co-existence within a 
multi-cultural society based on mutual tolerance and respect. It is argued that 
Islam and its teachings put forward a ‘progressive’ and ‘modern’ civilisation that 
is preferable and indeed superior to the democratic systems of the West, which 
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are claimed to frequently take the form of the ‘tyranny of majority’ rather than 
being genuine liberal systems (Bulaç 1995:11). The case of Ali Bulaç perfectly 
exemplifies ideological change among Islamic intellectuals in Turkey. It is clear 
that even when alternative ideas to Western modernity are offered, the attitude 
of Islamic intellectuals has shifted from the categorical rejection of Western 
values towards stating their ideas within the discursive context of modernity, 
often via the utilisation of terms originating in Western political thought such as 
‘democracy’ and ‘liberalism’.         
 
In sum, as a result of the economic opportunity space that led to the rise of a 
conservative capitalist class organised into MÜSİAD, the increasing integration 
of conservative professionals into public and private sectors and a profound 
intellectual discursive change, Islamic groups in Turkey were transformed from 
an economically disenfranchised and politically marginalised movement 
towards a systemic actor that would favour stability over revolutionary ideals 
such as the Islamic state. However, the incorporation of Islamism into the 
official ideology of the state in the 1980s and the electoral successes of the RP in 
the 1990s caused discontent among some elements of the state establishment in 
Turkey – the radical Kemalist officers.  
  
5.2.6 A Kemalist Counter-Revolution: The 28th February Process and the 
Turning Point for Ideological Transformation (1997-2001)  
  
In contrast to the seeming partnership between the Kemalist military and the 
Islamic movement in the 1980s, the latter half of the 1990s witnessed an 
intense conflict between the two forces. The rise of a new Islamic party of the 
National View – the RP – in the 1990s intensified tensions. If the period between 
the transition to multi-party life in 1950 and the electoral victory of the RP in 
1995 is evaluated as a détente in relations between the secular regime and the 
Islamic movement, the post-1995 period can be seen as a continuation of the 
early struggle in the formative years of the Republic.  
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The RP won the 1995 parliamentary elections and came to power by forming a 
coalition government, growing bolder as its mayors and low ranking members 
called for ‘an Islamic order’ frequently, prompting the Kemalist military to 
spearhead a secularist coalition (consisting of secularist political parties such as 
the CHP and segments of the media) and present the government an ultimatum 
on 28th February (Eligür 2010:214; Hosgör 2011:352; Yavuz 2009). The RP-led 
government was eventually forced to resign, which was shortly followed by the 
closure of the RP by the Constitutional Court in 1998.    
 
In the 1997-2001 period, the secularists began to severely restrict the political 
opportunity space of the Islamic movement. However, the Islamic political 
movement was benefiting from the economic opportunity space initiated in the 
1980s through building ties with the rising conservative capitalist class of 
Turkey. This dramatically affected the subsequent trajectory of the Islamic 
political movement and triggered a set of events that would produce a new 
Islamic political paradigm in Turkey: the AKP.  
 
A particular combination of political and economic opportunity spaces can be 
identified as the reason behind the rise of the AKP. The restriction of the 
political opportunity space with the military intervention of 1997 that resulted 
in the fall of the RP-led coalition government and the persecution of Islamic 
socio-economic networks had a paradoxical impact on the evolution of the 
Islamic political movement (Dağı 2008:27). After the RP was banned, the same 
cadre formed the FP as its successor, yet this party could not function properly 
due to the growing intra-party division between a staunchly conservative 
faction loyal to the venerable leader of the movement, Necmettin Erbakan, and a 
reformist group led by two young politicians, Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan. The traditionalists desired the Islamic political movement to remain a 
revolutionary vanguard party whereas the reformists wanted to shift towards a 
moderate, ‘catchall’, centre-right party that could maximise votes via reaching 
non-Islamic sections of the society (Gümüşçü and Sert 2009:962).     
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The 1997 military invention known as ‘the February 28th process’ allowed the 
differences of opinion between the traditionalists and the reformists to come to 
surface, however, the schism can be traced back to the 1980s:  
 
Nureddin Nebati, current vice-chair of AKP’s Istanbul branch, and a 
MUSIAD member, claims that the division between Yenilikciler 
[reformists] and Gelenekciler [traditionalists] existed from the 1980s, 
and he was one of the moderates known as the Yenilikci leader of a local 
RP branch in the early 1990s. As early as 1992, Nebati penned an article 
on RP’s future, arguing that the RP would either become a conservative 
democratic party or become increasingly marginalized and disappear. A 
core group within the MG [NOM] movement, including Erbakan himself, 
insisted that the RP should stay as an Islamist ideological party and 
resisted the centrist tendencies of the Yenilikciler (Gümüşçü and Sert 
2009:962).            
 
The reformists accused the ideologically charged discourse of traditionalists for 
the closure of the RP, therefore the 1997 intervention reinforced their sense of 
alienation from this group (Gümüşçü and Sert 2009). The main lesson the 
reformist faction drew from the 1997 intervention was that the power of the 
Kemalist establishment was overwhelming and that it would not hesitate to 
punish those who would overtly challenge the secularist regime, but as long as 
political movements remained within the established boundaries of official 
ideology, they would be allowed to participate in elections (Rashwan 2007:200; 
Göl 2009:802). Thus, the political opportunity space was not eliminated 
altogether, rather it was restricted to exclude revolutionary Islamic groups but 
remained inclusive enough to encourage the moderates into looking for possible 
solutions to come to power through elections.  
 
The long schism finally crystallised in the party congress of the FP in 2000 as 
the reformist faction led by key Abdullah Gül, Abdüllatif Şener and Bülenty 
Arınç (all of whom later became the founders and top leaders of the AKP along 
with Erdoğan) nominated Gül for party leadership. The reformists lost the 
election, but they were able to gain almost half the votes in the party congress, 
demonstrating the appeal of the movement. Once the reformists realised that 
they would not be able to ‘transform the movement from within’, they decided 
to form a separate political party after the closure of the FP (Gümüşçü and Sert 
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2009:963). While the reformists formed the AKP, the traditionalists formed the 
SP. The AKP came to power in 2002 after a highly successful public relations 
campaign in which the party leadership was able to portray the AKP as 
‘moderate’, ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ rather than ‘Islamic’ which had negative 
connotations in Turkish political system (Göl 2009:803; Aydın 2005:180). The 
AKP’s vocal support for Turkey's EU membership process played a crucial role 
in re-invigorating the images of its ruling cadre as moderates. All of the 
predecessors of the AKP within the National View (including the RP) were 
known for their anti-Western stance, therefore this was a radical departure 
from the conventional Islamic ideology in the country (Yılmaz 2007:492-493; 
Göl 2009:799).  
 
Following the 1997 crackdown on political Islam, many elements of the Turkish 
Islamic movement changed their attitudes towards the state establishment in 
Turkey. A notable Islamic intellectual, Ali Bulaç called for a new approach 
labelled as ‘civil Islam’, one that would avoid confrontation with the Kemalist 
regime, while the Islamic Gülen order organised a series of conferences 
designed to develop a moderate Islamic paradigm in-line with the passive 
secularism based on the American model (Kuru 2010:141-142). Founders and 
key leaders of the AKP such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Bülent Arınç and 
Abdullah Gül participated in these conferences (Kuru 2010:141-142). 
Nevertheless, not all parts of the Islamic political movement adopted the same 
approach after 1997. The traditionalist faction of the National View vehemently 
refused the emerging concept of ‘moderate political Islam’.   
  
The main factor that differentiated the reformist faction from the traditionalists 
was the alliance the former built with the conservative capitalists who had a 
vested interest in sustaining the stability of the Turkish political and economic 
system. The ultimate ideological transformation of the Islamic political 
movement with the foundation of the AKP occurred only when the post-1950 
political opportunity space facilitated by multi-party politics was complemented 
with that of post-1980 economic opportunity space, which emerged with the 
rise of the conservative SMEs. The moderation of the Islamic political movement 
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was led by the AKP in the political sphere with the support of their allies in the 
business world – MÜSİAD (Kuru 2009). The capitalist class centred on MÜSİAD 
was the essential driving force behind the rise of the reformists and the 
subsequent formation of the AKP. The alienation of Anatolian capitalists from 
the traditionalist discourse and their decision to support the reformists were 
due to their stakes in sustaining the economic liberalisation drive of Turkey: 
  
The so-called ‘Just Order’ of the MG [National View] line that highlighted 
social justice, redistribution, and heavy state intervention through an 
economic programme alienated the emerging devout bourgeoisie. Erol 
Yarar, the founding president of MUSIAD, stated that the organization 
was highly sceptical of Erbakan’s Just Order Economic Program and 
rather preferred a political cadre that could deliver a well-functioning 
free market. Erbakan’s backing of greater state presence in the economy 
did not match well with what the expanding devout bourgeoisie asked 
for (Gümüşçü and Sert  2009:963).  
  
  
In this context, the formation of an alliance between the reformist faction of the 
National View represented by the AKP and MÜSİAD can be attributed to a 
change in the perception of Europe by the latter. As explained in the preceding 
section, MÜSİAD had opposed the EU membership of Turkey until the late 
1990s, which had also reflected on the Euro-scepticism of their political allies, 
the RP, in those years. However, the signing of the Customs Union agreement 
with the EU in 1995 removed the protectionist barriers for Turkish exports and 
financial flows to the Eurozone. Benefiting from the state subsidies for the 
export drive and the removal of barriers after 1995, conservative entrepreneurs 
affiliated with MÜSİAD began to invest heavily in the Eurozone and establish 
close economic links with companies based in the EU countries from the late 
1990s onwards (Gümüşcü and Sert 2009:963; Özcan and Turunç 2011:72). 
Therefore, MÜSİAD changed its initially critical attitude towards the EU and 
voiced its approval for Turkey’s accession process into the organisation in the 
2000s (Özcan and Turunç 2011:72).  
 
In this conjuncture, the enduring Euro-scepticism and protectionist economic 
program of the traditionalist National View faction that formed the SP 
antagonised MÜSİAD, resulting in their decision to side with the AKP that 
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appeared supportive of the EU accession process (Göl 2009:799). In contrast to 
the AKP, the SP adopted the mantle of anti-Westernism of the RP, continuously 
referring to objectives such as withdrawing from NATO, modifying the legal 
system with Islamic principles and referring to the EU as a ‘Christian Club’ 
(Tuğal 2009). The impact of this conservative capitalist class on the formation of 
the AKP cannot possibly be over-stated as during the intra-party schism of the 
National View, 28 out of 31 members of parliament from the business world 
chose to join the reformist AKP rather than the traditionalist SP (Gümüşçü and 
Sert 2009:964).    
 
The split of the Islamic political movement with the formation of the AKP that 
was less confrontational towards the tenets of the Kemalist ideology than the 
conventional National View discourse was as a turning point in the socio-
political development trajectory of Turkey. The AKP carried the mainstream 
Turkish Islamic movement towards ideological moderation as the more 
confrontational Islamic discourse of the SP was marginalised during the 2000s 
while the AKP managed to win three parliamentary elections in a row since 
2002 (see Table 5.6.).  
 
 
Table 5.6. The Votes of the AKP and the SP in Parliamentary Elections  
(percentage of total votes) 
 
2002 
 
% 34,28 
 
% 2,49 
 
2007 
 
% 46,58 
 
% 2,34 
 
2011 
 
% 49,83 
 
% 1,27 
Source: İhlas Haber Ajansı (2014).  
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5.2.7 A New Path for the Islamic Political Movement: The AKP (2001-2013)          
 
‘What is an Islamic party? How can we distinguish an Islamic party from a 
secular one? When does an Islamic movement ceases to be so and under what 
conditions?’ (Yavuz 2009:2). These questions had been a key part of the 
scholarly debate on the AKP and its political identity since the formation of the 
party in 2001. The AKP leadership and the official party program consistently 
used the term ‘conservative democrat’ to define the identity of the party (AK 
Parti 2011). For instance, Yalçın Akdoğan (2010:61), a key ideologue of the 
party and the chief political advisor to the Prime Minister Erdoğan, defined the 
AKP's ideology as such:  
 
The parameters of conservative democrat political identity can be 
summarised: According to this approach, the political sphere is defined 
through a culture of consensus, the differences within social sphere can 
only be expressed in the political sphere through such a culture. Social 
and cultural differences should be involved in shaping the political 
sphere on the basis of mutual tolerance produced by a democratic, 
pluralist environment.    
 
Regardless of the definitions provided by the AKP leadership, however, the 
secularist critics of the party argued that the AKP was forced by the Kemalist 
elite to use the label of ‘conservative democracy’, which supposedly signified 
merely a ‘cosmetic change’ (Kurt 2009:35; Yavuz 2009; Tibi 2009). The AKP felt 
the necessity to curb its Islamic discourse in order to broaden its appeal in the 
2000s, yet its ideological roots often came to surface during its rule as seen the 
failed attempt of the party to criminalise adultery in 2005. Even though the 
party avoided defining itself as an Islamic party, it is clear that at least some of 
its policies were inspired by an Islamic morality. Hence, the party appeared 
more religious than conventional centre-right parties of Turkey such as the DP, 
AP, and the ANAP, yet not as religious as the traditional National View-affiliated 
parties, the MNP, MSP, RP, FP and the SP.  Therefore, despite the continuing 
scepticism of secularist observers, the AKP can be evaluated as the product of a 
genuine ideological transformation within the Islamic political movement (Köni 
and Açıkgöz 2013; Göl 2009:802-803; Kurt 2009:25; Kanra 2013:57; Dağı 2008; 
Özbudun and Hale 2010). 
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A common reading of the emergence of the AKP out of the National View is to 
perceive this phenomenon as the ‘victory of the secularising modernisation 
project’ of Turkey (Çınar 2005:177). According to this account, if there is 
‘Islamic modernity’ in contemporary Turkey today, then it is the product of the 
secular state (Çınar 2005:178). This understanding overlooks the fact that the 
Kemalist social engineering project was not fully successful in establishing its 
particularly radical brand of secularism within large sections of the populace. In 
contrast to Kemalist secularism, capitalist values based on the pursuit of wealth, 
professionalism and neo-liberalism had been strongly established over time, 
shaping even the Islamic movement (Tuğal 2002; Keskin 2009). In due process 
of multi-party competition and economic development, loyalty to the Republic 
had been ingrained within the Islamic movement though its struggle to re-
fashion the official ideology and institutional framework of the state towards a 
more Islamic-sensitive direction continued. Nevertheless, the current nature of 
the Islamic political movement in Turkey stands in stark contrast to the 
revolutionary Islamists of the 1920s and 1930s that aimed to implement shari'a, 
re-establish the caliphate and build an Islamic totalitarian state.  
 
As a result of the 12-year rule of the AKP since 2002, the mainstream Turkish 
Islamic movement was fully integrated into the political and economic system of 
Turkey, yet as explained in Chapter 4, the secular groups increasingly appeared 
to be the marginalised opposition movement in the country as demonstrated 
during the Gezi Park protests of 2013. As ideological polarisation in Turkish 
politics intensified over the years, the secularists and the AKP administration 
began to perceive each other as ‘security threats’ by 2013 (Özbudun 2014; Atay 
2013; Göle 2013). As Chapter 4 had analysed, while the Islamic movement 
moderated its discourse due to a genuine ideological transformation within the 
National View, the democratisation process in the country was not positively 
affected from this phenomenon, the political regime in Turkey reflecting the 
characteristics of a majoritarian system rather than a consolidated liberal 
democracy.      
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5.3 READING THE SOCIAL TRAJECTORY OF TURKEY THROUGH THE 
MULTIPLE MODERNITIES PARADIGM  
 
So far, the chapter emphasised the significance of path dependency within 
different periods of the social modernisation trajectory of Turkey. Part three 
showed that the legacy of the Ottoman Westernisation process constituted the 
genesis of Turkey’s social change experience, laying the groundwork of a power 
struggle between the pro-Western Kemalists and the revolutionary Islamic 
groups in the formative years of the Republic. The particular way the Kemalists 
interpreted the fall of the Ottoman Empire led them to the conclusion that the 
society was ‘not socially modernised enough’, which referred to the continuing 
influence of the Islamic clergy over social life. After the Kemalist Republican 
regime defeated the Islamic uprisings, it implemented its vision of social 
modernisation into practice. This resulted in the marginalisation of Islamic 
groups in the country, yet these networks managed to survive in rural areas 
where the control of the Republican regime was relatively weak.  
 
The survival of these groups shaped the subsequent trajectory of state-religion 
relations as after the transition to multi-party politics, the state gradually 
expanded the political opportunity space of Islamic groups through reforming 
its official ideology. With the inclusion of an economic opportunity space to this 
equation in the post-1980 period, the political economic setting that led to the 
creation of the AKP out of the mainstream Islamic political movement was 
established. The AKP renounced the official discourse of the National View, 
presenting itself as a pro-democratic social conservative party that supposedly 
had no intensions for building an Islamic state and implementing the shari’a.    
 
The conceptualisation of the socio-political modernisation trajectory of Turkey 
in this manner by the chapter contests the narratives of the structural and 
societal models within the literature on the Turkish modernity. As examined in 
Chapter 1, the former focuses on the role of the state and the secularisation 
process while the latter highlights the influence of the economic development 
process that created a conservative capitalist class. In contrast to both of these 
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approaches, this chapter argued that the transformation of Islamism in Turkey 
could only be understood through focusing on how the political opportunity 
space that started in the pre-1980 period complemented the post-1980 
economic opportunity space. Another factor that was neglected by both of the 
mainstream approaches was the transformation of the state over the years, a 
phenomenon that this chapter emphasised as one of the key reasons behind the 
change experienced by the Islamic movement in Turkey. Through the 
engagement between the state and the Islamic movement, a ‘social contract’ was 
established as the assertive secularism of the regime shifted towards passive 
secularism, which ensured the incorporation of mainstream Islamic groups into 
the political and economic system of the country.   
 
In addition to the role of path dependency, the framework of MMP utilised in the 
chapter acknowledged the contingent divergences of the Turkish case from the 
social modernisation experience of the Western model. The Kemalist paradigm 
of social modernisation adopted secularism as an inseparable part of the 
Republican ideology in the 1920s and 1930s and imposed it from above to the 
society, a phenomenon that preceded the advent of economic modernisation in 
the country. This meant that the social trajectory of Turkey strongly diverged 
from that of the historical Western modernisation experience in terms of the 
relationship between the secularisation process and the economic development 
(Göle 1997:48). While the secularisation process in the Western experience 
evolved in parallel to the economic modernisation, secularism in Turkey was 
implemented by the fiat of the state, emerging prior to the existence of a socio-
economic environment that could potentially generate and sustain the 
secularisation of the society. The roots of this divergence lay in the Ottoman 
period of Westernisation – as akin to the political modernisation effort studied 
in Chapter 4 – social modernisation in Turkey also emerged before the 
economic modernisation accelerated. The result of the interaction between the 
Turkish society and Western modernity in the social realm of modernisation 
was a hybrid modernity that emerged as a result of the initial violent clashes 
between secularists and Islamic groups, later to be followed by a reciprocal 
negotiation process.    
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In light of the analysis presented throughout the chapter, could contemporary 
Turkey be evaluated as a ‘socially modern’ society according to the views of the 
three theories of modernity – CMT, NMT and MMP? As analysed in Chapter 2, 
social modernity is envisaged by CMT as referring to a thoroughly secularised 
and largely non-religious society. As Turkey is a country in which religious 
values continue to play a large role in shaping the social and political life, 
contemporary Turkey would not possibly be defined as modern by scholars of 
CMT such as Daniel Lerner (1958), David Apter (1965) and Elie  Kedourie 
(1992). However, it is important to note that even contemporary Western 
societies such as the US and Germany that possess religiously motivated 
political parties with noteworthy public support – the Republican Party and the 
CDU (Christian Democratic Union) respectively – would fail to fulfil the 
exclusionary criteria of modernity put forward by CMT in this regard. In fact, 
this reveals a contradiction inherent in the framework of CMT: CMT that 
identified the features of Western civilisation as the ‘universal destination for 
modernisation’ cannot possibly account for the resurgence of religiosity and the 
popularity of religiously oriented political parties in some contemporary 
Western societies with very high economic development levels and 
consolidated liberal democratic regimes.        
 
By contrast, Turkey could be defined as ‘socially modern’ in accordance with the 
understandings of NMT and MMP. NMT puts forward the hypothesis of ‘Islamic 
Calvinism’ that forms a positive link between economic development and 
Islamic values. This accurately reflects the modernisation trajectory of Turkey 
in the post-1980 era when the rise of a conservative capitalist class centred on 
the business association, MÜSİAD, accompanied the ideological moderation of 
the discourse of the Islamic political movement, culminating in the formation of 
the AKP. Nevertheless, this approach solely focuses on the link between the 
economic and social development processes, neglecting the role of the political 
development in the form of democratisation. MMP presents the notion of 
‘multiple Islamisms’, arguing that different forms of Islamism are shaped by the 
interaction between Islamic groups and the political and economic conditions of 
a predominantly Muslim society (Kaya 2004; Göle 2002). This conceptualisation 
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is fully applicable to the case of Turkey as the ideology of Islamic groups in 
Turkey was shaped by their interaction with the state and the capitalist class. As 
such, MMP is a more effective framework than NMT, which overlooks the role of 
the state-religion interaction on social modernisation. Apart from their 
definitions of social modernity, the theories also offer highly different 
understandings regarding the trajectory that produces social modernity in non-
Western contexts such as Turkey. The following sections will assess four 
different hypotheses offered by CMT, NMT and MMP in light of the Turkish case 
of social modernisation trajectory analysed throughout the chapter.      
 
5.3.1 The ‘Irreversible Secularisation Hypothesis’ of CMT 
 
The scholars adhering to CMT envisaged Islam as incompatible with modernity 
and they interpreted secularisation as an irreversible process in the 1950s and 
1960s (Lerner 1958; Apter 1965; Berkes 1964). Once it was launched, it would 
automatically initiate a self-sustainable chain reaction that would supposedly 
produce an ‘irreligious modernity’ in modernising Muslim societies (Volpi 
2010:81). This hypothesis of CMT was based on the idea of linear progress, a 
key pillar of the social theory of the immediate post-World War II years. 
Nevertheless, the Turkish case refutes this notion as the Kemalist secularisation 
program imposed in the 1920s and 1930s did not result in the elimination of the 
appeal of Islamic values for a considerable portion of the society in the country 
(Gülalp 1997; Keskin 2009:10). There were a number of Islamic oriented revolts 
to the secular regime, both in the predominantly Kurdish areas (e.g. 1925 
Sheikh Said rebellion and the series of uprisings in the Ağrı province between 
1926 and 1930) and the Turkish provinces (e.g. the Menemen incident of 1930) 
(Çağaptay 2006). Moreover, Islamic networks such as Naqshbandis and Nurcus 
remained influential in rural areas despite the official closure of all religious 
orders (Jacoby 2004:83; Toprak 1981:71-72; Roos and Roos 1971:45). After 
1950, the political opening of the DP legitimised the social and political 
influence of Islamic, enabling political Islam to manifest strongly over the years.    
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In this context, the Turkish experience of socio-political development shows 
that in the decades following the implementation of secularism, religiosity did 
not wane in modernising Turkey. In contrast to CMT, the paradox of 
modernisation is that conservatism or religiousity actually increases during 
processes of rapid social change, because people often feel the need to cling on 
to values they feel under threat (Gencer 2008:230). As such, the Turkish case 
strongly challenges the ‘irreversible secularisation thesis’ of CMT. However, 
some scholars of CMT offered another hypothesis to revise the shortcomings of 
the irreversible secularisation thesis, arguing that Islamism was a reactionary 
movement launched by the so-called ‘victims of modernisation’ such as low 
income earning and political disenfranchised classes in rapidly developing 
societies such as Turkey (Volpi 2010:81; Lerner 1958). This argument suggests 
if economic development could ensure the elimination of mass poverty in 
predominantly Muslim societies such as Turkey, the appeal of Islamism would 
also vanish. Hence, the notion of the ‘transience of Islamism’ emerged in the 
literature.   
 
5.3.2 The ‘Transience of Islamism Hypothesis’ of CMT  
 
The transience of Islamism hypothesis was applied to the case of Turkey which 
began to experience a resurgence of Islamism from the 1950s onwards, 
proponents of CMT such as Niyazi Berkes (1964) and Binnaz Toprak (1981) 
arguing that the rise of religious groups in the country was only a temporary 
phenomenon that manifested because of income inequality. Islamism was 
perceived as an expression of socio-economic grievances, mostly adopted as a 
political ideology of anti-systemic opposition in rural areas and shantytowns of 
industrialised urban areas of western Turkey (Kösebalaban 2007). The rapid 
rise of the RP in the 1980s and 1990s was interpreted in this manner, 
supposedly a temporary symptom of a society in transition to modernity 
(Kongar 1997, 1999). The rapid economic development of Turkey in the post-
1980 period enabled the rise of an urban middle class and a conservative 
capitalist class, resulting in many conservative lower income-earning classes to 
be transformed into relatively high income-earners (European Stability 
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Initiative 2005; Nasr 2009:232-237 Kösebalaban 2007). As such, the 
socioeconomic development of Turkey in this era provides a suitable case to test 
the validity of the so-called transience of Islam thesis.   
 
The post-1980 liberalisation of trade and the export-oriented industrialisation 
strategy weakened the hegemony of Istanbul-centred conglomerates over 
Turkish economy as the SMEs across Turkey utilised the opportunities provided 
by the new economic program via building partnerships with foreign 
enterprises and exporting their products to the new markets in the Middle East 
and Central Asia (Başkan 2011). The rise of the new economic elite impacted on 
Turkish political life as many SMEs preferred to form ties with the National View 
affiliated parties such as the RP in the 1990s and the AKP in the 2000s rather 
than centre-right parties such as the ANAP. Ties with the influential business 
association of the SMEs, MÜSİAD, shaped the early social conservative ideology 
and the initial pro-EU program of the AKP in the early 2000s. The rise of the 
AKP indicates that political Islam – albeit in a relatively moderate form 
compared to the discourse of the National View in the pre-2000 period – has 
risen in parallel to the emergence of the middle class in Turkey, contesting the 
‘transience of Islamism’ hypothesis of CMT. Islamism in Turkey did not 
disappear with rapid economic development but merely transformed itself over 
the years through adopting a new discourse. As such, the Turkish experience of 
modernisation highlights the weaknesses of both of the key arguments of 
classical modernisation theorists regarding the link between religion and 
modernity: the irreversible secularisation thesis and the transience of Islamism 
thesis.  
 
5.3.3 The ‘Islamic Calvinism Hypothesis’ of NMT 
 
Challenging the arguments of CMT, scholars of NMT contend that Islamic values 
are fully compatible with modernity defined as a capitalist and liberal 
democratic society (See, for instance, Ülgener 1984; Rodinson 1974; Güngör 
1991; Yavuz 2013). The holy book, Qur’an, was re-conceptualised by NMT as a 
text that praises the spirit of merchants and the capitalist pursuit for wealth, 
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scholars noting that the Prophet himself was also a merchant (Yavuz 2005; Nasr 
2009; Akyol 2012; Dede 2011). In this context, scholars such as Mustafa Akyol 
(2008:86) applied the hypothesis to economically developing predominantly 
Muslim country cases such as Turkey and Malaysia: 
 
People understand religion according not only its textual teachings, but 
also their social environment. This environment has been feudal, 
imperial, or bureaucratic in most contexts. But now, in Turkey and in a 
few other Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Islam is being transformed 
into a religion of the middle class and its rational, independent 
individuals. No wonder this social change generates new interpretations 
of religion.   
 
As analysed in part two of the chapter, it is clear that economic change in the 
form of the rise of a conservative capitalist class and the formation of an alliance 
between this class and the Islamic political movement had a profound impact on 
the social modernisation of Turkey, considerably moderating the discourse of 
the AKP. This validates the hypothesis of Islamic Calvinism in the case of 
Turkey. However, NMT over-emphasises the role of economic modernisation 
and neglects the interaction between social modernisation and political 
modernisation.  
 
The particular conditions of Turkey enabled the rise of a conservative capitalist 
class after the liberalisation program was implemented, but the Islamic 
Calvinism hypothesis cannot be generalised to the whole Muslim world. 
Countries such as Egypt experienced a similar process of economic 
liberalisation, yet the degree of ideological moderation observed in the case of 
the Turkish Islamic political movement was not witnessed there (Sokhey and 
Yıldırım 2013). In societies with a historical legacy of colonialism and those that 
lacked a competitive multi-party life such as Egypt, the forms of Islamism 
differed from that of Turkey. As such, the political context of societies should be 
taken into account in addition to the economic factors. By presupposing a strong 
link between Islamic values and modernity, NMT fails to develop a generalisable 
theorem to account for the process of Islamic transformation. In this regard, the 
understanding offered by MMP is more successful.  
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5.3.4 The ‘Multiple Islamisms Hypothesis’ and a New Conceptualisation of 
the Link between Islam and Modernity by MMP   
 
As discussed above, the exclusionary framework of social modernity used by 
CMT perceives Islam as a monolithic bloc, neglecting all the possible varieties of 
interpretations across the Muslim world (Saeed 1994:1). True to Eurocentric 
social thought tradition, Islamism has been conceptualised as if it is autonomous 
from the subjective interpretations of social and political actors who derive the 
rationale of their actions from Islamic texts and worldview (Göle 2000:21-25). 
In reality, the Muslim world long contained a large number of interpretations 
derived from different teachings developed by various Sunni schools, variants of 
the Shi'a belief, heterodox sects and the Sufi orders. None of these interpreted 
Islamic texts in the same manner. Therefore, Islam – not unlike Christianity or 
other belief systems – can be possibly interpreted in radically different ways by 
an observer. As the transformation of the ideological discourse of the Turkish 
Islamic movement shows, there are many possible readings of Islam which 
renders the arguments of CMT as reductionist (Çınar and Duran 2008; Ayubi 
1991; Eickelman and Piscatori 1996:29; Volpi 2010; Saeed 1994).  
 
In contrast to CMT, NMT formed a positive correlation between Islamic values 
and capitalism, assuming that manifestations of Islamism would be compatible 
with modernity wherever economic modernisation had emerged. Yet, this 
approach neglects the possibility of Islamisms in economically developed 
countries that would not necessarily perceive modernity as desirable. Instead, 
MMP does not presuppose any a priori connection between Islamic values and 
modernity, suggesting that religious norms may be interpreted in various ways 
based on economic and political conditions of a society. In fact, historical and 
contemporary Islamist thinkers across the Muslim world have been highly 
selective and innovative in the way they interpret Islamic scripture, resulting in 
the manifestations of not one but many Islamism(s) as shown in the Turkish 
case (Ayubi 1991:3).   
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Depending on its particular interpretation – which is shaped by the interaction 
between the interpreter and the political and economic system of a country – 
Islamism could have positive or negative effects on the modernisation of a 
predominantly Muslim society. A religion cannot be judged as a whole via 
analysis of solely some of its interpretations. Rather than the source, the actions 
of the ‘interpreter’ of religion are the most important agents in the assessment 
of a particular religious understanding within modernisation processes (Saeed 
1994:26). The study of the social modernisation trajectory of Turkey shows that 
depending on a particular interpretation, religious norms can possibly co-exist 
with modernity. Yet, this compatibility in the Turkish context owed its existence 
to the political and economic opportunity spaces possessed by the Islamic 
groups in the country.  
 
In this context, the failure of CMT to account for the rise of Islamic morality and 
the collapse of the ‘irreversible secularisation paradigm’ do not necessarily 
mean that the Kemalist project did not impact on the transformation trajectory 
of the Islamic movement in Turkey as suggested by scholars of NMT such as M. 
Hakan Yavuz (2013) and Javaid Saeed (1994). In addition to the impact of the 
economic development that produced the conservative capitalist class, another 
key factor that contributed to the moderation of the ideology of the National 
View with the rise of the AKP was the interaction between the Islamic 
movement and the secularist regime (Cizre-Sakallioglu 1996). The ever-present 
fear of party closure by the Kemalist judiciary and the stabilising influence of 
the strong link between the Islamic political movement and the conservative 
SMEs resulted in the emergence of the AKP. With its social conservative agenda, 
the party greatly differed from its predecessors within the National View by 
downplaying Islamic values and focusing on ties with the Western world, 
welfare and economic development in the early 2000s. 
 
The Turkish case validates the ‘multiple Islamisms’ hypothesis of MMP by 
showing that the most important determinant for what role Islamism would 
play in a given society is the political and economic setting which conditions the 
nature of an Islamic group. In Middle Eastern and North African societies that 
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had a historical experience with Western colonialism, Islamism manifested in 
anti-Western and pro-militant forms as seen in the writings of Sayyid Qutb of 
Egypt, Sayyid Mohamud Taleqani of Iran and Abu-l-A'la Maududi of Pakistan 
(Çınar and Duran 2008:19). The analysis of Islamism, therefore, should be 
primarily centred on the political and economic conditions of a society. Islamic 
interpretation takes different forms in various Muslim societies, hence it should 
be expected that Turkish Islamism would be different from Egyptian, Saudi or 
Indonesian Islamisms.  
 
In this context, the Turkish case suggests an alternative way for conceptualising 
‘modern’ via not perceiving it as synonymous with ‘Western’ (White 2002). In a 
world of many different types of ‘modernities’, there would also be many 
‘Islamisms’: 
 
In analysing the relations between Islam and modernity it is essential 
that both are seen, not as clearly defined and fixed entities, but as open to 
interpretation. Not only there are different modernities, but there are 
different Islams (Kaya 2004:11).     
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter had three objectives: Firstly, the narratives on the social 
development experience of Turkey put forward by the structural and societal 
models within the literature have been contested through an approach that 
focused on the complementary roles of the political and economic opportunity 
spaces on the transformation of the Islamic movement. The long engagement 
between the state and the Islamic movement in Turkey had been an arduous 
process of clash, negotiation and reciprocal compromises that resulted in the 
moderation of ideologies and approaches of both the Islamic political movement 
and the state. A key product of this process was the integration of the once-
disenfranchised and marginalised Islamic groups into the political and economic 
system of the country.  
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Secondly, contemporary Turkey has been evaluated through the lens of the 
three theories of modernity to determine if it could be considered a socially 
modern society. It was shown that while CMT cannot define Turkey as modern 
(and even some contemporary Western societies) because of its exclusionary 
criteria, NMT and MMP would perceive the country as socially modern today. A 
key finding of the chapter in this context was that Turkey strongly diverged 
from the Western path of social development, because the secularisation 
process was imposed by the state rather than emerging as a social phenomenon 
as seen in the case of the Protestant reformation in Western Europe from the 
16th century onwards. The outcome of this unique social modernisation 
trajectory also differed from the contemporary features of Western modernity, 
as the new Islamic paradigm that emerged with the AKP in Turkey is a hybrid of 
modern lifestyles and a capitalist/consumerist culture with moralism and 
religious values. This is a phenomenon that poses a serious challenge to CMT 
that long interpreted modernisation process through opposing dichotomies 
such as ‘traditional versus modern’ or ‘secular versus religious’ (Çevik and 
Thomas 2012:143). 
 
Thirdly, the social modernisation trajectory of Turkey was interpreted to test 
the competing hypotheses offered by the three theories of modernity to 
comprehend the development experiences of non-Western societies. It was 
argued that MMP offers the most generalisable theorem that could fully explain 
the nature of the Turkish case. The method provided by MMP to study political 
Islam is inclusive and objective as it does not presupposes a static link between 
Islam and modernity, rather focusing its attention on the political and economic 
context of a society, which drives the Islamic groups towards different 
ideological stances. 
 
A key insight of the Turkish trajectory of state-Islam engagement is that through 
providing a restricted democratisation process where the Islamic movement 
was able to express itself, the state impacted on the ideology of the movement 
albeit its official ideology was also shaped during this interaction. Political 
opportunity space affected the moderation of Islamism in Turkey, making it 
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different from cases such as Algeria and Egypt where the clash between 
Islamism and the secular state has been violent (Göle 2000:54). This remains 
the most difficult element involved in the process of ideological moderation of 
anti-systemic movements as the Turkish case also highlights that the 
engagement between state and Islamic movement has been far from being a 
straightforward model that can be directly applied to other country cases. In the 
process of interaction between the state and the movement, fluctuations of 
government policies from repression to opening was witnessed in Turkey as 
well as the emergence of different reactions within the Islamic political 
movement, ranging from those who radicalised their ideologies to reformists 
that aimed to remain within the boundaries of the democratic system. Thus, the 
outcome of the process of ideological transformation within the state and the 
Islamic movement also depends on power struggles within these blocs.  
 
The most commonly referred unique element of Turkish modernisation vis-à-
vis other developing predominantly Muslim societies has been that of its radical 
and determined secularisation process undertaken by the Kemalists, yet other 
societies such as Tunisia and Iran also experienced similar processes to a large 
extent. The key factor that truly differentiates Turkey from most predominantly 
Muslim countries is its democratisation experience (Mecham 2004:341). 
Despite its deficiencies that prevent the system from being classified as a liberal 
democracy, the relative inclusivity of the system compared to fully authoritarian 
regimes could be offered as the key factor that prevented the radicalisation of 
the Islamic movement and ensured its shift towards integration with the 
political system. In this context, it is important to note that the mainstream 
Islamic political movement in Turkey was not involved in political violence 
since the transition to multi-party politics in 1950, whereas Islamism prior to 
that period appeared to be revolutionary, inciting a series of rebellions against 
the Kemalist state in the 1920s and 1930s (Yıldız 2003:200).   
 
With this chapter on social modernity, the study of the three major cases of the 
modernisation experience of Turkey is complete. The following Chapter 6 will 
present a discussion of the insights gathered from the economic, political and 
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social development processes of the country, each examined in a chapter. The 
thesis utilised the methodology of MMP to allocate one chapter to each of these 
processes in order to objectively analyse the connections in between without 
making a priori assumptions. This approach will be particularly helpful in the 
following chapter that will test the hypotheses of the theories of modernity – 
CMT, NMT and MMP – regarding the links between the three pillars of 
modernisation.  
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CHAPTER 6: RE-READING THE THEORIES IN LIGHT OF THE 
TURKISH MODERNITY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
The main purpose of this chapter is to comparatively scrutinise the hypotheses 
of theories of modernity in light of insights gathered from the empirical study of 
Turkey. Being a non-Western country case whose modernisation experience has 
been dramatically shaped by its interaction with Western modernity, and 
subverted from conforming to the Western model due to a path dependent and 
contingent historical trajectory, Turkey indeed sheds light on the explanatory 
power of theories. In this regard, this chapter will provide clear answers to two 
questions of utmost significance for our understanding of the subject matter; 
firstly, if modernisation does not transpire in similar ways across Turkey and 
Western societies, then how can we create an effective theoretical framework that 
helps us understand this phenomenon? Secondly, which specific factors have led to 
the divergence of Turkish model from Western modernity? This chapter will 
respectively focus on these questions in the following sections.    
 
6.2 A NON-DETERMINISTIC FRAMEWORK  
Chapter 2 had presented differing understandings within the existing 
literature: CMT and NMT adhere to the paradigm of ‘holy trinity’, both claiming 
that economic, political and social development processes are interrelated, 
therefore the interaction between them is characterised by the so-called 
‘positive feedback loop’. Accordingly, progress achieved in one field of 
modernity would supposedly reflect on the others positively. A third way is 
presented by MMP – the hypothesis that was referred to as the ‘flexible trinity’ 
in Chapter 2. Akin to mainstream approaches, MMP also understands 
modernity as composed of three dimensions, yet their contents are perceived 
differently. Accordingly, economic, political and social modernisation 
phenomena do not necessarily produce a West-like modernity in non-Western 
country cases.  
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Modernity is not equated with the characteristics of contemporary Western 
world such as a representative liberal democratic political system, a free-market 
capitalist economy with a non-interventionist state and a secularised and/or 
largely irreligious society (Eisenstadt 2000; Wagner 2012). Moreover, this 
thesis refers to the ‘trinity’ framework of MMP as ‘flexible’ because the 
connections between the three components of modernity are not assumed to be 
equally applicable to all country cases across the world – unlike the positive 
feedback loop hypothesis. As such, transformation process in some non-
Western societies may exhibit strong connections between two or all processes, 
whereas experiences of others may simply indicate total absence of links or 
even ‘negative correlation’ in which progress in one field may actually hamper 
the other (Wittrock 2002).       
 
As shown in detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the Turkish model today is a hybrid 
modernity that emerged after a sui generis trajectory of transformation. Hence, 
its features and historical path stand to challenge many of the tenets of CMT and 
NMT: firstly, the idea of universal convergence towards Western modernity; and 
secondly, the ‘positive feedback loop’ between economic, social and political 
transformation processes (see Table 6.1.).  
 
Both of these shortcomings of mainstream theories arise due to the inherent 
Eurocentrism and determinism of their conceptual frameworks. In other words, 
CMT and NMT cannot account for the contingent elements of Turkish case 
because they are fixated on expecting the historical Western experience to be 
replicated by the entire humanity. This understanding badly neglects the fact 
that the phenomenon of modernisation did not manifest in other societies as an 
‘organic process’ – that is the product of their own domestic conditions (e.g 
social class struggles or new technological inventions) – as it did historically in 
Western societies such as Britain or France. Instead, modernisation was 
launched only after these societies encountered Western societies and 
attempted to ‘learn’ from their example by modelling themselves. From the 19th 
century onwards; the Ottoman Empire, Japan, China, Egypt, Iran and many 
others constituted primary examples of this mode of behaviour.  
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Source: Author. 
Table 6.1. A Report Card on Hypotheses of Modernity in Light of the Turkish Modernity   
Theories 
Classical Modernisation                                                 Neo-Modernisation                                               Multiple Modernities 
Is Turkey Fully Modern? No. Turkey is an economically developed country 
that lacks a fully secularised society and a liberal 
democracy 
No. Turkey is an economically and 
socially developed country that lacks 
liberal democracy 
Yes. Democratisation and a complete 
secularisation is not a requisite for 
modernity 
Implications on: 
Islam 
The Turkish case challenges the theory as religiosity 
did not wane despite the secularisation project of 
Kemalism 
The Turkish case fully reflects the 
‘Islamic Calvinism thesis’ as the 
Islamic political movement moderated 
 
The Turkish case fully reflects the 
‘Multiple Islamisms thesis’ as 
contemporary Islamic political 
movement portrays capitalism and 
modernity positively 
 
Idea of Progress  
Turkey constitutes an alternative modernity model, 
challenging the ‘convergence towards Western 
values’ thesis 
 
Turkey constitutes an alternative 
modernity model, challenging the 
‘convergence towards Western values’ 
thesis 
 
The Turkish case constitutes an 
alternative modernity model to the 
West, fully reflecting the view of 
multiple modernities 
Components of 
Modernity 
The Turkish case challenges the ‘positive feedback 
loop’ between democratisation and economic 
development 
Instead, it displays a ‘positive feedback loop’ between 
economic and social development  as well between 
political and social development 
The Turkish case challenges the 
‘positive feedback loop’ between 
democratisation and economic 
development 
‘Positive feedback loop’ between 
economic and social development + 
political and social development 
The Turkish case supports the 
argument of multiple modernities in 
terms of negative feedback loop 
between economic development and 
democratisation 
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During the phase of adopting the characteristics of the Western model (e.g. 
secularisation or democratisation); these societies introduced many ‘inorganic 
elements’, which were the products of a West-specific historical experience, to 
their own societies. The outcome of such a course in Turkey was that the 
domestic path dependent social, economic and political features reacted to the 
entry of these inorganic elements in a way that could not possibly be predicted 
by deterministic theories (Göle 2000:113). Today, the result of the mixing of 
domestic (Turkey-specific) and foreign (Western-specific) elements is a type of 
modernity that was not envisaged by CMT and NMT: firstly, a free-market 
capitalist society where the state is much more dominant than in the Western 
model via patronage politics which largely subjugates the middle and capitalist 
classes; secondly, a secular institutional framework with a largely conservative 
citizenry and an ideologically transformed Islamic political movement (i.e. a 
form of ‘Islamic modernity’); and thirdly, a majoritarian political system that 
holds regular free and fair elections while not possessing many other essential 
components of a liberal democratic regime (see Table 6.1.).               
 
So, if CMT and NMT cannot compherend modernisation in Turkey; then, what is 
the more effective way? As I have consistently emphasised throughout this 
thesis, studies of modernisation and social change must be non-deterministic, 
acknowledging the unpredictability of outcomes that may manifest when 
country-specific (i.e. contingent) and path dependent characteristics interact 
with external influences (i.e. the social, political and economic products of other 
societies). Hence, a better understanding of the Turkish model can be obtained 
once the ways in which its origins were moulded by historical contingency, path 
dependency and international context are taken into account as seen in the 
conceptual framework of MMP.     
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6.3 SUBVERTING THE TURKISH TRAJECTORY    
According to MMP, a number of reasons result in the emergence of unique non-
Western modernities such as the Turkish case that do not adhere to the Western 
model (Eisenstadt 2003; Arnason 2002; Wagner 2012):  
 
i) Firstly, the interaction between the Western modernity and non-
Western societies disrupt the spontaneous transformation trajectory 
in these countries, elements of Western life influencing the mind-set 
of non-Western thinkers and decisions of policy-makers.  
 
ii) Secondly, the political, economic and military hegemony of Western 
states force non-Western societies to initiate a premeditated process 
of modernisation fully designed and directed by a state that mobilises 
the resources of the society for the achievement of modernity. The 
rationale behind this accelerated process of transformation led by the 
state, rather than the social forces, is to save non-Western societies 
from dependence on Western states.  
 
iii) Thirdly, the intensification of globalisation from the late 19th century 
onwards with increased levels of international trade and 
improvement of communications technology – which led to an 
unprecedentedly high level of interaction between various societies 
across the world – subjects the non-Western societies to external 
influences stemming not only from the Western world but also from 
other non-Western contexts.  
 
iv) Fourthly, the legacy of the particular features of the historical 
economic, political and social life of non-Western countries continue 
to shape their subsequent trajectory of transformation in the 
aftermath of the initiation of modernisation programs.  
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These general outlines put forward by MMP can be effectively complemented 
with insights derived from Kamran Matin’s (2013) U&CD theory44, which 
further specifies the influential impact of the ‘international context’ on the 
divergence of the modernisation trajectory of non-Western countries via the 
usage of three principles: the ‘whip of external necessity’, ‘substitution’ and 
‘historical re-shuffling’. Once the experience of Turkey is interpreted through the 
lens of this framework, the factors that subverted the Turkish trajectory can be 
identified.  
 
There is a repeating pattern in all three dimensions – economic, political and 
social – of the historical origins of Turkish model. The starting point of all was 
the ‘whip of external necessity’, namely the encounter between the Ottoman 
Empire and its more technologically advanced Western counterparts (see Table 
6.2.; Table 6.3.; and Table 6.4.). As demonstrated in numerous Ottoman 
military defeats throughout the 19th century, the balance of power was heavily 
tilted in favour of Western states. As a result, the interaction with the West 
triggered an increasingly desperate search for methods to reduce the wide gap 
in military and economic capabilities (Gencer 2000:159). For this purpose, the 
Ottoman policy-makers began to introduce elements of ‘modern life’ imported 
from the Western model such as more technological weaponry, secular 
education institutions, structural centralisation, constitution, parliament and 
industrial production facilities. After the transition from the Empire to the 
Republic, the process of change in economic, political and social life further 
intensified. The Kemalist elite largely consisted of military officers, bureaucrats 
and intellectuals that were traumatised by the decline and collapse of the 
Empire; and the salvation of the new Republic were sought in an even more 
extensive application of the Western model on Turkey, particularly in social life 
via state-imposed secularisation (Hanioğlu 2011).  
 
The whip of external necessity sowed the seeds of Turkey’s path dependent 
modernisation trajectory. The key to understanding subsequent events in 
                                                        
44
 U&CD framework and its combination with MMP was explained earlier in the fourth section of 
Chapter 2.  
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Turkey is to note that all the reforms that were implemented from above by the 
Ottoman and Kemalist elites were products of the organic trajectory of Western 
societies. Hence, the transformation processes did not originate in the domestic 
conditions of the country, instead showing the character of centrally directed 
programs containing elements ‘foreign’ to Turkey’s own social, economic and 
political life. Over time, the reaction of the society to these external stimuli 
became the main driving engine of the divergence of the Turkish model, many 
elements of Western modernity ‘re-shaped’ and transformed in a different 
environment.  
 
In the case of economic modernisation, Turkey attempted to conform to 
Western model through a state-led development process (see Table 6.2.). An 
influential indigenous capitalist class did not exist when the Republic was 
founded and the state created this class from the 1940s onwards – through 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises, provision of subsidies and state 
contracts and the protection of indigenous entrepreneurs via high tariffs on 
foreign companies. The artificial creation of a capitalist class in a society that did 
not organically possess it was a classical example of ‘historical re-shuffling’, 
namely the historical sequence of Western modernisation experience was 
entirely altered in Turkey. In contrast to the Turkish case, the capitalist class 
had emerged organically over time in Western societies such as Britain, France 
and the USA; becoming an independent political economic force that could 
check the executive powers of the state and gain a transformatory role in terms 
of political modernisation (see Moore 1966).    
 
The leading role of the state in initiating economic modernisation in Turkey was 
a necessity born out of the weak material conditions of the late Ottoman and 
early Republican period. The private sector simply did not possess the capital 
required to invest in industrialisation, mechanisation and infrastructure 
development. However, the overwhelming power of the state over society in 
Turkish political economy transcended the limiting characteristics of 
subsequent periods as well, constituting a type of ‘self-reinforcing path 
dependency’ (see Table 6.2.). Despite the transition from statism and ISI to a 
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liberal economic policy and waves of privatisation in the post-1980 years, crony 
capitalism has endured in Turkey, as the power of the state over capitalists, 
middle class and the rest of the citizenry has been constantly re-produced via 
patronage politics45.   
 
Table 6.2. The Divergence of the Economic Modernisation Trajectory 
 
Trigger 
 
The ‘whip of external necessity’ in the form of encounter 
with the West [international context] 
 
 
Conforming Method 
 
 
The creation of a capitalist class by the state  
[‘historical re-shuffling’]  
 
 
Self-Reinforcing 
Path Dependency 
 
The initially over-whelming power of the state in 
political economy remained a continuous character   
 
 
Contingent 
Peculiarities 
 
 Hybrid social security model 
 State-dependent capitalists 
[‘substitution’] 
Subverting Factor A state-society relationship dominated by the former 
Source: Author.       
 
Historical re-shuffling and self-reinforcing path dependency in the Turkish 
economic modernisation trajectory led to the emergence of ‘substitution’, 
namely the attempts to conform to Western model produced contingent 
peculiarities that neither existed in the original model nor initially envisaged by 
the modernising policy-makers themselves. The hybrid social security model of 
Turkey has subjugated most of the citizenry to the will of the government and 
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 For details of patronage politics in Turkey, see Asutay 2010; Öniş and Türem 2002; Grigoriadis and 
Kamaras 2008; Özel 2014; Laçiner 2014. 
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political parties, whereas the state-dependency of capitalists has been ensured 
through patronage politics. The result of the trajectory is a type of economic 
modernity ‘forged’ and ‘re-made’ in a form compatible with the conditions and 
nature of the society in Turkey. The Turkish model does not conform to Western 
economic modernity and the primary subverting factor that caused this was a 
state-society relationship dominated by the former (see Table 6.2.). Surely, the 
subversion of Turkish economic modernisation experience has had dramatic 
consequences on political modernisation process as well. 
 
Starting from the late Ottoman period; the bureaucracy, the pro-reform sultans 
and the mostly Western-educated intellectuals modelled the institutional and 
legal systems of the Empire based on Western modernity, an attitude inherited 
by the Kemalists that established a Republican regime from above (see Table 
6.3.). The vastly de-centralised structure of the Empire was rapidly transformed 
into a centralised political machine and the Republic further intensified the 
centralisation process, the decision-making mechanisms gathered almost 
exclusively in the new capital Ankara. The familiarity of the Ottoman-early 
Republican elite with Western modernity occurred through their education in 
either Western countries or Western-style secular institutions of the Empire 
such as military academies and medical schools. The heavy influence of Western 
ideas on Turkey’s socio-political life caused a ‘historical re-shuffling’ as political 
modernisation (e.g. centralisation, constitutionalism, republic and the 
establishment of parliaments) actually preceded economic modernisation (see 
Table 6.3.). Conversely, during the historical experiences of Western societies, 
political modernisation in the form of shift towards democratisation manifested 
only after urban middle classes – the products of economic modernisation – 
launched social uprisings from below (see Moore 1966). 
 
In the formative period of political modernisation, the Ottoman state collapsed a 
few years after World War I. The military and bureaucratic remnants of the 
Empire, the Kemalists, were able to mobilise the citizenry during the War of 
Turkish Independence and founded the Republic. Much like the role of the state 
in the economic realm, the initial leading role of the elites over political 
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modernisation can be seen as a historical necessity that was born out of the 
specific conditions of a period, namely the urgent need to save the country from 
invasion in the early 1920s. However, the 1920s was followed by the 
consolidation of an elite-led authoritarian state and even after transition to 
multi-party life occurred in 1950; the influence of the elite (i.e. the military) 
over political life did not diminish. In fact, military tutelage became a self-
reinforcing path dependency after the 1960 coup, the officers almost regularly 
intervening in political decision-making. After every intervention, namely in 
1960, 1971 and 1980, the military tutelage was further institutionalised and re-
produced, gaining a de jure legitimacy via mechanisms such as the MGK. Military 
tutelage was finally limited in the 2000s, yet not because of social pressure but 
the essential role of an external factor in the form of the EU accession process.   
 
Though Turkey consistently tried to conform to Western modernity via 
profound political changes imposed from above such as the transition to multi-
party life in 1950, the state-led nature of political modernisation process 
produced its own contingent peculiarities (see Table 6.3.). Because the regime 
changes (e.g. 1923, 1950) were implemented from above instead of by social 
forces, the prerequisites of liberal democracy such as a pro-active civil society 
could not mature and even when it did in periods such as the 1960s, 1970s, the 
military forces repressed them. Instead of social forces, the driving engine of 
political changes – witnessed in 1950 and in the early 2000s during the EU 
accession process – have been external factors as the desire to join NATO and 
the EU were influential in the implementation of democratic reforms. Yet, it was 
shown in Chaper 4 that external factors could not sustain a democratisation 
drive in the absence of strong domestic incentives, Turkey shifting towards a 
majoritarian political system from 2007 onwards. Hence, the Turkish model 
does not conform to Western political modernity and the primary subverting 
factor that caused this was a state-society relationship dominated by the former 
which is unfavourable for a liberal democracy to emerge and be consolidated 
(see Table 6.3.). 
 
  
314 
 
Table 6.3. The Divergence of the Political Modernisation Trajectory 
 
Trigger 
 
The ‘whip of external necessity’ in the form of encounter 
with the West [international context] 
 
 
Conforming Method 
 
 
An elite-led political modernisation process  
(e.g. constitution, parliamentary life, republic, 
democratisation) 
[‘historical re-shuffling’]  
 
 
Self-Reinforcing 
Path Dependency 
 
The leading role of state forces such as the military elite 
remained a continuous character   
 
 
Contingent 
Peculiarities 
 
 Military tutelage 
 Weak or repressed civil society 
 Democratisation driven by external forces instead 
of social forces 
[‘substitution’] 
Subverting Factor A state-society relationship dominated by the former 
Source: Author.       
 
In the case of social modernisation, attempts to conform to Western modernity 
began in the 19th century with the foundation of secular education institutions 
and the gradual elimination of the socio-political influence of the clergy by the 
secular bureaucracy and military. In the European experience of Protestant 
Reformation and subsequent waves of secularisation triggered by the 
Enlightenment ideals, social change came organically within the society. 
However, the Turkish case of social change was characterised by ‘historical re-
shuffling’ (see Table 6.4.). As such, societal transformation did not arise from 
domestic social forces but from a state-imposed social engineering program, 
particularly after the Kemalists implemented an extensive secularisation 
campaign by force from the 1920s onwards (Gencer 2000:167).       
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Table 6.4. The Divergence of the Social Modernisation Trajectory 
 
Trigger 
 
The ‘whip of external necessity’ in the form of encounter 
with the West [international context] 
 
 
Conforming Method 
 
 
State-imposed secularisation program and the elimination 
of the influence of clergy on socio-political life  
[‘historical re-shuffling’]  
 
 
Reactive Sequence 
Path Dependency 
 
The state could not sustain its initial social transformation 
program, engaging instead into a negotiation process with 
Islamic actors who have also changed their discourse and 
methods 
[political and economic opportunity spaces] 
 
 
Contingent 
Peculiarities 
 
 The Diyanet 
 Lingering religiousity of society 
 Survival of banned Islamic groups in the periphery 
(e.g. Naqshbandis, Nurcus) 
 Rise of National Outlook, later the AKP 
 ‘Islamic Modernity’ 
[‘substitution’] 
Subverting Factor A ‘weak state’: the state-society relationship dominated 
by the latter 
Source: Author.       
 
Faced with repression by the Kemalist state, Islamic groups shifted their 
activities towards the private sphere and the periphery of the society. Yet, 
Islamic values were strongly established as organic features of social life in 
Turkey and Islamic groups such as religious fraternities successfully sustained 
their claim to represent indigenous characteristics of the society. The lingering 
influence of religiousity within the society necessitated a paradoxical move by 
the Kemalist regime; attempting to repress public manifestations of Islam on 
one hand while building the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) to keep 
Islamic interpretation under its monopoly on the other hand. During the process 
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of social change, other contingent peculiarities emerged – such as the rise of the 
popularity of Islamic political parties affiliated with the National Outlook (see 
Table 6.4.).     
 
From the beginning, the Turkish model has been subverted from the Western 
model of secularisation by an elite that attempted to design a fully secularised 
society by fiat, yet lacked the social power required to accomplish this. The 
Kemalist state is often described46 as a ‘strong state’, yet it was clearly not in full 
control of the socio-political life of Turkey, resorting to repressive measures to 
prevent ‘undesirable’ social agents from threatening the regime. In fact, the 
subsequent fate of the state-imposed secularisation program offers clues 
regarding the nature of the Turkish state. Behind a façade of strength existed a 
‘weak state’ that was largely unable to control the social periphery and spread 
its ideological influence for legitimising the regime in the eyes of the citizenry 
(Hann 1995:135).  
 
The weakness of the Kemalist state caused its radical secularisation program to 
be not sustainable and ‘a reactive sequence form of path dependency’ 
manifested, namely the state had to change its initial stance towards Islamism 
over the years and eventually negotiate with Islamic groups such as the National 
Outlook (see Table 6.4.). Both the state and the Islamic groups changed their 
ideologies and methods of struggle at every step, state-religion relations having 
been transformed via a process of reciprocal compromises. The reactive 
sequence path dependency seen in the context of social modernisation stands in 
contrast to the self-reinforcing path dependency discussed in the economic and 
political modernisation trajectories.  
 
The key junctures of the reactive sequence path dependency was the provision 
of political opportunity space after the transition to multi-party system in 1950 
and the manifestation of economic opportunity space after the rise of 
conservative SMEs and middle class in the post-1980 period. A discursive 
change initiated by Islamic intellectuals such as Ali Bulaç accompanied the 
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 See, for instance, Heper 1997.  
317 
 
opportunity spaces, Islamic groups being increasingly integrated into the 
political and economic system of Turkey as seen in the experience of the AKP 
and its supporters since 2002. The outcome of social change in Turkey has been 
an entirely sui generis ‘Islamic modernity’ that originated from a delicate and 
highly fluid reactive sequence path dependency.  
 
To sum up, the contemporary features and origins of the Turkish model defies 
the deterministic expectations of mainstream theories of modernity because of 
the subversion of Turkey’s modernisation trajectory by path dependent 
elements of its own historical economic, political and social characteristics. As 
shown in the analysis presented above, a combined framework of non-
deterministic approaches, MMP and U&CD, could account for Turkey’s 
divergence, clearly highlighting the sequence of events and factors that caused 
it. 
 
6.4 CONCLUSION    
This chapter has once again underlined the deficits of the portrayal of the 
Turkish experience by the structural and societal models. The defining impact of 
path dependency on the subversion of Turkish case from the Western 
modernity proved that the pre-1980/post-1980 periodisation method used by 
the two predominant approaches could only reflect a very limited portion of the 
reality. 
 
This chapter has also aimed to test the hypotheses within modernisation 
studies. A key insight that can be drawn from the Turkish modernisation 
experience is that a capitalist class that emerge as a result of rapid economic 
development cannot always contain the excessive prerogatives possessed by 
forces of the state – the governments and the bureaucrats. This challenges the 
idea of a positive feedback loop between economic development and 
democratisation found in the works of classical and neo-modernisation scholars 
(see Table 6.1.). Compared to its economic development level, Turkey displays 
a very low quality of democracy as economically less-developed countries such 
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as Niger have similar democratic standards with Turkey (Goldsmith 2007:90-
91; Park 1976; Freedom House 2014b; Azavedo and Atamanov 2014; World 
Bank 2000).     
 
Despite the absence of a positive correlation between economic development 
and democratisation, however, the ideological transformation of the Islamic 
political movement in Turkey occurred due to the contributing impact of 
political development and economic development on social development. 
Therefore, The Turkish case stands as an example of a positive feedback loop 
between ideological moderation and economic development as well as between 
ideological moderation and democratisation. The outcome of the Turkish 
modernisation process, so far, appears to be a truly unique modernity. As such, 
it stands to challenge the mainstream theories on a number of issues (See Table 
6.1.).  
 
In terms of the role of Islam within modernity, the Turkish case shows that 
religiosity did not disappear in spite of a radical social engineering project 
aimed to completely secularise the society. Instead, an influential Islamic 
political movement emerged over time. Moreover, the appeal of Islamism did 
not wane in parallel with the rise of an urban middle class and a capitalist class. 
Modernisation process often triggers discrepancies and uneven development in 
non-Western societies (Kaya 2004; Eisenstadt 2000; Matin 2013). The unique 
trajectory of Turkish modernisation resulted in a peculiar relationship between 
the three processes – economic, social and political development – that was 
envisaged neither by CMT nor by NMT. As contemporary Turkey does not fit in 
the prescribed model of modernisation described within the mainstream 
literature, it can be better understood through the lens of MMP – complemented 
with insights put forward by U&CD.     
 
In conclusion, the theoretical implications of the study of modernisation in 
Turkey challenged various arguments offered by both mainstream schools of 
thought in the literature, while the conceptual framework of MMP appears to 
have been validated. The following last chapter of the thesis contains the 
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summary and concluding remarks, discussing the contributions of this study on 
bodies of scholarly literature, the potential objections that may be raised and 
the potential avenues for future research.      
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this final chapter is to reflect on the trail of thought followed 
throughout the thesis. The chapter will explain the origins of the research 
project, summarise its findings and state its contributions to scholarly 
literature. In addition, a number of potential objections that may be raised in 
response to its arguments, theoretical framework and research methods will 
also be discussed, along with future avenues for research that could possibly 
further or complement the goals of this project. 
 
The chapter consists of four sections. Part two reiterates the origins of the 
research project that was mentioned in Chapter 1, which will serve as a linkage 
between the initial objectives of the thesis and its findings. Part three discusses 
a number of objections, clarifying the rationale behind the hypotheses and 
methods adopted in the work in detail. Part four briefly suggests some 
potential avenues for future research and concludes the thesis.   
 
7.2 ORIGINS OF THE THESIS, ITS MAIN OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS  
 
As stated in Chapter 1, the main inspiration for the pursuit of this research 
project was the scholarly debates that were sparked by the Arab uprisings of 
2011, which dramatically impacted on politics, economy and social life of 
various MENA countries since then. A crucial – albeit contentious – subject that 
emerged in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings was regarding the Turkish 
modernisation experience, which was presented by a large body of literature as 
a model that supposedly offered insights that could be applicable for the 
developing and predominantly Muslim societies of the MENA region (See, for 
instance, Dede 2011; Atasoy 2011; Çavdar 2006; Kirişçi 2011). The notion of a 
Turkish model rapidly became a widely studied subject in the literature of 
modernisation and other disciplines closely connected to it such as 
democratisation, economic development and social change. However, as 
showed from Chapter 1 onwards, the concept itself was not entirely new, being 
highly connected to an already established discourse within modernisation 
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studies. After 2011, two main understandings of the Turkish model emerged 
and both of them – the structural model and the societal model – actually 
utilised conceptual frameworks developed earlier by classical modernisation 
theorists in the 1950s and 1960s and neo-modernisation theorists from the 
1980s onwards. Therefore, the starting point of this thesis was to trace the 
evolution of these mainstream theories within modernisation studies and 
analyse their hypotheses in comparison with a relatively recent approach – 
multiple modernities paradigm.  
 
The main premise that shaped this thesis is that the adoption of a conceptual 
framework based on MMP can comprehend the nature and historical origins of 
the contemporary Turkish model more effectively than the approaches offered 
by the structural and societal models, which were influenced by CMT and NMT. 
What were the shortcomings of existing approaches to the modernisation of 
Turkey and in what way this thesis sought to remedy them? As Chapter 1 
covered extensively, a considerable portion of the scholarly literature developed 
on the Turkish modernity is characterised by two main shortcomings:  
 
i) The periodization method used by the structural and societal models 
to study the Turkish case is problematic as they focused solely – and 
respectively – on the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods of the 
modernisation trajectory of Turkey to substantiate their claims.  
 
ii) Secondly, the conceptual frameworks of CMT and NMT themselves 
are fraught with problems as both are Eurocentric theories that fully 
base their understandings on the expectation that there is only one 
modernity, the concept defined in an exclusionary manner as 
synonymous with Westernisation. For CMT, modernity is a 
secularised, liberal democratic and a capitalist free-market society. 
NMT only removes the element of secularisation from this 
conceptualisation and adds ideological transformation of religious 
discourse instead.  
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The examination of the divergent path of the Turkish case through the lens of 
MMP and insights from U&CD in Chapter 6 showed that focusing on a particular 
era within the modernisation trajectory of Turkey cannot explain the state of 
Turkish model today, because this method cannot trace the path dependency, 
contingent factors and international context that moulded the nature of 
economic, political and social life in the country. Moreover, as the structural 
model and the societal model base their frameworks on the positive feedback 
loop of CMT and NMT, they cannot possibly explain why the Turkish model has 
been subverted from the Western model it attempted to conform and why an 
economically modern country such as Turkey does not possess a consolidated 
liberal democratic regime.   
 
The foremost aim of this research project was to remedy these shortcomings of 
the existing literature on the Turkish model with a new conceptualisation of the 
modernisation trajectory of Turkey. In this context, MMP was utilised as it 
avoids the two problems that were explained above. Scholars of MMP, such as 
Peter Wagner (2012), offer a conceptual framework that does not envisage non-
Western societies to replicate the historical path of Western modernisation and 
its outcome in the form of values that characterise contemporary Western 
societies such as capitalism and liberal democracy. Accordingly, the trajectories 
of non-Western societies are shaped by contingencies that CMT and NMT 
cannot predict. These contingencies in the form of economic, political and social 
conditions that diverge from the Western experience produce unexpected and 
potentially unique results in non-Western societies, which experience 
transformation.  
 
As discussed throughout Chapter 1 and 2 in detail, the non-Eurocentric and 
non-determinist nature of the methodology of MMP meant that this theorem 
could potentially comprehend the Turkish case more successfully than the 
earlier approaches that relied on CMT and NMT. This formed the rationale 
behind the study of the modernisation trajectory of Turkey through the 
perspective of MMP in this thesis.             
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To sum-up, this thesis mainly contributed to the literature on Turkish model. It 
re-conceptualised the trajectory of the Turkish modernity through MMP, 
emphasising the significance of path dependency to present a more 
comprehensive understanding of the political, social and economic forces that 
shaped contemporary Turkey than the earlier approaches developed by the 
structural and societal models. The thesis also drew noteworthy insights for the 
theories of modernity by highlighting the limits of the explanatory power of 
CMT and NMT on Turkey.  
 
The thesis can now suggest a potential answer to a research question that led to 
contentious debates within the literature of Turkish model and inspired the 
pursuit of this thesis: can the modernisation experience of a society be 
applicable to another county that wish to achieve similar outcomes in terms of 
modernity? One of the key findings of this thesis is that  non-Western country 
cases such as Turkey cannot be possibly expected to replicate the Western model 
as these countries have unique conditions and a historical trajectory that would 
produce unpredictable modernities.  
 
In this context, it should be noted that the adoption of the modernity model of a 
non-Western country such as Turkey by other non-Western societies – for 
instance those located in the MENA region such as Egypt and Tunisia – would 
result in further divergences of these countries from the Western path of 
development. This was actually seen in the case of the study of Turkey in this 
thesis as Turkish policy-makers were inspired by various models of Western 
and non-Western countries such as France, the Soviet Union, Japan and South 
Korea over the course of Turkey’s modernisation history. The applications of 
the experiences of these countries on the Turkish setting contributed to the 
hybridity of the Turkish modernity as foreign models gained unique 
characteristics through practice in a different setting. For instance, the French 
secularism inspired the secularisation program of the Kemalist Republic, yet it 
produced its own characteristics that diverged from the French model such as 
the formation of the state-controlled Diyanet institution to manage the Sunni 
clergy. Therefore, if post-2011 MENA societies were to adopt some elements 
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from the Turkish modernity model, it should be expected that the results could 
be quite dissimilar to the Turkish case as gradually; these societies would 
produce their own modernity models with different characteristics – e.g. the 
Tunisian model, the Egyptian model or the Libyan model.  
 
A second key finding of the research conducted in this thesis that there cannot 
be a singular universal modernity to which all societies across the world would 
eventually conform. As showed in Chapter 6, three conditions (i.e. ‘whip of 
external necessity’, ‘historical re-shuffling’ and ‘substitution’) that emerge out of 
the encounter between Western modernity and a non-Western country case 
such as Turkey gradually produce a path dependent trajectory filled with 
contingent elements. Over time, the trajectory results in types of modernities 
that are strongly distinct from the characteristics of contemporary Western 
societies as well as their historical origins.   
 
The subversion of the Turkish case from the CMT/NMT type of modernity does 
not mean that Turkey is not ‘modernising’ anymore, modernisation as an idea 
has ‘collapsed’ and that a new ‘dark age’ has begun (Kasaba 1997:32-33). 
Simply, the reality of the Turkish model highlights a conceptual lacuna in the 
literature on modernity that which MMP can successfully fill. Çağlar Keyder 
(1997:37-88) highlights this gap that first became apparent in the 1990s with 
the rise of political Islam, also pointing to the possible direction the theories of 
modernity can take:  
 
In a context where modernity was a conscious imposition by 
modernizers whose arsenal was the exercise of state power, the crisis of 
the state seemed to forebode the bankruptcy of the entire project… 
Turkish modernizers had readily identified modernization with 
Westernization—with taking a place in the civilization of Europe… It was 
this concept of modernity, with its strict identification of modernization 
with Westernization, that led to the pessimism I mentioned. There is, 
however, another conception in which modernization is taken to mean 
the process of actual transformations towards organizational efficiency 
and rationality, which implies no normative commitment to the 
Enlightenment project. This perspective of non-Western modernization 
has gained in popularity in the Turkish context. Its proponents, taking a 
stance similar to the postmodernist celebration of the hybrid, see in the 
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apparent crumbling of social cohesion and the rise of credos actively 
challenging the aspirations of modernity a welcome sign that some 
negotiation might occur between the Westernizers and their erstwhile 
objects.    
 
As such, breaks from the Eurocentric convergence thesis should be perceived as 
cases of non-Western societies ‘localising’ modernity. Today, all societies are 
affected by the same global patterns and we are all part of an inter-dependent 
international system (Esenbel 2000:19; Göle 2000:174). However, we are not all 
living the same modernity type described by mainstream theories. Non-Western 
modernities are different from the envisaged Western modernity in many ways 
and they are also distinct from each other, being the products of path dependent 
trajectories. However, what makes non-Western country cases similar to each 
other as cases ‘multiple modernities’ is the eclecticism of their experiences since 
they all diverge from Western modernity in varying levels.  
  
In this context, the application of the conceptual framework of MMP on studies 
of various non-Western countries in the future may help us to better 
comprehend the underlying factors that lead to divergences from the Western 
model. Before proceeding to discuss potential avenues for future research in 
more detail, however, the following part of the chapter will examine some 
potential objections that may be raised in response to this thesis.             
 
7.3 QUALIFICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND  POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS  
 
As with every research project, it is possible for this thesis to receive objections. 
They are categorised under five headings in this part of the chapter. This section 
will clarify the rationale behind the selection of the research hypotheses and 
methodology of the project.   
 
7.3.1 The Theoretical Framework of MMP    
 
Possibly, one of the main objections to this thesis would be concentrated on the 
theoretical framework it derived from MMP. Though even its critics 
acknowledge the superiority of its hypotheses vis-à-vis CMT and NMT in terms 
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of studying modernisation in the non-Western world, some scholars argue that 
MMP also has shortcomings (See, for instance, Matin 2013; Chakrabarty 2011; 
Schmidt 2006; Fourie 2012). Paradoxically, MMP is accused of building a new 
Eurocentric theorem while trying to deconstruct the Eurocentrism of CMT and 
NMT (Matin 2013; Chakrabarty 2011; Schmidt 2006). In addition, Elsje Fourie 
(2012:62) argues that the definitions of the components of modernity by MMP 
have been ‘vague’, its framework allegedly unable to distinguish modern from 
pre-modern societies. The second critique was already evaluated in Chapter 1 
and it was argued that this approach misrepresents MMP as it neglects the fact 
that the theory actually offers a clearly defined conceptualisation to define what 
modernity is. It was referred to as the ‘flexible trinity’ throughout this thesis.   
 
By contrast, the first critique highlights a particularly problematic issue within 
the conceptualisation of MMP offered by one of its main scholars, Shmuel N. 
Eisenstadt in his Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities (2003). In 
this work, Eisenstadt utilises a concept he refers to as ‘axial civilisations’ to 
explain the divergence of non-Western societies from the Western modernity 
model. Axial civilisations puts forward the hypothesis that cultural differences 
between Western and non-Western civilisations constitute a key reason behind 
the manifestation ‘different modernities’ across the world. Not unlike the 
frameworks of CMT scholars such as Daniel Lerner (1958) and NMT scholars 
such as Francis Fukuyama (1992), this emphasis on ‘culture’ as a static factor 
can be evaluated as Eurocentric. Instead, culture should be evaluated as a 
dynamic factor that evolves over time as a result of its interaction with changes 
in the political and economic context of a society.  
 
In this regard, it should be noted that this thesis did not refer to the hypothesis 
of axial civilisations at all in its analysis of the modernisation trajectory of 
Turkey. This was deliberate as I derived my framework to analyse the origins of 
Turkey’s divergence from other works of MMP scholars, in which the roots of 
different modernities are attributed to the interaction between Western ideas 
and non-Western societies in addition to the hegemony of state over society in 
non-Western modernisation programs and the global political economic 
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hegemony of the West (see Wagner 2012; Eisenstadt 2000, 2002, Arnason 
2002). Therefore, this thesis avoided the Eurocentric bias of a particular variant 
of MMP through focusing on the political and economic context behind social 
change and studying the Turkish case via such as an understanding.  
 
7.3.2 The Method of Analysing Modernity through ‘Three Pillars’ 
 
Even though the thesis studied the three components of modernisation 
separately in different chapters on economic development, political 
development and social development, several positive and negative linkages 
between the processes were found on the Turkish experience of modernisation. 
This should not be seen as a contradiction as the division of modernisation into 
three relatively narrow fields of change was used purely as an analytical tool to 
ensure in-depth analysis of each element and it help the thesis avoid the 
presupposition of linkages bias inherent in works of CMT and NMT. 
 
7.3.3 The Concept of the Turkish Model as a ‘Social Construct’ 
 
It has been argued that the Turkish model is a ‘socially constructed’ notion that 
supposedly serves the interests of Turkey in the MENA as the Turkish policy-
makers appeared increasingly willing to influence the politics of various 
countries in the region in recent years in order to carve a Turkish ‘sphere of 
influence’ (Andrikopoulos 2012). The Turkish policy-makers may in fact have 
foreign policy designs of their own in terms of utilising this concept, but the 
thesis showed that the Turkish model is actually an old and recurring discourse 
within modernisation studies since the 1950s. Therefore, it should be noted that 
rather than discussing the notion in conjunction with Turkish foreign policy, 
this thesis focused on its conceptualisations within the literature of 
modernisation.     
 
7.3.4 The Discourse of the AKP and the ‘Genuineness Debate’   
 
As Chapter 5 focused on the ideological transformation of Islamic groups in 
Turkey and portrayed the AKP as a turning point in the political discourse of 
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Islamism in Turkey, a potential criticism could focus on the genuineness of the 
claims for ideological change by the AKP leadership. It should be noted that this 
has been a contentious issue within Turkish politics since the party was 
founded in 2001 as many opponents of the AKP refuse the claim that the party 
represents a different type of political movement than its predecessors within 
the Islamic National View such as the RP and the FP (Dağı 2008). In this regard, 
it should be noted that ideological transformation in this thesis was used to 
refer to the integration of the mainstream Islamic movement of Turkey into the 
political and economic system of the country. Whether the party is truly social 
conservative or Islamic are ideologically-charged subjects that are very hard to 
study objectively. As such, the thesis did not focus on this debate, only noting 
that the AKP represents a different political paradigm from another successor of 
the National View, the overtly Islamic SP.  The ideological transformation of the 
AKP does not necessarily mean by itself that the party is fully democratic or that 
it constitutes a Muslim equivalent of Christian Democratic political parties of 
Europe.  
 
7.3.5 The Overlooked Elements of Democratisation  
 
Another potential objection to the thesis could be that Chapter 4 does not 
mention or emphasise enough a variety of issues that constitute crucial 
elements of liberal democratic life in the Western model – e.g. women’s rights 
and the rights of disadvantaged minority groups that were not mentioned in the 
chapter such as non-Muslims, non-religious citizens and ethnic groups such as 
the Romani people and Circassians. The work could not mention a considerable 
portion of these issues related to democratisation, yet it should be noted that 
the macro scale and the world limit of the research project necessitated a 
selective analysis. In addition, the thesis was not on democratisation and it was 
analysed as part of a broader phenomenon – modernisation. In research 
projects of this nature, there are limitations such as the neglect of many 
microelements of democratisation. Nevertheless, the main finding of the chapter 
was that Turkey does not constitute a liberal democracy in the sense that this 
regime type is practiced in the Western model. Therefore, even if these other 
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elements of democratisation were included in the analysis, the conclusion 
would not change because contemporary Turkey cannot fulfil many other 
criteria of liberal democracy.             
 
7.4 POTENTIAL AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
The study of the modernisation trajectory of Turkey through MMP in this work 
supplied this rising social theory of modernity with a holistic analysis of a non-
Western country case. The main research objective was to show that MMP is a 
more appropriate approach than CMT and NMT to explain the phenomenon of 
modernisation. There are several avenues for future research that may further 
the research goals of this thesis. One option is to multiply the case studies to 
comparatively assess the hypotheses of MMP on trajectories of different 
countries.  
 
As the divergence of non-Western societies such as Turkey from the Western 
modernity model has been established in this work, an original approach would 
be to select non-Western country cases that seemingly fit the prescribed 
conceptualisations of CMT and NMT – e.g. contemporary Japan or South Korea 
that possess liberal democratic regimes, free-market capitalist economies and 
religious discourses that supposedly comply with modernity (See Gbosoe 2006). 
A comparison between non-Western countries that converged towards the 
Western modernity and their counterparts that diverged from it such as Turkey 
may help us understand the underlying factors in their respective historical 
trajectories that led to dissimilar outcomes. A research of this nature would 
indeed be a valuable contribution to the scholarly literature of modernity. Due 
to the large amount of variables studied in this research project and its word 
limit, an in-depth comparison between distinct non-Western country cases 
could not be included.     
 
Another potentially rewarding option for future research would be to compare 
and/or combine the strength of the conceptual framework of MMP with other 
rising social theories of recent years such as post-colonialism, Neo-Gramscian 
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social theory and the U&CD47. An example of how MMP and U&CD can be 
effectively combined has already been provided in this thesis as seen in Chapter 
2 and Chapter 6.  
 
In the future, a comparative study of MMP with these approaches can be 
conducted on several non-Western country cases. Such a comprehensive study 
or series of studies could conclusively determine the future of modernisation 
studies of the non-Western world in the forthcoming period. Debates between 
scholars of CMT, NMT, the dependency theory and the world-systems theory 
shaped the discourses of the 20th century and the early 21st century. The fate of 
modernisation studies from the early 21st century onwards will probably be 
settled by a new group of theories – each supposedly superior to earlier 
theories and each claiming to explain the phenomenon of modernity in non-
Western cases better than its counterparts.     
 
 
 
    
  
                                                        
47
 For instance, a brief analysis of these approaches can be found in Kamran Matin (2013) who applies 
the framework of uneven and combined development to the case of Iranian modernity. 
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